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“At what point is the approach of danger to be expected?  I answer, if it ever reach us it must spring up amongst 
us; it cannot come from abroad.  If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher.  As a nation 
of freemen we must live through all time or die by suicide.” 
 Abraham Lincoln (1838) 
 
“I do not say that democracy has been more pernicious on the whole, and in the long run, than monarchy or 
aristocracy. Democracy has never been and never can be so durable as aristocracy or monarchy; but while it lasts, 
it is more bloody than either. … Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders 
itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide. It is in vain to say that democracy is less vain, 
less proud, less selfish, less ambitious, or less avaricious than aristocracy or monarchy. It is not true, in fact, and 
nowhere appears in history. Those passions are the same in all men, under all forms of simple government, and 
when unchecked, produce the same effects of fraud, violence, and cruelty. When clear prospects are opened before 
vanity, pride, avarice, or ambition, for their easy gratification, it is hard for the most considerate philosophers and 
the most conscientious moralists to resist the temptation. Individuals have conquered themselves. Nations and 
large bodies of men, never.”  
John Adams (1814)   The Letters of John and Abigail Adams 
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PREFACE 
 
This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2018). All the articles 
are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent 
monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the 
framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality.  As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey 
says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes.  If 
everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some 
control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance.  As things are however the leaders of society have 
no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy is inevitable.  
 
The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical 
delusions. In the next three groups, I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— 
technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide 
some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by 
well-known writers.  
 
It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles that try to describe (not 
explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior.  I start with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality, which 
provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions 
as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior.  This centers around the two writers I have found the most 
important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual 
system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I 
note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions 
that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has 
grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines 
the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. No 
neurophysiology, no metaphysics, no postmodernism, no theology. 
 
Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of 
perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical 
analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, 
history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology.  It is universal to mix 
the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present 
and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books 
in the early 1930’s. 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer 
questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness." (BBB p18) 
 
 
The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like 
Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on 
Earth.  As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see.   We live in the world of conscious 
deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the 
universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and 
Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model.  
 
The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be 
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thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case, there is no time for the slow, massively integrated 
System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ 
(T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must lead directly to actions.  
 
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features 
prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, 
and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, 
politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view 
it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes.  
 
Thus all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The 
Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout 
philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if 
told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in degree 
from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and 
over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true.  While the 
phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s futures. 
 
The next section describes the digital delusions, which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms 
of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., 
computers).  The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is 
that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it.  Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s 
book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”.  In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level 
emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Even for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or 
physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty.  Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they 
‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the ‘results’ mean.  Reductionist 
metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor.  
 
Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by 
computers/AI/robotics/nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2.  The No Free Lunch principal tells us there 
will be serious and possibly fatal consequences.  The adventurous may regard this principle as a higher order emergent 
expression of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Hi-tech enthusiasts hugely underestimate the problems resulting 
from unrestrained motherhood and dysgenics, and of course it is neither profitable nor politically correct (and now 
with third world supremacism dominant, not even possible) to be honest about it. They also gloss over the fact that AI 
is reaching the point where it will be impossible for us to understand how it works or to control or fix it and to prevent 
catastrophic failures in communications, power, police, military, agricultural, medical and financial systems. 
 
The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion, i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone, 
and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things 
correctly (the possibility of politics).  Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we 
see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain 
the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces these delusions. In addition, the monkey mind steeply 
discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly 
exacerbating the problems.  The only major change in this 3rd edition  is the addition in the last article of a short 
discussion of China, a threat to peace and freedom as great as overpopulation and climate change and one to which 
even most professional scholars and politicians are oblivious so I regarded it as sufficiently important to warrant a 
new edition. 
 
I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) as it appears in some 
recent books on sociology/biology/economics. Even Sapolsky’s otherwise excellent “Behave”(2017) embraces leftist 
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politics and group selection and gives space to a discussion of whether humans are innately violent. I end with an 
essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our evolved 
psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1.  Our psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic 
on the plains of Africa from ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 years ago, when 
many of our ancestors left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), is now maladaptive 
and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior (philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, history, economics, soccer strategies, business 
meetings, etc.), this book is about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection, natural 
selection).  
 
One thing rarely mentioned by the group selectionists is the fact that, even were ‘group selection’ possible, selfishness 
is at least as likely (probably far more likely in most contexts) to be group selected for as altruism. Just try to find 
examples of true altruism in nature –the fact that we can’t (which we know is not possible if we understand evolution) 
tells us that its apparent presence in humans is an artefact of modern life, concealing the facts, and that it can no more 
be selected for than the tendency to suicide (which in fact it is). One might also benefit from considering a phenomenon 
never (in my experience) mentioned by groupies--cancer. No group has as much in common as the (originally) 
genetically identical cells in our own bodies-a 50 trillion cell clone-- but we all born with thousands and perhaps 
millions of cells that have already taken the first step on the path to cancer, and generate millions to billions of cancer 
cells in our life.  If we did not die of other things first, we (and perhaps all multicellular organisms) would all die of 
cancer. Only a massive and hugely complex mechanism built into our genome that represses or derepresses trillions 
of genes in trillions of cells, and kills and creates billions of cells a second, keeps the majority of us alive long enough 
to reproduce. One might take this to imply that a just, democratic and enduring society for any kind of entity on any 
planet in any universe is only a dream, and that no being or power could make it otherwise. It is not only ‘the laws’ of 
physics that are universal and inescapable, or perhaps we should say that inclusive fitness is a law of physics.  
 
The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth and Humankind was the most evil idea 
that ever entered the Human mind.  In the 20th century an even more evil notion arose, or at least became popular 
with leftists—that humans are born with rights, rather than having to earn privileges. The idea of human rights is an 
evil fantasy created by leftists to draw attention away from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd 
world motherhood.  Thus, every day the population increases by 200,000, who must be provided with resources to 
grow and space to live, and who soon produce another 200,000 etc.  And one almost never hears it noted that what 
they receive must be taken from those already alive, and their descendants. Their lives diminish those already here in 
both major obvious and countless subtle ways.  Every new baby destroys the earth from the moment of conception.  
In a horrifically overcrowded world with vanishing resources, there cannot be human rights without destroying the 
earth and our descendents futures.  It could not be more obvious, but it is rarely mentioned in a clear and direct way, 
and one will never see the streets full of protesters against motherhood.  
 
The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in America or the world to lift a 
significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep them there.  The attempt to do this is already bankrupting 
America and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. 
And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich.  
 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century, 
and now all of it, due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will 
collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth 
loses at least 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing capacity will be gone. Billions 
will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and 
immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably 
turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm 
America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is 
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the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as 
though they had common interests (which I suggest may be regarded as an unrecognized -- but the commonest and 
most serious-- psychological problem -- Inclusive Fitness Disorder). This, plus ignorance of basic biology and 
psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies.  Few 
understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone 
consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by 
one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic 
and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a 
democratic system.  Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”.   
 
I had hoped to weld my comments into a unified whole, but I came to realize, as Wittgenstein and AI researchers did, 
that the mind (roughly the same as language as Wittgenstein showed us) is a motley of disparate pieces evolved for 
many contexts, and there is no such whole or theory except inclusive fitness, i.e., evolution by natural selection. 
 
Finally, as with my other writings 3DTV and 3D Movie Technology-Selected Articles 1996-2017  2nd Edition (2017), 
Psychoactive Drugs-- Four Classic Texts (1976-1982) (2016), Talking Monkeys (2017), The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Pychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle (2017),  and in all my letters and 
email and conversations for over 50 years, I have always used ‘they’ or ‘them’ instead of ‘his/her’, ‘she/he’, or the idiotic 
reverse sexism of ‘she’ or ‘her’, being perhaps the only one in this part of the galaxy to do so.  The slavish use of these 
universally applied egregious vocables is of course intimately connected with the defects in our psychology which 
generate academic philosophy, democracy and the collapse of industrial civilization, and I leave the further description 
of these connections as an exercise for the reader. 
 
Those who wish a more detailed exposition of the use of Wittgenstein and Searle in the description of behavior may 
consult my book The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle (2017), while a more complete edition of all my other writings can be found in Talking Monkeys: 
Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017). 
 
I am aware of many imperfections and limitations of my work and continually revise it, but I took up philosophy 12 
years ago at 65, so it is miraculous, and an eloquent testimonial to the power of System 1 automatisms, that I have been 
able to do anything at all. It was ten years of incessant struggle and I hope readers find it of some use. 
 
vyupzzz@gmail.com 
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The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, 
Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein 
and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality(mind, language, 
behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental 
discovery –that  all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—
confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all 
solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context 
at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are 
clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean 
(state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible 
in a very specific context. I begin with ‘On Certainty’ and continue the 
analysis of recent writings by and about them from the perspective of the 
two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality and new 
dual systems nomenclature. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
“If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting 
whether the word ‘hand’ has any meaning? So that is something I seem to 
know, after all.” Wittgenstein ‘On Certainty’ p48 
 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--
yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained 
or discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. 
But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification 
and truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
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First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –
that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments 
or data gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a 
particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how 
language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions 
(Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear.  The basic problem is that one 
can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary 
utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. Thus, W in 
his last masterpiece ‘On Certainty’ (OC) looks at perspicuous examples of the 
varying uses of the words ‘know’, ‘doubt’ and ‘certain’, often from his 3 
typical perspectives of narrator, interlocutor and commentator, leaving the 
reader to decide the best use (clearest COS) of the sentences in each context. 
One can only describe the uses of related sentences and that’s the end of it—
no hidden depths, no metaphysical insights. There are no ‘problems’ of 
‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘space’, ’time’ etc., but only the need to keep the use 
(COS) of these words clear. It is truly sad that most philosophers continue to 
waste their time on the linguistic confusions peculiar to academic philosophy 
rather than turning their attention to those of the other behavioral disciplines 
and to physics, biology and mathematics, where it is desperately needed. 
 
What has W really achieved? Here is how a leading Wittgenstein scholar 
summarized his work:  “Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems 
that have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than 
two millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about 
the relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and 
idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the 
nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up 
the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel 
and immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He 
attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics 
and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And 
he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human 
knowledge, but to human understanding – understanding of the forms of our 
thought and of the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—
Peter Hacker-- 'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe 
the two systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow 
reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is 
possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for 
judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, 
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time and space are innate true-only axioms. He noted in thousands of pages 
and hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not 
describable in language, this being possible only for behavior with a public 
language (the impossibility of private language). He predicted the utility of 
paraconsistent logic which only emerged much later. Incidentally he patented 
helicopter designs which anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets 
to drive the rotors, and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas 
turbine engine, designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the 
building of a modernist house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, 
subsequently completed by others. He laid out the psychological foundations 
of mathematics, logic, incompleteness, and infinity. 
 
And Paul Horwich gives a beautiful summary of where an understanding of 
Wittgenstein leaves us. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic  to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124,132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist, since he constantly 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. Though nobody seems aware of it, he described the 
psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental 
measure used in Evolutionary Psychology (EP) decades later. He noted the 
indeterminate or underdetermined nature of language and the game-like 
nature of social interaction. He described and refuted the notions of the mind 
as machine and the computational theory of mind, long before practical 
computers or the famous writings of Searle. He invented truth tables for use 
in logic and philosophy. He decisively laid to rest skepticism and 
metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of the 
mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
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Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor 
like him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like 
not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
of the world, and, like Einstein, nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein 
was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published 
only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, 
but became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 
years published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly 
garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; 
that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten 
scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, 
often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut 
and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the 
margins, underlinings and crossed out words, so that many sentences have 
multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into 
pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task 
of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly 
novel views of how the universe works and that they then published this 
material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with 
prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he 
became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all 
previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that virtually nobody 
understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands  of 
papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which 
he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such 
extremely abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what 
was being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and 
articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics 
had only passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that many 
omitted him entirely; that to this day, over half a century after his death, there 
were only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental 
consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation 
with Wittgenstein. 
 
Had W lived into his 80’s he would have been able to directly influence Searle 
(another modern genius of descriptive psychology), Symons, and countless 
other students of behavior. If his brilliant friend Frank Ramsey had not died 
in his youth, a highly fruitful collaboration would almost certainly have 
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ensued. If his student and colleague Alan Turing had become his lover, one 
of the most amazing collaborations of all time would likely have evolved. In 
any one case the intellectual landscape of the 20th century would have been 
different and if all 3 had occurred it would almost certainly have been very 
different. Instead he lived in relative intellectual isolation, few knew him well 
or had an inkling of his ideas while he lived, and only a handful have any real 
grasp of his work even today. He could have shined as an engineer, a 
mathematician, a psychologist, a physiologist (he did wartime research in it), 
a musician (he played instruments and had a renowned talent for whistling), 
an architect (the house he designed and constructed for his sister still stands), 
or an entrepreneur (he inherited one of the largest fortunes in the world but 
gave it all away). It is a miracle he survived the trenches and prison camps 
and repeated volunteering for the most dangerous duty (while writing the 
Tractatus) in WW1, many years of suicidal depressions (3 brothers 
succumbed to them), avoided being trapped in Austria and executed by the 
Nazis (he was partly Jewish and probably only the Nazi’s desire to lay hands 
on their money saved the family), and that he was not persecuted for his 
homosexuality and driven to suicide like his friend Turing. He realized 
nobody understood what he was doing and might never (not surprising as 
he was half a century –or a whole century depending on your point of view-
ahead of psychology and philosophy, which only recently have started 
accepting that our brain is an evolved organ like our heart.) 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of TLP, 
PI, OC by W, and PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social 
World (MSW), Seeing Things As They Are (STATA), Searle’s Philosophy and 
Chinese Philosophy (SPCP), John R Searle – Thinking About the Real World 
(TARW), and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear 
description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology books, that I 
will refer to as the WS framework. I begin with some penetrating quotes from 
W and S. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for 
instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods 
and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and 
methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
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we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem 
and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." 
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
"Many words then in this sense then don't have a strict meaning. But this is 
not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading 
lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary." BBB p27 
 
"Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn't be capable 
of interpretation. It is the last interpretation" BBB p34 
 
"There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir." BBB p143 
 
"And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word "to make" as we have used it in the sentence 
"It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do", because there is 
an idea that "something must make us" do what we do. And this again joins 
onto the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to 
follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end." BBB p143 
 
"If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
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and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn't the slightest 
similarity with what it represents." 
BBBp37 
 
"Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word "proof"; and 
that they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word 
"kind", when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the 
word "kind" here meant the same thing as in the context "kinds of apples." 
Or, we may say, they are not aware of the different meanings of the word 
"discovery" when in one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of 
the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery of the South Pole." BBB 
p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that 
can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
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the activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer." 
TLP 6.52 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for 
the future." (said in 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna 
Circle (1979) p183 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. 
--- Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel 
p312-314 
 
"Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations." BBB p125 
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These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from two of our greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy (in the strict sense I consider here) is the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of the obvious 
facts that are totally overlooked -i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated 
anywhere. In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is 
descriptive psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that 
they expect to contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., 
scientists) do not, so after noting W's above remark on science envy, I will 
quote again from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
... We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p 
be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he believes that p, but 
it is not the case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not 
the case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, 
attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why 
can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? 
Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can 
one know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? 
And so on - through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only 
to knowledge and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, 
forgetting, observing, noticing, recognizing, attending, being aware of, being 
conscious of, not to mention the numerous verbs of perception and their 
cognates. What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is 
the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts 
hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and 
incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and 
different forms of context dependency. To this venerable exercise in 
connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self-
styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever." (Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15-2005). 
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On his death in 1951 W left behind a scattered collection of some 20,000 pages. 
Apart from the Tractatus, they were unpublished and largely unknown, 
although some were widely circulated and read (as were notes taken in his 
classes), leading to extensive but largely unacknowledged influences. Some 
works are known to have been lost and many others W had destroyed. Most 
of this Nachlass was microfilmed in 1968 by Cornell University and copies 
were bought by a very few libraries. Budd, like most W commentators of the 
period, does not reference the microfilm. Although much of the Nachlass is 
repetitive and appears in some form in his subsequently published works 
(which are referenced by Budd), many variant texts are of great interest and 
there is substantial material that has never been translated from the original 
German nor published in book form. Even now (2016) we are awaiting a book 
of unpublished writings to be called ‘Dictating Philosophy’, and a new 
edition of the Brown Book, left with his lover Francis Skinner. In 1998, the 
Bergen CD of the complete Nachlass appeared -- Wittgenstein's Nachlass: 
Text and Facsimile Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition $2500 ISBN 10: 
0192686917. It is available through interlibrary loan and apparently free on 
the net as well. Like the other CDs of W’s work, it is available from Intelex 
(www.nlx.com). It is indexed and searchable and the prime W resource. 
However, my extensive readings of the W literature show that very few 
people have bothered to consult it and thus their works are lacking a critical 
element. One can see Victor Rodych’s papers on W’s remarks on Godel for 
one notable exception. One major work dating from W’s middle period (1933) 
that was published as a book in 2000 is the famous Big Typescript. Budd’s 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (1991) is one of the better 
treatments of W (see my review) but since he finished this book in 1989, 
neither the Big Typescript nor the Bergen CD was available to him and he 
neglected the Cornell microfilm. Nevertheless, by far the most important 
works date from W’s 3rd period (ca. 1935 to 1951) and these were all used by 
Budd. 
 
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century 
Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, 
German, and W in order to do this and very few are up to it. All of his works 
suffer from clear translation errors and there are more subtle questions where 
one has to understand the whole thrust of his later philosophy in order to 
translate. Since, in my view, nobody except Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) 
has grasped the full import of his later works, one can see why W has yet to 
be fully appreciated. Even the more or less well-known critical difference 
between understanding ‘Satz’ as ‘sentence’ (i.e., an S1 utterance) vs 
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‘proposition’ (i.e., an S2 utterance) in various contexts has usually escaped 
notice. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern and DMS in a recent article are rare 
exceptions) that W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science 
came into being) suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in 
chaotic processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding 
to a memory trace. He also suggested several times that the causal chain has 
an end, and this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the 
state of science) to trace it any further and that the concept of `cause' ceases 
to be applicable beyond a certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made 
similar suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in 
fact over a century now in a few instances). 
 
With DMS I regard W’s last book ‘On Certainty’ (OC) as the foundation stone 
of philosophy and psychology. It is not really a book but notes he made 
during the last two years of his life while dying of prostate cancer and barely 
able to work. He seems to have been principally motivated by the realization 
that G.E. Moore’s simple efforts had focused attention on the very core of all 
philosophy--how it’s possible to mean, to believe, to know anything at all, 
and not to be able to doubt it. All anyone can do is to examine minutely the 
working of the language games of ‘know’ and ‘certain’ and ‘doubt’ as they 
are used to describe the primitive automated prelinguistic system one (S1) 
functions of our brain (my K1, C1 and D1) and the advanced deliberative 
linguistic system two (S2) functions (my K2, C2 and D2).  Of course, W does 
not use the two systems terminology, which only came to the fore in 
psychology some half century after his death, and has yet to penetrate 
philosophy, but he clearly grasped the two systems framework (the 
‘grammar’) in all of his work from the early 30’s on, and one can see clear 
foreshadowings in his very earliest writings. 
 
Much has been written on Moore and W and On Certainty (OC) recently, after 
half a century in relative oblivion. See e.g., Annalisa Coliva’s “Moore and 
Wittgenstein” (2010), “Extended Rationality” (2015), The Varieties of Self- 
Knowledge’(2016), Brice’s ‘Exploring Certainty’(2014) and Andy Hamilton’s 
‘Routledge Philosophy Guide Book to Wittgenstein and On Certainty’ (which 
I will review soon) and the many books and papers of Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock (DMS) and Peter Hacker (PH), including Hacker’s recent 3 volumes 
on Human Nature. DMS and PH have been the leading scholars of the later 
W, each writing or editing half a dozen books (many reviewed by me) and 
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many papers in the last decade. However, the difficulties of coming to grips 
with the basics of our higher order psychology, i.e., of how language 
(approximately the same as the mind, as W showed us) works are evidenced 
by Coliva, one of the most brilliant and prolific contemporary philosophers, 
who made remarks in a very recent article which show that after years of 
intensive work on the later W, she does not seem to get that he has solved the 
most basic problems of the description of human behavior. As DMS makes 
clear, one cannot even coherently state misgivings about the operations of our 
basic psychology (W’s ‘Hinges’ which I equate with S1) without lapsing into 
incoherence. DMS has noted the limitations of both of these workers 
(limitations shared by all students of behavior) in her recent articles, which 
(like those of Coliva and Hacker) are freely available on the net. 
 
As DMS puts it: “…the notes that make up On Certainty revolutionize the 
concept of basic beliefs and dissolve scepticism, making them a corrective, 
not only to Moore but also to Descartes, Hume, and all of epistemology. On 
Certainty shows Wittgenstein to have solved the problem he set out to solve 
– the problem that occupied Moore and plagued epistemology – that of the 
foundation of knowledge. 
 
Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what 
philosophers have traditionally called 'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all 
knowledge must ultimately be based on – cannot, on pain of infinite regress, 
themselves be based on further propositional beliefs. He comes to see that 
basic beliefs are really animal or unreflective ways of acting which, once 
formulated (e.g. by philosophers), look like (empirical) propositions. It is this 
misleading appearance that leads philosophers to believe that at the 
foundation of thought is yet more thought. Yet though they may often look 
like empirical conclusions, our basic certainties constitute the ungrounded, 
nonpropositional underpinning of knowledge, not its object. In thus situating 
the foundation of knowledge in nonreflective certainties that manifest 
themselves as ways of acting, Wittgenstein has found the place where 
justification comes to an end, and solved the regress problem of basic beliefs 
– and, in passing, shown the logical impossibility of hyperbolic scepticism. I 
believe that this is a groundbreaking achievement for philosophy – worthy of 
calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'.” I reached the same 
general conclusions myself some years ago and stated it in my book reviews. 
 
She continues:” … this is precisely how Wittgenstein describes Moore-type 
hinge certainties in On Certainty: they'have the form of empirical 
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propositions', but are not empirical propositions. Granted, these certainties 
are not putative metaphysical propositions that appear to describe the 
necessary features of the world, but they are putative empirical propositions 
that appear to describe the contingent features of the world. And therein lies 
some of the novelty of On Certainty. On Certainty is continuous with all of 
Wittgenstein's earlier writings – including the Tractatus – in that it comes at 
the end of a long, unbroken attempt to elucidate the grammar of our 
language-games, to demarcate grammar from language in use. Baker and 
Hacker have superbly elucidated the second Wittgenstein's unmasking of the 
grammatical nature of metaphysical or super-empirical propositions; what 
sets On Certainty apart is its further perspicuous distinction between some 
'empirical' propositions and others ('Our "empirical propositions" do not 
form a homogenous mass' (OC 213)): some apparently empirical and 
contingent propositions being in fact nothing but expressions of grammatical 
rules. The importance of this realization is that it leads to the unprecedented 
insight that basic beliefs – though they look like humdrum empirical and 
contingent propositions – are in fact ways of acting which, when conceptually 
elucidated, can be seen to function as rules of grammar: they underlie all 
thinking (OC 401). So that the hinge certainty 'The earth has existed for many 
years' underpins all thought and action, but not as a proposition that strikes 
us immediately as true; rather as a way of acting that underpins what we do 
(e.g., we research the age of the earth) and what we say (e.g., we speak of the 
earth in the past tense): ‘Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, 
comes to an end; – but the end is not certain propositions striking us 
immediately  as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game.’ (OC 204)” 
 
“The non-propositional nature of basic beliefs puts a stop to the regress that 
has plagued epistemology: we no longer need to posit untenable self-
justifying propositions at the basis of knowledge. In taking hinges to be true 
empirical propositions, Peter Hacker fails to acknowledge the ground-
breaking insight that our basic certainties are ways of acting, and not 'certain 
propositions striking us… as true' (OC 204). If all Wittgenstein were doing in 
OC was to claim that our basic beliefs are true empirical propositions, why 
bother? He would be merely repeating what philosophers before him have 
been saying for centuries, all the while deploring an unsolvable infinite 
regress. Why not rather appreciate that Wittgenstein has stopped the 
regress?” (“Beyond Hacker’s Wittgenstein” -(2013)).” 
 
It is amazing (and a sign of how deep the divide remains between philosophy 
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and psychology) that (as I have noted many times) in a decade of intensive 
reading, I have not seen one person make the obvious connection between 
W’s ‘grammar’ and the automatic reflexive functions of our brain which 
constitute System 1, and its extensions into the linguistic functions of System 
2. For anyone familiar with the two systems framework for understanding 
behavior that has dominated various areas of psychology such as decision 
theory for the last several decades, it should be glaringly obvious that ‘basic 
beliefs’ (or as I call them B1) are the inherited automated true-only structure 
of S1 and that their extension with experience into true or false sentences (or 
as I call them B2) are what non-philosophers call ‘beliefs’. This may strike 
some as a mere terminological trifle, but I have used the two systems view 
and its tabulation below as the logical structure of rationality for a decade and 
regard it as the single biggest advance in understanding higher order 
behavior, and hence of W or any philosophical or behavioral writing. In my 
view, the failure to grasp the fundamental importance of the automaticity of 
our behavior due to S1 and the consequent attribution of all social interaction 
(e.g., politics) to the superficialities of S2 can be seen as responsible for the 
inexorable collapse of industrial civilization. The almost universal oblivion to 
basic biology and psychology leads to endless fruitless attempts fix the 
world’s problems via politics, but only a drastic restructuring of society with 
understanding of the fundamental role of inclusive fitness as manifested via 
the automaticities of S1 has any chance to save the world. The oblivion to S1 
has been called by Searle ‘The phenomenological Illusion’, by Pinker ‘The 
Blank Slate’ and by Tooby and Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science 
Model’. 
 
OC shows W’s unique super-Socratic trialogue (narrator, interlocutor, 
commentator) in full bloom and better than anywhere else in his works. He 
realized by the late 20’s that the only way to make any progress was to look 
at how language actually works-otherwise one gets lost in the labyrinth of 
language from the very first sentences and there is not the slightest hope of 
finding one’s way out. The entire book looks at various uses of the word 
‘know’ which separate themselves out into ‘know’ as an intuitive ‘perceptual’ 
certainty that cannot meaningfully be questioned (my K1) and ‘know’ as a 
disposition to act (my K2), which functions the same as think, hope, judge, 
understand, imagine, remember, believe and many other dispositional 
words. As I have suggested in my various reviews of W and S, these two uses 
correspond to the modern two systems of thought framework that is so 
powerful in understanding behavior (mind, language), and this (and his 
other work) is the first significant effort to show how our fast, prelinguistic 
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automatic ‘mental states’ are the unquestionable axiomatic basis (‘hinges’) for 
our later-evolved, slow, linguistic, deliberative dispositional psychology. As 
I have noted many times, neither W, nor anyone else to my knowledge, has 
ever stated this clearly. Undoubtedly, most who read OC go away with no 
clear idea of what he has done, which is the normal result of reading any of 
his work. 
 
On Certainty (OC) was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s 
death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. There are few 
references to it in Searle (along with Hacker, W’s heir apparent and the most 
famous living philosopher) and one sees whole books on W with barely a 
mention. There are however reasonably good books on it by Stroll, Svensson, 
Coliva, McGinn and others and parts of many other books and articles, but 
the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume 
“Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every 
educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding 
Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) all 
analysis of W falls short of fully grasping his unique and revolutionary 
advances by failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and 
contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt here. I will not give a 
page by page explanation since (as with any other book dealing with 
behavior-i.e., philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, law, 
politics, religion, literature etc.) we would not get past the first few pages, as 
all the issues discussed here arise immediately in any discussion of behavior. 
The table below summarizing the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) provides a framework for 
this and all discussion of behavior. 
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what 
is now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just 
animal behavior. Sadly, few realize that his works are a vast and unique 
textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was 
written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral 
sciences and humanities, and even those few who have understood him have 
not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and 
cognitive illusions (e.g., the two selves of fast and slow thinking—see below). 
John Searle (S), refers to him infrequently, but his work can be seen as a 
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straightforward extension of W’s, though he does not seem to see this. W 
analysts such as Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, 
Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but mostly stop short of putting 
him in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. It should 
also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of 
higher order behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to 
translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of 
“Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and 
into W’s work (and they do). 
 
The failure of most to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited 
attention On Certainty (0C) and his other 3rd period works have received until 
recently, but even more to the inability of many philosophers and others to 
understand how profoundly our view of behavior alters once we embrace the 
evolutionary framework. I call the framework the descriptive psychology of 
higher order thought- DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language 
used in DPHOT --which Searle calls the logical structure of rationality-LSR), 
which grounds anthropology, sociology, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, 
aesthetics, literature and history. 
 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, 
intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least 
half a century earlier. One cannot help but incorporate T. rex and all that is 
relevant to it into our true-only axiomatic background via the inexorable 
workings of EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it 
is truly stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this 
most basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few 
others) which was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the 
equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding 
W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody 
else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my 
or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed 
out of and are tied to countless others in the true-only network that begins 
with birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness 
and memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own 
unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other 
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minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot 
really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking 
axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the 
default of the ‘second self’ of slow thinking conscious system 2, which 
(without education) is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all 
behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 
1 (Searle’s ‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very 
insightful recent article by noting that many logical features of intentionality 
are beyond the reach of phenomenology because the creation of 
meaningfulness (i.e., the COS of S2) out of meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes 
of S1) is not consciously experienced. See Philosophy in a New Century 
(PNC) p115-117 and my review of it. 
 
It is essential to grasp the W/S (Wittgenstein/Searle) framework so I will first 
offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein 
(W), Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock(DMS) 
et. al. To grasp my simple two systems terminology and perspective, it will 
help to see my reviews of W/S and other books about these geniuses, who 
provide a clear description of higher order behavior not found in psychology 
books. To say that Searle has extended W’s work is not necessarily to imply 
that it is a direct result of W study (and he is clearly not a Wittgensteinian), 
but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same 
reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately 
describing behavior must be enunciating some variant or extension of what 
W said. 
 
However, S seldom mentions W and even then, often in a critical way but in 
my view his criticisms (like everyone’s) nearly always miss the mark and he 
makes many dubious assertions for which he is often criticized. In present 
context, I find the recent criticisms of DMS, Coliva and Hacker most relevant. 
Nevertheless, he is the prime candidate for the best since W and I recommend 
downloading the over 100 lectures he has on the net. Unlike nearly all other 
philosophy lectures they are quite entertaining and informative and I have 
heard them all at least twice. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms of S1 (which I equate with W’s 
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‘hinges’) from the less mechanical linguistic dispositional behavior of S2. To 
rephrase: all study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart fast 
System 1 (S1) and slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions. Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2 social behavior including ‘we intentionality’, 
while the later W shows how S2 is based on true-only unconscious axioms of 
S1, which in evolution and in each of our personal histories developed into 
conscious dispositional propositional thinking (acting) of S2. 
 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a young science and that 
philosophers are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way 
science does. He noted that this tendency is the real source of metaphysics 
and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. See BBB p18. Another 
notable comment was that if we are not concerned with “causes” the activities 
of the mind lie open before us –see BB p6 (1933). Likewise, the 20,000 pages 
of his nachlass demonstrated his famous dictum that the problem is not to 
find the solution but to recognize as the solution what appears to be only a 
preliminary. See his Zettel p312-314. And again, he noted 80 years ago that 
we ought to realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior and that 
these are not hints of explanations (BBB p125). See the full quotes at other 
places in this article. 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, 
speech) is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even 
(Fodor’s LOT, Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language 
of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to 
show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of 
language in action, that language is not a picture of but is itself thinking or 
the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this 
idea. 
 
Many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view 
none better than W in BBB p37 — “if we keep in mind the possibility of a 
picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the 
interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For 
now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such 
a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” So, 
language issues direct from the brain and what could count as evidence for 
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an intermediary? 
 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology 
and computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language 
Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always 
in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in 
these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 
347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we 
interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is 
expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our 
speech using the later evolved Language Games (LG’s) of the Second Self--
the dispositions such as imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending 
etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are 
the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), 
the irrelevance of our subjective ‘mental life’ to the functioning of language, 
and the impossibility of private language. The bedrock of our behavior is our 
involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, true-only, mental states- our perceptions 
and memories and involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later LG’s are 
voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, testable true or false dispositional (and 
often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole 
psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to 
recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to 
look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1 “the greatest danger here is wanting to observe 
oneself”). 
 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that 
our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our 
psychology. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the 
rest are fascinating and powerful ways to describe and extend our innate 
axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our 
behavior, multiply our language games, and extend S2. The true-only axioms 
of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, 
which we now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to 
the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operate by 
the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). 
 
See the recent works of Trivers for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb 
“Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. The recent travesty of 
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evolutionary thought by Nowak and Wilson in no way impacts the fact that 
IF is the prime mechanism of evolution by natural selection (see my review 
of 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012)). 
 
As W develops in OC, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes 
a true-only extension (i.e., S2 Hinges or S2H) of our axiomatic EP (i.e., S1 
Hinges or S1H) and cannot be found ‘mistaken’ without threatening our 
sanity—as he noted a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) has profoundly different 
consequences from one in S2 (testable). A corollary, nicely explained by DMS 
and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view 
of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) cannot get 
a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary ‘fast thinking’ axioms and 
not testable propositions (as I would put it). 
 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and especially in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking 
or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--
“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W 
laid out the framework over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and 
automatic and which corresponds to the mental states of perception, emotion 
and memory, as W notes over and over. One might call these “intracerebral 
reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the 
brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware another 
network of language games!) second self brain activity corresponds to what 
W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states, are conscious, deliberate and 
propositional (true or false), and do not have any definite time of occurrence. 
 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
mostly philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to 
the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., 
our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), originally 
termed Causally Self Referential (CSR) by Searle (but now Causally Self-
Reflexive) or reflexive or intransitive in W’s Blue and Brown Books (BBB), 
and the S2  use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted 
out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they 
have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in the strict sense, and are not CSR 
(called transitive in BBB). The equation of these terms from modern 
psychology with those used by W and S (and much else here) is my idea, so 
don’t expect to find it in the literature (except my articles and reviews on 
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Amazon, viXra.org, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, academia.edu). 
 
Though seldom touched upon by philosophers, the investigation of 
involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., 
Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive 
illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course these 
too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use 
these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear, but of course he did not 
use this terminology), but presumably not ever of slow S2 dispositional 
thinking only, since any thought (intentional action) cannot occur without 
involving much of  the  intricate S1 network of the “cognitive modules”, 
“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive 
axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and Searle call our EP) which 
must also use S1 to move muscles (action). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary 
psychology, that `will', `self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are 
presupposed by all discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic true-only 
elements of S1, composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there 
is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their 
falsehood. As W made clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment 
and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. As he famously said in OC p94— “but I did not get my picture of 
the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am 
satisfied of its correctness. -no: it is the inherited background against which I 
distinguish between true and false.” 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions 
of Satisfaction (COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from 
W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my 
mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle 
of thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is, as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's 
aphorisms (p132 in Budd’s lovely book on W) – “It is in language that wish 
and fulfillment meet and like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.” And one 
might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP or LSR 
(DPHOT—see table) and that, in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing (for which he is often incorrectly criticized by 
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Searle), this is about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive 
psychology (philosophy) as one can find (as DMS also notes).  
 
W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, and Searle 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning “speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction” -- which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence 
expressing COS in a context that can be true or false, and this is an act and 
not a mental state. i.e., as Searle notes in Philosophy in a New Century p193 
— “the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” -- propositions being 
public events that can be true or false –contra the perverse use of the word 
for the true-only axioms of S by Searle, Coliva and others. Hence, the famous 
comment by W from PI p217— “If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of”, and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's 
Him" and “what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," 
or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) –“what it always 
comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen-and- the question whether I 
know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact 
that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I 
should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied. Suppose it were 
asked -do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then 
I do know.” 
 
One of W’s recurring themes is now called Theory of Mind, or as I prefer, 
Understanding of Agency (UA). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 
and UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has become aware of the work 
of Daniel Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor 
representation can be involved in UA1-- that being reserved for UA2—see my 
review of his book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly 
has no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily 
defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive 
illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and 
straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite of the fact that most of the above 
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has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century in the case of 
some of W’s teachings), I have rarely seen anything approaching an adequate 
discussion in philosophy or other behavioral science texts, and commonly 
there is barely a mention. 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the 
pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown 
Books) to 1951, and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, 
Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I 
have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The 
rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems 
(dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can 
also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much 
simpler table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the 
three recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2   and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition
* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****      Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****    Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
*******Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in 
mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He 
showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences 
(language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— 
showing the correct context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of 
system 2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually 
say they are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-
reflexive since the description of our perceptual experience-the presentation 
of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as 
the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the 
percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of 
S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row 
will be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, 
will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise 
duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and 
working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have 
voluntary content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences 
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and in the world), and in the infinite variations of ‘brain states’ (‘mental states 
or the pattern of activations of billions of neurons that can correspond to 
‘seeing a red apple’) and this is one reason why it’s not possible to ‘reduce’ 
higher order behavior to a ‘system of laws’ which would have to state all the 
possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. And what 
counts as ‘reducing’ and as a ‘law’ and a ‘system’ (see e.g., Nancy 
Cartwright). This is a special case of the irreducibility of higher level 
descriptions to lower level ones that has been explained many times by 
Searle, DMS, Hacker, W and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary 
or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, 
automated, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, 
intransitive, informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location, and over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the 
further ability to describe displacements in space and time of events (the past 
and future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional 
preferences, inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated 
Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, 
information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction- 
Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 
for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 
for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, 
with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental 
states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, 
Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated 
desires), Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the 
world and not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some 
Emotions are slowly developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W-
‘Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical 
S1— automatic and fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, 
“they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in 
spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding 
lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about others are true or false –
i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and 
of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, 
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reflexive acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) 
in the 1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have 
commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has 
often been noted that this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, 
intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositional nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness 
and Language p118). Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public 
representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 
to System 2 – Searle-Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential 
acts displaced in time or space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 
perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is 
one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate 
psychology after System 1—the ability to represent (state public COS for) 
events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s 
third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and 
volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic 
brain processes of System One) are potential or unconscious mental states of 
S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, 
NO TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or 
animal reflexes as W and DMS describe. Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted 
out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, 
feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well known books 
on W by Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when 
spoken or written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas 
are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka 
& Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as 
the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation 
of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction 
with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the 
early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this 
table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey 
of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his 
very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior 
or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
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pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, in which the mind automatically fits (presents) the 
world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) -- the unquestionable, true-only, 
axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible. 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking 
conscious Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the 
mind tries to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other 
confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because 
we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate 
actions of S2(The Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood 
this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to 
memory and so we use consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to 
explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). 
Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to 
match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) 
plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind 
direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other 
dispositions. Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe 
mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities 
(agents as they act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly 
called “Propositional Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our 
innate programs (cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use 
these to produce Dispositions — (believing, knowing, understanding, 
thinking, etc., -actual or potential public acts such as language (thought, 
mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of 
S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e.,no private language, thought 
or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have 
a public psychology. 
 
Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature 
Memories:  Remembering (X was true) Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions 
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(X might become True): 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting. 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and 
anger. We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my 
thoughts): Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, 
obliged to do. 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending. 
 
ACTIONS: (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing 
Trying, Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), The Blank Slate (BS)or the Standard Social 
Science Model (SSSM). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the 
names of objects, nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of 
humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the 
scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into 
inference engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the 
formation of preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. 
Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes 
or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject 
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of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including 
neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then 
coextensive in evolution, development and individual action with 
preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive 
modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our 
understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions of how 
they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy 
(descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus 
making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of 
dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott 
(1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, 
require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order 
to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility 
maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions 
of Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts 
(muscle movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. 
The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist 
Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings 
back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle 
beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I 
strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. 
Much of intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W 
noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our 
templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some 
contexts as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb ‘thinking’)—nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow 
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thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not 
as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective 
or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info 
even for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or 
mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike 
perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act 
or event such as in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our 
perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) 
only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, 
feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 
generates S2. Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of 
advanced humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual 
muscles) for acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory 
of Mind) is much better called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and 
UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called 
Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically 
programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to 
intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles—i.e., Understanding is 
a Disposition like Thinking and Knowing. Thus, “propositional attitude” is 
an incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow 
deliberative functioning of System 2) or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion 
of frequently practiced System 2 functions of speech and action into 
automatic fast functions). We see that the efforts of cognitive science to 
understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going 
to tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, language) works (as 
opposed to how the brain works) than we already know, because “mind” 
(thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that 
are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, 
or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is 
composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics 
and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is 
hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open 
to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. Language 
(mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate 
social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and 
reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) 
functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze 
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it. This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences 
have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” 
normally describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge 
(i.e., S2) but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my 
mental state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my 
review of the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not 
describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s 
raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person 
present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but 
then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or future 
tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ 
contain or can be resolved by information that is true or false, as they describe 
public acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” 
has no information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe 
it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts 
displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information (or 
misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words 
as Deeds by W & then by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in 
Philosophical Psychology in 2000). 
 
Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are 
Non-Propositional (NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them 
functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky Kahneman). Prior Intentions are 
stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must 
separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the 
conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions 
(e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes 
of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-
Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our 
Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential 
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reading for an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order 
thought are Coliva, Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who, 
like many scholars now, have posted most of their work (often in preprint 
form) free online at academia.edu, philpapers.org and other sites and of 
course the diligent can find everything free online. Baker & Hacker are found 
in their many joint works and on his personal page. The late Baker went 
overboard with a bizarre psychoanalytic and rather nihilistic interpretation 
that was ably refuted by Hacker whose “Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation 
of Wittgenstein” is a must read for any student of behavior. 
 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to 
the attempt to explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal 
framework of S1 which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the 
current leaders of scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism -- 
hereafter CDC—my acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease 
Control) and many others pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently 
beginning with W in the BBB in the 30’s when he noted that –“philosophers 
constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency 
is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness”- and by Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker and countless others since. 
The attempt to ‘explain’ (really only to describe as W made clear) S2 in causal 
terms is incoherent and even for S1 it is extremely complex and it is not clear 
that the highly diverse language games of “causality” can ever  be made to 
apply (as has been noted many times)-even their application in physics and 
chemistry is variable and  often obscure (was it gravity or the abscission layer 
or hormones or the wind or all of them that made the apple fall and when did 
the causes start and end)? But as W said-“now if it is not the causal 
connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie 
open before us”. 
 
However, I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side, as 
usually stated, as his views are much more subtle, more often than not leaving 
his trialogues unresolved. One might find it useful to start with my reviews 
of W, S etc., and then study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, Coliva, Hacker, 
Glock, DMS, Stern, etc. as feasible before digging into the literature of 
causality and the philosophy of science, and if one finds it uninteresting to do 
so then W has hit the mark. 
 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers 
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have little grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically 
different uses of ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), or of the 
nature of dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on such 
notions as private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and 
computationalism, which W laid to rest ¾ of a century ago. 
 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they 
cite. Often the authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly 
complete omission of all the authors I cite here. W is easily the most widely 
discussed modern philosopher with about one new book and dozens of 
articles largely or wholely devoted to him every month. He has his own 
journal “Philosophical Investigations” and I expect his bibliography exceeds 
that of the next top 4 or 5 philosophers combined. Searle is perhaps next 
among moderns (and the only one with many lectures on YouTube, Vimeo, 
University sites etc.—over 100, which, unlike almost all other philosophy 
lectures, are a delight to listen to) and Hutto, Coliva, DMS, Hacker, Read, etc., 
are very prominent with dozens of books and hundreds of articles, talks and 
reviews. But CDC and other metaphysicians ignore them and the thousands 
who regard their work as critically important. 
 
Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well by and large of that of 
modern research in thinking) is totally absent and all the confusions it has 
cleared away are abundant. If you read my reviews and the works 
themselves, perhaps your view of most writing in this arena may be quite 
different. But as W insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. 
As often noted, his super-Socratic trialogues had a therapeutic intent. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are 
noted in my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are 
as simple as pie—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and 
tests can only be external and public. He famously illustrated this with the 
‘Beetle in the Box’. If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. 
and call what is inside a ‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in 
language, for every box could contain a different thing or even be empty. So, 
there is no private language that only I can know and no introspection of 
‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly demonstrable it cannot be a word in our 
language. This shoots down Carruther’s ISA theory of mind, as well as all the 
other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references. I have explained W’s 
dismantling of the notion of introspection and the functioning of 
dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of 
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Budd, Johnston and several of Searle’s books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations” (2004) for a nice explanation of Private 
Language and everything by Read et al for getting to the roots of these issues 
as few do. 
 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a ‘higher self’. But, 
the very act of writing, reading and all language and concepts (language 
games) presuppose self, consciousness and will, so such accounts are self- 
contradictory cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero impact 
on the daily life of anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the first 
person point of view is just not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a 3rd 
person one, but absence of coherence is no problem for the cartoon views of 
life. Likewise, with the description of brain function or behavior as 
‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc., -- well debunked countless 
times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker and many others. 
 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning 
of many key terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid 
and hopeless, but there are thousands of science and philosophy books like 
this. There is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our 
behavior and then the experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these 
dealing with human behavior combine the conscious thinking of S2 with the 
unconscious automatisms of S1 (absorb psychology into physiology). We are 
often told that self, will, and consciousness are illusions, since they think they 
are showing us the ‘real’ meaning of these terms, and that the cartoon use is 
the valid one. That is, S2 is ‘unreal’ and must be subsumed by the scientific 
causal descriptions of S1. Hence, the reason for the shift from the philosophy 
of language to the philosophy of mind. See e.g., my review of Carruther’s 
recent ‘The Opacity of Mind’. Even Searle is a frequent offender here as noted 
by Hacker, Bennet and Hacker, DMS, Coliva etc. 
 
If someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly 
mistaken, or if by choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be 
described as having a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to 
‘cause’ so we must regard it as illusory, then that is trivially true (or 
incoherent), but irrelevant to how we use language and how we live, which 
should be regarded as the point from which to begin and end such 
discussions. 
 
Perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and 
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Nietzsche (great intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the 
problems of philosophy), who were voted the best of all time by 
philosophers-not Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I 
consider here, keeping in mind W’s comment that not everything with the 
appearance of a question is one). We want to understand how the brain (or 
the universe) does it but S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the 
unconscious machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA 
does, courtesy of the death of countless trillions of organisms over some 3 
billion years. We can describe the world easily but often cannot agree on what 
an ‘explanation’ should look like. So, we struggle with science and ever so 
slowly describe the mechanisms of mind. Even if we should arrive at 
“complete” knowledge of the brain, we would still just have a description of 
what neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red, but it is not clear what it 
would mean (COS) to have an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., why qualia 
exist). As W said, explanations come to an end somewhere. 
 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruther’s 
“Opacity of Mind” (a major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised 
largely of the standard confusions that result from ignoring the work of W, S 
and hundreds of others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and denies 
the ‘reality’ of our higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, except 
as these are given a quite different and wholly incompatible use in science. 
We have e.g., no reasons for action, only a brain that causes action etc. They 
create imaginary problems by trying to answer questions that have no clear 
sense. It should strike us that these views have absolutely no impact on the 
daily life of those who spend most of their adult life promoting them. 
 
This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his article ‘The Hard 
Problem of Consciousness’ — “the hardcore problem becomes more and 
more remote, the more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as 
information and perception and intentionality. The problem will only really 
be being faced if we face up to it as a ‘problem’ that has to do with whole 
human beings, embodied in a context (inextricably natural and social) at a 
given time, etc…then it can become perspicuous to one that there is no 
problem. Only when one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ information across human 
and non-human domains (supposedly using the non-human-the animal 
{usually thought of as mechanical} or the machine-as one’s paradigm, and 
thus getting things back to front), does it begin to look as if there is a 
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problem…that all the ‘isms’ (cognitivism, reductionism (to the brain), 
behaviorism and so on)…push further and further from our reach…the very 
conceptualization of the problem is the very thing which ensures that the 
‘hard problem’ remains insoluble…no good reason has ever been given for 
us to think that there must be a science of something if it is to be regarded as 
real. There is no good reason to think that there should be a science of 
consciousness, or of mind or of society, any more than there need be a science 
of numbers, or of universes or of capital cities or of games or of constellations 
or of objects whose names start with the letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the 
idea of ourselves as embodied persons acting in a world, not with the idea of 
ourselves as brains with minds ‘located’ in them or ‘attached’ to them… There 
is no way that science can help us bootstrap into an ‘external’/’objective’ 
account of what consciousness really is and when it is really present. For it 
cannot help us when there is a conflict of criteria, when our machines come 
into conflict with ourselves, into conflict with us. For our machines are only 
calibrated by our reports in the first place. There can be no such thing as 
getting an external point of view… that isn’t because… the hard problem is 
insoluble, …Rather, we need not admit that a problem has even been 
defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the keeping alive 
indefinitely of the problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological 
satisfaction of both a humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to 
the understanding and, the knowingness of being part of a privileged elite, 
that in stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to see what 
Wittgenstein made clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only 
be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be 
simply nonsense.” 
 
Many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 85 years ago that ‘mysteries’ 
satisfy a longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can see the 
‘limits of human understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, and 
that we should dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language (mind) in 
the fact that we cannot describe the facts which correspond to a sentence 
except by repeating the sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, 
written in 1931). I also find it useful to repeat frequently his remark that 
“superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus” --written a century ago 
in TLP 5.1361. 
 
Also, apropos is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the 
philosophical problems about mental processes (and all philosophical 
problems). "How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and 
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states and about behaviorism arise? The first step is the one that altogether 
escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature 
undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them -- we think. 
But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. 
For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it 
was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) -- And now the analogy 
which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to 
deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And 
now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't 
want to deny them.” 
 
Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked us to imagine a 
person who forgot what the word ‘pain’ meant but used it correctly –i.e., he 
used it as we do! Also relevant is W’s comment (TLP 6.52) that when all 
scientific questions have been answered, nothing is left to question, and that 
is itself the answer. And central to understanding the scientistic (i.e., due to 
scientism, not science) failures of CDC et al is his observation that it is a very 
common mistake to think that something must make us do what we do, 
which leads to the confusion between cause and reason. “And the mistake 
which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is labeled 
by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of 
insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that 
“something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the 
confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the 
rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
He has also commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there is 
no reason in the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. W saw 
in his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ oneself 
by working out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of being told 
the answers. Hence his famous comments about philosophy as therapy and 
‘working on oneself’. 
 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised 
philosophy throughout the behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that 
there is often no hint that there are other points of view— that many of the 
most prominent philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There 
is also the fact (seldom mentioned) that, provided of course we ignore its 
incoherence, reduction does not stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can 
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easily be extended (and has often been) to the level of chemistry, physics, 
quantum mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. What exactly should make 
neurophysiology privileged? The ancient Greeks generated the idea that 
nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz famously described the universe as a 
giant machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram became a legend in the 
history of pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a computer 
automaton in ‘A New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, 
reductionism, behaviorism and dualism in their many guises are hardly news 
and, to a Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and 
Brown books in the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent publication and 
extensive commentary on his nachlass. But convincing someone is a hopeless 
task. W realized one has to work on oneself—self therapy via long hard 
working through of ‘perspicuous examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
 
An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how 
easy it is to change a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist 
Sir James Jeans long ago: “The Universe begins to look more like a great 
thought than like a great machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’,  
‘cause’, ‘event’,‘happen’, ‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the same 
meanings (uses) in science or philosophy as in daily life, or rather they have 
the old uses mixed in at random with many new ones so there is the 
appearance of sense without sense. Much of academic discussion of behavior, 
life and the universe is high comedy (as opposed to the low comedy of most 
politics, religion and mass media): i.e., “comedy dealing with polite society, 
characterized by sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate plot”-
(Dictionary.com). But philosophy is not a waste of time--done rightly, it is the 
best way to spend time. How else can we dispel the chaos in the behavioral 
sciences or describe our mental life and the higher order thought of System 
2--the most intricate, wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s 
examples describing how our innate psychology uses the reality testing of 
System 2 to build on the certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and 
as societies acquire a world view of irrefutable interlocking experiences that 
build on the bedrock of our axiomatic genetically programmed reflexive 
perception and action to the amazing edifice of science and culture. The 
theory of evolution and the theory of relativity passed long ago from 
something that could be challenged to certainties that can only be modified, 
and at the other end of the spectrum, there is no possibility of finding out that 
there are no such things as Paris or Brontosaurs. The skeptical view is 
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incoherent. We can say anything but we cannot mean anything. 
 
Thus, with DMS, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of 
human understanding and the most basic document on our psychology. 
Though written when in his 60’s, mentally and physically devastated by 
cancer, it is as brilliant as his other work and transforms our understanding 
of philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought), bringing 
it at last into the light, after three thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics has 
been swept away from philosophy and from physics. 
 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--
yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained 
or discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. 
But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification 
and truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
 
Let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the 
center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, 
difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to 
miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
An excellent recent work that displays many of the philosophical confusions 
in a book putatively about science and mathematics is Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer 
Limits of Reason: What Science, Mathematics and Logic Cannot Tell 
Us’(2013). 
 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem 
becomes a philosophical one-i.e., one of how language can be used 
intelligibly. Yanofsky, like virtually all scientists and most philosophers, does 
not get that there are two distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions” (i.e., 
Language Games or LG’s) here. There are those that are matters of fact about 
how the world is—that is, they are publicly observable propositional (True or 
False) states of affairs having clear meanings (Conditions of Satisfaction --
COS) in Searle’s terminology—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are 
those that are issues about how language can coherently be used to describe 
these states of affairs, and these can be answered by any sane, intelligent, 
literate person with little or no resort to the facts of science. Another poorly 
understood but critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, 
inferring, understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of 
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a true or false statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our 
slow, conscious System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are 
entangled, the star shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part 
that involves seeing that the symbols are used correctly in each line of the 
proof), is always made by the fast, automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via 
seeing, hearing, touching etc. in which there is no information processing, no 
representation (i.e., no COS) and no decisions in the sense in which these 
happen in S2 ( which receives its inputs from S1). This two systems approach 
is now the standard way to view reasoning or rationality and is a crucial 
heuristic in the description of behavior, of which science, math and 
philosophy are special cases. There is a huge and rapidly growing literature 
on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of behavior or science. A 
recent book that digs into the details of how we actually reason (i.e., use 
language to carry out actions—see W, DMS, Hacker, S etc.) is ‘Human 
Reasoning and Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008), 
which, in spite of its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of W/S and the 
broad structure of intentional psychology), is (as of 2016) the best single 
source I know. 
 
W wrote a great deal on the philosophy of mathematics since it clearly 
illustrated many of the types of confusions generated by ‘scientific’ language 
games, and there have been countless commentaries, many quite poor. I will 
comment on some of the best recent work as it is brought up by Yanofsky. 
 
Francisco Berto has made some penetrating comments recently. He notes that 
W denied the coherence of metamathematics-i.e., the use by Godel of a 
metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his “notorious” 
interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept his 
argument, I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, 
metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that such concepts 
(words, language games) as metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted 
by millions (and even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al 
to reveal fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple 
misunderstandings about how language works? Isn’t the proof in this 
pudding that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and 
will as illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no 
practical impact whatsoever? 
 
Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the 
very same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal 
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system… and demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency 
hypothesis) in a different system (the meta- system). If, as Wittgenstein 
maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved sentence, 
then it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with the 
same meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a 
different system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea 
that a formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic 
consequence that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths can 
prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical 
sentences, then there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there cannot be 
incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., 
nonclassical arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a 
reality. What is more important, the theoretical features of such theories 
match precisely with some of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian 
intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from Godel’s First 
Theorem, and from Church’s undecidability result: they are, that is, 
demonstrably complete and decidable. They therefore fulfil precisely 
Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there cannot be mathematical 
problems that can be meaningfully formulated within the system, but which 
the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the decidability of 
paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein 
maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or 
our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as 
a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. 
“Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can 
say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Gregory Chaitin show. 
W commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems 
derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one 
applies a test. W often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual 
sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world 
applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it 
cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much 
wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ 
of PA it cannot be used in the real world either. As Victor Rodych notes 
“…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus 
(i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra-systemic application in 
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a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring 
or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply 
our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, 
‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with 
‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with ‘Incompleteness’ this 
warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s 
account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus 
because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is 
meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other 
comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some 
stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see 
arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of 
the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human 
behavior, which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical 
computer that can be assured of correctly processing information faster than 
the universe does. The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, 
general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, 
general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that 
are infinite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also 
hold even if one uses an infinitely fast, infinitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also 
published what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective 
intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific 
footing. Although he has published various versions of these over two 
decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., 
Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news 
items in major science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have looked 
in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision theory and computation 
without finding a reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of 
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Wolpert, since his work is the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, 
inference, incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many 
proofs in Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantor’s 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or 
mechanisms and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, 
but on cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by 
partitioning the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it 
does and not how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent 
of any particular physical laws or computational structures in establishing 
the physical limits of inference for past, present and future and all possible 
calculation, observation and control. He notes that even in a classical universe 
Laplace was wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or even 
perfectly depict the past or present) and that his impossibility results can be 
viewed as a “non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there 
cannot be an infallible observation or control device). Any universal physical 
device must be infinite, it can only be so at one moment in time, and no reality 
can have more than one (the “monotheism theorem”). Since space and time 
do not appear in the definition, the device can even be the entire universe 
across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of incompleteness with 
two inference devices rather than one self-referential device. As he says, 
“either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of 
computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic 
information complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it that 
can be applicable throughout our universe.” 
 
Another way to say this is that one cannot have two physical inference 
devices (computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary questions about 
the output of the other, or that the universe cannot contain a computer to 
which one can pose any arbitrary computational task, or that for any pair of 
physical inference engines, there are always binary valued questions about 
the state of the universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. 
One cannot build a computer that can predict an arbitrary future condition of 
a physical system before it occurs, even if the condition is from a restricted 
set of tasks that can be posed to it—that is, it cannot process information 
(though this is a vexed phrase as S and Read and others note) faster than the 
universe. The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do 
not have to be physically coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of 
physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an 
infinite speed of light. The inference device does not have to be spatially 
localized but can be nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the entire 
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universe. He is well aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, 
Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerning the universe as computer or the 
limits of ”information processing”, in a new light (though the indices of their 
writings make no reference to him and another remarkable omission is that 
none of the above are mentioned by Yanofsky either). 
 
Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot contain an inference device 
that can process information as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot 
have a perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can 
never be perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. 
He also proved that no combination of computers with error correcting codes 
can overcome these limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of 
the observer (“the liar”) and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of 
physics, math and language that concern Yanofsky. Again cf. Floyd on W: 
”He is articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The 
argument is thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to 
any purported listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely 
on any particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of 
signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is 
not essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be 
diagrammed and insofar as it is a logical argument, its logic may be 
represented formally). Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any 
particular formalism. [The parallels to Wolpert are obvious.] Unlike Turing’s 
arguments, it explicitly invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to 
(and presupposes) an everyday conception of the notions of rules and of the 
humans who follow them. Every line in the diagonal presentation above is 
conceived as an instruction or command, analogous to an order given to a 
human being...” It should be obvious how Wolpert’s work is a perfect 
illustration of W’s ideas of the separate issues of science or mathematics and 
those of philosophy (language games). 
 
Yanofsky also does not make clear the major overlap that now exists (and is 
expanding rapidly) between game theorists, physicists, economists, 
mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists and others, all of whom 
have been publishing for decades closely related proofs of undecidability, 
impossibility, uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more bizarre 
is the recent proof by Armando Assis that in the relative state formulation of 
quantum mechanics one can setup a zero-sum game between the universe 
and an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, from which follow the Born rule 
and the collapse of the wave function. Godel was first to demonstrate an 
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impossibility result, and (until the remarkable papers of David Wolpert—see 
below and my review article) it is the most far reaching (or just 
trivial/incoherent), but there have been an avalanche of others. One of the 
earliest in decision theory was the famous General Impossibility Theorem 
(GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for which he got the Nobel Prize 
in economics in 1972—and five of his students are now Nobel laureates so 
this is not fringe science).  It states roughly that no reasonably consistent and 
fair voting system (i.e., no method of aggregating individuals’ preferences 
into group preferences) can give sensible results. The group is either 
dominated by one person, and so GIT is often called the “dictator theorem”, 
or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original paper was titled "A 
Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated like this:” It is 
impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies all of the 
following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; 
Freedom From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those 
familiar with modern decision theory accept this and the many related 
constraining theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find it 
(and all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find a career 
path that has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) 
among legions of publications. 
 
Yanofsky mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and 
Keisler (2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and 
like all these impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind) 
which shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. 
One interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically 
just logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or 
beliefs that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually 
hold (i.e., no clear COS). “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes 
that Bob’s assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ 
(another LG) has been assumed in argumentation, linguistics, philosophy 
etc., for a century at least, but they showed that it is impossible for Ann and 
Bob to assume these beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body of such 
impossibility results for 1 or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., it grades 
into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc). For a good technical paper from 
among the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s 
paper from arXiv.org, which takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s 
infinity (as its title notes it is about “interactive forms of diagonalization and 
self-reference”) and thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of 
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these papers quote Yanofksy’s paper “A universal approach to self- 
referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–
386, 2003. Abramsky (a polymath who is among other things a pioneer in 
quantum computing) is a friend, and so Yanofsky contributes a paper to the 
recent Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum 
Foundations’ (2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) commentary on the BK 
and related paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes 
Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes about Knowledge and 
Belief’.  For a good multi-author survey see ’Collective Decision Making 
(2010). 
 
Since Godel’s famous theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing 
algorithmic ‘randomness’ (‘incompleteness’) throughout math (which is just 
another of our symbolic systems), it seems inescapable that thinking 
(behavior, language, mind) is full of impossible, random or incomplete 
statements and situations. Since we can view each of these domains as 
symbolic systems evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps 
it should be regarded as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, 
Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a group of LG’s) shows there are 
limitless theorems that are true but unprovable— i.e., true for no reason. One 
should then be able to say that there are limitless statements that make perfect 
“grammatical” sense that do not describe actual situations attainable in that 
domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s views. He 
wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his 
work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context 
sensitivity of language, math and logic. The recent papers of Rodych, Floyd 
and Berto are the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the 
foundations of mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
As noted, David Wolpert has derived some amazing theorems in Turing 
Machine Theory and the limits of computation that are very apropros here. 
They have been almost universally ignored but not by well known 
econometricians Koppl and Rosser, who, in their famous 2002 paper “All that 
I have to say has already crossed your mind”, give three theorems on the 
limits to rationality, prediction and control in economics. The first uses 
Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to computability to show some logical limits 
to forecasting the future. Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical 
analog of Godel’s incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant 
can be viewed as its social science analog, though Wolpert is well aware of 
the social implications. K and R‘s second theorem shows possible 
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nonconvergence for Bayesian (probabilistic) forecasting in infinite-
dimensional space. The third shows the impossibility of a computer perfectly 
forecasting an economy with agents knowing its forecasting program. The 
astute will notice that these theorems can be seen as versions of the liar 
paradox and the fact that we are caught in impossibilities when we try to 
calculate a system that includes ourselves has been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, 
Rosser and others in these contexts and again we have circled back to the 
puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R conclude “Thus, 
economic order is partly the product of something other than calculative 
rationality”. Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of 
thousands of papers and hundreds of books. 
 
Reasoning is another word for thinking, which is a disposition like knowing, 
understanding, judging etc. As Wittgenstein was the first to explain, these 
dispositional verbs describe propositions (sentences which can be true or 
false) and thus have what Searle calls Conditions of Satisfaction (COS). That 
is, there are public states of affairs that we recognize as showing their truth 
or falsity. “Beyond reason” would mean a sentence whose truth conditions 
are not clear and the reason would be that it does not have a clear context. It 
is a matter of fact if we have clear COS (i.e., meaning) but we just cannot make 
the observation--this is not beyond reason but beyond our ability to achieve, 
but it’s a philosophical (linguistic) matter if we don’t know the COS. “Are the 
mind and the universe computers?” sounds like it needs scientific or 
mathematical investigation, but it is only necessary to clarify the context in 
which this language will be used since these are ordinary and unproblematic 
terms and it is only their context which is puzzling. 
 
As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W’s dictum that there are no new 
discoveries to be made in philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only 
clear descriptions of behavior (language). Once one understands that all the 
problems are confusions about how language works, we are at peace and 
philosophy in their sense has achieved its purpose. As W/S have noted, there 
is only one reality, so there are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the 
world that can meaningfully be given, and we can only communicate in our 
one public language. There cannot be a private language and any “private 
inner” thoughts cannot be communicated and cannot have any role in our 
social life. It should also be very straightforward to solve philosophical 
problems in this sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." 
Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
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We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the 
bedrock or background and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy 
which S calls the logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive 
psychology of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the 
study of the language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s 
comments on philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its 
translation into the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which 
illuminate the use of language. If not, then showing how they have been 
bewitched by language dispels the confusion. I repeat what Horwich has 
noted on the last page of his superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my 
review): “What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been 
removed--yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been 
explained or discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one 
might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, 
demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough.” 
 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say 
“describing”) and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes 
various theories, and there is no harm in it, provided one realizes they are 
comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general idea of how 
language (the mind) works and that as his “theories” are explicated via 
examples they become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by 
any other name...” When there is a question one has to go back to the 
examples or consider new ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly 
complex and context sensitive (W being the unacknowledged father of 
Contextualism), and so it is utterly unlike physics where one can often derive 
a formula and dispense with the need for further examples. Scientism (the 
use of scientific language and the causal framework) leads us astray in 
describing HOT. 
 
Once again: “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way 
science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness.”(BBB p18). Unlike so many others, S has 
largely avoided and often demolished scientism, but there is a residue which 
evinces itself when he insists on using dispositional S2 terms which describe 
public behavior (thinking, knowing believing etc.) to describe S1 ‘processes’ 
in the brain, that e.g., we can understand consciousness by studying the brain, 
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and that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W made it 
abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or basic language games and 
giving them up or even changing them is not a coherent concept. As noted in 
my other reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from the major 
tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went 
to England to study) and making the common fatal mistake of thinking he is 
smarter than W. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty-- 
-I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing 
as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We 
have already said everything. --- Not anything that follows from this, no this 
itself is the solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly 
expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell 
upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettelp312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the 
reptilian subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories 
and reflexes, and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of 
giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are 
the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true- only axioms of our 
psychology are not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting 
W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (the 
leading expert on W for many years) who gives a good start on it and a 
counterblast to scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
...What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web 
of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang 
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together, the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their 
point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context 
dependency. To this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific 
knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can 
contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s 
cul-de- sac- p15-2005) 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural 
deontic relationships so well described by Searle. I expect this fairly well 
abstracts the basic structure of social behavior. 
 
Several comments bear repeating. So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly 
causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) while S2 has content (i.e. is representational) and is downwardly 
causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical 
Enactivism'), I would translate the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning 
"In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention-- and other S2 
propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
totally dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
originating in) the Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) rapid automatic primitive 
true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, 
as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the 
present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly 
by learned deontic cultural relations, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive 
illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
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reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. 
One refers to the true- only sentences describing our direct perceptions, 
reflexes (including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology which are Causally Self Reflexive (CSR)-(called reflexive or 
intransitive in W’s BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, 
understanding, knowing etc.) which can be acted out, and which can become 
true or  false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? 
 
– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about 
processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we 
shall know more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a 
particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of 
what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in 
the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite 
innocent). —And now the analogy which was to make us understand our 
thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process 
in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied 
mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.   W’s PI p308 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNCp193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that 
can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
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conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
Like Carruthers, Coliva, S and others sometime state (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that 
S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in my reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. However, since 
what S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and 
is in turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is able to 
become propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious or 
conscious but automated activities of S1 must be able to become the conscious 
or deliberative ones of S2. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) 
because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, but if 
S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is 
intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact 
if true, life would not be possible. It would e.g., mean that truth and falsity 
and the facts of the world could be decided without consciousness. As W 
stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book ‘On Certainty’, life must 
be based on certainty-- automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms 
that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die--no evolution, no 
people, no philosophy. 
 
Again, I will repeat some crucial notions. Another idea clarified by S is the 
Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's 
summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our 
desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and 
time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner 
or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would 
restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The resolution 
of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive 
fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term 
personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the 
proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are very restricted extensions of 
unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help 
the poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain 
chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
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thinking of S2, which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and 
by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and 
in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can 
see that this view is not credible. 
 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I 
think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as 
there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 
Budd- Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish 
and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony 
between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." 
And one might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) and that in spite of his frequent warnings 
against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization 
of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find—beyond 
even Searle’s ‘theories’ (who often criticizes W for his famous anti-theoretical 
stance). 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable 
of interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W BBB p34 
 
“Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy” (2008) is a superb and unique 
book, but so totally ignored that my 2015 review is the only one! It should be 
obvious that philosophical issues are always about mistakes in language used 
to describe our universal innate psychology and there is no useful sense in 
which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. 
Such views can exist of philosophy in the broad sense but that is not what 
philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any interesting and substantive 
philosophy) is about. It could take a whole book to discuss this and S does an 
excellent job, so I will just comment here that re p35 propositions are S2 and 
not mental states which are S1 as W made quite clear over ¾ of a century ago 
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and that both Quine and Davidson were equally confused about the basic 
issues involved (both Searle and Hacker have done excellent demolitions of 
Quine). As often, S’s discussion is marred by his failure to carry his 
understanding of W’s “background” to its logical conclusion and so he 
suggests (as he has frequently) that he might have to give up the concept of 
free will—a notion I find (with W) is incoherent. What are the COS (the 
truthmaking event, the test or proof) that could show the truth vs the falsity 
of our not having a choice to lift our arm? 
 
Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our 
axiomatic EP) as our being able to talk at all presupposes it (as W noted 
frequently). It’s also true that “reduction” along with “monism”, “reality”, 
etc.  are complex language games and they do not carry meaning along in 
little backpacks! One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then 
see how another useage (context) differs. 
 
Philosophers (and would-be philosophers) create imaginary problems by 
trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. This situation is nicely 
analyzed by Finkelstein in ‘Holism and Animal Minds’ and so admirably 
summed up by Read in ‘The Hard Problem of Consciousness’ quoted above. 
 
Wittgenstein’s ``Culture and Value``(published in 1980), but written decades 
earlier), though it´s perhaps his least interesting book, has much that is 
pertinent to this discussion, and of course to a large part of modern 
intellectual life. 
 
``There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical 
expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.`` 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we 
are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. 
But the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because 
our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the 
same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if 
it functions in the same way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as long as we still have 
the adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to 
talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep 
stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at 
something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s 
more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people 
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think they can see ` the limits of human understanding´, they believe of course 
that they can see beyond these.`` 
 
Likewise let us try to distill the essence from two of Searle’s recent works. 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost 
invariably matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, 
duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action...these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons 
for action...The general point  is very clear: the creation of the general field of 
desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of 
desire-independent reasons for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
That is, the functioning of our linguistic System 2 presupposes that of our pre-
linguistic System 1. 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
That is, our mental functioning is usually so preoccupied with system 2 as to 
be oblivious to system 1. 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNCp193 
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"So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created 
by collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic 
powers...With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional 
reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech 
acts that have the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional 
reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have 
the same logical form as) Status Function  Declarations,  including the cases 
that  are not  speech  acts in  the explicit  form of Declarations." 
Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have 
the upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, 
like statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and 
in that sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world 
direction of fit. The conative- volitional states such as desires, prior intentions 
and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how 
we would like them to be or how we intend to make them be...In addition to 
these two faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional 
content is not supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents 
of cognition and volition are supposed to fit...the world-relating commitment 
is abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment 
that it represent with either direction of fit." Searle MSWp15 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that 
can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. Prelinguistic 
intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts 
as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language" MSW p69 
 
"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
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because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed 
according to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. 
This is true not just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term `propositional 
attitudes'  by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 
of PNC: "Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction." As S states it in PNC, "A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that 
such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. 
Regarding intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must 
function causally in the production of the action."(MSWp34). 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of 
human cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at 
once, in a way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the 
speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the 
utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has 
a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs" MSW p74 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 
activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about 
throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in 
certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over 
prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
Most people will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 
and 2" or DMS's two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the 
difference between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false 
propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to 
Searle's taking S1 perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his 
work) since they can only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them in MSW) 
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after one begins thinking about them in S2. 
 
Searle often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description 
of one event so for Intention in Action (IA) "We have different levels of 
description where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower 
level...in addition to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the 
causal by means of relation."(p37 MSW). 
 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The COS of PI need a whole action while 
those of IA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions 
(PI) are mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-
action (IA) which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-
reflexive (CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs 
and desires) it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These 
descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 (p38 
MSW), which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for the much 
extended one I present here and in my many articles. In my view, it helps 
enormously to relate this to modern psychological research by using my S1, 
S2 terminology and W's true-only vs propositional (dispositional) 
description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, memory and 
intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so 
wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A 
function is a cause that serves a purpose...In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent...status functions... 
require... collective imposition and recognition of a status"(p59 MSW). 
 
 
I suggest,  the  translation  of  "The  intentionality  of  language  is  created  by  
the  intrinsic,  or  mind-  independent intentionality of human beings" (p66 
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MSW) as "The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1". That is, one must keep in 
mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
Once again, Searle states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, 
perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I 
have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that 
W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is 
propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and 
Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed 
countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty-
-automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a 
doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations 
of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of 
magnitude higher for visual information. 
 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of 
billions and hundreds of millions of years of natural selections by inclusive 
fitness. They facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment 
of Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk in S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about 
`extra-linguistic conventions' and `extra semantical semantics' is in fact 
referring to EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which 
are the basis for all behavior. As W said many times, the most familiar is for 
that reason invisible. 
 
Here again is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason 
operates: We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which 
typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA-- i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), which 
produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness- IF (increased survival for 
genes in ourselves and those closely related). 
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I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at 
all unique to humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if 
we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but 
certainly the higher order DIRA of S2 (DIRA2) that require language are 
uniquely human. The paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2 
(i.e., the S2 acts and their cultural extensions that are desire independent) is 
that the unconscious DIRA1, serving long term inclusive fitness, generate the 
conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate 
desires. Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, 
but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious or merely automated 
DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
Following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only 
reflexive actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the 
basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your 
awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection 
and the impossibility of a truly private language pop up repeatedly 
(“…introspection can never lead to a definition…” p8). The basics of this 
argument are extremely simple—no test, no language and a test can only be 
public. If I grow up alone on a desert island with no books and one day decide 
to call the round things on the trees ‘coconut’ and then next day I see one and 
say ‘coconut’ it seems like I have started on a language. But suppose what I 
say (since there is no person or dictionary to correct me) is ‘coca’ or even 
‘apple’ and the next day something else? Memory is notoriously fallible and 
we have great trouble keeping things straight even with constant correction 
from others and with incessant input from media. This may seem like a trivial 
point but it is central to the whole issue of the Inner and the Outer—i.e., our 
true-only untestable statements of our experience vs the true or false testable 
statements regarding everything in the world, including our own behavior. 
Though W explained this with many examples beginning over ¾ of a century 
ago, it has rarely been understood and it is impossible to go very far with any 
discussion of behavior unless one does. As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Hacker, DMS, 
Johnston and others have explained, anyone who thinks W has an affinity 
with Skinner, Quine, Dennett, Functionalism or any other behaviorist 
excretions that deny our inner life needs to go back to the beginning. 
 
 Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’(1991) is one of the better 
works for gaining insight so I discuss it in detail (see my review for more). 
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On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, 
knowing, believing) which seem like they refer to mental states (i.e., to S1 
automatisms), another major confusion which W was the first to set straight. 
Thus, on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood as another dispositional ability 
that is not a mental state and has no definite duration like thinking, 
understanding, believing etc. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern, Johnston and Moyal-Sharrock are 
exceptions) that W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science 
came into being) suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in 
chaotic processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding 
to a memory trace. He also suggested several times that the causal chain has 
an end and this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the 
state of science) to trace it any further or that the concept of `cause' ceases to 
be applicable beyond a certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made 
similar suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in 
fact over a century now in a few instances). On p32 the “counter-factual 
conditionals” refer again to dispositions such as “may think it’s raining” 
which are possible states of affairs (or potential actions—Searle’s conditions 
of satisfaction) which may arise in chaos. It may be useful to tie this to Searle’s 
3 gaps of intentionality, which he finds critically necessary. 
 
Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there 
is anything that meaning something consists in.” Though W is correct that 
there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted above) 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction” which is an act and not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this 
can be seen as another statement of his argument against private language 
(personal interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule 
following and interpretation on p36 -41—they can only be publicly checkable 
acts--no private rules or private interpretations either. And one must note that 
many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W’s 
frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it’s just arbitrary 
public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes 
clear many times that such conventions are only possible given an innate 
shared psychology which he often calls the background. Budd correctly 
rejects this misinterpretation several times (e.g., p58). 
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In Budd’s next chapter he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in 
modern psychology) is S1 and in W’s terms the true-only undoubtable and 
untestable background. His comment (p47) ...” that our beliefs about our 
present sensations rest upon an absolutely secure foundation- the ‘myth of 
the given’ is one of the principal objects of Wittgenstein’s attack...” can easily 
be misunderstood. Firstly, he makes the universal mistake of calling these 
‘beliefs’, but it is better to reserve this word for S2 true or false dispositions. 
As W made very clear, the sensations, memories and reflexive acts of S1 are 
axiomatic and not subject to belief in the usual sense but are better called 
understandings (my U1). Unlike our S2 beliefs (including those about other 
peoples S1 experiences), there is no mechanism for doubt. Budd explains this 
well, as on p52 where he notes that there is no possible justification for saying 
one is in pain. That is, justifying means testing and that is possible with S2 
dispositional slow conscious thinking, not S1 reflexive fast unconscious 
processing. His discussion of this on p52-56 is excellent but in my view, like 
everyone who discusses W on rules, private language and the inner, all he 
needs to do is say that in S1 there is no possible test and this is the meaning 
of W’s famous the ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria’. That is, 
introspection is vacuous. 
 
Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true-only causal experiences of S1 and the 
reasoned dispositions of S2. 
 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, 
thoughts etc.) is again that they have their use (meaning) and it is the 
designation of dispositions to act, or in Searle’s terms, the specification of 
Conditions of Satisfaction, which make the utterance true. 
 
Again, Budd’s discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating 
that we ‘self-ascribe’ or ‘believe’ in our sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) 
that we have a pain or see a horse, but rather we have no choice—S1 is true-
only and a mistake is a rare and bizarre occurrence and of an entirely different 
kind than a mistake in S2. And S1 is causal as opposed to S2, which concerns 
reasons, and that is why seeing the horse or feeling the pain or jumping out 
of the way of a speeding car is not subject to judgments or mistakes. But he 
gets in right again — “So the infallibility of non-inferential self-ascriptions of 
pain is compatible with the thesis that a true self-ascription of pain must be 
caused by a physical event in the subject’s body, which is identical with the 
pain he experiences (p67).” I do not accept his following statement that W 
would not accept this based on one or two comments in his entire corpus, 
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since in his later work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing 
the causal automated nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which 
then feeds back to S1 to cause muscle movements (including speech). 
Animals survive only because their life is totally directed by the phenomena 
around them which are highly predictable (dogs may jump but they never 
fly). 
 
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on 
how S1 and S2 interact and where our language is ambiguous in what we 
may mean by ‘seeing’. In general, it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ or aspectual seeing 
is part of the slow S2 brain actions while just seeing is the true-only S1 
automatisms, but they are so well integrated that it is often possible to 
describe a situation in multiple ways which explains W’s comment on p97.He 
notes that W is exclusively interested in what I have elsewhere called 
‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., aspectual or S2 higher order processing of 
images. 
 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of 
behavior, it is of great value to refer to Johnston’s ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking 
the Inner’ (1993) and especially to his discussions of the indeterminate nature 
of language. 
 
In Budd’s chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later 
work—the relations between S1 and S2. As I have noted in my other reviews, 
few have fully understood the later W and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is 
not surprising. Thus, Budd’s discussion of seeing (automatic S1) vs 
visualizing (conscious S2 which is subject to the will) is severely hampered. 
Thus, one can understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it 
as the domination of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 it is the familiar issue of 
there being no test for my inner experiences, so whatever I say comes to mind 
when I imagine Jack’s face counts as the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading 
and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination and there is the 
constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where that lack of any 
test makes them inapplicable. See Bennet and Hacker’s ‘Neurophilosophy’, 
DMS, etc. for discussions. On p120 et seq. Budd mentions two of W’s famous 
examples used for combatting this temptation—playing tennis without a ball 
(‘S1 tennis’), and a tribe that had only S2 calculation so ‘calculating in the head 
(‘S1 calculating’) was not possible. ‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual 
or potential acts—i.e., they are disposition words but with plausible reflexive 
S1 uses so as I have said before one really ought to keep them straight by 
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writing ‘playing1’ and ‘playing2’ etc. But we are not taught to do this and so 
we want to either dismiss ‘calculating1’ as a fantasy, or we think we can leave 
its nature undecided until later. Hence W’s famous comment (p120)—“The 
decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one we thought quite innocent.” 
 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the 
speech itself is our thought and there is not some other prior mental process 
and this can be seen as another version of the private language argument -- 
there are no such things as ‘inner criteria’ which enable us to tell what we 
thought before we act (speak). 
 
The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the 
verb ‘intend’ is that they would not be the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name 
of a potential event (PE) and in fact it is not clear what it would mean. “I 
intend to eat” has the COS of eating but if it meant (COS is) eating then it 
wouldn’t describe an intention but an action and if it meant saying the words 
(COS is speech) then it wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it 
function in either case? 
 
To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a 
meaning), we can say ‘When it has clear COS’ and this means has public truth 
conditions. Hence the quote from W: “When I think in language, there aren’t 
‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought.” And, if I think with or without 
words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other 
possible criterion (COS). Thus, W’s lovely aphorisms (p132) “It is in language 
that wish and fulfillment meet” and “Like everything metaphysical, the 
harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the 
language.” 
 
And one might note here that ‘grammar’ in W can usually be translated as 
‘EP’ and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and 
generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and 
higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. Again, this quashes 
Searle’s frequent criticism of W as anti- theoretical—it all depends on the 
nature of the generalization. 
 
It helps greatly in this section of Budd on the harmony of thought with reality 
(i.e., of how dispositions like expecting, thinking, imagining work-- what it 
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means to utter them) to state them in terms of S’s COS which are the PE 
(possible events) which make them true. If I say I expect Jack to come then 
the COS (PE) which makes it true is that Jack arrives and my mental states or 
physical behavior (pacing the room, imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The 
harmony of thought and reality is that jack arrives regardless of my prior or 
subsequent behavior or any mental states I may have and Budd is confused 
or at least confusing when he states (p132 bottom) that there must be an 
internal description of a mental state that can agree with reality and that this 
is the content of a thought, as these terms should be restricted to the 
automatisms of S1 only and never used for the conscious functions of S2. The 
content (meaning) of the thought that Jack will come is the outer (public) 
event that he comes and not any inner mental event or state, which the private 
language argument shows is impossible to connect to the outer events. We 
have very clear verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner 
events’. And as W and S have beautifully demonstrated many times, the 
speech act of uttering the sentence ‘I expect Jack to come’ just is the thought 
that Jack will come and the COS is the same—that Jack does come. And so 
the answer to the two questions on p133 and the import of W’s comment on 
p 135 should now be crystal clear — “In virtue of what is it true that my 
expectation does have that content?” and “What has become now of the 
hollow space and the corresponding solid?” as well as “…the interpolation of 
a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now, the 
sentence itself can serve as such a shadow.” And thus, it should also be quite 
clear what Budd is referring to as to what makes it “possible for there to be 
the required harmony (or lack of harmony) with reality.” 
 
Likewise, with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my 
image of Jack is an image of him? Imagining is another disposition and the 
COS is that the image I have in my head is Jack and that’s why I will say ‘YES’ 
if shown his picture and ‘NO’ if shown one of someone else. The test here is 
not that the photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had 
the COS that) to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: “If God 
had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom 
we were speaking of (PI p217)” and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in “that’s Him” and “…what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies.” Hence W’s summation (p140) that 
“What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he 
calls what happened the wish that that should happen” … the question 
whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. 
And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills 
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it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied” … 
Suppose it were asked ‘Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have 
learned to talk, then I do know.” Disposition words refer to PE’s which I 
accept as fulfilling the COS and my mental states, emotions, change of interest 
etc. have no bearing on the way dispositions function. 
 
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I 
express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be 
expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there 
is less substance to chapter 7. He notes that typically the object and cause are 
the same—i.e., they are causally self- referential (or self reflexive as Searle 
now prefers)—a concept further developed by S. If one looks at my table, it is 
clear emotions have much more in common with the fast, true-only 
automatisms of S1 than with the slow, true or false thinking of S2, but of 
course S1 feeds S2 and in turn is often fed by it. 
 
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the 
model of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the 
denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation 
of the grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s 
hostility to the use of introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is 
its ultimate foundation.” 
 
Now let us take another dose of Searle. 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition ... There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description." Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive 
science is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete 
biological reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference 
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by the fact that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used 
to record both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational 
model of vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is 
simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle 
PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that 
can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
And another shot of Wittgenstein. 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name 
`philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." 
PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. 
--- Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel 
p312-314 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
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logical extensions of S2 into culture. 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true- only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking of S2. 
 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophy has no practical impact 
whatsoever except to clear up confusions about how language is being used 
in particular cases. Like various ‘physical theories’ but unlike other cartoon 
views of life (religious, political, psychological, sociological, anthropological), 
it is too cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it 
is so unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. 
Likewise, with other academic ‘theories of life’ such as the Standard Social 
Science Model widely shared by sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, 
history and literature. However, religions big and small, political movements, 
and sometimes economics often generate or embrace already existing 
cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit forces 
terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions (EP defaults), and help to 
lay waste to the earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice and 
institution, which are there to facilitate replication of genes and consumption 
of resources). The point is to realize that these are on a continuum with 
philosophical cartoons and have the same source (our evolved psychology). 
All of us could be said to generate/absorb various cartoon views of life when 
young and only a few ever grow out of them. 
 
Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and 
confusing in most (maybe all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ anywhere 
substitute ‘cognition’ or ‘thinking’, since thinking about what we or others 
believe or know is thinking like any other and does not have to be seen as 
‘mindreading’ (Understanding of Agency or UA in my terminology) either. 
In S’s terms, the COS are the test of what is being thought and they are 
identical for ‘it’s raining’, I believe it’s raining’, ‘I believe I believe it’s raining’ 
and ‘he believes it’s raining’ (likewise for ‘knows’, wishes, judges, 
understands, etc.), namely that it’s raining. This is the critical fact to keep in 
mind regarding ‘metacognition’ and ‘mindreading’ of dispositions 
(‘propositional attitudes’). 
 
Now for a few extracts from my review of Carruthers’ (C) ‘The Opacity of 
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Mind’ (2013) which is replete with the classical confusions dressed up as 
science. It was the subject of a precis in Brain and Behavioral Sciences (BBS) 
that is not to be missed. 
 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s 
illusions), who seems to find these ideas quite good, except that C should 
eliminate the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a higher self (the aim 
being hard reduction of S2 to S1). Of course, the very act of writing, reading 
and all the language and concepts of anything whatsoever presuppose self, 
consciousness and will (as S often notes), so such an account would be just a 
cartoon of life without any value whatsoever, which one could say of most 
philosophical and many ‘scientific’ disquisitions on behavior. The W/S 
framework has long noted that the first person point of view is not eliminable 
or reducible to a 3rd person one, but this is no problem for the cartoon view 
of life. Likewise, with the description of brain function or behavior as 
‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc., -- all well debunked countless 
times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker and many others. Worst of all is the crucial 
but utterly unclear “representation”, for which I think S’s use as a condition 
of satisfaction (COS) is by far the best. That is, the ‘representation’ of ‘I think 
it’s raining’ is the COS that it’s raining. 
 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett and Searle) thinks he is an expert on W, 
having studied him early in his career and decided that the private language 
argument is to be rejected as ‘behaviorism’! W famously rejected behaviorism 
and much of his work is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a 
description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t 
you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a 
fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) 
And one can also point to real behaviorism in C in its modern 
‘computationalist’ form. W/S insist on the indispensability of the first person 
point of view while C apologizes to D in the BBS article for using “I” or “self”. 
 
Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve 
to characterize C as well, since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s 
and many others) to be on the same page. S is one of many who have 
deconstructed D in various writings and these can all be read in opposition 
to C. And let us recall that W sticks to examples of language in action, and 
once one gets the point he is mostly very easy to follow, while C is captivated 
by ‘theorizing’ (i.e., chaining numerous sentences with no clear COS) and 
rarely bothers with specific language games, preferring experiments and 
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observations that are quite difficult to interpret in any definitive way (see the 
BBS responses), and which in any case have no relevance to higher level 
descriptions of behavior (e.g., exactly how do  they fit into the Intentionality 
Table). One book he praises as definitive (Memory and the Computational 
Brain) presents the brain as a computational information processor—a 
sophomoric view thoroughly and repeatedly annihilated by S and others, 
including W in the 1930’s. In the last decade, I have read thousands of pages 
by and about W and it is quite clear that C does not have a clue. In this he 
joins a long line of distinguished philosophers whose reading of W was 
fruitless—Russell, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam, Chomsky etc. 
(though Putnam began to see the light later). They just cannot grasp the 
message that most philosophy is grammatical jokes and impossible 
vignettes—a cartoon view of life. 
 
Books like ‘The Opacity of Mind’ that attempt to bridge two sciences or two 
levels of description are really two books and not one. There is the description 
(not explanation, as W made clear) of our language and nonverbal behavior 
and then the experiments of cognitive psychology. “The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the 
problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another 
by."(W PI p232), Cet al are enthralled by science and just assume that it is a 
great advance to wed high-level descriptive psychology to neuroscience and 
experimental psychology, but W/S and many others have shown this is a 
mistake. Far from making the description of behavior scientific and clear, it 
makes it incoherent. And it must have been by the grace of God that Locke, 
Kant, Nietzsche, Hume, Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give such 
memorable accounts of behavior without any experimental science 
whatsoever. Of course, like politicians, philosophers rarely admit mistakes or 
shut up, so this will go on and on for reasons W diagnosed perfectly. The 
bottom line has to be what is useful and what makes sense in our everyday 
life. I suggest the philosophical views of CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, 
Churchland), as opposed to those of W/S, are not useful and their ultimate 
conclusions that will, self and consciousness are illusions make no sense at 
all—i.e., they are meaningless, having no clear COS. Whether the CDC 
comments on cognitive science have any heuristic value remains to be 
determined. 
 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of 
other animals and to reduce behavior to brain functions (to absorb 
psychology into physiology). The philosophy is a disaster but, provided one 
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first reads the many criticisms in the BBS, the commentary on recent 
psychology and physiology may be of interest. Like Dennett, Churchland and 
so many others often do, C does not reveal his real gems til the end, when we 
are told that self, will, consciousness are illusions (supposedly in the normal 
senses of this words). Dennett had to be unmasked by S, Hutto et al for 
explaining away these ‘superstitions’ (i.e., doing the usual philosophical 
move of not explaining at all and in fact not even describing) but amazingly 
C admits it at the beginning, though of course he thinks he is showing us 
these words do not mean what we think and that his cartoon use is the valid 
one. 
 
One should also see Bennett and Hacker’s criticisms of cognitive science in 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ (2003) and their debate with S 
and Dennett in ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ (2009-and don’t miss the final 
essay by Daniel Robinson). It is also well explored in Hacker’s three recent 
books on "Human Nature". 
 
There have long been books on chemical physics and physical chemistry but 
there is no sign that the two will merge (nor is it a coherent idea) nor that 
chemistry will absorb biochemistry nor it in turn will absorb physiology or 
genetics, nor that biology will disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, 
sociology, etc. This is not due to the ‘youth’ of these disciplines but to the fact 
that they are different levels of description with entirely different concepts, 
data and explanatory mechanisms. But physics envy is powerful and we just 
cannot resist the ‘precision’ of physics, math, information, and computation 
vs the vagueness of higher levels. It ‘must’ be possible. Reductionism thrives 
in spite of the incomprehensibility of quantum mechanics, uncertainty, 
wave/particles, live/dead cats, quantum entanglement, and the 
incompleteness and randomness of math (Godel/Chaitin—see my full review 
of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’ and the excerpts here) and its 
irresistible pull tells us it is due to EP defaults. Again, a breath of badly 
needed fresh air from W: “For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.” PI p107. It is hard to resist 
throwing down most books on behavior and rereading W and S. Just jump 
from anything trying to ‘explain’ higher order behavior to e.g. these quotes 
from PI 
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-
138_239-309.html. 
 
It is clear to me after reading ten thousand pages of philosophy in the last 
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decade that the attempt to do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, 
where ordinary language morphs into special uses both deliberately and 
inadvertently, is essentially impossible (i.e., the normal situation in 
philosophy and other behavioral disciplines).Using special jargon words 
(e.g., intensionality, realism etc.) does not work either as there are no 
philosophy police to enforce a narrow definition and the arguments on what 
they mean are interminable. Hacker is good but his writing so precious and 
dense it’s often painful. Searle is very good but requires some effort to 
embrace his terminology and makes some egregious mistakes, while W is 
hands down the clearest and most insightful, once you grasp what he is 
doing, and nobody has ever been able to emulate him. His TLP remains the 
ultimate statement of the mechanical reductionist view of life, but he later 
saw his mistake and diagnosed and cured the ‘cartoon disease’, but few get 
the point and most simply ignore him and biology as well, and so there are 
tens of thousands of books and millions of articles and most religious and 
political organizations (and until recently most of economics) and almost all 
people with cartoon views of life.  But the world is not a cartoon, so a great 
tragedy is being played out as the cartoon views of life collide with reality 
and universal blindness and selfishness bring about the collapse of 
civilization. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as all basic behavior—it is the default operation of 
our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious. 
 
However, it is true that most of behavior is mechanical and that The 
Phenomenological Illusion is of vastly greater reach than Searle describes. It 
is most striking to me when driving a car on the freeway and suddenly 
snapping back to S2 awareness startled to realize I have just driven for several 
minutes with no conscious awareness at all. On reflection, this automatism 
can be seen to account for almost all of our behavior with just minimal 
supervision and awareness from S2. I am writing this page and have to think 
about what to say, but then it just flows out into my hands which type it and 
by and large it’s a surprise to me except when I think of changing a specific 
sentence. And you read it giving commands to your body to sit still and look 
at this part of the page but the words just flow into you and some kind of 
understanding and memory happen but unless you concentrate on a sentence 
there is only a vague sense of doing anything. A soccer player runs down the 
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field and kicks the ball and thousands of nerve impulses and muscle 
contractions deftly coordinated with eye movements, and feedback from 
proprioceptive and balance organs have occurred, but there is only a vague 
feeling of control and high level awareness of the results. S2 is the Chief of 
Police who sits in his office while S1 has thousands of officers doing the actual 
work according to laws that he mostly does not even know. Reading, writing 
or soccer are voluntary acts A2 seen from above but composed of thousands 
of automatic acts A1 seen from below. Much of contemporary behavioral 
science is concerned with these automatisms. 
 
It is a good idea to read at least Chapter 6 of Searle’s PNC, “The 
Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI). It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to 
obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious 
thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate 
blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and gave 
the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic 
axiomatic network of our innate System 1 which is the source of the Inner. 
Very roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 
or The Inner, and ‘observer dependent’ features as S2 or The Outer should 
prove very revealing. As Searle notes, the Phenomenologists have the 
ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost everyone due to the 
defaults of their EP. 
 
Another excellent work on W that deserves close study is Johnston’s 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ (1993). He notes that some will object 
that if our reports and memories are really untestable they would have no 
value but “This objection misses the whole point of W’s argument, for it 
assumes that what actually happened, and what the individual says 
happened, are two distinct things. As we have seen, however, the grammar 
of psychological statements means that the latter constitutes the criteria for 
the former. If we see someone with a concentrated expression on her face and 
want to know ‘what is going on inside her’, then her sincerely telling us that 
she is trying to work out the answer to a complicated sum tells us exactly 
what we want to know. The question of whether, despite her sincerity, her 
statement might be an inaccurate description of what she is (or was) doing 
does not arise. The source of confusion here is the failure to recognize that 
psychological concepts have a different grammar from that of concepts used 
to describe outer events. What makes the inner seem so mysterious is the 
misguided attempt to understand one concept in terms of another. In fact our 
concept of the Inner, what we mean when we talk of ‘what was going on 
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inside her’ is linked not to mysterious inner processes, but to the account 
which the individual offers of her experience…As processes or events, what 
goes on inside the individual is of no interest, or rather is of a purely medical 
or scientific interest” (p13-14). 
 
“W’s attack on the notion of inner processes does not imply that only the 
Outer matters, on the contrary; by bringing out the true nature of utterances, 
he underlines the fact that we aren’t just interested in behavior. We don’t just 
want to know that the person’s body was in such and such a position and that 
her features arranged in such and such a way. Rather we are interested in her 
account of what lay behind this behavior…” (p16-17) 
 
In laying out W’s reasoning on the impossibility of private rules or a private 
language, he notes that “The real problem however is not simply that she fails 
to lay down rules, but that in principle she could not do so…The point is that 
without publicly checkable procedures, she could not distinguish between 
following the rule and merely thinking she is following the rule.” 
 
On p55 Johnston makes the point with respect to vision (which has been made 
many times by W and S in this and other contexts) that the discussion of the 
Outer is entirely dependent for its very intelligibility on the unchallengeable 
nature of our direct first person experience of the Inner. The System 2 
sceptical doubts concerning mind, will, senses, world, cannot get a foothold 
without the true-only certainties of System 1 and the certainty that you are 
reading these words now is the basis for judgment, not a thing that can itself 
be judged. This mistake is one of the most basic and common in all 
philosophy. 
 
On p81 he makes the point that the impossibility, in the normal case, of 
checking your statements concerning your dispositions (often but 
confusingly called ‘propositional attitudes’) such as what you thought or are 
feeling, far from being a defect of our psychology, is exactly what gives these 
statements interest. “I am tired” tells us how you are feeling rather than 
giving us another bit of data about the Outer such as your slow movements 
or the shadows under your eyes. 
 
Johnston then does an excellent job of explaining W’s debunking of the idea 
that meaning or understanding (and all dispositions) are experiences that 
accompany speech. As W pointed out, just consider the case where you think 
you understand, and then find out you did not, to see the irrelevance of any 
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inner experience to meaning, understanding, thinking, believing, knowing 
etc. The experience which counts is the awareness of the public language 
game we participate in. Similar considerations dissolve the problem of the 
‘lightning speed of thought’. “The key is to recognize that thinking is not a 
process or a succession of experiences but an aspect of the lives of conscious 
beings. What corresponds to the lightning speed of thought is the individual’s 
ability to explain at any point what she is doing or saying.” (p86). And as W 
says “Or, if one calls the beginning and the end of the sentence the beginning 
and end of the thought, then it is not clear whether one should say of the 
experience of thinking that it is uniform during this time or whether it is a 
process like speaking the sentence itself” (RPP2p237). 
 
Again: “The individuals account of what she thought has the same grammar 
as her account of what she intended and of what she meant. What we are 
interested in is the account of the past she is inclined to give and the 
assumption that she will be able to give an account is part of what is involved 
in seeing her as conscious” (p 91). That is, all these disposition verbs are part 
of our conscious, voluntary S2 psychology. 
 
In “The Complexity of the Inner”, he notes that it is ironic that our best way 
to communicate the Inner is to refer to the Outer but I would say it is both 
natural and unavoidable. Since there is no private language and no telepathy, 
we can only contract muscles and by far the most efficient and deep 
communication is by contracting oral muscles (speech). As W commented in 
several contexts, it is in plays (or now in TV and films) that we see language 
(thought) in its purest form. 
 
Dispositions like intending continue as long as we don’t change or forget 
them and thus lack a precise duration as well as levels of intensity and the 
content is a decision and so is not a precise mental state, so in all these respects 
they are quite different from S1 perceptions, memories and reflexive 
responses like S1 emotions. 
 
The difference between S1 and S2 (as I put it- this was not a terminology 
available to J or W) also is seen in the asymmetry of the disposition verbs, 
with the first person use of ‘I believe’ etc., being (in the normal case of sincere 
utterance) true-only sentences vs the third person use ‘he believes’ etc., being 
true or false evidence-based propositions. One cannot say “I believe it is 
raining and it isn’t” but other tenses such as “I believed it was raining and it 
wasn’t” or the third person “He believes it is raining and it isn’t” are OK. As 
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J says: “The general issue at the heart of the problem here is whether the 
individual can observe her own dispositions…The key to clarifying this 
paradox is to note that the individuals description of her own state of mind is 
also indirectly the description of a state of affairs…In other words, someone 
who says she believes P is thereby committed to asserting P itself…The reason 
therefor that the individual cannot observe her belief is that by adopting a 
neutral or evaluatory stance towards it, she undermines it. Someone who said 
“I believe it’s raining but it isn’t” would thereby undermine her own 
assertion. As W notes, there can be no first person equivalent of the third 
person use of the verb for the same reason that a verb meaning to believe 
falsely would lack a first person present indicative...the two propositions are 
not independent, for ‘the assertion that this is going on inside me asserts: this 
is going on outside me’ (RPP1 p490)” (p154-56). Though not commented on 
by W or J, the fact that children never make such mistakes as “I want the 
candy but I don’t believe I want it” etc., shows that such constructions are 
built into our grammar (into our genes) and not cultural add-ons. 
 
He then looks at this from another viewpoint by citing W “What would be 
the point of my drawing conclusions from my own words to my behavior, 
when in any case I know what I believe? And what is the manifestation of my 
knowing what I believe? Is it not manifested precisely in this-that I do not 
infer my behaviour from my words? That is the fact.” 
 
(RPP1 p744). Another way to say this is that S1 is the axiomatic true-only basis 
for cognition, and as the non- propositional substrate for determining truth 
and falsity, cannot be intelligibly judged. 
 
He ends the chapter with important comments on the variability within the 
LG’s (within our psychology) and I suggest it be read carefully. 
 
Johnston continues the discussion in “The Inner/Outer Picture” much of 
which is summed up in his quote from W. “The inner is hidden from us 
means that it is hidden from us in a sense that it is not hidden from him. And 
it is not hidden from the owner in the sense that he gives expression to it, and 
we, under certain conditions, believe his expression and there, error has no 
place. And this asymmetry in the game is expressed in the sentence that the 
Inner is hidden from other people.” (LWPP2 p36). J goes on: “The problem is 
not that inner is hidden but that the language game it involves is very 
different from those where we normally talk about knowledge.” And then he 
enters into one of W’s major themes throughout his life—the difference 
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between man and machine. “But with a human being the assumption is that 
it is impossible to gain an insight into the mechanism. Thus, indeterminacy is 
postulated…I believe unpredictability must be an essential characteristic of 
the Inner. As also is the endless diversity of expressions.” (RPP2 p645 and 
LWPP2 p65). Again, W probes the difference between animals and 
computers. 
 
J notes that the uncertainties in our LG’s are not defects but critical to our 
humanity. Again W: “[What matters is] not that the evidence makes the 
feeling (and so the Inner) merely probable, but that we treat this as evidence 
for something important, that we base a judgement on this involved sort of 
evidence, and so that such evidence has a special importance in our lives and 
is made prominent by a concept.” (Z p554). 
 
J sees three aspects of this uncertainty as the lack of fixed criteria or fine 
shades of meaning, the absence of rigid determination of the consequences of 
inner states and the lack of fixed relationships between our concepts and 
experience. W:  ”One can’t say what the essential observable consequences of 
an inner state are. When, for example, he really is pleased, what is then to be 
expected of him, and what not? There are of course such characteristic 
consequences, but they can’t be described in the same way as reactions which 
characterize the state of a physical object.” (LWPP2 p90). J “Here her inner 
state is not something we cannot know because we cannot penetrate the veil 
of the Outer. Rather there is nothing determinate to know.” (p195). 
 
In his final chapter, he notes that our LG’s are not likely to change regardless 
of scientific progress. “Although it is conceivable that the study of brain 
activity might turn out to be a more reliable predictor of human behavior, the 
sort of understanding of human action it gave would not be the same as that 
involved in the language game on intentions. Whatever the value of the 
scientist’s discovery, it could not be said to have revealed what intentions 
really are.” (p213). 
 
This indeterminateness leads to the notion that correlation of brain states with 
dispositions seems unlikely. “The difficulty here is that the notion of one 
thought is a highly artificial concept. How many thoughts are there in the 
Tractatus? And when the basic idea for it struck W, was that one thought or 
a rash of them? The notion of intentions creates similar problems…These 
subsequent statements can all be seen as amplifications or explanations of the 
original thought, but how are we to suppose this relates to the brain state? 
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Are we to imagine that it too will contain the answer to every possible 
question about the thought? ..we would have to allow that two significantly 
different thoughts are correlated with the same brain state…words may in 
one sense be interchangeable and in another sense not. This creates problems 
for the attempt to correlate brain states and thoughts…two thoughts may be 
the same in one sense and different in another…Thus the notion of one 
thought is a fragile and artificial one and for that reason it is hard to see what 
sense it could make to talk of a one to one correlation with brain states.” 
(p218-219). That is, the same thought (COS) “it’s raining” expresses an infinite 
number of brain states in one or many people. Likewise, the ‘same’ brain state 
might express different thoughts (COS) in different contexts. 
 
Likewise, W denies that memory consists of traces in the nervous system. 
“Here the postulated trace is like the inner clock, for we no more infer what 
happened from a trace than we consult an inner clock to guess the time.” He 
then notes an example from W (RPP1 p908) of a man jotting marks while he 
reads and who cannot repeat the text without the marks but they don’t relate 
to the text by rules …  ”The text would not be stored up in the jottings. And 
why should it be stored up in our nervous system?” and also “…nothing 
seems more plausible to me than that people will someday come to the 
definite opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or the 
nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought or a particular 
idea of memory” (LWPP1 p504). This implies that there can be psychological 
regularities to which no physiological regularities correspond; and as W 
provocatively adds ‘If this upsets our concepts of causality, then it is high 
time they were upset.’” (RPP1 p905) …’Why should not the initial and the 
terminal states of a system be connected by a natural law which does not 
cover the intermediary state? (RPP1 p909) ... [It is quite likely that] there is no 
process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking, so that it 
would be impossible to read off thought processes from brain 
processes…Why should this order, so to speak, not proceed out of chaos? ...as 
it were, causelessly; and there is no reason why this should not really hold for 
our thoughts, and hence for our talking and writing.’(RPP1 p903)…But must 
there be a physiological explanation here? Why don’t we just leave explaining 
alone? -but you would never talk like that if you were examining the behavior 
of a machine! – Well who says that a living creature, an animal body, is a 
machine in this sense?’” (RPPI p918) (p 220- 21). 
 
Of course, one can take these comments variously, but one way is that W 
anticipates the rise of chaos theory, embodied mind and self organization in 
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biology. Since uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability are standard doctrine 
now, from subatomic to molecular scale, and in planetary dynamics (weather 
etc.,) and cosmology, why should the brain be an exception? The only 
detailed comments on these remarks I have seen are in a recent paper by 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS). 
 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all 
study of behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, 
anthropology, politics, sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most 
books and articles, with even the exceptions having little to say, and most of 
that distorted or flat wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in 
philosophy, and possibly this preposterous situation will change, but 
probably not much. 
 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes 
and the S2 reasons in Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book ‘Human Nature’ 
(2011), especially p226-32, is critical for any student of behavior. It is a nearly 
universal delusion that “cause” is a precise logically exact term while 
“reason” is not but W exposed this many times. Of course, the same issue 
arises with all scientific and mathematical concepts. And of course, one must 
keep constantly in mind that ‘action’, ‘condition’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, 
and even ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘prior’, ‘true’ etc. are all complex language games able to 
trip us up as W so beautifully described in BBB in the early 30’s. 
 
Searle make many interesting remarks in one of his most recent books 
‘Thinking About the Real World’ (TARW)(2013),and I seem to have written 
the only review, so I will discuss it in detail here. 
 
On p21 of TARW we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in 
S’s work and one that should have been obviated long ago had he only read 
the later W and his commentators more carefully. He refers to free will as an 
“assumption” that we may have to give up! It is crystal clear from W that will, 
self, world, and all the phenomena of our lives are the basis for judging-the 
axiomatic bedrock of our behavior and there is no possibility of judging them. 
Can we “assume” we have two hands or live on the surface of the earth or 
that Madonna is a singer etc.? Perhaps this huge mistake is connected with 
his blending of true only S1 and propositional S2 which I have noted. 
Amazing that he can get nearly everything else right and stumble on this! 
 
On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which 
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he first discussed in his 1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the 
sorts of things that could become conscious (e.g., dreams). W was I think the 
first to comment on this noting that if you can’t speak of unconscious 
thoughts you can’t speak of conscious ones either (BBB). Here and 
throughout his work it is unfortunate that he does not use the S1/S2 concepts 
as it makes it so much easier to keep things straight and he still finds it 
necessary to indulge in very un-Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have 
manipulable syntactical elements, you can detach intentionality from its 
immediate causes in the form of perceptions and memories, in a way that it 
is not possible to make detachments of unsyntactically structured 
representational elements.” (p31) just says that with language came the 
dispositional intentionality of S2 where conscious thought and reason became 
possible. 
 
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) see elsewhere here and my reviews of 
his other works. 
 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states, and his reference to 
mental states as representations (actually ‘presentations’ here) with COS, is 
(in my view) counterproductive. On p25 e.g., it seems he wants to say that the 
apple we see is the COS of the CSR – (Causally Self Reflexive--i.e., cause is 
built in) perception of the apple and the reflexive unconscious scratching of 
an itch has the same status (i.e., a COS) as the deliberate planned movement 
of the arm. Thus, the mental states of S1 are to be included with the actions of 
S2 as COS. Though I accept most of S’s ontology and epistemology I don’t see 
the advantage of this, but I have the greatest respect for him so I will work on 
it. I have noted his tendency (normal for others but a flaw in Searle) to mix S1 
and S2 which he does on p29 where he seems to be referring to beliefs as 
mental states. It seems to me quite basic and clear since W’s BBB in the 30’s 
that S2 are not mental states in anything like the sense ofS1. 
 
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true-only 
unconscious percepts, memories and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic 
EP. As noted, one can read Hutto and Myin’s book ‘Radicalizing Enactivism: 
Basic Minds Without Content’ (2012) for a very different recent account of the 
nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1. 
 
The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and 
which I have used as the basis for my extended table above. 
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Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was 
a revolutionary advance in our understanding of behavior. He has continued 
to develop the naturalistic description of behavior and on p39 he shows how 
ethics originates in our innate social behavior and language. A basic concept 
is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA) which is explained in 
his various books. For an outline see my reviews of his MSW and other works. 
He tends to use the proximate reasons of S2 (i.e., dispositional psychology 
and culture) to frame his analysis but as with all behavior I regard it as 
superficial unless it includes the ultimate causes in S1 and so I break his DIRA 
into DIRA1 and DIRA2. This enables the description in terms of the 
unconscious mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness. Thus, I 
would restate the last sentence on p39 “…people are asked to override their 
natural inclinations by making ethical considerations prevail” as “…people 
are compelled to override their immediate personal benefits to secure long 
term genetic benefits via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.” 
 
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern 
two systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” 
epistemology as stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is 
most unfortunate (as I have noted in many reviews). It was W who did the 
first and best job of describing the two systems (though nobody else has 
noticed) and OC represents a major event in intellectual history. Not only is 
S unaware of the fact that his framework is a straightforward continuation of 
W, but everyone else is too, which accounts for the lack of any significant 
reference to W in this book. As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance 
with EP, which can enlighten all discussions of behavior by providing the real 
ultimate evolutionary and biological explanations rather than the superficial 
proximate cultural ones. 
 
Thus, S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on 
p202 is in my view vastly clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain 
is automatic true-only S1, but as soon as we attend to it consciously (ca. 500 
msec or more) it becomes ‘seeing as’ and a propositional (true or false) S2 
function that can be expressed publicly in language (and other bodily muscle 
contractions as well). Thus, the S1 ‘experience’ that is identical with red or the 
pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ of red or pain, once we begin to reflect on it, 
normally are blended together into one ‘experience’. For me by far the best 
place to get an understanding of these issues is still in W’s writings beginning 
with the BBB and ending with OC. Nobody else has ever described the 
subtleties of the language games with such clarity. One must keep constantly 
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in mind the vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, ‘true’, 
‘experience’, ‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to 
do it—even S stumbles frequently. And it is not a trivial issue—unless one 
can clearly restate all of p202 separating the true-only non-judgeable S1 from 
the propositional S2 then nothing about behavior can be said without 
confusion. And of course, very often (i.e., normally) words are used without 
a clear meaning—one has to specify how ‘true’ or ‘follows from’ or ‘see’ is to 
be used in this context and W is the only one I know of who consistently gets 
this right. 
 
Again, on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional automatic 
causal dispositionality only makes sense to me because I look at it as just 
another way to describe S1 states which provide the raw material for 
deliberate conscious S2 dispositionality which, from a biological evolutionary 
point of view (and what other can there be?) has to be the case. Thus, his 
comment on p212 is right on the money— the ultimate explanation (or as W 
insists the description) can only be a naturalized one which describes how 
mind, will, self and intention work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them 
as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall S’s famous review of Dennett’s ‘Consciousness 
Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained away”. And this makes it all 
the more bizarre that S should repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure if 
we have free will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
 
Also, I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that 
the confusions are due to historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, 
idealism, materialism, epiphenomenalism etc., rather than in universal 
susceptibility to the defaults of our psychology — ‘The Phenomenological 
Illusion’ (TPI) as he has termed it, and bewitchment by language as 
beautifully described by W. As he notes, “The neurobiological processes and 
the mental phenomena are the same event, described at different levels” and 
“How can conscious intentions cause bodily movement? …How can the 
hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what solidity 
is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see 
analogously there is no philosophical problem left over.” 
 
I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to 
refer only if in the utterance of the referring expressions the speaker 
introduces a condition that the object referred to satisfies; and reference is 
achieved in virtue of the satisfaction of that condition.” as “Meaning is 
achieved by stating a publicly verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth 
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condition).” “I think it is raining” is true if it is raining and false otherwise. 
 
Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, 
as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of 
our representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that does not depend 
on our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
Time for some more quotes and a discussion of his recent book of reprints 
‘Philosophy in a New Century’ (2008) and as elsewhere I will repeat some 
comments to place them in a different context. 
 
“Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. 
Indeed, only a machine process can cause a thought process, and 
‘computation’ does not name a machine process; it names a process that can 
be, and typically is, implemented on a machine.” Searle PNC p73 
 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of 
a physical system from outside; and the identification of the process as 
computational does not identify an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is 
essentially an observer relative characterization.” Searle PNC p95 
 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to 
syntax. I am now making the separate and different point that syntax is not 
intrinsic to physics.” Searle PNC p94 
 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive 
decomposition fails, because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the 
physics is to put a homunculus in the physics.” Searle PNC p97 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description.” Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive 
science is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete 
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biological reality of intrinsic intentionality…We are blinded to this difference 
by the fact that the same sentence ‘I see a car coming toward me,’ can be used 
to record both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational 
model of vision…in the sense of ‘information’ used in cognitive science, it is 
simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device.” Searle 
PNC p104-105 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The   
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.”  Searle PNC p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost 
invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, 
duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a  reason for 
action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons 
for action…The general point  is very clear: the creation of the general field of 
desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of 
desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is 
not consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the 
phenomenological illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness 
has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the 
underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to 
ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and 
therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, 
something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
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relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work 
follows directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say 
that Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W 
study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the 
same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately 
describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W 
said (as they must if they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I 
find most of S foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese 
room argument against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of 
Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should 
read Victor Rodych's excellent, but virtually unknown, supplement on the 
CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb 
papers on W's philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary 
Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 ability of counting up to 3, as extended 
into the endless System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. 
 
W’s insights into the psychology of math provide an excellent entry into 
intentionality. I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, the 
multifarious versions of behaviorism, computer functionalism, CTM 
(Computational Theory of Mind) and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), seems 
to be aware that W's Tractatus can be viewed as the most striking and 
powerful statement of their viewpoint ever penned (i.e., behavior (thinking) 
as the logical processing of facts--i.e., information processing). Of course, later 
(but before the digital computer was a gleam in Turing's eye) W described in 
great detail why these were incoherent descriptions of mind that must be 
replaced by psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the rest of his 
life). S however makes little reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as 
mechanism, and his destruction of it in his later work. 
 
Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views 
of behavior, and perhaps the most important descriptive psychologist 
(philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, 
by and large, do others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and 
Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, 
and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you 
approach it from the right direction.  See my articles for more details. 
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Like W, Searle is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his 
written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, 
his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and 
confusions. On p7 of PNC he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts 
is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but as 
Coliva, DMS et al have noted, W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that 
there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our 
System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is the basis for 
judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us 
that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call 
Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty 
(Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true 
or false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over 
and over again. One word-- two (or many) distinct uses. 
 
On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, 
‘theorizing’ is another language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a 
general description of behavior with few well worked out examples and one 
that emerges from a large number of such that is not subject to many 
counterexamples. Evolution in its early days was a theory with limited clear 
examples but soon became just a summary of a vast body of examples and a 
theory in a quite different sense. Likewise, with a theory one might make as 
a summary of a thousand pages of W’s examples and one resulting from ten 
pages. 
 
Again, on p12, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 
functioning that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the 
normal case, a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own 
case and a true-only perception in the case of others. 
 
As I read p13 I thought: “Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if 
nothing is wrong?” No! —this would not be ‘pain’ in the same sense. “The 
inner experience stands in need of outer criteria” (W) and Searle seems to 
miss this.  See W or Johnston. 
 
As I read the next few pages I felt that W has a much better grasp of the 
mind/language connection, as he regards them as synonymous in many 
contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified in 
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numerous perspicuous examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if 
it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." And as explained above I feel the 
questions with which S ends section 3 are largely answered by considering 
W’s OC from the standpoint of the two systems. Likewise, for section 6 on the 
philosophy of science. Rodych has done an article on Popper vs W which I 
thought superb at the time but I will have to reread it to make sure. 
 
Finally, on p25, one can deny that any revision of our concepts (language 
games) of causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read 
just about any page of W and much of DMS, Coliva, Hacker etc. for the 
reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples 
from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything 
relevant to our normal use of words. 
 
On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy 
and life) of identical words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of 
‘belief’, ‘seeing’ etc., as applied to S1 which is composed of mental states in 
the present only, and S2 which is not. The rest of the chapter summarizes his 
work on ‘social glue’ which, from an EP, Wittgensteinian perspective, is the 
automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are 
inexorably and universally expanded during personal development into a 
wide array of automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and 
arbitrarily into cultural variations on them. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical 
view of mind which seem to me definitive. I have read whole books of 
responses to them and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical 
(psychological) points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half a 
century earlier before there were computers). To put it in my terms, S1 is 
composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non- 
propositional, true-only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). Computers and the rest of nature have only derived 
(ascribed) intentionality that is dependent on our perspective while higher 
animals have primary intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S 
and W appreciate, the great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical 
reductions of psychology masquerade as cutting edge science, but in fact they 
are utterly anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and cognitive 
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psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is 
Hofstadter, Dennett, Carruthers, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
 
Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has 
still not quite let go of the blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in 
terms of the cultural extensions of S2. As he does in many other places in his 
writings, he gives cultural, historical reasons for behaviorism, but it seems 
quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists 
for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our 
EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious. As noted above, Searle has described this as TPI. Again, on p65 I 
find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions 
in his OC and other works to be deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we are 
NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather it is not open to doubt. 
See the earlier section of this article dealing with OC and DMS. 
 
Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that ‘computation’, 
‘information’, ‘syntax’, ‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer 
relative (i.e., psychological) terms and have no physical or mathematical 
meaning(COS) in this psychological sense, but of course there are other 
senses they have been given recently as science has developed. Again, people 
are bewitched by the use of the same word into ignoring that vast difference 
in its use (meaning). These comments are all extensions of classic 
Wittgenstein and in this connection, I recommend Hutto’s and Read’s papers 
too. 
 
Chapter 6 “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, 
while demolishing that field, it shows both his supreme logical abilities and 
his failure to grasp the full power of both the later W, and the great heuristic 
value of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal 
that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the 
slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is 
classic Blank Slate blindness. It is clear that W showed this some 60 years 
earlier and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only 
unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1. Like so 
many others, Searle dances all around it but never quite gets there. Very 
roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 and 
‘observer dependent’ features as S2 should prove very revealing. As S notes, 
Heidegger and the others have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course 
 92  
so does almost everyone due to the defaults of their EP. 
 
But the really important thing is that S does not take the next step to realizing 
that TPI is not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness 
to our EP that is itself built into EP. He actually states this in almost these 
words at one point, but if he really got it how could he fail to point out its 
immense implications for the world. With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina 
Tirthankaras going back over 5000 years to the beginnings of the Indus 
civilization and most recently and remarkably Osho, Buddha, Jesus, 
Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc.), we are all meat puppets stumbling through 
life on our genetically programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our almost 
total preoccupation with using the second self S2 personality to indulge the 
infantile gratifications of S1 is creating Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, 
it’s only about reproduction and accumulating resources therefor. Yes, much 
noise about Global Warming and the imminent collapse of industrial 
civilization in the next century, but nothing is likely to stop it. S1 writes the 
play and S2 acts it out. Dick and Jane just want to play house—this is mommy 
and this is daddy and this and this and this is baby. Perhaps one could say 
that TPI is that we are humans and not just another primate. 
 
Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as 
new. Chapter 8 on property dualism is much more interesting even though 
mostly a rehash of his previous work. The last of his opening quotes above 
sums this up, and of course the insistence on the critical nature of first person 
ontology is totally Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see is his blank 
slate or (cultural) type of explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when 
in my view, it is clearly another instance of TPI—a mistake which he (and 
nearly everyone else) has made many times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the 
otherwise superb Chapter 9. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the 
strings (contracts the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. 
Again, he needs to read my comments or those of DMS on W’s OC so he 
changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of 
p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
 
A critical point is made again on p169. “Thus, saying something and meaning 
it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction 
that the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall 
have conditions of satisfaction.” One way of regarding this is that the 
unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious 
personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which 
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inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to 
potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic 
interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able to convey very 
limited information about intentions and S makes a similar point in 
Chapter10. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts 
the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read 
my comments and those of DMS, Coliva, Andy Hamilton etc., on W’s OC so 
he changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of 
p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) 
would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s 
various books and papers, as they make clear the difference between true 
only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This 
strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as 
propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about 
them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual 
or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide 
a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it 
“A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of 
satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the 
case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be 
imagined to be the case. 
 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still 
is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated 
with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much 
younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
 
“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created 
by collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic 
powers…With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional 
reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech 
acts that have the logical form of Declarations…all of human institutional 
reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have 
the same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases 
that are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations.” 
Searle MSWp11-13 
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“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have 
the upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, 
like statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and 
in that sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world 
direction of fit. The conative- volitional states such as desires, prior intentions 
and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how 
we would like them to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to 
these two faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional 
content is not supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents 
of cognition and volition are supposed to fit…the world-relating commitment 
is abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment 
that it represent with either direction of fit.” Searle MSWp15 
 
“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of 
state …and the content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make 
a distinction between the type of speech act it is…and the propositional 
content…we have the same propositional content with different 
psychological mode in the case of the intentional states, and different 
illocutionary force or type in the case of the speech acts. Furthermore, just as 
my beliefs can be true or false and thus have the mind-to-world direction of 
fit, so my statements can be true or false and thus have the word-to-world 
direction of fit. And just as my desires or intentions cannot be true or false 
but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied, so my orders and promises 
cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied—
we can think of all the intentional states that have a whole propositional 
content and a direction of fit as representations of their conditions of 
satisfaction. A belief represents its truth conditions, a desire represents its 
fulfillment conditions, an intention represents its carrying out 
conditions…The intentional state represents its conditions of 
satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental representation 
must be consciously thought…but the notion of a representation as I am using 
it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions 
of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of 
satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social 
phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.”  Searle MSW p28-
32 
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“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: 
corresponding to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are 
desires, corresponding to Commissives are intentions and corresponding to 
Expressives is the whole range of emotions and other intentional states where 
the Presup fit is taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analog for the 
Declarations.Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world 
by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires 
a language” MSW p69 
 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of 
human cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at 
once, in a way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the 
speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the 
utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has 
a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs” MSW p74 
 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed 
according to the conventions of a language without creating commitments.  
This is true not just for statements but for all speech acts” MSW p82 
 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all 
we can do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing 
theories but of course “theory” and “description” are language games too and 
it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other 
name…. W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all 
know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories 
that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to 
generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own 
mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account 
for the multifarious language games they get closer and closer to describing 
behavior by way of numerous examples as did W. 
 
The Primary Language Games (PLG's) are the simple automated utterances 
by our involuntary, System  1,  fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, non-
propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts 
(‘will’) including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- 
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and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger, which can be described causally, 
while the evolutionarily later Secondary Language Games (SLG's) are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 
and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing, etc., which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's a fact 
that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic 
physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W for many examples and 
Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., `I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in 
terms of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it 
is meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make 
sense in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into 
Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, 
Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and 
Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical 
extension of Truths 1). W recognized that ` Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole 
psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to 
recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to 
look deeper. 
 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to 
those who have kept up with Searle’s work. 
 
I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards 
them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition 
of mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. 
As quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." One can 
deny that any revision of our concepts (language games) of causation or free 
will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about any page of W 
for the reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using 
examples from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say 
anything relevant to our normal use of words. 
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The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious universal 
cultural deontic relationships with others (S3). Though this is my précis of 
behavior I expect it fairly describes S’s work. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation 
of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious (TPI). I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology 
and its extensions in his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S’s 
(or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but 
rather it is not open to (not possible to) doubt. 
 
Now let us review Searle’s brilliant summary of his many years of work on 
the logical structure of the ‘social glue’ that holds society together as set forth 
is his ‘Making the Social World’ (2010). 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term ‘propositional 
attitudes’ by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 
of PNC: “Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction.” As S states it in PNC, “A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that 
such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. 
Regarding intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must 
function causally in the production of the action.” (MSWp34). 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” 
or DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they 
can only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them here) after one begins 
thinking about them in S2. However, his point in PNC that propositions 
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permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future 
and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic 
society, is cogent. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of 
one event so for IA (Intention in Action) “We have different levels of 
description where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower 
level…in addition to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the 
causal by means of relation.” (p37). 
 
So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly 
causal (e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s ‘Radical Enactivism’) I would change the 
paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and ending on pg 40 with 
“conditions of satisfaction” as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via 
prior intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire 
things to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire 
(and imagination—desires time shifted and so decoupled from intention) and 
other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second 
self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic 
primitive true only reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in neurophysiology 
there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) 
or remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in 
the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
by the learned deontic cultural relations seamlessly, so that our normal 
experience  is  that  we  consciously control everything that we do. This vast 
arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has described as ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his 
writings, what I regard as a very basic mistake that he shares with nearly 
everyone—the notion that the experience of ‘free will’ may be ‘illusory’. It 
follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W’s 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
‘will’, ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
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demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so 
wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. S understands and uses basically this same argument in 
other contexts (e.g., skepticism, solipsism) many times, so it is quite 
surprising he can’t see this analogy. He makes this mistake frequently when 
he says such things as that we have “good evidence” that our dog is a dog 
etc. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. Here you have 
the best descriptive psychologist since W so this is not a stupid mistake. 
 
His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a 
prelinguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms 
are built, and you have to have the collective intentionality of the 
conversation in order to make the commitment” is much clearer if 
supplemented with “The prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic 
dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) which evolve during our maturation into their 
cultural manifestations.” 
 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to 
understand them and so he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant 
here. “A function is a cause that serves a purpose…In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent…status functions… 
require… collective imposition and recognition of a status” (p59). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created 
by the intrinsic, or mind- independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) 
as “The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” (p68). That is, one must keep 
in mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
However, I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his 
writings that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional 
(i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other 
reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and 
true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the 
genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were 
propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, 
the chaos that was philosophy before W would return and in fact life would 
not be possible (no this is not a joke). As W showed countless times and 
biology shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty— automated 
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unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause 
to reflect will die. 
 
Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words 
for material objects any more than I can imagine a visual system that cannot 
see them, because it is the first and most basic task of vision to segment the 
world into objects and so that of language to describe them. Likewise, I cannot 
see any problem with objects being salient in the conscious field nor with 
sentences being segmented into words. How could it be otherwise for beings 
with our evolutionary history? 
 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the 
primitive reflexive PLG’s of S1 while representations are the dispositional 
SLG’s of S2. 
 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second 
paragraph on p79 beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey 
meaning by speaking a public language composed of words in sentences with 
a syntax.” 
 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and 
writing, I would answer: ’They are special because the short wavelength of 
vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information 
transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several 
orders of magnitude higher for visual information.’ 
 
On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., 
why does it work) is EP and S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of 
exposition in this book is to try to make the familiar seem strange and 
striking” is of course classic Wittgenstein. His claim on the next page that 
there is no general answer to why people accept institutions is clearly wrong. 
They accept them for the same reason they do everything—their EP is the 
result of inclusive fitness. It facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA 
(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically 
and mentally bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk here (e.g., p114) 
about ‘extra- linguistic conventions’ and ‘extra semantical semantics’ is in fact 
referring to EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which 
are the basis for all behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most familiar is 
for that reason invisible. 
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S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. 
Totally illiterate deaf-mutes could play cards, soccer and even chess but of 
course a minimal counting ability would be necessary. I agree (p121) that the 
ability to pretend and imagine (e.g., the counterfactual or as-if notions 
involved in time and space shifting) are, in full form, uniquely human 
abilities and critical to higher order thought. But even here there are many 
animal precursors (as there must be), such as the posturing of ritual combats 
and mating dances, the decoration of mating sites by bower birds, the broken 
wing pretense of mother birds, fake alarm calls of monkeys, ‘cleaner’ fish that 
take a bite out of their prey and simulation of hawk and dove strategies 
(cheaters) in many animals. 
 
More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq.). 
Saying that thinking is propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive 
entities’ means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as 
opposed to the true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. 
 
In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his 
classic book ‘Rationality in Action’ and creates some new terminology for 
describing the formal apparatus of practical reasons which I do not find 
felicitous. “Factitive Entities’ do not seem different from dispositions and 
‘motivator’ (desire or obligation), ‘effector’ (body muscles), ‘constitutor’ 
(speech muscles) and ‘total reason’ (all relevant dispositions) do not, at least 
here seem to add to clarity (p126-132). 
 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human 
behavior and remind ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness 
has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which 
often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the 
cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result 
in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in various 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. This may seem infelicitous as 
well, but has the virtue that it is based on fact, and given the complexity of 
our higher order thought, I don’t think a general description is going to get 
much simpler. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion’) is that S2 has generated the action consciously 
for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar 
with modern biology and psychology knows this view is not credible. 
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Again, I will repeat some crucial notions. Another idea clarified by S is the 
Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's 
summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our 
desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and 
time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner 
or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would 
restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The resolution 
of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive 
fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term 
personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the 
proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are very restricted extensions of 
unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help 
the poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain 
chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2, which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation   of   body   and/or   speech   muscles   by   S1   causing   actions.   
The   general   mechanism   is   via   both neurotransmission and by changes 
in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive 
illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is 
that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully 
aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
 
Thus, I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: 
“We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire –Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA— i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which 
produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for 
genes in ourselves and those closely related).” 
 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are 
universal in higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother 
hen defending her brood from a fox) if we include the automated 
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prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA 
of S2 or DIRA2 that require language are uniquely human. This seems to me 
an alternative and clearer description of his “explanation” (as W suggested 
these are much better called ‘description’) on the bottom of p129 of the 
paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the S2 desires and 
their cultural extensions). That is, “The resolution of the paradox is that the 
recognition of desire-independent reasons can ground the desire and thus 
cause the desire, even though it is not logically inevitable that they do and 
not empirically universal that they do” can be translated as “The resolution 
of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive 
fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term 
personal immediate desires.” Likewise, for his discussion of this issue on 
p130-31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 (Evolutionary Psychology, Reciprocal Altruism, 
Inclusive Fitness, System 1) which ground the dispositions and ensuing 
actions ofS2. 
 
On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we 
must get them from biology as there is no other option and the above 
description shows how this happens. Contrary to his statement, the strongest 
inclinations DO always prevail (by definition, otherwise it is not the 
strongest), but deontics works because the innate programming of RA and IF 
override immediate personal short term desires. His confusion of nature and 
nurture, of S1 and S2, extends to conclusions 2 and 3 on p143. Agents do 
indeed create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are not just anything 
but, with few if any exceptions, very restricted extensions of DIRA1 (the 
ultimate cause). If he really means to ascribe deontics to our conscious 
decisions alone then he is prey to ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which 
he so beautifully demolished in his classic paper of that name (see my review 
of PNC). As I have noted above, there is a huge body of recent research 
exposing cognitive illusions which comprise our personality. TPI is not 
merely a harmless philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our 
biology which produces the illusion that we control our life and our society 
and the world and the consequences are almost certain collapse of industrial 
civilization during the next 150 years. 
 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ 
(actually 3 gaps which he has discussed many times). That is, without free 
will (i.e., choice) in some non-trivial sense it would all be pointless, and he 
has rightly noted that it is inconceivable that evolution could create and 
maintain an unnecessary genetically and energetically expensive charade. 
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But, like nearly everyone else, he cannot see his way out and so once again he 
suggests (p133) that choice may be an illusion. On the contrary, following W, 
it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive 
actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for 
questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your awareness 
of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Now lets us briefly review Searle’s most recent book, ‘Seeing Things As They 
Are’ (STATA-2015). See the full review for further comments. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for 
on page 4 we have the terms ‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they were 
used is some normal sense but we are doing philosophy so we are going to 
be undulating back and forth between language games have no chance of 
keeping our day to day games distinct from the various philosophical ones. 
Again, you can read some of Bennett and Hacker’s ‘Neuroscience and 
Philosophy’ or ‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ to get a feel for 
this. Sadly, like nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has still not adopted the 
two systems framework, so it’s much harder to keep things straight than it 
needs to be. 
 
On p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, 
deliberative, slow, with no precise time of occurrence and ‘it is raining’ is their 
public Condition of Satisfaction (COS2) (Wittgenstein’s transitive) –i.e., it is 
propositional and representational and not a mental state and we can only 
intelligibly describe it in terms of reasons , while Visual Experience (VisExp) 
is system 1 and so requires (for intelligibility, for sanity) that it be raining (it’s 
COS1) and has a determinate time of occurrence, is fast (typically under 
500msec ), nontestable (Wittgenstein’s true-only), and nonpublic, automatic 
and not linguistic i.e., not propositional and presentational and only 
describable in terms of causes of a mental state. In spite of this on p7 after 
crushing the horrific (but still quite popular) term ‘propositional attitude’, he 
says that perception has propositional content, but I agree with W that S1 is 
true-only and hence cannot be propositional in anything like the sense of S2 
where propositions are public statements (COS) that are true or false. 
 
On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), 
and then he notes that to describe the world we can only repeat the 
description which W noted as showing the limits of language. The last 
sentence on to the end of the paragraph middle of p13 needs translating (like 
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most of philosophy!) so for “The subjective experience has a content, which 
philosophers call an intentional content and the specification of the 
intentional content is the same as the description of the state of affairs that the 
intentional content presents you with etc.” I would say ‘Perceptions are 
System 1 mental states that can only be described in the public language of 
System 2.” And when he ends by noting again the equivalence of a 
description of believing with that of a description of our perception, he is 
repeating what W noted long ago and which is due to the fact that S1 is 
nonlinguistic and that describing, believing, knowing, expecting, etc. are all 
different psychological or intentional modes or language games played with 
the same words. 
 
On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public 
events, so what warrants our use of the word for ‘private experiences’ (i.e., 
S1) can only be their public manifestations (S2) —i.e., language we all use to 
describe public acts as even for myself I cannot have any way to attach 
language to something internal. This is of course W’s argument against the 
possibility of a private language. He also mentions several times that 
hallucinations of X are the same as seeing X but what can be the test for this 
except that we are inclined to use the same words? In this case, they are the 
same by definition so this argument rings hollow. 
 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which 
is not an attitude to a sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its public COS, 
i.e., to the fact or truthmaker. Then he says “For example, if I see a man in 
front of me, the content is that there is a man in front of me. The object is the 
man himself. If I am having a corresponding hallucination, the perceptual 
experience has a content, but no object. The content can be exactly the same 
in the two cases, but the presence of a content does not imply the presence of 
an object.” The way I see this is that the ‘object’ is normally in the world and 
creates the mental state (S1) and if we put this in words it becomes S2 with 
COS2 (i.e., a public truthmaker) and this does entail the public object, but for 
an hallucination (or direct brain stimulation etc.) the ‘object’ is only the 
similar mental state resulting from brain activation. 
 
As W showed us, the big mistake is not about understanding perception but 
about understanding language—all the problems of philosophy proper are 
exactly the same—failure to look carefully at how the language works in a 
particular context so as to yield clear COS. 
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Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we 
fail to keep S1 and S2 separate. Either we must not refer to representations in 
S1 or we must at least call them R1 and realize they have no public COS—i.e., 
no COS2. 
 
On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of 
S1 and not a reasoned, voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues 
onto the next page, but of course is relevant to the whole book and to all of 
philosophy, and it is so unfortunate that Searle, and nearly all in the 
behavioral sciences, cannot get into the 21st century and use the two systems 
terminology which renders so many opaque issues very clear. Likewise with 
the failure to grasp that it’s always just a matter of whether it’s a scientific 
issue  or  a  philosophical  one  and  if philosophical then which language 
game is going to be played and what the COS are in the context in question. 
 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W 
made so clear there is no private language and as Bennett and Hacker take 
the whole neuroscience community to task for, in normal use ‘experience’ can 
only be a public phenomenon for which we share criteria, but what is the test 
for my having an experience in my head? At the least, there is an ambiguity 
here which will lead to others. Many think these don’t matter, many think 
they do. Something happens in the brain but that’s a scientific 
neurophysiological issue and certainly by ‘experience’ or by ‘I saw a rabbit’ 
one never means the neurophysiology. Clearly this is not a matter for 
investigation but one of using words intelligibly. 
 
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more 
philosophical jargon used instead of System 1 by people who have not 
adopted the two systems framework for describing behavior (i.e., nearly 
everyone). Likewise, for the following pages if we realize that ‘objects and 
states of affairs’, ‘visual experiences’, ‘fully determinate’ etc., are just 
language games where we have to decide what the COS are and that if we 
just keep in mind the properties of S1 and S2 all of this becomes quite clear 
and Searle and everyone else could stop ‘struggling to express’ it. Thus (p69) 
‘reality is determinate’ only means that perceptions are S1 and so mental 
states, here and now, automatic, causal, untestable (true-only) etc. while 
beliefs, like all dispositions are S2 and so not mental states, do not have a 
definite time, have reasons and not causes, are testable with COS etc. 
 
On p70 he notes that intentions in action of perception (IA1 in my terms) are 
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part of the reflexive acts of S1 (A1 in my terms) which may originate in S2 acts 
which have become reflexive (S2A in my terminology). 
 
On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate 
dividing line between seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2) which means S1 passes 
the percept to higher cortical centers of S2 where they can be deliberated upon 
and expressed in language. 
 
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 
and ‘nothing is seen’ in S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing 
in the same sense as for S1 and indeed philosophy and a good chunk of 
science (e.g., physics) would be different if people realized they were playing 
language games and not doing science. 
 
On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no 
language as it’s automatic and reflexive so when saying what I saw or to 
describe what I saw I can only say “I saw a cat”. Once again W pointed this 
out long ago as showing the limits of language. 
 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak 
so that “Because presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of 
representation, and because all representation is under aspects, the visual 
presentations will always present their conditions of satisfaction under some 
aspects and not others.” becomes “Because the percepts of S1 present their 
data to S2, which has public COS, we can speak of S1 as though it also has 
public COS”. On p111 the ‘condition’ refers to the public COS of S2, i.e., the 
events which make the statement true or false and ‘lower order’ and ‘higher 
order’ refer to S1 and S2. 
 
On p112 the basic action and basic perception are isomorphic because S1 
feeds its data to S2, which can only generate actions by feeding back to S1 to 
contract muscles, and lower level perception and higher level perception can 
only be described in the same terms due to there being only one language to 
describe S1 and S2. On p117 bottom it would be much less mysterious if he 
would adopt the two systems framework, so that instead of “internal 
connection” with conditions of satisfaction (my COS1), a perception would 
just be noted as the automaticity of S1 which causes a mental state. 
 
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because 
the language games of ‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-
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psychological phenomena of nature, whereas semantics is S2 and we can only 
intelligibly speak of reasons for higher order human behavior. One way this 
manifests is ‘meaning is not in the head’ which enmeshes us in other language 
games. 
 
On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the 
experience’) merely describes the conditions of the language game of 
perception—it is an automatic causal mental state. 
 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective 
world is for it to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual 
experiences like this.” is not coherent as there is nothing to which we can refer 
‘this’ so it should be stated as “First, for something to be red is just for it to 
incline me to call it ‘red’ ”—as usual, the jargon does not help at all and the 
rest of the paragraph is unnecessary as well. 
 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state 
of S1 and as I, in agreement with W, DMS and others have said many times 
these cannot intelligibly be called ‘presuppositions’ as they are unconsciously 
activated ‘hinges’ that are the basis for presuppositions. 
 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or 
most of philosophy in the narrow sense ) could be titled “The language games 
describing the interaction of the causal, automatic, nonlinguistic transient  
mental states of S1 with the reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking 
of S2” and the background is not suppositional nor can it be taken for granted 
but it is our axiomatic true-only psychology (the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’ 
of W’s ‘On Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is evident from my 
comments I think the whole section, lacking the two systems framework and 
W’s insights in OC is confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of 
perception where it can at best only describe how the language of perception 
works in various contexts. We can only describe how the word ‘red’ is used 
and that’s the end of it and for the last sentence of this section we might say 
that for something to be a ‘red apple’ is only for it to normally result in the 
same words being used by everyone. 
 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated 
what many (e.g., DMS an eminent contemporary philosopher and leading W 
expert) regard as maybe the greatest discovery in modern philosophy—W’s 
revolutionizing of epistemology in his ‘On Certainty’ as nobody can do 
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philosophy or psychology in the old way anymore without looking 
antiquated. And though Searle almost entirely ignored ‘On Certainty’ his 
whole career, in 2009 (i.e., 6 years before publication of this book) he spoke at 
a symposium on it held by the British Wittgenstein Society and hosted by 
DMS, so he is certainly aware of the view that has revolutionized the very 
topics he is discussing here. I don’t think this meeting was published, but his 
lecture can be downloaded from Vimeo. It seems to be a case of an old dog 
who can’t learn new tricks. Though he has probably pioneered more new 
territory in the descriptive psychology of higher order behavior than anyone 
since Wittgenstein, once he has learned a path he tends to stay on it, as we all 
do. Like everyone, he uses the French word repertoire when there is an easier 
to pronounce and spell English word ‘repertory’ and the awkward ‘he/she’ 
or reverse sexist ‘she’ when one can always use ‘they’ or ‘them’. In spite of 
their higher intelligence and education, academics are sheep too. 
 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and 
awkward language games one is forced into when trying to describe (not 
explain as W made clear) the properties of S1 (i.e., to play the language games 
used to describe ’primary qualities’) and how these feed data into S2 (i.e., 
secondary qualities’), which then has to feed back to S1 to generate actions. It 
also shows the errors one commits by failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s unique 
view of ‘hinge epistemology’ presented in “On Certainty”. To show how 
much clearer this is with the dual system terminology I would have to rewrite 
the whole chapter (and much of the book). Since I have rewritten sections 
here several times, and often in my reviews of Searle’s other books, I will only 
give a couple brief examples. 
 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but 
conversely. The concept of the reality in question already involves the causal 
capacity to produce certain sorts of experiences. So, the reason that these 
experiences present red objects is that the very fact of being a red object 
involves a capacity to produce this sort of experience. Being a straight line 
involves the capacity to produce this other sort of experience. The upshot is 
that organisms cannot have these experiences without it seeming to them that 
they are seeing a red object or a straight line, and that “seeming to them” 
marks the intrinsic intentionality of the perceptual experience.” Can be 
rendered as “S1 provides the input for S2 and the way we use the word ‘red’ 
mandates it’s COS in each context, so using these words in a particular way 
is what it means to see red. In the normal case, it does not ‘seem’ to us that 
we see red, we just see red and we use ‘seem to” to describe cases where we 
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are in doubt.” 
 
On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the 
character of things in the world and the character of our experience?” can be 
translated as “Are our public language games (S2) useful (consistent) in the 
description of perception (S1)?” 
 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most 
important one in the book, as it is critical for all of philosophy to understand 
that there cannot be a precise 1:1 connection between or reduction of S2 to S1 
due to the many ways of describing in language a given event (mental state, 
i.e., percept, memory etc.). Hence the apparent impossibility of capturing 
behavior in algorithms (the hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or of extrapolating 
from a given neuronal pattern in the brain to the multitudinous acts 
(language games) we use to describe it. The ‘Backward Road’ is the language 
(COS) of S2 used to describe S1. Again, I think his failure to use the two 
systems framework renders this quite confusing if not opaque. Of course, he 
shares this failing with nearly everyone. Searle has commented on this before 
and so have others (e.g., Hacker) but it seems to have escaped most 
philosophers and almost all scientists. 
 
Again, Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem 
to see’ red or ‘seem’ to have a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the 
experience and the word, but as with all the perceptions and memories that 
constitute the innate axiomatic true-only mental states of System 1, we just 
have the experience and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when described in public 
language with this word in this context by System 2. We know it’s red as this 
is a hinge—an axiom of our psychology that is our automatic action and is 
the basis for assumptions or judgements or presuppositions and cannot 
intelligibly be judged, tested or altered. As W pointed out so many times, a 
mistake in S1 is of an entirely different kind than one in S2. No explanations 
are possible—we can only describe how it works and so there is no possibility 
of getting a nontrivial “explanation” of our psychology. As he always has, 
Searle makes the common and fatal mistake of thinking he understands 
behavior (language) better than Wittgenstein. After a decade reading W, S 
and many others I find that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’ , aphorisms and 
trialogues usually provide greater illumination than the wordy disquisitions 
of anyone else. 
 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything 
 111  
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, 
and description alone must take it’s place.” (PI 109). 
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a 
pattern of neuronal activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that 
we see a red rose in front of us, and in appropriate contexts for a normal 
English speaking person, this leads us to activate muscle contractions which 
produces the words ‘I see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that there is a red rose 
there. Or simply, S1 produces S2 in appropriate contexts. So, on p136 we can 
say S1 leads to S2 which we express in this context by the word ‘smooth’ 
which describes (but never ‘explains’) how the language game of ‘smooth’ 
works in this context and we can translate “For basic actions and basic 
perceptions the intentional content is internally related to the conditions of 
satisfaction, even though it is characterized non- intentionalistically, because 
being the feature F perceived consists in the ability to cause experiences of 
that type. And in the case of action, experiences of that type consist in their 
ability to cause that sort of bodily movement.” as “Basic perceptions (S1) can 
lead automatically (internally) to basic reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a 
finger leads to withdrawing the arm) which only then enters awareness so 
that it can be reflected upon and described in language (S2). 
 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 
disposition expressed in language with public COS that are informational 
(true or false) while percepts are non-informational (see my review of Hutto 
and Myin’s book) automated responses of S1 and there is no meaningful way 
to play a language game of inferring in S1. Trees and everything we see is S1 
for a few hundred msec or so and then normally enter S2 where they get 
language attached (aspectual shape or seeing as). 
 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that Searle, as part of his lack of attention to 
the later W, never seems to refer to what is probably the most penetrating 
analysis of color words in W’s “Remarks on Colour’, which is missing from 
nearly every discussion of the subject I have seen. The only issue is how do 
we play the game with color words and with ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘experience 
‘etc. in this public linguistic context (true or false statements—COS2) because 
there is no language and no meaning in a private one (S1). So, it does not 
matter (except to neuroscientists) what happens in the mental states of S1 but 
only what we say about them when they enter S2. It’s clear as day that all 7.6 
billion on earth have a slightly different pattern of neural activation every 
time they see red and that there is no possibility for a perfect correlation 
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between S1 and S2. As I noted above it is absolutely critical for every 
philosopher and scientist to get this clear. 
 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the 
normal relations of S1 and S2, we lose the language games of intentionality. 
The same applies to intelligent machines and W described this situation 
definitively over 80 years ago. 
 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human 
being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious 
or unconscious.” (PI 281) 
 
Chapter 6: yes disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is 
incoherent and the fact that this and other absurdities flourish in his own 
department and even among some of his former students who got top marks 
in his Philosophy of Mind classes shows perhaps that, like most, he stopped 
too soon in his Wittgenstein studies. 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is 
true-only- i.e., it is the fast, axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic 
mental states which can only be described with the slow, deliberative public 
language games of S2. 
 
On p204 -5,,representation is always under an aspect since, like thinking, 
knowing etc., it is a disposition of S2 with public COS, which is infinitely 
variable. 
 
Once again, I think the use of the two systems framework greatly simplifies 
the discussion. If one insists to use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 
then one should say that R1 have COS1 which are transient 
neurophysiological mental states, and so totally different from R2, which 
have COS2 (aspectual shapes) that are public, linguistically expressible states 
of affairs, and the notion of unconscious mental states is illegitimate since 
such language games lack any clear sense. 
 
Sadly, on p211 Searle for maybe the tenth time in his writings (and endlessly 
in his lectures) says that ‘free will’ may be illusory, but as W from the 30’s on 
noted, one cannot coherently deny or judge the ‘hinges’ such as our having 
choice, nor that we see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., as these words express 
the true-only axioms of our psychology, our automatic behaviors that are the 
basis for action 
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On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On 
Certainty’ who pointed out that behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis 
and that its foundation is our animal certainty or way of behaving that is the 
basis of doubt and certainty and cannot be doubted (the hinges of S1). He also 
noted many times that a ‘mistake’ in our basic perceptions (S1) which has no 
public COS and cannot be tested (unlike those of S2), if it is major or persists, 
leads not to further testing but to insanity. 
 
Phenomenalism p227 top: See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent 
essay ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New 
Century’. There is not even any warrant for referring to one’s private 
experiences as ‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or anything else. As W famously 
showed us, language can only be a public testable activity (no private 
language). And on p230 the problem is not that the ‘theory’ ‘seems’ to be 
inadequate, but that (like most if not all philosophical theories) it is 
incoherent. It uses language that has no clear COS. As W insisted all we can 
do is describe—it is the scientists who can make theories. 
 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as 
good as anyone else can produce, but lacking understanding of the 
fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein, and with no grasp of the two 
systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. 
 
Finally, permit me to again note that W posed an interesting resolution to 
some of these ‘puzzles’ by suggesting that some ‘mental phenomena’ (i.e., 
words for dispositions leading to public acts) may originate in chaotic 
processes in the brain and that there is not anything corresponding to a 
memory trace, nor to a single brain process identifiable as a single intention 
or action--that the causal chain ends without a trace, and that ‘cause’, ‘event’ 
and ‘time’ cease to  be applicable (useful—having clear COS). Subsequently, 
many have made similar suggestions based on physics and the sciences of 
complexity and chaos.  One must however recall that ‘chaotic’ in the modern 
sense means determined by laws, but not predictable, and that the science of 
chaos did not exist until long after his death.  
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Review of Making the Social World by John Searle 
(2010) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Before commenting in detail on making the Social World (MSW) I will first 
offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the 
works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way 
to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will 
help greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW and other books 
by these two geniuses of descriptive psychology. 
 
S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in 
TLP, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the 
principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most 
important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how 
completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many 
papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work 
is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is 
mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my 
reviews of W S and other books for more details. 
 
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still 
is unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my 
reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent 
prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s 
perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. 
If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
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"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false."  
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6 (1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway."Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the 
problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description.” Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
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virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC p165-
171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost 
invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, 
duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons 
for action…The general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of 
desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of 
desire-independent reasons for action.” 
Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is 
not consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the 
phenomenological illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness 
has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the 
underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to 
ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and 
therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, 
something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created 
by collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic 
powers…With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional 
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reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech 
acts that have the logical form of Declarations…all of human institutional 
reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have 
the same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases 
that are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations.”  Searle MSW 
p11-13 
 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have 
the upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, 
like statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and 
in that sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world 
direction of fit. The conative-volitional states such as desires, prior intentions 
and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. 
 
They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like 
them to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to these two 
faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content is 
not supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of 
cognition and volition are supposed to fit…the world-relating commitment 
is abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment 
that it represent with either direction of fit.” Searle MSW p15 
 
“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of 
state …and the content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make 
a distinction between the type of speech act it is…and the propositional 
content…we have the same propositional content with different 
psychological mode in the case of the intentional states, and different 
illocutionary force or type in the case of the speech acts. Furthermore, just as 
my beliefs can be true or false and thus have the mind-to-world direction of 
fit, so my statements can be true or false and thus have the word-to-world 
direction of fit. And just as my desires or intentions cannot be true or false 
but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied, so my orders and promises 
cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied—
we can think of all the intentional states that have a whole propositional 
content and a direction of fit as representations of their conditions of 
satisfaction. A belief represents its truth conditions, a desire represents its 
fulfillment conditions, an intention represents its carrying out 
conditions…The intentional state represents its conditions of 
satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental representation 
 118  
must be consciously thought…but the notion of a representation as I am using 
it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions 
of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of 
intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of 
satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social 
phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.”  Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: 
corresponding to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are 
desires, corresponding to Commissives are intentions and corresponding to 
Expressives is the whole range of emotions and other intentional states where 
the Presup fit is taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analog for the 
Declarations. Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world 
by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires 
a language” MSW p69 
 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of 
human cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at 
once, in a way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the 
speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the 
utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has 
a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs” MSW p74 
 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed 
according to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. 
This is true not just for statements but for all 
speech acts” MSW p82 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews of books by these two geniuses) are a précis of behavior from our two 
greatest descriptive psychologists. 
 
Before commenting in detail on Making the Social World (MSW) I will first 
offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the 
works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way 
to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will 
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help greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC,TARW and other books 
by these two geniuses of descriptive psychology,To say that Searle has carried 
on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that 
because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is 
only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior 
must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said (as they must if 
they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find most of S 
foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room 
argument against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of 
Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should 
read Victor Rodych's xlnt, but virtually unknown, supplement on the CR--
"Searle Freed of Every Flaw.” 
 
S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in 
TLP, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the 
principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most 
important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how 
completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many 
papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work 
is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is 
mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my 
reviews of W S and other books for more details. 
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. 
His work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-
only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges 
from unconscious machinations (System 1) (S1) and is extended logically into 
culture (System 3(S3). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final extended 
treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His corpus can 
be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing 
how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the 
fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there 
is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic 
structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based 
on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality (a 
cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based on throat muscle contractions 
(language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be 
regarded as trivial). 
 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work is a development of or variation on these 
ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human 
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behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, 
which underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few 
philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly 
discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they 
are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all 
study of higher order behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and 
slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 
and S2--see below), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less 
clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you 
prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought 
or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works 
are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the 
day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or 
less understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the 
latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two 
selves of fast and slow thinking etc., -- see below). Searle’s work as a whole 
provides a stunning description of higher order social behavior that is 
possible because of the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional 
thinking of S2. 
 
Long before Searle, W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of 
physiology, experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, 
Functionalism, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, Computational Theory 
of Mind, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language 
Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he noted are to understand what 
is always in front of our eyes (we can now see this as obliviousness to System 
1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological illusion’) and to capture 
vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). 
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s 
comment that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we 
are thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes 
clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving 
and remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 functions are 
always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. 
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This is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S 
muddies the waters here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as 
well, but as W did long ago, he shows that the language of causality just does 
not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions—again not a theory 
but a description about how language (thinking) works. 
 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all 
we can do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing 
theories but of course “theory” and “description” are language games too and 
it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other 
name…. W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all 
know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories 
that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to 
generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own 
mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account 
for the multifarious language games they get closer and closer to describing 
behavior by way of numerous examples as did W. 
 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 
or roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language 
Games (SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston- ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry in 
philosophy and psychology), the impossibility of private language and the 
axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first 
described S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, 
leading to the whole mythology of inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to 
imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. The PLG's are the 
simple automated utterances by our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true only, non-propositional, mental states- our perceptions 
and memories and reflexive acts (‘will’) including System 1 Truths and UOA1 
--Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) 
which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 
and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a 
fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic 
physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W for many examples and 
Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
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It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., `I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in 
terms of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it 
is meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make 
sense in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into 
Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, 
Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and 
Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical 
extension of Truths 1). W recognized that ` Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole 
psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to 
recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to 
look deeper. 
 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to 
provide the physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our analysis of 
language games which nevertheless remain unexplainable--EP just is this 
way-- and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 
'On Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only 
reactions of bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and 
operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb 
"Principles of Social Evolution". 
 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions 
rather than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games 
and one person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their 
innate true-only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to 
the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into 
further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this 
is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our 
two hands or our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human 
nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only 
Understandings of Agency (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which 
newborn animals (including flies and worms if UOA is suitably defined) have 
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and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note 
here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 
and System 2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UOA1 and the 
Slow conscious UOA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted 
phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into 
S1— higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, 
reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s 
examples explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the 
duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in Johnston). 
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On 
Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center 
of current research (e.g., see Kahneman-- "Thinking Fast and Slow", but he 
has no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is 
involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of 
perception (including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes 
over and over in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral 
reflexes"(maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the 
brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers 
inspired W to write OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting 
from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
(`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful 
ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
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presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any 
System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much 
of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", 
"intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
Though W warned frequently against theorizing and produced more and 
better examples of language in action than anyone, one might say that his 
aggregate aphorisms illustrated by examples constitute the most 
comprehensive “theory” of behavior (“reality”) ever penned. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult 
or irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look 
at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from 
Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in 
modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional 
with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex 
charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
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Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others ( or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and 
charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle 
and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may 
consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind 
and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
Now for some comments on Searle’s MSW. I will make some references to 
another of his recent works which I have reviewed- Philosophy in a New 
Century (PNC). 
 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to 
those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best 
standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and 
groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W 
seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. In various places in 
his work (e.g., p7 of PNC) he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts 
is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W 
showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting 
the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and 
thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment (reason) and cannot itself be 
judged. In the first sentence on p8 of PNC he tells us that certainty is revisable, 
but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of 
extending our axiomatic and non-revisable certainty (Certainty1 of S1) via 
experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is 
of course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One 
word- two (or many) distinct uses. 
 
On p12 of PNC, ‘consciousness’ is described as the result of automated 
System 1 functioning that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and 
not, in the normal case, a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in 
our own case and a true-only perception in the case of others. 
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I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards 
them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition 
of mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. 
As quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." One can 
deny that any revision of our concepts (language games) of causation or free 
will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about any page of W 
for the reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using 
examples from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say 
anything relevant to our normal use of words. 
 
The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious universal 
cultural deontic relationships with others (S3). Though this is my précis of 
behavior I expect it fairly describes S’s work. 
 
Those who wish to become acquainted with S’s well-known arguments 
against the mechanical view of mind, which seem to me definitive, may 
consult Chaps 3-5 of his PNC. I have read whole books of responses to them 
and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical (psychological) 
points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half acentury earlier). To 
put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, 
automatic, non-propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only 
coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less 
conscious dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). Computers and the rest of nature have only derived 
intentionality that is dependent on our perspective while higher animals have 
primary intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W 
appreciate, the great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions 
of psychology masquerade as cutting edge science, but in fact they are utterly 
anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and cognitive 
psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is 
Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation 
of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious (TPI). I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology 
and its extensions in his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S’s 
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(or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but 
rather it is not open to (not possible to) doubt. 
 
Chapter 5 of S’s PNC nicely demolishes Computational Theory of Mind, 
Language of Thought etc., noting that ‘computation’, ‘information’, ‘syntax’, 
‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative (i.e., psychological) 
terms and have no physical or mathematical meaning in this psychological 
sense, but of course there are other senses they have been given recently as 
science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by the use of the same 
word into ignoring the vast difference in its use (meaning).  And of course, 
this is all an extension of classic Wittgenstein. 
 
Every thinking person should read Chapter 6 of S’s PNC “The 
Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) as it shows his supreme logical abilities and 
his failure to appreciate the full power of the later W, and the great heuristic 
value of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal 
that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the 
slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is 
classic Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years 
earlier and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only 
unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1 (though of 
course he did not use these terms). 
 
But the really important thing is that TPI is not just a failing of a few 
philosophers, but a universal blindness to our Evolutionary Psychology (EP) 
that is itself built into EP and which has immense (and fatal) implications for 
the world. We are all meat puppets stumbling through life on our genetically 
programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation 
with using the second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications 
of S1 is creating Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it’s only about 
reproduction and accumulating resources therefor. S1 writes the play and S2 
acts it out. Dick and Jane just want to play house—this is mommy and this is 
daddy and this and this and this is baby. 
 
Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and not just another 
primate-a fatal cognitive illusion. 
 
The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) 
of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my 
comments on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to believe” at the 
bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
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A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term ‘propositional 
attitudes’ by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 
of PNC: “Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction.” As S states it in PNC, “A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that 
such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. 
Regarding intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must 
function causally in the production of the action.” (MSWp34). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 
activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about 
throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in 
certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over 
prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” 
or DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they 
can only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them here) after one begins 
thinking about them in S2. However, his point in PNC that propositions 
permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future 
and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic 
society, is cogent. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of 
one event so for IAA “We have different levels of description where one level 
is constituted by the behavior at the lower level…in addition to the 
constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation.” 
(p37). 
 
“The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in- action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different.” (p35). The COS of PI need a whole action while those of 
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IAA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions(PI) are 
mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-
action(IAA) which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-
referential (CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike 
beliefs and desires) it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. 
These descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1, 
which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I 
have created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern 
psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W’s true-only 
vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-
only perception, memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such 
as belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly 
causal (e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s ‘Radical Enactivism’) I would change the 
paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and ending on pg 40 with 
“conditions of satisfaction” as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via 
prior intentions and intentions- in-action, we try to match how we desire 
things to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire 
(and imagination—desires time shifted and so decoupled from intention) and 
other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second 
self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic 
primitive true only reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in neurophysiology 
there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) 
or remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in 
the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3 seamlessly, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast 
arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has described as ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his 
writings, what I regard as a very basic mistake that he shares with nearly 
everyone—the notion that the experience of ‘free will’ may be ‘illusory’. It 
follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W’s 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
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‘will’, ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so 
wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. S understands and uses basically this same argument in 
other contexts (e.g., skepticism, solipsism) many times, so it is quite 
surprising he can’t see this analogy. He makes this mistake frequently when 
he says such things as that we have “good evidence” that our dog is a dog 
etc. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. Here you have 
the best descriptive psychologist since W so this is not a stupid mistake. 
 
His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a 
prelinguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms 
are built, and you have to have the collective intentionality of the 
conversation in order to make the commitment” is much clearer if 
supplemented with “The prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic 
dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) which evolve during our maturation into their 
cultural manifestations in S3.” 
 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to 
understand them and so he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant 
here. “A function is a cause that serves a purpose…In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent…status functions… 
require… collective imposition and recognition of a status” (p59). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created 
by the intrinsic, or mind-independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) 
as “The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” (p68). That is, one must keep 
in mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
However, I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his 
writings that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional 
(i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other 
reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and 
true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the 
genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were 
propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, 
the chaos that was philosophy before W would return and in fact life would 
not be possible (no this is not a joke). As W showed countless times and 
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biology shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty—automated 
unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause 
to reflect will die. 
 
Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words 
for material objects any more than I can imagine a visual system that cannot 
see them, because it is the first and most basic task of vision to segment the 
world into objects and so that of language to describe them. Likewise, I cannot 
see any problem with objects being salient in the conscious field nor with 
sentences being segmented into words. How could it be otherwise for beings 
with our evolutionary history? 
 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the 
primitive reflexive PLG’s of S1 while representations are the dispositional 
SLG’s of S2. 
 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second 
paragraph on p79 beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey 
meaning by speaking a public language composed of words in sentences with 
a syntax.” 
 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and 
writing, I would answer: ’They are special because the short wavelength of 
vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information 
transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several 
orders of magnitude higher for visual information.’ 
 
On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., 
why does it work) is EP and S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of 
exposition in this book is to try to make the familiar seem strange and 
striking” is of course classic Wittgenstein. His claim on the next page that 
there is no general answer to why people accept institutions is clear wrong. 
They accept them for the same reason they do everything—their EP is the 
result of inclusive fitness. It facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA 
(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically 
and mentally bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk here (e.g., p114) 
about ‘extra-linguistic conventions’ and ‘extra semantical semantics’ is in fact 
referring to EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which 
are the basis for all behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most familiar is 
for that reason invisible. 
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S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. 
Totally illiterate deaf-mutes could play cards, soccer and even chess but of 
course a minimal counting ability would be necessary. I agree (p121) that the 
ability to pretend and imagine (e.g., the counterfactual or as-if notions 
involved in time and space shifting) are, in full form, uniquely human 
abilities and critical to higher order thought. But even here there are many 
animal precursors (as there must be), such as the posturing of ritual combats 
and mating dances, the decoration of mating sites by bower birds, the broken 
wing pretense of mother birds, fake alarm calls of monkeys, ‘cleaner’ fish that 
take a bite out of their prey and simulation of hawk and dove strategies 
(cheaters) in many animals. 
 
More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq). 
Saying that thinking is propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive 
entities’ means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as 
opposed to the true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. 
 
In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his 
classic book ‘Rationality in Action’ and creates some new terminology for 
describing the formal apparatus of practical reasons which I do not find 
felicitous. “Factitive Entities’ do not seem different from dispositions and 
‘motivator’ (desire or obligation), ‘effector’ (body muscles),‘constitutor’ 
(speech muscles) and ‘total reason’ (all relevant dispositions) do not, at least 
here seem to add to clarity (p126-132). 
 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human 
behavior and remind ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness 
has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which 
often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the 
cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result 
in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in various 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. This may seem infelicitous as 
well, but has the virtue that it is based on fact, and given the complexity of 
our higher order thought, I don’t think a general description is going to get 
much simpler. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion’) is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously 
for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar 
with modern biology and psychology knows this view is not credible. 
 
Thus, I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: 
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“We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire –Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA—i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which 
produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for 
genes in ourselves and those closely related).” 
 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are 
universal in higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother 
hen defending her brood from a fox) if we include the automated 
prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA 
of S2/3 or DIRA2 that require language are uniquely human. This seems to 
me an alternative and clearer description of his “explanation” (as W 
suggested these are much better called ‘description’) on the bottom of p129 
of the paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2/3 (i.e., the S2 
desires and their cultural S3 extensions). That is, “The resolution of the 
paradox is that the recognition of desire-independent reasons can ground the 
desire and thus cause the desire, even though it is not logically inevitable that 
they do and not empirically universal that they do” can be translated as “The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term 
inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short 
term personal immediate desires.” Likewise, for his discussion of this issue 
on p130-31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 which ground the dispositions and ensuing 
actions of S2/3. 
 
On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we 
must get them from biology as there is no other option and the above 
description shows how this happens. Contrary to his statement, the strongest 
inclinations DO always prevail (by definition, otherwise it is not the 
strongest), but deontics works because the innate programming of RA and IF 
override immediate personal short term desires. His confusion of nature and 
nurture, of S1 and S2, extends to conclusions 2 and 3 on p143. Agents do 
indeed create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are not just 
anything but, with few if any exceptions, very restricted extensions of DIRA1 
(the ultimate cause). If he really means to ascribe deontics to our conscious 
decisions alone then he is prey to ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which 
he so beautifully demolished in his classic paper of that name (see my review 
of PNC). As I have noted above, there is a huge body of recent research 
exposing cognitive illusions which comprise our personality. TPI is not 
merely a harmless philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our 
biology which produces the illusion that we control our life and our society 
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and the world and the consequences are almost certain collapse of civilization 
during the next 150 years. 
 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ 
(actually 3 gaps which he has discussed many times). That is, without free 
will (i.e., choice) in some non- trivial sense it would all be a pointless, and he 
has rightly noted that it is inconceivable that evolution could create and 
maintain an unnecessary genetically and energetically expensive charade. 
But, like nearly everyone else, he cannot see his way out and so once again he 
suggests (p133) that choice may be an illusion. On the contrary, following W, 
it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive 
actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for 
questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your awareness 
of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Few notice (Budd in his superb book on W is one exception) that W posed an 
interesting resolution to this by suggesting that some mental phenomena may 
originate in chaotic processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything 
corresponding to a memory trace. He also suggested several times that the 
causal chain has an end and this could mean both that it is just not possible 
(regardless of the state of science) to trace it any further and that the concept 
of ‘cause’ ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point. Subsequently, many 
have made similar suggestions based on physics and the sciences of 
complexity and chaos. 
 
On p155 one should note that the Background/Network is our EP and its 
cultural extensions of S1, S2, S3. 
 
Given the above I don’t feel it necessary to comment on his discussion of 
Power and Politics but I will say a few words about human rights. I agree 
completely with his comment on p185 that the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights is an irresponsible document. The rapid and probably inexorable 
collapse of society is due to people having too many rights and too few 
responsibilities. The only tiny ray of hope for the world is that somehow 
people can be forced (few will ever do it voluntarily) to place the earth first 
and themselves second. Consuming resources and producing children must 
be regulated as privileges or the tragedy of the commons will soon end the 
game. 
 
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still 
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is unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my 
reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent 
prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s 
perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. 
If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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Review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ by John 
Searle (2008) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle 
and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already 
published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along 
with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those 
who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup 
philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and 
groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W 
seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. Just a few examples: 
on p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the 
overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed 
definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-
only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and 
thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. 
In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind 
of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our 
axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is 
utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic 
example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or 
many) distinct uses. 
 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) 
would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two 
books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true 
only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This 
strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as 
propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about 
them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual 
or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide 
a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it 
“A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of 
satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the 
case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be 
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imagined to be the case. 
 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still 
is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated 
with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much 
younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
 
" But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false."  
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6 (1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
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"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the 
problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
“Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. 
Indeed, only a machine process can cause a thought process, and 
‘computation’ does not name a machine process; it names a process that can 
be, and typically is, implemented on a machine.” Searle PNC p73 
 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of 
a physical system from outside; and the identification of the process as 
computational does not identify an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is 
essentially an observer relative characterization.” Searle PNC p95 
 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to 
syntax. I am now making the separate and different point that syntax is not 
intrinsic to physics.” Searle PNC p94 
 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive 
decomposition fails, because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the 
physics is to put a homunculus in the physics.” Searle PNC p97 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description.” Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive 
science is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete 
biological reality of intrinsic intentionality…We are blinded to this difference 
by the fact that the same sentence ‘I see a car coming toward me,’ can be used 
to record both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational 
model of vision…in the sense of ‘information’ used in cognitive science, it is 
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simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device.” Searle 
PNC p104-105 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and 
evaluations? ...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to 
pose Hume’s guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the 
use of which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC 
p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost 
invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, 
duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons 
for action…The general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of 
desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of 
desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is 
not consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the 
phenomenological illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness 
has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the 
underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to 
ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and 
therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, 
something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
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Before commenting in detail on Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) I will 
first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the 
works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way 
to place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. 
 
Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work 
follows directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say 
that Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W 
study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the 
same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately 
describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W 
said (as they must if they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I 
find most of S foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese 
room argument against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of 
Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should 
read Victor Rodych's xlnt, but virtually unknown, supplement on the CR--
"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb 
papers on W's philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary 
Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 ability of counting up to 3, as extended 
into the endless System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. W’s 
insights into the psychology of math provide an excellent entry into 
intentionality. I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, the 
multifarious versions of behaviorism, computer functionalism, CTM 
(Computational Theory of Mind) and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), seems 
to be aware that W's Tractatus can be viewed as the most striking and 
powerful statement of their viewpoint ever penned (i.e., behavior (thinking) 
as the logical processing of facts--i.e., information processing).  
 
Of course, later (but before the digital computer was a gleam in Turing's eye) 
W described in great detail why these were incoherent descriptions of mind 
that must be replaced by psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the 
rest of his life). S however makes little reference to W’s prescient statement of 
mind as mechanism, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has 
become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, 
and the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not 
realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but 
see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and 
AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some 
jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right 
direction. See my reviews of W and other books for more details. 
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Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. 
His work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-
only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges 
from unconscious machinations (System 1) (S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for 
his final extended treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for 
preparation. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of 
animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The 
"must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and 
common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this 
necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same 
evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is 
extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based 
on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others 
(with variations that can be regarded as trivial). 
 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work is a development of or variation on these 
ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human 
behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, 
which underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few 
philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly 
discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they 
are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all 
study of higher order behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and 
slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 
and S2--see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less 
clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you 
prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought 
or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works 
are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the 
day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or 
less understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the 
latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two 
selves of fast and slow thinking etc., -- see below). Searle’s work as a whole 
provides a stunning description of higher order social behavior that is 
possible because of the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional 
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thinking of S2. 
 
I suggest the key to W is to regard his corpus as the pioneering effort in 
deciphering our EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves of S1 and S2 
and the multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by 
starting from his 3rd period works and reading backwards to the Proto-
Tractatus. It should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, 
all accounts of behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to 
translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of 
"Embodied Mind" and "Radical Enactivism" should flow directly from and 
into W's work (and they do). However, almost nobody is able to follow his 
example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even 
the redoubtable Searle has to be filtered and translated to see that this is true, 
and even he does not get how completely W has anticipated the latest work 
in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (writing, speaking, acting). 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—
which can be regarded as the Top Down analysis of the mind and its 
evolution via the careful analysis of examples of language use in context. He 
exposes the many varieties of language games and the relationships between 
the primary games of the true-only unconscious, pre or protolinguistic 
axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive thinking, 
emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical 
reptilian brain first-self, mirror neuron functions), and the later evolved 
higher cortical dispositional linguistic conscious abilities of believing, 
knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional 
secondary language games of slow thinking that are the network of cognitive 
illusions that constitute the second-self personality of which we are so 
enamored. W dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-
only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of S1 grade into the 
thinking, remembering, and understanding of S2 dispositions, and many of 
his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this 
evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of 
human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many 
perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two 
systems perspective illuminates all higher behavior. Dobzhansky famously 
commented: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution." And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of 
evolutionary psychology. 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of 
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Thought: language as a window into human nature") that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other "Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W (and likewise by S), who tried to show, with hundreds of 
continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that 
language is the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human 
nature, and W's whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this 
idea. Long before Searle, he rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches 
of physiology, experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, 
Functionalism, Strong AI, DST, CTM, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down 
deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he 
noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see 
this as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological 
illusion’) and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). And 
so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not 
a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic 
blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later 
evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the 
dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). 
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s 
comment that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we 
are thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes 
clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving 
and remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 functions are 
always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. 
This is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S 
muddies the waters here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as 
well, but as W did long ago, he shows that the language of causality just does 
not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions—again not a theory 
but a description about how language (thinking) works. This brings up 
another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can do is 
give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of 
course “theory” and “description” are language games too and it seems to me 
S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other name…. W’s point 
was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all know to be true 
accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories that try to 
account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to generalize 
and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own mistakes in 
PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account for the 
 147  
multifarious language games they get closer and closer to describing behavior 
by way of numerous examples as did W. 
 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 
or roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language 
Games (SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston-‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry in 
philosophy and psychology), the impossibility of private language and the 
axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first 
described S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, 
leading to the whole mythology of inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to 
imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. The PLG's are 
utterances by and descriptions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true only, nonpropositional, mental states- our perceptions 
and memories and involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths and UOA1 
(Understanding of Agency 1) and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which 
can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions 
or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, 
testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 and Emotions2- 
joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which 
can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to 
describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, 
just make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle for good 
disquisitions on this). 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., `I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in 
terms of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it 
is meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make 
sense in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never--(e.g., 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459). 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into 
Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, 
Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and 
Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical 
extension of Truths 1). W recognized that ` Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole 
psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to 
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recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to 
look deeper. 
 
Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language 
philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since 
language is just another name for the mind. And, when W says that 
understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the progress of 
psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion "The confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but cf. 
another comment that I have never seen quoted-- "Is scientific progress useful 
to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the 
philosophers task. Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1,807). So, he is not 
legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our behavior 
(mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all 
discussions of higher order behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. 
 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to 
provide the physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our analysis of 
language games which nevertheless remain unexplainable--EP just is this 
way-- and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 
'On Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only 
reactions of bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and 
operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb 
"Principles of Social Evolution". 
 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions 
rather than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games 
and one person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their 
innate true-only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to 
the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into 
further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this 
is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our 
two hands or our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human 
nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true- only 
Understandings of Agency (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which 
newborn animals (including flies and worms if UOA is suitably defined) have 
and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note 
 149  
here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 
and System 2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UOA1 and the 
Slow conscious UOA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted 
phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into 
S1— higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, 
reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s 
examples explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the 
duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in Johnston). 
 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, 
intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least 
half a century earlier. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all that 
is relevant to it into our true only background via the inexorable workings of 
EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly 
stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most 
basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) 
which was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation 
of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and 
human nature (as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody else, 
points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my 
or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed 
out of and are tied to countless others in the true only network that begins 
with birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness 
and memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own 
unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other 
minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot 
really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking 
axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On 
Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center 
of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has 
no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary 
and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and 
over in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 
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99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers 
inspired W to write OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting 
from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
(`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful 
ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any 
System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much 
of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", 
"intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
One of W's recurring themes was what is now called Theory of Mind (TOM), 
or as I prefer Understanding of Agency (UOA), but of course he did not use 
these terms, which is the subject of major research efforts now. I recommend 
consulting the work of Ian Apperly, who is carefully dissecting UOA1 and 2 
and who has recently become aware of one of the leading Wittgensteinian 
philosophers Daniel Hutto, since Hutto has now characterized UOA1 as a 
fantasy (or rather insists that there is no `Theory' nor representation involved 
in UOA1--that being reserved for UOA2). However, like other psychologists, 
Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years 
ago. 
 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life 
is epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not accurately describe nor 
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determine how we act—now a pillar of the behavioral sciences. See ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ in PNC for a grand example from philosophy. It 
is an obvious corollary of W’s and S’s descriptive psychology that it is the 
unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior 
and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, 
loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most 
strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, some of which is 
nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two 
Selves', but of course there is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite 
and an endless stream of pop and pro books issuing). It is an easily defensible 
view that most of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, 
automatisms and higher order thought is wholly compatible with and 
straightforwardly deducible from W. 
 
Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has 
noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and many 
times in passing, the psychology behind what later became known as the 
Wason Test--long a mainstay of EP research. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult 
or irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look 
at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from 
Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in 
modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional 
with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex 
 152  
charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
 
  
 153  
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others ( or COS1 by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, 
possible actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
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described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and 
charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle 
and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may 
consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind 
and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Now for some 
comments on Searle’s PNC. 
 
The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though 
some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing 
here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like 
W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written 
work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure 
to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions.  
 
On p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the 
overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed 
definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true- 
only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and 
thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. 
In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind 
of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our 
axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is 
utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic 
example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or 
many) distinct uses. 
 
On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, 
‘theorizing’ is another language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a 
general description of behavior with few well worked out examples and one 
that emerges from a large number of such that is not subject to many 
counterexamples. Evolution in its early days was a theory with limited clear 
examples but soon became just a summary of a vast body of examples and a 
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theory in a quite different sense. Likewise, with a theory one might make as 
a summary of a thousand pages of W’s examples and one resulting from ten 
pages. 
 
Again, on p12, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 
functioning that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the 
normal case, a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own 
case and a true-only perception in the case of others. 
 
As I read p13 I thought: “Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if 
nothing is wrong?” No! —this would not be ‘pain’ in the same sense. “The 
inner experience stands in need of outer criteria” (W) and Searle seems to 
miss this. See W or Johnston. 
 
As I read the next few pages I felt that W has a much better grasp of the 
mind/language connection, as he regards them as synonymous in many 
contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified in 
numerous perspicacious examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now 
if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." And as explained above I feel the 
questions with which S ends section 3 are largely answered by considering 
W’s OC from the standpoint of the two systems. Likewise, for section 6 on the 
philosophy of science. Rodych has done an article on Popper vs W which I 
thought superb at the time but I will have to reread it to make sure. Finally, 
on p25, one can deny that any revision of our concepts (language games) of 
causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about 
any page of W for the reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the 
world using examples from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is 
another to say anything relevant to our normal use of words.  
 
On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy 
and life) of identical words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of 
‘belief’, ‘seeing’ etc., as applied to S1 which is composed of mental states in 
the present only, and S2 which is not. The rest of the chapter summarizes his 
work on ‘social glue’ which, from an EP, Wittgensteinian perspective, is the 
automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are 
inexorably and universally expanded during personal development into a 
wide array of automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and 
arbitrarily into cultural variations on them. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical 
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view of mind which seem to me definitive. I have read whole books of 
responses to them and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical 
(psychological) points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half a 
century earlier before there were computers). To put it in my terms, S1 is 
composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, nonpropositional, 
true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in 
terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to 
behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). 
Computers and the rest of nature have only derived intentionality that is 
dependent on our perspective while higher animals have primary 
intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W appreciate, the 
great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions of psychology 
masquerade as cutting edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. 
Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and cognitive psychology (freed of 
superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, 
Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
 
Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has 
still not quite let go of the blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in 
terms of the cultural extensions of S2. As he does in many other places in his 
writings, he gives cultural, historical reasons for behaviorism, but it seems 
quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists 
for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our 
EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious. Again, on p65 I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited 
psychology and its extensions in his OC and other works to be deeper than 
S’s (or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but 
rather it is not open to doubt. 
 
Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that ‘computation’, 
‘information’, ‘syntax’, ‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer 
relative (i.e., psychological) terms and have no physical or mathematical 
meaning in this psychological sense, but of course there are other senses they 
have been given recently as science has developed. Again, people are 
bewitched by the use of the same word into ignoring that vast difference in 
its use (meaning).  All extensions of classic Wittgenstein and I recommend 
Hutto’s papers too. 
 
Chapter 6 “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, 
while demolishing that field, it shows both his supreme logical abilities and 
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his failure to grasp the full power of both the later W, and the great heuristic 
value of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal 
that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the 
slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is 
classic Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years 
earlier and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only 
unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1. Like so 
many others, Searle dances all around it but never quite gets there. Very 
roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 and 
‘observer dependent’ features as S2 should prove very revealing. As S notes, 
Heidegger and the others have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course 
so does almost everyone due to the defaults of their EP. 
 
But the really important thing is that S does not take the next step to realizing 
that TPI is not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness 
to our EP that is itself built into EP. He actually states this in almost these 
words at one point, but if he really got it how could he fail to point out its 
immense implications for the world. 
 
With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina Tirthankaras going back over 5000 years 
to the beginnings of the Indus civilization and most recently and remarkably 
Osho, Buddha, Jesus, Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc., we are all meat 
puppets stumbling through life on our genetically programmed mission to 
destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation with using the second self 
S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 is creating Hell On 
Earth. As with all organisms, it’s only about reproduction and accumulating 
resources therefor. Yes, much noise about Global Warming and the imminent 
collapse of industrial civilization in the next century, but nothing is likely to 
stop it. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick and Jane just want to play 
house—this is mommy and this is daddy and this and this and this is baby.  
Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and not just another 
primate. 
 
Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as 
new. Chapter 8 on property dualism is much more interesting even though 
mostly a rehash of his previous work. The last of his opening quotes above 
sums this up, and of course the insistence on the critical nature of first person 
ontology is totally Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see is his blank 
slate or (cultural) type of explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when 
in my view, it is clearly another instance of TPI—a mistake which he (and 
nearly everyone else) has made many times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the 
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otherwise superb Chapter 9. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the 
strings (contracts the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. 
Again, he needs to read my comments on W’s OC so he changes the “good 
reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” (in 
the true-only sense). 
 
A critical point is made again on p169. “Thus, saying something and meaning 
it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction 
that the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall 
have conditions of satisfaction.” One way of regarding this is that the 
unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious 
personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which 
inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to 
potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic 
interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able to convey very 
limited information about intentions and S makes a similar point in Chapter 
10. 
 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) 
would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two 
books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true 
only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This 
strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as 
propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about 
them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual 
or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide 
a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it 
“A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of 
satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the 
case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be 
imagined to be the case. 
 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still 
is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated 
with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much 
younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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 Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul 
Horwich 248p (2013) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, 
but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length 
in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably 
Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial 
understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all 
complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, 
society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a 
sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will 
start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum 
considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human 
behavior. 
 
First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be 
suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any 
other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another 
irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the 
constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” 
etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likewise, the 
use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite 
well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to 
employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of 
HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially 
poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 2-7), 
where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated 
true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better 
view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my 
reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially 
liked his summary of the import of W’s anti-theoretical stance on p65. He 
needs to give more emphasis to ‘On Certainty’, recently the subject of much 
effort by Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva and others and summarized in my 
recent articles. 
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Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he 
(and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as 
Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker 
etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on 
academia.edu and philpapers.org, but for PMS Hacker see 
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
 
He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of 
Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W 
is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not 
obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear 
and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures 
possible. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, 
but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length 
in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably 
Searle also) then I don’t see how one could have more than a superficial 
understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all 
complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, 
society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a 
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sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. 
I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the 
minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy 
and human behavior. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for 
instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods 
and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and 
methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem 
and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." 
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway."  Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest 
similarity with what it represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and 
that they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word 
“kind”, when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the 
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word “kind” here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” 
Or, we may say, they are not aware of the different meanings of the word 
“discovery” when in one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of 
the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB 
p29 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), 
which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have 
never seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, 
problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship 
between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-
knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary 
truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European 
philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful 
array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn 
centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. 
He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a 
vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to 
human understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of 
the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively 
describe the two systems of thought -- fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the 
slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is 
possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for 
judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, 
time and space are innate true-only axioms. He discussed many times what 
is now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions. He 
frequently explained the necessity of the innate background and 
demonstrated how it generates behavior. He described the psychology 
behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP 
research decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language and 
the game-like nature of social interaction. He examined in thousands of pages 
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and hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not 
describable in language, this being possible only for public behavior with a 
public language (the impossibility of private language). Thus, he can be 
viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist. 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor 
like him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like 
not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein 
was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published 
only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, 
but became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 
years published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly 
garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; 
that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten 
scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, 
often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that he wrote in a 
Socratic style with 3 distinct persons in the dialog—the narrator, the 
interlocutor and the commentator (usually W’s view) whose comments were 
blended together by most readers, thus completely vitiating the whole 
elucidatory and therapeutic thrust, that these were cut and pasted from other 
notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, under linings and 
crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what 
they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no 
real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as 
famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and 
even nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of 
hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many 
physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive 
summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and 
condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he 
was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature 
of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and 
usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that 
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to this day, over half a century after his death, there were only a handful of 
people who really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had 
done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on 
philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It 
will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, 
OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior not found 
in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. A major theme 
in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically 
programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher 
order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking 
--e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions 
of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows 
how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into 
conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, prelinguistic mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, 
love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, 
slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, 
propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- 
the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of 
reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of 
neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, 
Hacker etc.). 
 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is 
not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading 
lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only 
from this can more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a 
refinement. ‘In the beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
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“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ 
meant-so that he constantly called different things by that name-but 
nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and 
presuppositions of the word ‘pain’-in short he used it as we all do.” 
PI p271 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable 
of interpretation. Is is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence 
“It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there 
is an idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again 
joins onto the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason 
to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the 
true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are 
Causally Self Referential (CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and 
the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, 
and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary 
psychology, that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only 
elements of S1 composed of perceptions and reflexes., and there is no 
possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their 
falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the 
basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our 
psychology are not evidential. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which 
produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or 
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speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of 
the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological 
Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The 
Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but 
anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I 
think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as 
there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 
Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence 
expressing COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not 
a mental state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's 
Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it 
lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it 
always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked 
`Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know." 
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Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human 
behavior. He shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms 
(see “On Certainty” for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our 
conscious ratiocination emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus 
can be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing 
how the mind works and indeed must work. The “must” is entailed by the 
fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there 
is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic 
structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based 
on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality 
based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate 
others. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work and 
most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking 
(e.g., perceptions vs dispositions-- see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake.  The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for 
the future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna 
Circle (1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. 
---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! ….This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to   get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
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“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” 
PI p133 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—
the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis 
of examples of language use in context, exposing the many varieties of 
language games and the relationships between the primary games of true-
only unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and 
reflexive emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive 
cortical reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher 
cortical dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. 
that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of 
slow thinking that include the network of cognitive illusions that constitute 
the basis of our second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of language 
games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive 
actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples 
also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary 
perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature 
that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have 
heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. 
To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy 
makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is not 
just the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, 
but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the 
development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches 
of physiology, experimental psychology and computation (Computational 
Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, functionalism, etc.) 
could reveal what his analyses of Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties 
he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture 
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vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all 
the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) 
and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as 
always here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to 
abandon the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The 
greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology 
is essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody 
else, points out). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that 
can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
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the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic 
EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true 
or false propositions. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of 
course these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful 
ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any 
System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much 
of the intricate network of “cognitive modules”, “inference 
engines”,“intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, 
“background” or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP). One of W’s 
recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA (Understanding of Agency). 
Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 in experiments, has 
recently become aware of Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., 
no ‘Theory’ nor representation involved in UA1--that being reserved for 
UA2—see my review of his book with Myin). However, like other 
psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years 
ago. It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature 
on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is compatible 
with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite of the fact that most 
of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century 
in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching 
an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts and commonly there is 
barely a mention. 
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Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look 
at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from 
Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in 
modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional 
with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex 
charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others ( or COS1 by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and 
charts that should be compared with this one. Those wishing a 
comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis 
of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happening in less than 500msec, while System 2 are 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions tha t are represented in 
consciousness (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of 
system 2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually 
say they are successful   or not, rather than T or F. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.G., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row 
will be True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, 
will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise 
duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and 
working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have 
voluntary content, and will not have public  conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match 
the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a 
combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this 
is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws 
which would have to   state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s 
warnings against theories. 
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About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast,automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location) and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time (conditionals, hypotheticals or 
fictionals) of potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, 
conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions -the 
Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 slow, 
cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public 
Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I 
divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational—
which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) ,true or 
false propositional attitudinal thinking, with all S2 functions having no 
precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are 
Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, Capacities, 
Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly developing and changing results of 
S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical S1—fast and automatic 
to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions 
of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person 
statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third 
person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of 
Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, 
reflexive acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) 
in the   1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have 
commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a 
misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are 
often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf. Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, 
observer independent public representations (as opposed to presentations or 
representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53).  They are potential 
acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 
perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is 
one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate 
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psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of 
them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of 
counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 
‘thoughts’ are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil 
Issues 1:45- 66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as 
S1 or primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal 
case, NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see 
the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do 
I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my 
reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). Note well that Dispositions also 
become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in other 
ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and 
his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 
psychology and its interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the 
groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the 
Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who 
made a simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action 
(2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary 
psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so 
beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51).  
OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology 
(arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in 
my view the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive 
psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, 
Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary 
Mental States, that can be described in PL G’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential--Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no 
control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of 
slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-
- in which the mind tries to fit the world. Behaviorism and all the other 
confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because 
we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The 
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Phenomenological Illusion— TPI—Searle). W understood this and described 
it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) 
in action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act 
(Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus acts which try 
to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle 
e.g., C+L   p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other 
dispositions. Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe 
mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities 
(agents as they act or might act - ‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly 
called “Propositional Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our 
innate programs (cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use 
these to produce Dispositions — (believing, knowing, understanding, 
thinking, etc., -actual or potential PUBLIC ACTS (language, thought, mind) 
also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and 
Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of PRIVATE mental 
states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or mind). 
Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. 
 
Perceptions: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
Memories:  Remembering, Dreaming? 
 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X might become True) : 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
 179  
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and 
anger. 
 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my 
thoughts): Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, 
obliged to do INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing 
Trying, Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, 
Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or 
Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs –these are Public and 
Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the 
Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of  
behavior. 
 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE 
AND ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
 
The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—
roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of 
neurons organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and 
memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and 
then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all 
these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader 
sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. 
Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding 
functions or of the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is 
then coextensive in evolution, development and individual action with 
preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive 
modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our 
understanding by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend 
them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), 
math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster and 
more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional 
probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
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aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, 
require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order 
to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility--Bayesian utility 
maximization but Bayesianism is highly questionable) via dominance and 
reciprocal altruism (Desire Independent Reasons for Action-Searle- which I 
divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and impose Conditions of 
Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the 
world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, 
sex, sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all 
by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological 
phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 
p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (i.e., of our language games) admits of 
degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. 
All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in 
some contexts as they must to be useful. There are at least two types of 
thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the dispositional verb 
“thinking“)— nonrational without awareness and rational with partial 
awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2. It is 
useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W 
RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) 
are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can 
play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all 
dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) lacks any test, is not a 
mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it 
becomes a public act in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our 
perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) 
only when they are manifested in public actions, for    only then do thinking, 
feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing 
language means manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. 
TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called UA-Understanding of Agency –
my term-and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2) –and can also be 
called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically 
programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to 
intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles.  Thus, “propositional 
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attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive rational S2D or nonrational 
automated S2A speech and action. We see that the efforts of cognitive science 
to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not 
going to tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, language) 
works (as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already know, because 
“mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any 
phenomena that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, 
quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the 
fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the 
laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said 
“Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of 
language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was 
evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. It’s grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we 
try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple uses depending on 
context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I believe and 
I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person 
expressive use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” describe my ability to 
predict my probable acts and are not descriptive of my mental state nor based 
on knowledge or information in the usual sense of those words (W).  It does 
not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe 
it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person 
present tense are causally self-referential--they instantiate themselves but as 
descriptions of possible states they are not testable (i.e., not T or F). However 
past or future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he 
will believe’ contain information that is true or false as they describe public 
acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no 
information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will 
rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts 
displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information (or 
misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words 
as Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in 
Philosophical Psychology in 2000) Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are 
Non-Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them 
functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions 
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are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1 but again I think one 
must separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions 
are the conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 
Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better 
called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON -Propositional 
and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our 
Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Now for some comments on Horwich’s “Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy”. 
After the above and my many reviews of books by and about W, S, H, DMS 
etc., it should be clear what W is doing and what a contemporary account of 
behavior should include, so I’ll make just a few comments. 
 
First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be 
suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any 
other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another 
irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the 
constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” 
etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. The major 
deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I 
see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and 
Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant 
in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (esp. in footnotes 2-7), where we swim 
in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, 
propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the 
inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). 
Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his 
summary of the import of W’s antitheoretical stance on p65. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
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For me, the high points of all writing on W are nearly always the quotes from 
the master himself and this is again true here. His quote (p101) from TLP 
shows W’s early grasp of EP which he later termed the 
‘background’ or ‘bedrock’. 
 
“Thought is surrounded by a halo. Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact 
the a priori order of the world: that is the order of possibilities, which must 
be common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be 
utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; 
no empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it. It must 
rather be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an 
abstraction; but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it 
were, the hardest thing there is. (TLP # 5, 5563, PI 97).” 
 
There are many good points in the chapter on Kripke but some confusions as 
well. The discussion of W’s refutation of private language on p165-6 seems a 
bit unclear be on p 196-7 he states it again—and this notion is not only central 
to W but to all understanding of HOT. Stern has perhaps the best discussion 
of it I have seen in his “Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations”. Kripke, 
in spite of all the noise he made, is now generally understood to have totally 
misconstrued W, merely repeating the classic skeptical metaphysical 
blunders. Those who want to dig into ‘Kripkenstein’, or philosophy 
generally, should read “Kripke’s Conjuring Trick” by Read and Sharrock—a 
superb deconstruction of skepticism that is readily available on the net. 
 
I find the chapter on consciousness very good, especially p190 et. seq. on 
private language, qualia, inverted spectra and the umpteenth refutation of 
the idea that W is a behaviorist. 
 
It is worth repeating his final remark. “What sort of progress is this—the 
fascinating mystery has been removed-- yet no depths have been plumbed in 
consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or reconceived. How 
tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, 
the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying 
enough.” 
 
Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he 
(and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as 
Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker 
etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on 
academia.edu but for PMS Hacker see      
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http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W 
is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not 
obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear 
and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures 
possible. 
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Review of The Stuff of Thought by Steven Pinker 
(2008) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) 
Ludwig Wittgenstein because Pinker shares with most people (due to the 
default settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about 
the functioning of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and 
profound insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which 
he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. The last 
quote is the only reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, 
which is most unfortunate considering that he was one of the most brilliant 
and original analysts of language. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully 
summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, 
intentional psychology) –a product of blind selfishness, moderated only 
slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our 
genes--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us 
hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and 
make the world a decent place to live. 
 
Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about 
our psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature 
that are left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and 
sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), 
dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of 
intentional psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual 
states (e.g, satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain 
damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision 
theory (incl. game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior (very 
little language but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books have been 
written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in this 
book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this 
way or how it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various 
way (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that 
operates at a more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most active. 
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And there is scant attention to context. 
 
Nevertheless, this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth 
reading. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
“If God looked into our minds he would not be able to see there whom we 
were thinking of.” 
 
“Ought the word “infinite” to be avoided in mathematics? Yes: where it 
appears to confer a meaning upon the calculus; instead of getting one from 
it.” RFM revised edition (1978) p141 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and 
set it in relief—but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses 
itself in the very fact that language can and only does refer to it. For since 
language only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from the 
world, no language is conceivable that does not represent this world.” 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks S47 
 
 “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” TLP 
 
I start with these famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) because Pinker shares with most people (due to the 
default settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about 
the functioning of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and 
profound insights into the workings of language, thought and reality (which 
he viewed as more or less coextensive) not found anywhere else. The last 
quote is the only reference Pinker makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, 
which is most unfortunate considering that he was one of the most brilliant 
and original analysts of language. 
 
Another famous Wittgensteinian dictum is “Nothing is Hidden.” If one dips 
into his work sufficiently, I think he makes it very clear what this means—
that our psychology is in front of us all the time if we only open our eyes to 
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see it and that no amount of scientific work is going to make it clearer (in fact 
it just gets more and more obscure). This is not antirational or antiscientific 
but it just states what he sees as the facts—a soccer game is out on the field –
not in our head--and we understand perfectly well the motivations, anxieties, 
stresses and disappointments of the players and what effort is required to 
play and how the ball moves when kicked. Immense advances have been 
made in sports physiology, anatomy, bioenergetics, physics math and 
chemistry. Whole books full of equations have been written about how balls 
move thru the air and muscles apply force to move bones; about how muscle 
movements originate in part of the cortex, are mirrored in the brains of others; 
mountains of literature on motivation, personality, brain function and 
modeling. Has this given us any more insight into a soccer game or changed 
our experience of playing or watching? 
 
Intentionality (rationality) has been evolved piecemeal from whatever tools 
(genes) animals had to work with and so is full of paradoxes and illusions. 
Just as we see mirages in the desert or read words into sentences that are not 
there, and see animated blobs on a screen “causing” others to move and 
“helping” or “hindering”’, we look for thinking and believing in the head and 
confuse our innate psychological axioms with empirical facts (e.g., regarding 
math and geometry as things we “discover” in the world, rather than invent). 
 
In order for the concept and word “reality” to apply to the results we get from 
the use of differential equations, MRI scanners and particle colliders to a 
greater degree than or in place of apples, rocks and thunderstorms, it would 
be necessary for these recent discoveries to have had the same role in natural 
selection over hundreds of millions of years. It is only survival advantage 
over eons that selected the genes enabling our distant (invertebrate) ancestors 
to begin reacting in useful ways to the sights and sounds of the world and 
ever so slowly to produce brains that could form concepts (thoughts) that 
eventually were verbalized. Science and culture cannot replace or take 
preference over our ancient intentional psychology but merely slightly 
extends or supplements it. But when philosophizing (or doing linguistics!) 
we are easily misled as context is missing and our psychology automatically 
dissects every situation for the causes and the ultimate or lowest level of 
explanation and we substitute that for the gross higher levels because there 
is nothing in our language rules to prevent it. It comes ever so naturally to 
say we don’t think—our brain does and tables are not solid because physics 
tells us they are made of molecules. But W reminded us that our concepts of, 
and words for, thinking, believing and other dispositions are public actions, 
not processes in the brain, and in what sense are molecules solid? Hence, the 
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quote above, which bears repeating, since I see it as one of the most 
fundamental ideas we have to get clear about before we can make any 
progress in the study of behavior. 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and 
set it in relief—but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses 
itself in the very fact that language can and only does refer to it. For since 
language only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from the 
world, no language is conceivable that does not represent this world.” 
 
Much of W’s writing is examples of the common-sense knowledge that is 
essential to the success of all animal behavior and by and large not only the 
behavioral science but even AI, which cannot succeed without it, has been 
unable to grasp and implement it. Even one of the fathers of AI, Marvin 
Minsky said (in a 2003 Boston Univ. speech) that “AI has been brain dead 
since the 70’s” and lacked common sense reasoning. But his recent book “The 
Emotion Machine” still shows no awareness of the work that W did 75 years 
ago, and this means no awareness of the contextual, intentional, point of view 
without which one cannot hope to grasp how the mind (language) works. 
 
When talking about behavior (i.e., thought or language or action) it is a nearly 
universal mistake to regard the meaning of a word or sentence as attached to 
it, ignoring the infinite subtleties of context, and thus we go astray. Of course, 
we cannot include everything about context, as that would make discussion 
difficult, even impossible, but there is a vast difference between regarding 
meaning as something that can be fully given by a dictionary entry and 
meaning as shorthand for a family of complex uses. Even Klein’s classic book 
‘Time in Language’ (not cited by Pinker) regards the ‘time’ as a family of 
loosely connected uses, though of course he too has no awareness of W, Searle 
or intentionality. 
 
The point of mentioning this is that Pinker shares the reductionistic biases of 
most modern scientists and that this colors his approach to behavior in ways 
that will not be obvious to most readers. As fascinating as his data are and as 
masterful as his writing is, it subtly leads us to what I think is a mistaken 
picture of our psychology—a view that is due to the innate biases of our 
evolved psychology and hence is a universal failing. 
 
Pinker is the Richard Dawkins of psychology—one of the major popularizers 
of science in modern times. Possibly only the late and most unlamented (he 
was a self-serving egomaniac who misled millions with his specious 
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reasoning and blank slateism) Stephan Gould sold more volumes of pop sci. 
It was Pinker’s masterful refutation of the universal delusion that human 
nature is culturally generated (one of Gould’s many delusions) that made his 
previous book ‘The Blank Slate’ a classic and a top choice for most important 
books of the 21st century. Incidentally, there are many put-downs of Gould, 
including some by Pinker and Dawkins (“he has made tilting at windmills 
into his own personal art form” –as I recall it from a Dawkins review of a 
Gould tome from the Journal ‘Evolution’ a decade or so ago), but I think the 
best is that of Tooby and Cosmides in a letter to the NY Times (search their 
page or the Times). All of these works are intimately connected by the subject 
of animal behavior, evolutionary psychology, and of course ‘The Stuff of 
Thought”. 
 
Following convention, Pinker discusses Putnam’s famous, but badly flawed, 
twin earth thought experiment (bizarre thought expts. in philosophy were 
essentially invented by Wittgenstein), which claims to show that meaning is 
not in the head, but it was W in the 30’s—i.e., 40 years earlier-- who showed 
decisively that all the dispositions or inclinations (as he called them, though 
philosophers, lacking acquaintance with his work commonly call them by the 
incorrect name of propositional attitudes) including meaning, intending, 
thinking, believing, judging etc. function as descriptions of our actions and 
not as terms for mental phenomena. They cannot be in the head for the same 
reason a soccer game cannot be in the head. Later in life Putnam began to take 
Wittgenstein seriously and changed his tune accordingly. 
 
He makes almost no reference to the large and fascinating literature on 
behavioral automatisms (i.e., most of our behavior! --see e.g., “Experiments 
With People’(2004) or Bargh’s ‘Social Psychology and the Unconscious’ (2007) 
for the older work, and the now (2016) vast and rapidly expanding literature 
on implicit cognition), which shows that the more you look, the clearer it 
becomes that actions which we regard as results of our conscious choice are 
not. People shown pictures or reading stories of old people tend to walk out 
of the building slower than when give those of young people etc. etc. The 
well-known placebo effect is a variant where the info is consciously input—
e.g., in a 2008 study eighty-five percent of volunteers who thought they were 
getting a $2.50 sugar pill said they felt less pain after taking it, compared with 
a 61 percent control group. Such effects can be induced subliminally if the 
price info is input via images, text or sound. Presumably the same is true of 
most of our choices. 
 
This brings us to one of my major gripes about this book—it’s monomaniacal 
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obsession with the “meaning” of words rather than their use-- a distinction 
made famous by W in his lectures and some 20 books beginning in the 1930’s. 
Like W’s insistence that we do not explain behavior (or the rest of nature) but 
only describe it, this may seem like a pointless quibble, but, as usual, I have 
found as I reflected on these matters over the years that W was right on the 
mark. He said that a formula which will work most of the time is that the 
meaning of a word (far better to say a sentence) is its use in language—and 
this means its public use in a specified context to communicate info from one 
person to another (and sometimes to another higher mammal—dogs share a 
major portion of our intentional psychology). I mention this partly because in 
a previous book Pinker accused W of denying that animals have 
consciousness (an extraordinary view that is actually defended by some) 
because he noted that a dog can’t think “perhaps it will rain tomorrow”, but 
W’s point was the unexceptional one that there are many thoughts that we 
cannot have without language and that we have no test for interpreting a 
dog’s behavior as showing that it expected something tomorrow. Even if it 
used an umbrella and invariably got it out of the closet the day before a rain, 
there is no way to connect this to it’s mental state—same for a deaf mute who 
could not read or write or use sign language. This connects to his famous 
demonstrations of the impossibility of a private language and to the fact that 
dispositions are not in the head. W showed how the absence of any public 
test means that even the dog and the mute cannot know what they are 
thinking—nor can we, because dispositions are public acts and the act is the 
criterion for what we thought—even for ourself. This is the point of the quote 
above—neither God nor neurophysiologists can see thoughts, beliefs, images, 
hopes in our brain, because they these are terms for acts and neither the vague 
and fleeting epiphenomena we experience, nor the correlates detectable by 
brain studies, function in our life in the same way as do the contextual use of 
the sentences describing these acts. And, regarding animal consciousness, W 
noted that intentional psychology gets a foothold even in a fly—a point 
marvelously and increasingly supported by modern genetics, which shows 
that many genes and processes fundamental to primate behavior got their 
start at least as early as nematodes (i.e., C. elegans) some billion years ago. 
 
Intentional psychology or intentionality (very roughly our personality or 
rationality or higher order thought (HOT) is a very old philosophical concept 
that (unknown to most) was given its modern formulation by Wittgenstein, 
who, in the 20,000 pages of his nachlass, now mostly translated and published 
in some 20 books and several CDROM’s, laid the foundations for the modern 
study of human behavior. Sadly, he was mostly a recluse who did not publish 
for the last 30 years of his life, never really finished writing anything of his 
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later work and wrote his brilliant and highly original comments on behavior 
in a style various termed epigrammatic, telegraphic, oracular, Socratic, 
obscure etc. and all published posthumously over a period of more than 50 
years (the famous Philosophical Investigations (PI) in 1953 and the most 
recent-but not the last!—The Big Typescript in 2005) and thus, though he was 
recently voted one of the top 5 philosophers of all time, and Philosophical 
Investigations  the most important philosophy book of the 20   century, he is 
ignored or misunderstood by nearly everyone. The feeling I often get is that 
our psychology is a coral reef with most people snorkeling on the surface 
admiring the bumps while Wittgenstein is 20 meters below probing the 
crevices with scuba gear and flashlight. 
 
Wittgenstein’s literary executors were stuffy academics and his books issued 
mostly from Blackwell with staid academic titles and no explanation 
whatsoever that they can be seen as a major foundation for the modern study 
of evolutionary psychology, personality, rationality, language, 
consciousness, politics, theology, literature, anthropology, sociology, law etc., 
–in fact everything that we say, think and do since, as he showed, it all 
depends on the innate axioms of our evolved psychology which we share to 
a large extent with dogs and to some extent even with flies and C. elegans. 
Had his works been presented with flashy covers by popular presses with 
titles like How the Mind Works, The Language Instinct, and The Stuff of 
Thought, much of the intellectual landscape of the 20   century might have 
been different. As it is, though he is the major subject of at least 200 books and 
10,000 papers and discussed in countless thousands more (including Pinker’s 
How the Mind Works), based on the hundreds of articles and dozens of books 
I have read in the last few years, I would say there are less than a dozen 
people who really grasp the significance of his work, as I present it in this and 
my other reviews. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle 
and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may 
consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind 
and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
One result of all this (what one philosopher has called “the collective amnesia 
regarding Wittgenstein”) is that students of language including Pinker take 
Grice’s notions such as implicature (which seems just a fancy word for 
implication) and, more recently, relevance theory, as a framework for “the 
relation between words and meaning” (of course W would turn in his grave 
at this phrase since how can they be separable from their use if one follows 
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his meaning is use formula?) but they seem to me feeble substitutes for 
intentionality as described by W and revised and enlarged by Searle and 
others. In any case, Grice is the normal soporific academic, Sperber (a leader 
in relevance theory) tolerable, Pinker engaging and often elegant and even 
poignant, Searle (see esp. ‘Rationality in Action’) is clear, rigorous, and quite 
original (though owing, I think, a very big debt to W) but too academic for 
the bestseller lists, while Wittgenstein, once you grasp that he is a natural 
master psychologist describing how the mind works, is very demanding, but 
brilliantly original and often breathtaking. Pinker writes masterful prose 
while Wittgenstein writes telegrams, though often moving and poetic ones 
and on a few occasions, he wrote beautiful essays. Pinker can be mined for 
some gold, lots of iron and some dross while W is mostly gold, a little iron 
and hardly a speck of dross. Pinker is mostly summarizing the work of others 
(though in impeccable style) while W is so original and so bizarre he’s way 
over most people’s heads. I suggest reading Pinker, Searle and Wittgenstein 
alternately or simultaneously with a dash of Sperber, Grice and a few 
hundred others from time to time. 
 
W said that the problem is not to find the answer, but to recognize that which 
is always before us as the answer. That is, our language is (by and large) our 
thought, which is about actual or potential events (including actions by 
agents such as barking, speaking and writing), and that meaning, contra 
Pinker and a cast of thousands, is use and nothing is hidden (i.e., language is 
(mostly) thought). 
 
The ignorance in many quarters is so complete that even an otherwise 
marvelous recent 358 page book by Wiese on a topic virtually created by 
Wittgenstein (Numbers, Language and the Human Mind—which I see is 
cited by Pinker) there is not a single reference to him! 
 
W mostly emphasizes the different uses of the “same” words” (i.e., a splitter) 
who originally wanted to use the quote “I’ll teach you differences!” as the 
motto of his book PhilosophicaI Investigations. That is, by describing the 
different uses of sentences (the language games), and by modifying the games 
in thought experiments, we remind ourselves of the different roles these 
games play in life and we see the limits of our psychology. But Pinker, again 
following the seductive defaults of our evolved modules and the egregious 
examples of thousands of others, is a lumper who often blurs these 
differences. E.G., he speaks repeatedly of “reality” as though it was a single 
thing (rather than a whole family of uses). He also speaks of reality as 
something separate from our experience (i.e., the classic idealist/realist 
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confusion). 
 
But what test is there for reality? He slips (as do we all) so easily into the 
reductionistic substitution of lower levels for higher ones so we are all 
inclined to dismiss the thinking that we can see (i.e., actions) for processes in 
the brain, which our language (thought) can not possibly be describing, as it 
evolved long before anyone had any idea of brain functions. If Pinker 
imagines that you are not really reading this page (e.g., your retina is being 
hit with photons bouncing off ink molecules etc.) then I respectfully suggest 
he needs to reflect further on the issue of language, thought and reality and I 
know of no better antidote to this toxic meme than immersion in 
Wittgenstein. 
 
Reflecting on Wittgenstein brings to mind a comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor 
like him), which ran something like ‘Not offering the chair of philosophy to 
Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I 
think of Wittgenstein as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born 
ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at 
nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like Einstein 
nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual 
recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of 
his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world famous; 
completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing 
more, and knowledge of his new work in mostly garbled form diffused 
slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 
leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from 
other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings 
and crossed out words so that many sentences have multiple variants; that 
his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what 
they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no 
real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as 
famous due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and 
even nonsense and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of 
hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many 
physicists knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive 
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summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and 
condensed form that it was impossible to decide what was being said; that he 
was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature 
of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and 
usually erroneous references to him and that many omitted him entirely; that 
to this day, half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people 
who really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, 
I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
It seems crushingly obvious that our evolved psychology has been selected 
to match the world to the maximal extent compatible with our genetic and 
energetic resources and that is ALL we can say about reality, and we ALL 
understand this (we LIVE it) but when we stop to think about it, the defaults 
of our universal psychology take over and we start to use the words 
(concepts) of “reality,” “aspects,” “time,” “space,”, “possible,” etc. out of the 
intentional contexts in which they evolved. The following gem comes from 
biologists (I take it from Shettleworth’s superb but neglected book Cognition, 
Evolution and Behavior). 
 
“The role of psychology then is to describe the innate features of the minds of 
different organisms which have evolved to match certain aspects of that 
physical external universe, and the way in which the physical universe 
interacts with the mind to produce the phenomenal world. O’Keefe and 
Nadel “The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map” 
 
Think of it this way—you can look up a word in the dictionary but you cannot 
look up a use there, unless there was a video which showed before and after 
the event and all relevant facts about it. The dictionary is like a morgue full 
of dead bodies. Here lies “rose” and here “run” and here “in” and here “is” 
and what is missing is life. Add a photo and it’s a little better: add a video 
and lots better: add a long 3D color hires video with sound and smell and its 
getting there. 
 
Part of Wittgenstein’s description of our public psychology included many 
detailed examples of how the sensations and images in my mind don’t carry 
any epistemic weight even for me. How do I know I am eating an apple? My 
taste and vision might be wrong and how to decide? But if I talk about it or 
write it down and you say “that’s a tasty looking apple” etc. I have an 
objective test. Right and wrong get a foothold here. 
 
W was going to use a quote from Goethe as the motto of PI --“In the beginning 
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was the deed.” That is, evolutionarily it was perceptions and actions and then 
memories of them and then thoughts about them and then words voicing the 
thoughts. So, the event is the thing Australopithecus thought about and 
natural selection for being able to make acoustic blasts which substituted for 
them was strong enough to modify our vocal apparatus and suitable control 
circuitry at a fantastic pace, so by early Neanderthal time they were talking a 
blue streak and have not shut up mind or mouth for more than a few minutes 
since. W understood, as few have, the primacy of actions and the irrelevance 
of our thoughts, feelings etc. as the foundations of communication, which is 
why he is often called a behaviorist (i.e., Dennett, Hofstadter, B.F. Skinner 
style denial of the reality of our mental life, mind, consciousness etc.) but this 
is patently absurd. 
 
It reminds me of the famous description of Plato of the shadows on the cave 
wall vs turning around to see people actually using language—an analogy 
that I never thought of in regard to W and which I was stunned to see a few 
hours later in Pinker’s last chapter. In any case if one considers carefully any 
case of language use we see that much of our intentional psychology is called 
into play. 
 
One can see the ignorance of Wittgenstein in the articles in EEL2 (the Elsevier 
Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics-2nd ed. (2005) 12,353p- yes that’s 
12 thousand pages in 14 vols and a mere $6000) which is by far the biggest, 
and one hopes the most authoritative, reference in language studies. 
 
Curiously, Pinker does not have a single reference to it, but you can find it, 
along with nearly all of Pinker, Searle, Wittgenstein and thousands of others 
free on the net. 
 
To get a grasp of the basic necessities for AI you might e.g., find it much more 
interesting to read W’s RFM than Minsky’s ‘The Emotion Machine’. Pinker 
has referred to Brown’s famous list of hundreds of universals of human 
behavior, but these are nearly all gross higher level behaviors such as the 
possession of religion, reciprocal altruisms etc. but it large omits hundreds of 
other universals which underlie these. Wittgenstein was the first, and in some 
cases perhaps the only one to date, to point out many of the more 
fundamental ones. However, he did not tell you what he was doing and 
nobody else has either so you will have to puzzle it out for yourself. Most 
people read first (and often nothing else) his Philosophical Investigations but 
I prefer the more strictly mathematical examples in his Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics. If you read with the understanding that he is 
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describing the universal axioms of our evolutionary psychology which 
underlie all our reasoning then his work makes perfect sense and is 
breathtaking in its ingenuity. 
 
Pinker illustrates how the mind works with the Barbecue Sauce example. 
There are of course a limitless number of others which illustrate our 
subjective probability (often called Bayesian reasoning—though he does not 
mention this). My favorites are Doomsday (see e.g., Bostrum’s book or web 
page), Sleeping Beauty and Newcomb’s problem. Unlike Barbecue, which has 
a clear solution, many others have (depending on your viewpoint) one, none 
or many. We may regard these as interesting, as they show gaps in or limits 
to our rationality (a major theme in Wittgenstein) or (what we have known at 
least since de Finetti’s work in the 20’s) that all probability is subjective, or 
like the famous liar paradox or Godel’s theorems (see my review of 
Hofstadter’s ‘I am a Strange Loop), as trivial demonstrations of the limits of 
our primate mind, though Pinker does not expand on this issue nor give more 
than a few hints at the vast literature on decision theory, game theory, 
behavioral economics, Bayesianism etc. 
 
EEL2 does have a passable short article on W which avoids making too many 
glaring errors, but it totally misses nearly everything of importance, which, if 
really understood, would make the article by far the longest one in the book. 
Nearly the whole thing is wasted on the Tractatus, which everyone knows he 
totally rejected later and which is extremely confused and confusing as well. 
Hardly anything on his later philosophy and not a word about the two 
searchable CDROM’s which are now the starting point for all W scholars (and 
anyone interested in human behavior) which are now becoming widely 
disseminate via the net. There is also nothing here nor in the articles about 
Chomsky, innate ideas , evolution of syntax, evolution of semantics, 
evolution of pragmatics (practically every one of his 20,000 pages has to do 
with novel ideas and examples on these two), schema theory etc., nor about 
how he anticipated Chomsky in studying “depth grammar”, described the 
problem of underdetermination or combinatorial explosion nor a word about 
his discovery (repeatedly and in detail—e.g., RPP Vol. 2 p20) some 20 years 
before Wason of the reasons for “glitches” in “if p then q” types of 
constructions now analyzed by the Wason selection tests (one of the standard 
tools of EP research), nor about how his work can be seen as anticipating 
many ideas in evolutionary psychology, about his founding the modern 
study of intentionality, of dispositions as actions, of the epiphenomenality of 
our mental life and of the unity of language, math, geometry, music, art and 
games, nor even an explanation of what he meant by language games and 
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grammar—two of his most frequently used terms. W made the change from 
trying to understand the mind as a logical, domain general structure to a 
psychological idiosyncratic domain specific one in the late 20’s but 
Kahneman got the Nobel for it in 2002, for numerous reasons, not the least of 
which is that they did lab work and statistical analysis (though W was a 
superb experimentalist and quite good at math). Of course, one cannot fault 
the EEL2 too much as it merely follows the similar omissions and lack of 
understanding throughout the behavioral sciences. And, I am not bringing 
this up in the way one might complain about the absence of info on ancient 
Chinese war rockets in a book on rocket engines, but because his work is still 
a virtually untapped mine of behavioral science diamonds, and, for my 
money, some of the most exhilarating and eye opening prose I have ever read. 
Nearly anything he has written could be used as a supplementary text or lab 
manual in any philosophy or psychology class and in much of law, 
mathematics, literature, behavioral economics, history, politics, 
anthropology, sociology and of course linguistics. Which brings us back to 
Pinker. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully 
summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, 
intentional psychology) – a product of blind selfishness, moderated only 
slightly by automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our 
genes--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us 
hope that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and 
make the world a decent place to live. 
 
Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about 
our psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature 
that are left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and 
sounds, images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), 
dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of 
intentional psychology of action, neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual 
states (e.g., satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and recording, brain 
damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, decision 
theory (including game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior 
(very little language but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books have 
been written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in 
this book are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it 
this way or how it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their 
various ways (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology 
that operates at a more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most 
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active.  And there is scant attention to context. 
 
Among the countless books not referred to here are Guerino Mazzola’s 
excellent tome investigating the similarity of math and music ‘The Topos of 
Music’, Shulgin’s amazing work probing the mind with psychochemicals 
‘Phikal’ and ‘Tikal’. Many which try to represent mental functions with 
geometrical or mathematical means such as Rott ‘Belief Revision’ Gardenfors 
various books, and of course the massive efforts going in logic (e.g. the 20 or 
so Vol Handbook of Philosophical Logic) as well as many others edited or 
written by the amazing Dov Gabbay (e.g., ‘Temporal Logic’). Re spatial 
language of the numerous volumes on the psychology, language or 
philosophy of space, the recent ‘Handbook of Spatial Logic’ (especially fun 
are Chap 11 on space-time and the last Chap. by Varzi) stands out. The point 
is that these logical, geometrical and mathematical works are extensions of 
our innate axiomatic psychology, and so they show in their equations and 
graphics something about the ‘shape’ or ‘form’ or ‘function’ of our thoughts 
(modules, templates, inference engines), and so also the shape of those of 
animals and even perhaps of computers (though one has to think of what test 
would be relevant here!). And of course. all the works of Wittgenstein, 
keeping in mind that he is sometimes talking about the most basic 
prelinguistic or even premammalian levels of thought and perception. Of 
course, many books on AI, robot navigation and image processing are 
relevant as they must mimic our psychology. Face recognition is one of our 
most striking abilities (though even crustaceans can do it) and the best recent 
work I know is ‘Handbook of Face Recognition’. Of the numerous books on 
space/time one can start with Klein’s ‘Language and Time’ or McLure’s ‘The 
Philosophy of Time’. Smith’s ‘Language and Time’, Hawley’s ‘How Things 
Persist’ and Sider’s ‘Four- Dimensionalism’ , Ludlow’s ‘Semantics, Tense and 
Time’ , Dainton’s ‘Time and Space’.and ‘Unity of Consciousness’, Diek’s ‘The 
Ontology of Spacetime’ and Sattig’s ‘The Language and Reality of Time”. But 
as one would expect, and as detailed by Rupert Read, the language games 
here are all tangled up and most of the discussions of time are hopelessly 
incoherent. 
 
And also a good but now dated book covering much of relevance with articles 
by Searle and others is Vanderveken’s  ‘Logic, Thought and Action’. 
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Review of “Are We Hardwired? by Clark & 
Grunstein Oxford (2000) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This is an excellent review of gene/environment interactions on behavior and, 
in spite of being a bit dated, is an easy and worthwhile read. They start with 
twin studies which show the overwhelming impact of genetics on behavior. 
They note the increasingly well known studies of Judith Harris which extend 
and summarize the facts that shared home environment has almost no effect 
on behavior and that adopted children grow up to be as different from their 
stepbrothers and sisters as people chosen at random. One basic point that 
they (and nearly all who discuss behavioral genetics) fail to note is that the 
hundreds (thousands depending on your viewpoint) of human behavioral 
universals, including all the basics of our personalities, are 100% determined 
by our genes, with no variation in normals. Everyone sees a tree as a tree and 
not a stone, seeks and eats food, gets angry and jealous etc. So, what they are 
mostly talking about here is how much environment (culture) can affect the 
degree to which various traits are shown, rather than their appearance. 
 
Finally, they discuss eugenics in the usual politically correct fashion, failing 
to note that we and all organisms are the products of nature’s eugenics and 
that attempts to defeat natural selection with medicine, agriculture, and 
civilization as a whole, are disastrous for any society that persists. As much 
as 50% of all conceptions, or some 100 million/year, end in early spontaneous 
abortion, nearly all without the mother being aware. This natural culling of 
defective genes drives evolution, keeps us relatively genetically sound and 
makes society possible. However, it is now clear that overpopulation will 
destroy the world before dysgenics has a chance. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
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This is an excellent review of gene/environment interactions on behavior and, 
in spite of being a bit dated, is an easy and worthwhile read. 
 
They start with twin studies which show the overwhelming impact of 
genetics on behavior. They note the increasingly well known studies of Judith 
Harris which extend and summarize the facts that shared home environment 
has almost no effect on behavior and that adopted children grow up to be as 
different from their stepbrothers and sisters as people chosen at random. 
There is lots of impact on personality (ca 50% of variation) from early 
environment, presumably peer interaction, TV etc., but we really don’t know. 
 
They summarize the genetics of behavior in the earliest true animals, the 
protozoa, and note that many of the genes and mechanisms underlying our 
behavior are already present. There is strong selective advantage to 
identifying the genes of one’s potential mates and even protozoa have such 
mechanisms. There is data showing that people tend to pick out mates with 
different HLA types but the mechanism is obscure. They present various lines 
of evidence that we communicate unconsciously with pheromones via the 
vomeronasal organs and not mediated by smell neurons. 
 
One chapter reviews the biology of the nematode C. elegans, noting the fact 
that it shares many mechanisms and genes with protozoa and with us due to 
the extreme conservativism of evolution. Some human genes have been 
inserted into it with apparent preservation of their function in us. 
 
Moreover, they show what seem to be mechanisms of long term and short 
term memory controlled by genes in a fashion similar to that in higher 
organisms. 
 
They note the general similarity of the nonvisual cryptochome mediated 
regulation of circadian rhythms in yeasts and fruitflies to those in higher 
animals and even to those in plants. It has been shown that both cry-1 and 
cry-2 cryptochrome genes are present in fruit flies, mice and humans and that 
the photoreceptor system is active in many body cells other than the retina, 
and researchers have even been able to trigger circadian rhythms from light 
shined on our leg! 
 
After a brief survey of work on the famous slug Aplysia and the cAMP and 
Calmodulin systems, they review the data on human neurotransmitters. The 
chapter on aggression notes the impulsive aggression of low serotonin mice 
and the effects on aggressive behavior of mutations/drugs that effect the 
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chemistry of nitric oxide— recently, to the amazement of all, identified as a 
major neurotransmitter or neuromodulator. 
 
In a chapter on consumption, they recount the now well known story of leptin 
and its role in regulation food intake. Then a summary of the genetics of 
sexual behavior. 
 
One basic point that they (and nearly all who discuss behavioral genetics) fail 
to note is that the hundreds (thousands depending on your viewpoint) of 
human behavioral universals, including all the basics of our personalities, are 
100% determined by our genes, with no variation in normals. Everyone sees 
a tree as a tree and not a stone, seeks and eats food, gets angry and jealous 
etc. So, what they are mostly talking about here is how much environment 
(culture) can affect the degree to which various traits are shown, rather than 
their appearance. 
 
There are also highly active fields studying human behavior which they 
barely mention— evolutionary psychology, cognitive psychology, parts of 
sociology, anthropology and behavioral economics—which are casting 
brilliant lights on behavior and showing that it is to a large extent automatic 
and unconscious with little voluntary awareness or control. The authors bias 
towards biology is a huge defect. 
 
Finally, they discuss eugenics in the usual politically correct fashion, failing 
to note that we and all organisms are the products of nature’s eugenics and 
that attempts to defeat natural selection with medicine, agriculture, and 
civilization as a whole, are disastrous for any society that persists. As much 
as 50% of all conceptions, or some 100 million/year, end in early spontaneous 
abortion, nearly all without the mother being aware. This natural culling of 
defective genes drives evolution, keeps us relatively genetically sound and 
makes society possible. However, it is now clear that overpopulation will 
destroy the world before dysgenics has a chance. 
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Is JK Rowling More Evil Than Me? 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
How about a different take on the rich and famous? First the obvious—the 
Harry Potter novels are primitive superstition that encourages children to 
believe in fantasy rather than take responsibility for the world-- the norm of 
course. JKR is just as clueless about herself and the world as all the other 
monkeys, but about 200 times as destructive as the average American and 
about 800 times more than the average Chinese. She has been responsible for 
the destruction of maybe 30,000 hectares of forest to produce these trash 
novels and all the erosion ensuing (not trivial as its ca. 12 tons/year soil into 
the ocean for everyone on earth or maybe 100 tons per American, and so 
about 5000 tons/year for Rowling’s books and movies and her 3 children). The 
earth loses about 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its 
food growing capacity will be gone. Then there is the huge amount of fuel 
burned and waste made to make and distribute the books and films, plastic 
dolls etc. She shows her lack of social responsibility by producing children 
rather than using her millions to encourage family planning or buy up the 
rain forest, and by promoting the conventional liberal stupidity of 3rd world 
supremacy that is destroying Britain, America, the world and her 
descendant’s future. Of course, she's not that different from the other 7.7 
billion clueless - just noisier and more destructive 
 
It is the no free lunch problem writ large. The mob just can’t see that there is 
no such thing as helping one person without harming others. Rights or 
privileges given to new entrants into an overcrowded world can only 
diminish those of others. In spite of the massive ecological disasters 
happening in front of them everywhere everyday, they can’t pin them to the 
unrestrained motherhood of “the diverse”, which accounts for most of the 
population increase of the last century and all of that in this one. They lack 
some combination of intelligence, education, experience and sanity required 
to extrapolate the daily assaults on the resources and functioning of society 
to the eventual collapse of industrial civilization. Each meal, each trip by car 
or bus, each pair of shoes is another nail in the earth’s coffin.  It has likely 
never crossed her mind that one seat on a plane from London to San Francisco 
produces about one ton of carbon which melts about 3 square meters of sea 
ice and as one of the overprivileged she has probably flown hundreds of such 
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flights.  
 
Not only the rich and famous, but nearly any public figure at all, including 
virtually all teachers, are pressured to be politically correct, which in the 
Western Democracies, now means social democratic (diluted communist) 
third world supremacists working for the destruction of their own societies 
and their own descendants. So, those whose lack of free speech (and basic 
common sense), which should prohibit them from making any public 
statements at all, totally dominate all the media, creating the impression that 
the intelligent and civilized must favor democracy, diversity and equality, 
while the truth is that these are the problems and not the solutions, and that 
they themselves are the prime enemies of civilization. 
 
How about a different take on the rich and famous? First the obvious—the 
Harry Potter novels are primitive superstition that encourages children to 
believe in fantasy rather than take responsibility for the world-- the norm of 
course. JKR is just as clueless about herself and the world as all the other 
monkeys, but about 200 times as destructive as the average American and 
about 800 times more than the average Chinese. She has been responsible for 
the destruction of maybe 30,000 hectares of forest to produce these trash 
novels and all the erosion ensuing (not trivial as its ca. 12 tons/year soil into 
the ocean for everyone on earth or maybe 100 tons per American, and so 
about 5000 tons/year for Rowling’s books and movies and her 3 children). The 
earth loses about 1% of its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its 
food growing capacity will be gone. Then there is the huge amount of fuel 
burned and waste made to make and distribute the books and films, plastic 
dolls etc. She shows her lack of social responsibility by producing children 
rather than using her millions to encourage family planning or buy up the 
rain forest, and by promoting the conventional liberal stupidity of 3rd world 
supremacy that is destroying Britain, America, the world and her 
descendant’s future. Of course, she's not that different from the other 7.7 
billion clueless - just noisier and more destructive. 
 
Like all the rich, she is able to multiply her destruction by causing others to 
destroy on her behalf. Each child she produced results in about 50 tons of 
topsoil into the ocean, 300 lbs of toxic chemicals produced, 1 acre of 
forest/wetland/ gone forever, every year. Like all people, her family steals 
from all people on the earth and from their own descendants (no human 
rights without human wrongs), and, like the vast majority, she is poorly 
educated, egomaniacal, and lacking self-awareness, so these issues never 
cross her mind. In addition to the material destruction to make and distribute 
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her books and movies, there is the vast amount of time wasted in reading and 
viewing them. In addition, the extreme immaturity shown by the characters 
in them and their preoccupation with infantile superstitious fantasies can 
only do harm to impressionable minds. The world would be a better place if 
she had never been born, but one can say it of nearly everyone. 
 
It has long been the understanding of spiritually aware people that all but a 
tiny number of us spend their whole lives asleep, and this view is powerfully 
supported by modern psychological research, which shows that nearly all our 
actions are done mechanically, for reasons of which we are not aware and 
over which we have no control. Our personality is an illusion produced by 
evolution to ensure reproduction. We are only a package for selfish genes 
carrying out their blind programs and, like all organisms, we live to replicate 
our genes and to accumulate and consume resources to that end. In our case 
that means we live to destroy the earth and our own descendants. It is 
essential to this game that we remain unaware of it, for, to the extent we 
become aware and live our lives as conscious beings, we diminish our 
reproduction and the genes which produce this behavior are selected against. 
 
Rowling is a typical example of a seemingly intelligent aware person who 
will walk through their whole life sound asleep—just like nearly all of the 
other 11 billion (I extrapolate to 2100) —and like them, lives only to destroy 
the earth and to leave her toxic offspring behind to continue the destruction. 
Like so many, she, with Obama and the Pope, share the common delusion 
that the poor are more noble and deserving, but the rich differ only in having 
the chance to be more destructive.  The poor are the rich in waiting.   So 800 
Chinese or Indians do about as much damage as JKR and her family.  Rich or 
poor they do the only things monkeys can do - consume resources and 
replicate their genes until the collapse of industrial civilization about the 
middle of the next century. In the blink of an eye, centuries and millennia will 
pass and, in the hellish world of starvation, disease, war and violence that 
their ancestors created, nobody will know or care that any of them existed.  
She is no more inherently evil than others, but also no better and, due to the 
accidents of history, she is high on the list of Enemies of Life on Earth. 
 
It is the no free lunch problem writ large. The mob just can’t see that there is 
no such thing as helping one person without harming others. Rights or 
privileges given to new entrants into an overcrowded world can only 
diminish those of others. In spite of the massive ecological disasters 
happening in front of them everywhere everyday, they can’t pin them to the 
unrestrained motherhood of “the diverse”, which accounts for most of the 
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population increase of the last century and all of that in this one. They lack 
some combination of intelligence, education, experience and sanity required 
to extrapolate the daily assaults on the resources and functioning of society 
now to the eventual collapse of industrial civilization, as well as the courage 
to say so even if they do realize it. Each meal, each trip by car or bus, each 
pair of shoes is another nail in the earth’s coffin.  It has likely never crossed 
her mind that one seat on a plane from London to San Francisco produces 
about one ton of carbon which melts about 3 square meters of sea ice and as 
one of the overprivileged she has probably flown hundreds of such flights. 
 
It never crosses their minds that the average lower class family of 4 take out 
in goods, services, and infrastructure costs perhaps $50,000 more every year 
than they contribute, and in 100 years (when it will have expanded to perhaps 
10 people) will have cost the country about $15 million, and immeasurably 
more in long term ecological and social costs (what is the value for the 
collapse of civilization?). 
 
Not only the rich and famous, but nearly any public figure at all, including 
virtually all teachers, are pressured to be politically correct, which in the 
Western Democracies, now means social democratic (diluted communist) 
third world supremacists working for the destruction of their own societies 
and their own descendants. So, those whose lack of free speech (and basic 
common sense), which should prohibit them from making any public 
statements at all, totally dominate all the media, creating the impression that 
the intelligent and civilized must favor democracy, diversity and equality, 
while the truth is that these are the problems and not the solutions, and that 
they themselves are the prime enemies of civilization. 
 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive 
population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd 
world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more 
ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, 
disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear 
war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive 
immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made 
possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream 
of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. China will 
continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the 
dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability 
of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people 
to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus 
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ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering 
delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few 
understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no 
free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond 
repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one 
by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into 
anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is 
no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows 
a democratic system. 
 
Those who want a broader framework may see my essay ‘Suicide by 
Democracy’ at the end of this volume. 
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Review of Freedom Evolves by Daniel Dennett  (2003) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we 
are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. 
But the people who say this don´t understand why it has to be so. It is because 
our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the 
same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ´to be´ that looks as if 
it functions in the same way as ´to eat and to drink´, as long as we still have 
the adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to 
talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep 
stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at 
something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s 
more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people 
think they can see the limits of human understanding´, they believe of course 
that they can see beyond these.``   
 
This quote is from Ludwig Wittgenstein who redefined philosophy some 70 
years ago (but most people have yet to find this out). Dennett, though he has 
been a philosopher for some 40 years, is one of them. It is also curious that 
both he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under famous 
Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) but 
Searle got the point and Dennett did not, (though it is stretching things to call 
Searle or Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett is a hard determinist (though he 
tries to sneak reality in the back door), and perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose 
famous book ´The Concept of Mind´(1949) continues to be reprinted. That 
book did a great job of exorcising the ghost but it left the machine.  
 
Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, Ryle (and many others 
since) have exposed in detail. Our use of the words consciousness, choice, 
freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, wave, cause, happened, 
event (and so on endlessly) are rarely a source of confusion but as soon as we 
leave normal life and enter philosophy (and any discussion detached from 
the environment in which language evolved) chaos reigns. Like most Dennett 
lacks a coherent framework-which Searle has called the logical structure of 
rationality. I have expanded on this considerably since I wrote this review 
and my recent articles show in detail what is wrong with Dennett's approach 
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to philosophy. Let me end with another quote from Wittgenstein--´Ambition 
is the death of thought´. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we 
are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were   the Greeks.  
But the people who say this   don´t understand why it has to be so.  It is 
because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into 
asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb  ´to  be´ 
that  looks as if it  functions  in the  same way as ´to eat´ and  ´to  drink´,  as  
long as we still have the adjectives  ´identical´, ´true´,  ´false´,  ´possible´, as 
long as we continue to  talk of a river of time, of  an expanse of space, etc., 
etc., people  will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find 
themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable of 
clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, 
because, insofar as people think they can see `the limits of human 
understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond these.`` 
 
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means 
of language”.  
 
 “Ambition is the death of thought” 
 
These three quotes are from Ludwig Wittgenstein, who redefined philosophy 
some 70 years ago (but most people have yet to find this out).  Dennett, 
though he has been a philosopher for some 40 years, is one them. It is also 
curious that both he and his prime antagonist, John Searle, studied under 
famous Wittgensteinians (Searle with John Austin, Dennett with Gilbert Ryle) 
but Searle at least partially got the point and Dennett did not. Dennett is a 
hard determinist (though he tries to sneak reality in the back door), and 
perhaps this is due to Ryle, whose famous book ´The Concept of Mind´(1949) 
continues to be reprinted. That book did a great job of exorcising the ghost 
but it left the machine. Dennett enjoys making the mistakes Wittgenstein, 
Ryle (and many others since) have exposed in detail. By accident, just before 
this book, I had read ´ ´The Minds I´´, which Dennett coauthored with Douglas 
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Hofstadter in 1981. They made some bad mistakes (see my review), and 
saddest of all, they reprinted two famous articles that pointed the way out of 
the mess--- Nagel´s `What is like to be a bat?` and an early version of John 
Searle´s Chinese Room argument explaining why computers don´t think. 
 
Nagel pointed out that we do not even know how to recognize what a concept 
of a bat´s mind would be like.  Searle similarly explained how we lack a way 
to conceptualize   thinking and how it differs from what a computer does 
(e.g., it can translate Chinese without understanding it). Likewise, we lack a 
clear test for recognizing what counts as good vs bad--or just intelligible-- for 
many philosophical and scientific concepts. Our use of the words 
consciousness, choice, freedom, intention, particle, thinking, determines, 
wave, cause, happened, event (and so on endlessly) are rarely a source of 
confusion but as soon as we leave normal life and enter philosophy (and any 
discussion detached from the environment in which language evolved)  chaos  
reigns. Wittgenstein was the first to understand why and to point out how to 
avoid this. 
 
Unfortunately, he died in his prime, his works are composed almost entirely 
of a series of examples of how the mind (language) works, and he never wrote 
any popular books, so understanding of his work is restricted to a very few. 
 
Searle is one of the world´s leading philosophers and has written many 
extremely clear and highly regarded articles and books, some of which have 
pointed out the glaring defects in Dennett´s work. His review 
``Consciousness Explained Away´´ of Dennett’s 1991 book `´Consciousness 
Explained´´ and   his book ´´The Mystery of Consciousness´´ are very well -
known, and show, in a way that is amazingly clear for philosophical writing, 
why neither Dennett (nor any of the hundreds of philosophers and scientists 
who have written on this topic) have come close to explaining the hard 
problem—i.e., how do you conceptualize consciousness. Many suspect we 
will never be able to ‘conceptualize’ any of the really important things 
(though I think W made it clear that they are mixing up the very hard 
scientific issue with the very simple issue of how to use the word), but it is 
clear that we are nowhere near it now as a scientific issue. My own view is 
that the scientific issue is straightforward as we can see ‘consciousness’ being 
put together a few neurons at a time by evolution and by development. And 
the ‘concept’ is a language game like any others and one just needs to get clear 
(specify clear COS) about how we will use the word. 
 
Dennett has mostly ignored his critics but has favored Searle with 
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vituperative personal attacks. Searle has been accused by Dennett and others 
of being out to destroy cognitive psychology which is quite funny, as modern 
philosophy is (mostly) a branch of cognitive psychology, and Searle has made 
it very clear for 30 years that WE are a good example of a biological machine 
that is conscious, thinks, etc. He just points out that we don´t have any idea 
how this happens. Searle characterizes as ´´intellectual pathology´´, the views 
of Dennett and all those who deny the existence of the very phenomena they 
set out to explain. 
 
Dennett repeats his mistakes here and leaves his reply to his critics to the 
penultimate page of the book, where we are told that they are all mistaken 
and it is a waste of space to show how!  Unsurprisingly, there is not one 
reference to Wittgenstein or Searle in the entire book. There are however, 
many references to other old school philosophers who are as confused as he 
is. It is scientism writ large—the almost universal mistake of mixing together 
the real empirical issue of science with the issues of how the language is to be 
used (language games) of philosophy. 
 
Like most people, it does not cross his mind that the very inference engines 
he thinks with are forcing him to come to certain conclusions and that these 
will often be quite unconnected with or wrong about the way things are in 
the world. They are a jumble of evolutionary curiosities which do various 
tasks in organizing behavior that were useful for survival hundreds of 
thousands of years ago. Wittgenstein was a pioneer in doing thought 
experiments in cognitive psychology and began to elucidate the nature of 
these engines and the subtleties of language in the 30´s, and thus he made the 
sorts of comments that this review begins with. 
 
Dennett says (p98) that his view is compatibilism, i.e., that free will (which I 
hope, for coherence, we can equate with choice) is compatible with 
determinism (i.e., that ´´there is at any instant exactly one physically possible 
future´´--p25).  He wants to show that determinism is not the same as 
inevitability. 
 
However, the whole book is smoke and mirrors by means of which choice, in 
the sense we normally understand it, disappears and we are left with 
``choice``, which is something we cannot choose. Naturally, this echoes the 
fate of consciousness in his earlier book ``Consciousness Explained``. 
 
It is remarkable that, at a time when we are just beginning to reach the point 
where we might be able to understand the basics of how a single neuron 
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works (or how an atom works for that matter), that anyone should think they 
can make the leap to understanding the whole brain and to explain its most 
complex phenomena. Please recall the last sentence of Wittgenstein from the 
opening quote: ´´ And what´s more, this satisfies a longing forthe 
transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see `the limits of 
human understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond 
these.`` The relation between language, thought and reality is extraordinarily  
complex and everyone gets lost.  If one is very, very careful, we can lay out 
the language games (e.g., specify the Conditions of Satisfaction of various 
statements using the words consciousness and mind) and clarity becomes 
possible, but Dennett throws caution to the winds and we are dragged into 
the quicksand. 
 
There are at least 3 different topics here (evolution of our brain, choice and 
morality) and Dennett tries vainly to weld them together into a coherent 
account of how freedom evolves from the deterministic crashing of atoms. 
There is, however, no compelling reason to accept that bouncing atoms (or 
his favorite example, the game of life running on a computer) are isomorphic 
with reality. He knows that quantum indeterminacy (or the uncertainty 
principle) is a major obstacle to determinism, however defined (and has been 
taken by many as an escape to freedom), but dismisses it due to the fact that 
such events are too rare to bother with. By extension, it’s unlikely that any 
such event will happen now or even in our whole lifetime in our brain, so we 
appear to be stuck with a determined brain (whatever that may be). However, 
the universe is a big place and it’s been around a long time (perhaps ‘forever’) 
and if even one such quantum effect occurs it would seem to throw the whole 
universe into an indeterminate state. The notion ´´there is at any instant 
exactly one physically possible future´´ cannot be true if at any instant, a 
quantum indeterminacy can occur--in this case there would seem to be 
infinitely many possible futures. This recalls one of the escapes from the 
contradictions of physics—each instant our universe is branching into 
infinitely many universes. 
 
He correctly rejects the idea that quantum indeterminacy gives us the answer 
to how we can have choice. This obvious idea has been suggested by many 
but the problem is that nobody has any idea how to specify an exact sequence 
of steps which starts with the equations of physics and ends up with the 
phenomena of consciousness (or any other emergent phenomenon). If so, 
they will definitely win at least one Nobel Prize, for not only will they have 
‘explained’ consciousness, they will have ‘explained’ (or much better 
‘described’ as Wittgenstein insisted) the universal phenomenon of emergence 
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(how higher order properties emerge from lower ones). So, they would have 
to solve the ´easy´ problem (to determine the exact state of the brain 
corresponding to some mental state and preferably specify the exact position 
of all the atoms in the brain over time-ignoring uncertainty) and the ´hard´ 
one (what exactly correlates with or produces consciousness or choice etc.?). 
And while they are at it how about also doing the impossible--an exact and 
full solution to the quantum field equations for a brain. It is very well known 
that these equations are uncomputable, even for one atom or a vacuum, as it 
would require an infinite amount of computer time. But infinite will do for 
one atom so maybe a brain will take no longer. It never crosses his mind (nor 
anyone I have seen) that nobody can make clear how an atom ‘emerges’ from 
electrons, neutrons and protons or a molecule emerges from atoms nor cells 
from molecules etc. Yes, there are some equations but if you look carefully 
you will see lots of hand waving and facts that are just accepted as ‘the way 
things are’ and so I think it clearly is the same with consciousness, color, 
choice, pain emerging from bunches of cells. 
 
He starts off on the first page appealing to the laws of  physics for  protection  
against fantastic notions such as immaterial souls, but physics is made of 
notions just as fantastic (uncertainty, entanglement, wave/particle duality, 
Schrodinger´s dead/alive cat etc.) and as Feynmann said many times 
``Nobody understands physics!´´ Many think nobody ever will and I am one 
of many who say there is nothing to ‘understand’ but rather there is just lots 
of ‘things’ along with existence, space, time, matter etc. to accept. There is a 
limit to what our tiny brain can do and maybe we are at that limit now. 
 
Even if we create a massive computer that could understand (in some sense) 
far better than we, it is not clear that it could explain to us. Understanding an 
idea requires a certain level of intelligence or power (e.g., holding a certain 
number of things in mind and performing a certain number of 
calculations/second). Most people will never grasp the abstruse math of 
string theory no matter how long they have to do it. Many cannot understand 
much simpler concepts. So, there is good reason to suppose that our 
supersmart computer, even if we teach it how to think in the ‘same’ sense that 
we do, will never be able to explain really complex things to us. 
 
On the first page is one of his favorite quotes, which compares the brain to a 
bunch of tiny robots, and on pg2 he says that we are made of mindless robots. 
The way the brain (and any cell) works is nothing at all like the way robots 
work and we don´t even know how to conceptualize the difference (i.e., we 
know how robots work but not how brains work—e.g., how do they make 
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choices, understand images and motives etc.). As I noted above, this was 
pointed out by Searle 30 years ago but Dennett (and countless others) just 
does not getit. 
We are also told on the first page that science will let us understand our 
freedom and give us better foundation for our morality. So far as I can see, 
neither science nor philosophy, nor religion, has any effect on our 
understanding of our freedom or morality.  Although he discusses the 
biology of altruism and rational choice at length, he never mentions the 
abundant evidence from cognitive psychology that our moral intuitions are 
built in and demonstrable in 4 year old children.  Instead, he spends much 
time trying to show how choice and morality come from memories of events 
and our interaction with others.  On  pg2 he says our values have little to do 
with the goals of our cells and on pg2 to3 that our personality differences are 
due to how our ´ ´robotic teams are put together, over a lifetime of growth and 
experience.`` This is a bald dismissal of human nature, of the abundant 
evidence that our differences are to a large extent programmed into our genes 
and fixed in early childhood, and is typical of his constant confused 
wandering back and forth between determinism and environmentalism (i.e., 
his view that we develop morality over time by experience and by thinking 
aboutmoral issues). Many other sections of the book show the same 
confusion.  Those who don´t know the evidence may wish to read Pinker´s 
´´The Blank Slate´´, Boyer´s´´Religion Explained´´ and any of the hundred or 
so recent texts, and tens of thousands of articles and web pages on personality 
development, and evolutionary and cognitive psychology. 
 
On pg4 he says bison don´t know they are bison and that we have known we 
are mammals for only a few hundred years. Both show a fundamental lack of 
understanding of cognitive psychology. The cognitive templates for 
ontological categories were evolved, in their original forms, hundreds of 
millions of years ago and animals have the inborn ability to recognize others 
of their species and of other species and classes of animals and plants without 
any learning sufficient to establish categories. Bison know they are like other 
bison and our ancestors knew they were like other mammals and that reptiles 
were different but similar to each other etc.   Cognitive studies have shown 
these types of abilities in very young children. 
 
Of course, it is true that the words ´bison´ and ´mammal´ are recent, but they 
have nothing to do with how our brains work. 
 
On page 5 he attributes postmodernism´s hostility to science as a product of 
´fearful thinking´ but does not speculate why that is. In spite of his 
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acquaintance with cognitive psychology he does not see that this is likely due 
to the fact that many science results clash with the feelings normally 
produced by the operation of the inference engines for intuitive psychology, 
coalition, social mind, social exchange, etc. 
 
On page 9 he notes that free will is a problem and our attitudes to it make a 
difference, but for whom? Nobody but philosophers. We make choices. 
What´s the problem? One has to step outside life to experience a problem and 
then everything becomes a problem. What are consciousness, pain, yellow, 
intention, matter, quarks, gravity etc.? I doubt that any normal person has 
ever experienced a fundamental change in their interactions with people or 
their decision-making processes due to their thinking about choice. This 
shows that there is something strange about such questions. Wittgenstein 
shows that the language games are different. There are games for language 
connected with the cognitive templates for Decisions, or seeing colors etc., 
and thinking philosophically is operating them in decoupled mode. 
 
Decoupled modes permit thinking about the past, planning for the future, 
guessing the mental states of others, etc., but if one takes the results in the 
wrong way and starts to think `´John will try to steal my wallet´´, rather than 
just imagining that John might do it, confusion enters and those who cannot 
turn off the decoupled mode or distinguish it from coupled mode, enter the 
realm of pathology. Some aspects of schizophrenia and other mental illness 
might be seen this way--they lose control of which mode they are in, e.g., not 
being able to see the difference between the motives people have and the 
motives they might have. 
 
One can then see much of the philosophizing people do as operating in these 
decoupled modes but failing to be able to keep in front of them the differences 
from the normal mode. Normal mode—e.g., what is that lion doing-- was 
undoubtedly the first one evolved and decoupled modes--what did that lion 
do last time or what does he intend to do next--evolved later. This was 
probably never a problem for animals--any animal that spent too much time 
worrying about what might happen would not be very successful 
contributing to the gene pool. It is interesting to speculate that only when 
humans developed culture and began degenerating genetically, could large 
numbers of people survive with genes that led them to spend alot of time in 
decoupled modes. Hence, we have philosophy and this book, which is mostly 
about running the decision templates in decoupled mode where there are no 
real consequences except earning royalties for putting the results in a book 
for other people to use to run their engines indecoupled mode. Let us alter 
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Wittgenstein´s quote to read: ´´As long as there continues to be a verb ´to 
decide´ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, 
as long as we continue to talk of freedom of action, of saying I wish I had 
done otherwise, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling 
difficulties and find themselves staring at something which no explanation 
seems capable of clearing up.´´ 
 
As with most philosophy books, nearly every page, often every paragraph, 
changes from one type of language game to another without noticing that 
now one would have to be joking or dreaming or acting in a play or reciting 
a story, etc., and not actually intending anything nor describing an actual 
situation in the world. On page 10 he says we count on free will for the whole 
way of thinking about our lives, like we count on food and water, but 
whoever, outside philosophy, standing in front of lunch counter full of food, 
ever thinks how fine it is that they have free will so they can pick coke instead 
of mineral water? Even if I want to be a serious compatibilist and try thinking 
this in decoupled mode, I have to exit and enter nondecoupled mode to make 
the actual choice. Only then can I go back to decoupled mode to wonder what 
might have happened if I had not had the ability to make a real choice. 
Wittgenstein noted how pretend games are parasitic on real ones (this is not 
a trivial observation!). The ability to engage in very complex decoupled 
scenarios is already evident in 4 year old children. So, I would say that 
normally, nobody counts on having choice, but rather we just choose. As 
Wittgenstein made clear it is action based on certainty that is the bedrock of 
our life. See the recent writings of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. 
 
On the same page, he shows again that he does not grasp cognitive basics. He 
says we learn to conduct our lives in the conceptual atmosphere of choice, 
and that `´It appears to be a stable and ahistorical construct, as eternal and 
unchanging as arithmetic, but it is not.´´ And on page 13--´´It is an evolved 
creation  of human activity and beliefs´´. The whole thrust of cognitive 
psychology (and Wittgenstein) is that we do NOT learn the basics of 
planning, deciding, promising, resenting, etc., but that these are built-in 
functions of the inference engines that work automatically and unconsciously 
and start running in very early childhood. There is no evidence that they 
change as we grow, or are in any way subject to our beliefs, only that they 
mature just as our body does. 
 
On pg 14 he suggests it’s probable that our having free will depends on our 
believing we have it! Do we believe we see an apple, feel a pain, are happy? 
The language game of belief is very different from that of knowing. We can 
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believe we have a dollar in our pocket but if we take it out and look at it we 
can´t meaningfully then say that we still believe it (except as a joke etc.). The 
inference engine can run in decoupled (belief) mode so we can imagine 
having choices or making them, but in life we just make them and it is only 
in very odd situations we can say that we believe we made a choice. But 
Dennett is saying this is the universal case. If making a choice had any 
dependence on belief than so would everything else-- consciousness, seeing, 
thinking, etc. If we take this seriously (and he says ´the serious problems of 
free will´) then we are getting into trouble and if we actually try to apply it to 
life, then madness is minutes away. He, like nearly all philosophers had no 
clue that Wittgenstein showed us the way out of this need to ground our 
actions on beliefs by describing the actual basis of knowing which is the 
ungrounded ‘hinges’ or automatisms of System 1 thinking in his last work 
‘On Certainty’. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has explained this over the last 
decade and I have summarized her work and incorporated it in my reviews 
and articles. 
. 
On page 65 et seq., he discusses causation, intention and the `informal 
predicates´ that we use to describe atoms etc., but cognitive research has 
shown that we describe all ‘objects’ with a limited number of ontological 
categories, which we analyze with our intuitive physics modules, and that 
when agents (i.e., animals or people or things like them—i.e., ghosts or gods) 
are involved we use our concepts (engines) for agency, intuitive psychology, 
social minds, etc. to decide how to behave. There is almost certainly no 
causation module but rather it will involve all of these and other inference 
engines, depending on the precise situation. Discussing possibility and 
necessity is much easier if one talks in terms of the output of our modules for 
intuitive physics, agency, ontological categories etc. Of course, there is no 
mention here of Wittgenstein´s many incisive comments on causation, 
intention, deciding, nor of Searle´s now classic works on Intention and Social 
Reality. 
 
He spends much time on Ainslie´s book ´Breakdown of Will´, in which is 
discussed the hyperbolic discounting faculties (i.e., inference engines) by 
which we evaluate probable outcomes. 
 
He makes much of the excellent work of Robert Frank on altruism, emotion 
and economics, but the book he cites was 15 years old when this book was 
published. It was Bingham´s idea, amplified by Frank and by Boyd and 
Richardson (1992) that cooperation was greatly stimulated by the evolution 
of means for punishing cheaters.  He suggests these as examples of Darwinian 
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approaches that are obligatory and promising. 
 
Indeed, they are, and in fact they are standard parts of economic, 
evolutionary and cognitive theory, but unfortunately, he makes little 
reference to the other work in these fields. All that work tends to show that 
people do not choose but their brains choose for them. He does not establish 
any convincing connection between this work and the general problem of 
choice. 
 
Philosophers of all stripes have been hypnotized by their ability to decouple 
the inference engines to play `what if´´ games, loving to put counterintuitive 
tags on ontological categories (i.e., if Socrates was immortal etc.). In this 
respect, they share some elements with primitive religion (see Boyer). This is 
not a joke, nor an insult, but merely points out that once one has a grasp of 
modern cognitive concepts, one sees that they apply thoughout the whole 
spectrum of human activity (and it would be odd if they did not). But as 
Wittgenstein explained so beautifully, the language games and the inference 
engines of S2 have their limits--explanations come to an end--we hit bedrock 
(S1). But the philosopher thinks he can see beyond it and walks out on the 
water. 
 
On pg 216 he says that making oneself so that one could not have done 
otherwise is a key innovation in the evolutionary ascent to free will, and that 
we can only be free if we learn how to render ourselves insensitive to 
opportunities. But where this ability resides is not revealed for several 
chapters!  Dennett has a penchant for hiding his ideas in a massive amount of 
rather irrelevant text. Again, he gets things backwards, as there is a vast body 
of very good evidence from biology and psychology that we get the feelings 
that we should behave in some way from our inference engines and these are 
not provided by some part of our conscious self, but by the automatic and 
unconscious operation of the engines. As he notes, hundreds of experiments 
with the Prisoner´s Dilemma and related protocols have shown how easy it 
is to manipulate people´s choices and that their calculations are not conscious 
and deliberate at all and in fact much of modern psychological, sociological 
and neuroeconomics research is devoted to distinguishing the automatisms 
of S1 from the deliberative thinking of S2 and showing how S1 rules. 
 
When the situation is manipulated to make people conscious, they are much 
slower and less reliable (S2). So, there has been constant pressure of natural 
selection to make the engines fast and automatic and inaccessible to 
deliberate thought. 
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Dennett says `we make ourselves´ so that we could not do otherwise and that 
this is the basis of morality and choice. The evidence would seem to be exactly 
the opposite. Our inference engines give us basic moral intuitions and we 
generally act in accord with the results. If we or others do not we feel guilt, 
outrage, resentment etc., and then cheater genes will invade the population 
and this is one of the main theories as to how a good part of morality evolved. 
Our genes make us so we can´t (mostly) do otherwise, not our will or 
whatever Dennett thinks can do it. We can often choose to do otherwise, but 
our own intuitions and the knowledge of social disapproval usually serve to 
limit our choices. These intuitions evolved in small groups between 50,000 
and some millions of years ago.  In the modern world, the intuitions are often 
not to our long-term advantage and the social controls weak. This is a prime 
reasonfor the inexorable progress into chaos in the world. 
 
On pg 225 he finally sneaks in a definition of free will as ´´a complicated snarl 
of mechanistic causes that look like decision making (from certain angles)´´. 
He claims that this plays all the valuable roles of free will but lacks some 
(unspecified) properties possessed by traditional free will. The smoke is thick 
but I am pretty sure one of those unspecified properties is what we 
understand as choice. He insists (top of pg 226) that hisnaturalistic account of 
decision making leaves plenty of room for moral responsibility, but making 
ourselves so we couldn´t do otherwise does not seem to describe the way we 
actually function, nor does it seem to leave any room for morality, as that 
would seem to consist precisely in being able to do otherwise. 
 
He does not propose any test for deciding if a choice is voluntary or forced 
and I doubt he could do so. Normally if someone asks us to move our hand, 
we know what counts as having a choice, but, typical of philosophers, I expect 
that regardless of whether it moves or not he will count both as evidence for 
his position and of course if everything counts then nothing counts as 
Wittgenstein so trenchantly remarked many times. 
 
At this point he also starts his discussion of Libet´s well known work on 
conscious attention, which is the only part of the book that I felt was worth 
my time. However, Libet’s claim that we make decisions without awareness 
has been debunked many times, by both psychologists and philosophers (e.g., 
Searle and Kihlstrom). 
 
 
On page 253 et seq., he sneaks in his definition of conscious will—the ´´brains 
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user illusion of itself´´´ which has as one of its main roles providing ´´me with 
the means of interfacing with myself at other times``. And ``Illusory or not, 
conscious will is the persons guide to his or her own moral responsibility for 
action. `` He says the trick we need is to see that ``I`´ control what is 
happening inside the ´´simplification barrier´´... ´´where decision making 
happens´´. ``Mental events´´ become conscious by ´´entering into memory´´. 
´´The process of self description... is what we are´´. The crucial thing is that 
choice is possible because the self is distributed over space (the brain) and 
time (memories). He realizes this is going to leave many incredulous 
(everyone who can follow this and really understands the bizarre language 
games!). ´´I know that many people find it hard to grasp this idea or take it 
seriously.  It seems to them to be a trick with mirrors, some kind of verbal 
slight of hand that whisks consciousness, and the real Self, out of the picture 
just when it was about to be introduced.´´ Many will say he took the words 
out of their mouth, but I would say it´s incoherent and that everything we 
know about consciousness and the whole universe (making the obvious 
extensions of such claims) was gone long before we got this far in his tome. 
And a careful look at the language games shows their lack of coherence (i.e., 
no clear Conditions of Satisfaction as I note in my articles). 
 
On pg 259 he says that culture has made us rational animals! This is a 
stunning denial of human (and animal) nature (i.e., genetics and evolution) 
coming from the person who wrote ´Darwin´s Dangerous Idea´´! 
 
Presumably he is talking about his idea that it is memories spread over space 
(the brain and other people) and time (much like Dawkins’ memes) that give 
us choices and morals and consciousness (line 6 from bottom). He says 
consciousness is a user-interface but it is never made clear who or where the 
user is and how it interfaces with the brain (you will have to suffer through 
´Consciousness Explained’ to find that there is no answer there either). 
Though he makes many references to evolutionary and cognitive psychology, 
he seldom uses any of the terminology that has been current for decades 
(social mind, intuitive psychology, coalitional intuitions etc.) and clearly is 
not familiar with most of the concepts. If he means that we got the fine details 
of morality from culture, that’s ok, but this is the S2 icing on the cake and the 
S1 cake was baked by the genes. 
 
We are also told here that R&D (by which he means evolution here, but other 
things elsewhere) has given us the self and that language creates a new kind 
of consciousness and morality. I am sure that he will get little agreement on 
this. It seems quite clear that consciousness and the basics of morality evolved 
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in primates (and earlier) long before spoken language (though it is very 
contentious as to how language evolved from extant capacities in the brain). 
He continues ``morality memes arose by accident some tens of thousands of 
years ago`` which would be OK if he meant the icing on the cake but he clearly 
means the cake! And then he says the point of morality is not the survival of 
our genes, which is an amazing (and totally incorrect) thing to say, even if he 
was only referring to memes. 
 
On pg 260 he claims that because we do not comprehend our ´´bland 
dispositions to cooperate´´, they mean nothing to us, but it is the operation of 
our templates (i.e., reciprocal altruism promoting inclusive fitness) that is 
everything to us. As Dawkins recently noted in his comments on E.O Wilson’s 
disastrous recent work supporting the phantasm of ‘group selection’, natural 
selection is inclusive fitness (see my article on Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest 
of Earth’). There is ample evidence that if one of our many ‘templates’ is 
damaged, a person cannot function properly as a social being (e.g., autism). I 
would say it is the operation of the templates for intuitive psychology etc., 
which lead Dennett to the counterintuitive views that we do not have 
consciousness and choice in the way we think. 
 
He also says here that it was one of the major evolutionary transitions when 
we were able to change our views and reflect on reasons for them. This again 
reflects his lack of understanding of evolutionary psychology. I know of no 
evidence that the basic moral intuitions, like all the templates, are accessible 
to consciousness but there is a huge body of work showing the opposite. We 
may decide our cheating was justifiable, or forgive someone else´s cheating, 
but we still know it was cheating (i.e., we cannot change the engine). I suspect 
my ancestors a million years ago had the same feelings in the same situation, 
but what has happened is that there are now lots of other things that may be 
taken as relevant, and that sometimes these will lead me to act contrary to my 
feelings.  Another issue is that as culture developed, one had to make many 
important or ´moral type` decisions for which the engines were not evolved 
to give a clear answer. 
 
On pg 267 he says that we now replace our ` free floating rationales´ (probably 
corresponding to what cognitive psychologists call our templates or inference 
engines) with reflection and mutual persuasion. And on pg 286 he says that 
it is a child´s upbringing --demanding and giving reasons-- that affects moral 
reasoning. Again, he just has no grasp of what has happened in the last 30 
years of research--the templates are innate S1 automatisms and cannot 
change with reflection or upbringing. We are then told again that 
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consciousness makes moral issues available over time to the self, which takes 
responsibility. It is not any more coherent or credible with repetition. 
 
On pg 289 he has a chapter summary which repeats the mistaken notions that 
it is culture that makes it possible to reflect and that choice depends on 
education (memory) and sharing. It´s clear that it is not culture but the 
inherited cognitive structures that make it possible to reflect and to choose 
and that culture determines the acceptable actions and their rewards or 
punishments. On pg. 303 he discusses the classic philosophical barrier 
between ´ought´ and ´is´, unaware that our templates solved that problem 
long ago— i.e., they tell us how to feel about situations regarding other 
people. He also seems to be unaware that there are hundreds of ‘cultural’ 
universals implanted in our genes (e.g. see Pinker’s ´The Blank Slate´). 
 
He often starts into what looks like it’s going to be a good discussion of some 
issues in evolutionary psychology, but invariably wanders off into 
philosophical arcana and winds up with more confusion. This happens on 
pg. 261 where he states that concepts like ´praiseworthy´ were shaped over 
millennia by culture, while most would say the basis for such concepts is in 
the genes and each culture only determines the details of acceptable reactions 
to the intuitions its members get from their innate mechanisms. On pg 262 he 
tries to explain how an ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy) can produce 
morality. His idea here is that genetic `R&D`(i.e., evolution) produces dim 
understandings of morals and then culture (memetics) produces variations 
and clarifications. I would say that we all know, and much research has made 
clear, that we commonly get very clear results from our inference engines and 
only dimly understand in special cases. Culture merely decides what we can 
do about our feelings. 
 
The last part of the book is mostly concerned with moral culpability. He refers 
to the legal classic by Hart and Honore, which I started reading 30 years ago 
since its authors were deeply influenced by Wittgenstein. Dennett tells us that 
we have control overour own morality and that thinking about morality will 
improve us. But, there seems no justification whatever for this view in this 
book. There is nothing at all here to help anyone escape from the dictates of 
the monkey mind and I am quite sure that when industrial civilization 
collapses in the 22nd century people will be acting as their ancestors did 
200,000 years ago. It is a defensible point of view that those who manage to 
escape do so by traveling a spiritual path that has no connection with 
philosophy- and there is not a hint of spirituality in this entire book--another 
telling point considering that many mystics have fascinating things to say 
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about the functioning of the mind. I find more wisdom about how to be free 
and moral in any of Osho´s 200 books and tapes than anywhere in 
philosophy. 
 
Unsurprisingly, one rarely finds spiritually and morally advanced people 
teaching at universities. There is no sign here, nor in anything he has done, 
that Dennett is morally superior. After 40 years of thinking about morality he 
launches personal attacks on his critics or arrogantly dismisses them. It seems 
clear that, like all of us, he is trapped in the limits of his inference engines. 
 
So, how much opportunity is there to improve our morality? It seems clear 
(e.g., see Pinker´s `The Blank Slate`) that most of our behavior is genetic and 
the rest due to unknown factors in our environment, in spite of the vigorous 
efforts of parents and religions and political parties. On average, maybe 5% 
of the variation in moral behavior (variations are the only thing we can study) 
is due to our own efforts (culture). The moral choices that matter most today 
are those affecting the fate of the world. But our templates were not evolved 
to deal with overpopulation (except by murder) and climate change (except 
by moving elsewhere and killing any opposition). 
 
How remarkable it would be if just one of the hundreds of millions of 
educated people in the world managed to figure out what consciousness or 
choice or any mental phenomenon really is. And if one did, we would expect 
them to be a scientist at the cutting edge of research using some exotic fMRI 
equipment and the latest parallel processing neural networked fuzzy logic 
computer etc. And that would only mean they specify the neural circuits. So, 
they cannot answer this question at all! But it needs no answer –like the 
existence of space, time, matter, it’s just the way things are and the 
philosopher’s job is to clarify the language games we can play.  But a 
philosopher or physicist just sitting there thinking, coming up with the 
solution to the greatest scientific puzzle there is! And then writing a whole 
book about it without checking with the sceptics first. To return to the quote 
at the beginning--´Ambition is the death of thought´. Indeed--though clearly 
Wittgenstein was thinking of profound thought! 
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Review of I Am a Strange Loop by Douglas 
Hofstadter (2007) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor 
Hofstadter. Like his much more famous (or infamous for its relentless 
philosophical errors) work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial 
plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes 
real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what 
language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I 
provide a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the 
work of Wittgenstein (since updated in my more recent writings). 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
“It might justly be asked what importance Gödel's proof has for our work. 
For a piece of mathematics cannot solve problems of the sort that trouble us. 
--The answer is that the situation, into which such a proof brings us, is of 
interest to us. 'What are we to say now?'--That is our theme. However, queer 
it sounds, my task as far as concerns Gödel's proof seems merely to consist in 
making clear what such a proposition as: ‘Suppose this could be proved’ 
means in mathematics.” Wittgenstein “Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics” p337(1956) (written in 1937). 
 
“My theorems only show that the mechanization of mathematics, i.e., the 
elimination of the mind and of abstract entities, is impossible, if one wants to 
have a satisfactory foundation and system of mathematics. I have not proved 
that there are mathematical questions that are undecidable for the human 
mind, but only that there is no machine (or blind formalism) that can decide 
all number- theoretic questions, (even of a very special kind) .... It is not the 
structure itself of the deductive systems which is being threatened with a 
brakedown, but only a certain interpretation of it, namely its interpretation 
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as a blind formalism.” Gödel "Collected Works" Vol 5, p 176-177. (2003) 
 
“All inference takes place a priori. The events of the future cannot be inferred 
from those of the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus. The 
freedom of the will consists in the fact that future actions cannot be known 
now. We could only know them if causality were an inner necessity, like that 
of logical deduction. -- The connexion of knowledge and what is known is 
that of logical necessity. (“A knows that p is the case” is senseless if p is a 
tautology.) If from the fact that a proposition is obvious to us, it does not 
follow that it is true, then obviousness is no justification for belief in its truth.” 
TLP 5.133--5.1363 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book” 
p6 (1933) 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.” Wittgenstein TLP 6.52 (1922) 
 
I have read some 50 reviews here and on the net (that by quantum physicist 
David Deutsch was perhaps the best) and none of them provide a satisfying 
framework, so I will try to give novel comments that will be useful, not only 
for this book but for any book in the behavioral sciences (which can include 
ANY book, if one grasps the ramifications). 
 
Like his classic Gödel, Escher, Bach: The Eternal Golden Braid, and many of 
his other writings, this book by Hofstadter (H) tries to find correlations or 
connections or analogies that shed light on consciousness and all of human 
experience. As in GEB, he spends a great deal of time explaining and drawing 
analogies with the famous “incompleteness” theorems of Gödel, the 
“recursive” art of Escher and the “paradoxes” of language (though, as with 
most people, he does not see the need for quotes, and this is the core of the 
problem). The idea is that their seemingly bizarre consequences are due to 
“strange loops” and that such loops are in some way operative in our brain. 
In particular, they may “give rise” to our self, which he seems roughly to 
equate with consciousness and thinking. As with everyone, when he starts to 
talk about how his mind works, he goes seriously astray. I suggest that it is 
in finding the reasons for this that the interest in this book, and most general 
commentary on behavior lies. 
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I will contrast the ideas of ISL with those of the philosopher (armchair 
psychologist) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W), whose commentaries on 
psychology, written from 1912 to 1951, have never been surpassed for their 
depth and clarity. He is an unacknowledged pioneer in evolutionary 
psychology (EP) and developer of the modern concept of intentionality. He 
noted that the fundamental problem in philosophy is that we do not see our 
automatic innate mental processes. He gave many illustrations (one can 
regard the entire 20,000 pages of his nachlass as an illustration), some of them 
for words like “is” and “this”, and noted that all the really basic issues usually 
slip by without comment. A major point which he developed was that nearly 
all of our intentionality (roughly, our evolutionary psychology (EP), 
rationality or personality) is invisible to us and such parts as enter our 
consciousness are largely epiphenomenal (i.e., irrelevant to our behavior). 
The fact that nobody can describe their mental processes in any satisfying 
way, that this is universal, that these processes are rapid and automatic and 
very complex, tells us that they are part of the “hidden” cognitive modules 
(templates or inference engines) that have been gradually fixed in animal 
DNA over more than 500 million years. 
 
As in virtually all writing which tries to explain behavior (philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, politics, theology, and even, as 
with H, math and physics), I am a Strange Loop (ISL) commits this kind of 
error (oblivion to our automaticity) continually and this produces the puzzles 
which it then tries to solve. The title of ISL comprises words we all know, but 
as W noted, word uses can be seen as families of language games (grammar) 
which have many senses (uses or meanings), each with its own contexts. We 
know what these are in practice but if we try describing them or 
philosophizing (theorizing) about them, we nearly always go astray and say 
things that may appear to have sense but lack the context to give them sense.  
 
It never crosses Hofstadter’s mind that both “strange” and “loop” are out of 
context and lack any clear sense (to say nothing about “I” and “am”!). If you 
go to Wikipedia, you find many uses (games as W often said) for these words 
and if you look around in ISL you will find them referred to as if they were 
all one. Likewise, for “consciousness”, “reality”, “paradox”, “recursive”, “self 
referential”, etc. So, we are hopelessly adrift from the very first page, as I 
expected from the title. A loop in a rope can have a very clear sense and 
likewise a diagram of a steam engine governor feedback loop, but what about 
loops in mathematics and the mind? H does not see the “strangest loop” of 
all—that we use our consciousness, self and will to deny themselves! 
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Regarding Gödel’s famous theorems, in what sense can they be loops? What 
they are almost universally supposed to show is that certain basic kinds of 
mathematical systems are incomplete in the sense that there are “true” 
theorems of the system whose “truth” (the unfortunate word mathematicians 
commonly substitute for validity) or “falsity (invalidity) cannot be proven in 
the system. Though H does not tell you, these theorems are logically 
equivalent to Turing’s “incompleteness” solution of the famous halting 
problem for computers performing some arbitrary calculation. He spends a 
lot of time explaining Gödel’s original proof, but fails to mention that others 
subsequently found vastly shorter and simpler proofs of “incompleteness” in 
math and proved many related concepts. The one he does briefly mention is 
that of contemporary mathematician Gregory Chaitin—an originator with 
Kolmogorov and others of Algorithmic Information Theory-- who has shown 
that such “incompleteness” or “randomness” (Chaitin’s term-- though this is 
another game), is much more extensive than long thought, but does not tell 
you that both Gödel’s and Turing’s results are corollaries to Chaitin’s theorem 
and an instance of “algorithmic randomness”. You should refer to Chaitin’s 
more recent writings such as “The Omega Number (2005)”, as Hofstadter’s 
only ref. to Chaitin is 20 years old (though Chaitin has no more grasp of the 
larger issues here –i.e., innate intentionality as the source of the language 
games in math-- than does H and shares the ‘Universe is a Computer” fantasy 
as well). 
 
Hofstadter takes this “incompleteness” (another word (conceptual) game out 
of context) to mean that the system is self referential or “loopy” and 
“strange”. It is not made clear why having theorems that seem to be (or are) 
true (i.e., valid) in the system, but not provable in it, makes it a loop nor why 
this qualifies as strange nor why this has any relationship to anything else. 
 
It was shown quite convincingly by Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (i.e., shortly 
after Gödel’s proof) that the best way to look at this situation is as a typical 
language game (though a new one for math at the time)—i.e., the “true but 
unprovable” theorems are “true” in a different sense (since they require new 
axioms to prove them). They belong to a different system, or as we ought now 
to say, to a different intentional context. No incompleteness, no loops, no self 
reference and definitelynot strange! W: “Gödel's proposition, which asserts 
something about itself, does not mention itself” and “Could it be said: Gödel 
says that one must also be able to trust a mathematical proof when one wants 
to conceive it practically, as the proof that the propositional pattern can be 
constructed according to the rules of proof? Or: a mathematical proposition 
must be capable of being conceived as a proposition of a geometry which is 
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actually applicable to itself. And if one does this it comes out that in certain 
cases it is not possible to rely on a proof.” (RFM p336). These remarks barely 
give a hint at the depth of W’s insights into mathematical intentionality, 
which began with his first writings in 1912 but was most evident in his 
writings in the 30’s and 40’s. W is regarded as a difficult and opaque writer 
due to his aphoristic, telegraphic style, but if one starts with his only textbook 
style work—the Blue and Brown Books --and understands that he is 
explaining how our evolved higher order thought works, it will all become 
clear to the persistent. 
 
W lectured on these issues in the 1930’s and this has been documented in 
several of his books. There are further comments in German in his nachlass 
(some of it formerly available only on a $1000 cdrom but now, like nearly all 
his works, on p2p). Canadian philosopher Victor Rodych has recently written 
two articles on W and Gödel in the journal Erkenntnis and 4 others on W and 
math, which I believe constitute a definitive summary of W and the 
foundations of math. He lays to rest the previously popular notion that W did 
not understand incompleteness (and much else concerning the psychology of 
math). In fact, so far as I can see W is one of very few to this day (and NOT 
including Gödel! —though see his penetrating comment quoted above) who 
does. Related forms of “paradox” which exercise H (and countless others) so 
much was extensively discussed by W with examples in math and language 
and seems to me a natural consequence of the piecemeal evolution of our 
symbolic abilities that extends also to music, art, games etc. Those who wish 
contrary views will find them everywhere and regarding W and math, they 
may consult Chihara in Philosophical Review V86, p365-81(1977). I have 
much respect for Chihara (I am one of maybe half a dozen people who have 
read his “A Structural Account of Mathematics” cover to cover) but he fails 
on many basic issues such as W’s explanations of paradoxes as unavoidable 
and almost always harmless facets of our EP. 
 
In any case, it would seem that the fact that Gödel’s result has had zero impact 
on math (except to stop people from trying to prove completeness!) should 
have alerted H to its triviality and the “strangeness” of trying to make it a 
basis for anything. I suggest that it be regarded as another conceptual game 
that shows us the boundaries of our psychology. Of course, all of math, 
physics, and human behavior can usefully be taken this way. 
 
While on the topic of W, we should note that another work which H spends 
a lot of time on is Whitehead and Russell’s classic of mathematical logic 
“Principia Mathematica”, primarily since it was at least partly responsible for 
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Gödel’s work leading to his theorems. W had gone from Russell’s beginning 
logic student to his teacher in about a year, and Russell had picked him to 
rewrite the Principia. But W had major misgivings about the whole project 
(and all of philosophy as it turned out) and, when he returned to philosophy 
in the 30’s, he showed that the idea of founding math (or rationality) on logic 
was a profound mistake. W is one of the world’s most famous philosophers 
and made extensive commentaries on Gödel and the foundations of 
mathematics and the mind; is a pioneer in EP (though nobody seems to 
realize this); the discoverer of the basic outline and functioning of higher 
order thought and much else, and it is amazing that Dennett &H, after half a 
century of study, are completely oblivious to the thoughts of the greatest 
natural psychologist of all time (though they have 6 billion for company). 
There is, as some have remarked, a collective amnesia regarding W not only 
in psychology (for which his works should be in universal service as texts and 
lab manuals) but in all the behavioral sciences including, amazingly, 
philosophy. 
 
H’s association with Daniel Dennett (D), another famously confused writer 
on the mind, has certainly done nothing to help him learn new perspectives 
in the nearly 30 years since GEB. In spite of the fact that D has written a book 
on intentionality (a field which, in its modern version, was essentially created 
by W), H seems to have no acquaintance with it at all. Perceptions leading to 
memories, feeding into dispositions (inclinations)(W’s terms, also used by 
Searle, but called “propositional attitudes by others) such as believing and 
supposing, which are not mental states and have no precise duration etc/, are 
momentous advances in understanding how our mind works, which W 
discovered in the 20’s, but with threads going back to his writings before the 
first worldwar. 
 
The Eternal Golden Braid is not realized by H to be our innate Evolutionary 
Psychology, now, 150 years late (i.e., since Darwin), becoming a burgeoning 
field that is fusing psychology, cognitive science, economics, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, religion, music ( e.g., G. Mazzola’s “The 
Topos of Music”—(topos are substitutes for sets) one of the great science 
(psychology) books of the 21st century, though he is clueless about W and 
most of the points in this review), art, math, physics and literature. H has 
ignored or rejected many persons one might regard as our greatest teachers 
in the realm of the mind—W, Buddha, John Lilly, John Searle, Osho, Adi Da 
(see his “The Knee of Listening”), Shulgin and countless others. The vast 
majority of the insights from philosophy, as well as those from quantum 
physics, probability, meditation, EP, cognitive psychology and psychedelics 
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do not rate even a passing reference here (nor in most philosophical writings 
of scientists). 
 
Though there are some good books in his bibliography, there are many I 
would regard as standard references and hundreds of major works in 
cognitive science, EP, math and probability, and philosophy of mind and 
science that are not there (nor in his other writings). His sniping at Searle is 
petty and pointless—the frustration of someone who has no grasp of the real 
issues. In my estimation, neither H nor anyone else has provided a convincing 
reason to reject the Chinese room argument (the most famous article in this 
field) that computers don’t think (NOT that they cannot ever do something 
that we might want to call thinking— which Searle admits is possible). And 
Searle has (in my view) organized and extended W’s work in books such as 
“The Construction of Social Reality” and “Rationality in Action’-- brilliant 
summations of the organization of HOT (higher order thought—i.e., 
intentionality)—rare philosophy books you can even make perfect sense of 
once you translate a little jargon into English! H, D and countless others in 
cognitive science and AI are incensed with Searle because he had the temerity 
to challenge (destroy- I would say) their core philosophy –the Computational 
Theory of Mind (CTM) almost 30 years ago and continues to point this out. 
Of course, they (nearly) all reject the Chinese room or simply ignore it, but 
the argument is, in the view of many, unanswerable. The recent article by 
Shani (Minds and Machines V15, p207- 228(2005)) is a nice summary of the 
situation with references to the excellent work of Bickhard on this issue. 
Bickhard has also developed a seemingly more realistic theory of mind that 
uses nonequilibrium thermodynamics, in place of Hofstadter’s concepts of 
intentional psychology used outside the contexts necessary to give them 
sense. 
 
Few realize that W again anticipated everyone on these issues with numerous 
comments on what we now call CTM, AI or machine intelligence, and even 
did thought experiments with persons doing “translations” into Chinese. I 
had noticed this (and countless other close parallels with Searle’s work) when 
I came upon Diane Proudfoot’s paper on W and the Chinese Room in the 
book “Views into the Chinese Room” (2005). One can also find many gems 
related to these issues in Cora Diamond’s edition of the notes taken in W’s 
early lectures on math “Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics, Cambridge 1934(1976). W’s own “Remarks on the Foundations 
of Mathematics” covers similar ground. One of the very few who has 
surveyed W’s views on this in detail is Christopher Gefwert, whose excellent 
pioneering book “Wittgenstein on Minds, Machines and Mathematics” 
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(1995), is universally ignored. Though he was writing before there was any 
serious thought concerning electronic computers or robots, W realized that 
the basic issue here is very simple---computers lack a psychology (and even 
70 years later we have barely a clue how to give them one), and as usual he 
summed it all up in his unique aphoristic way “But a machine surely cannot 
think! --Is that an empirical statement? No. We only say of a human being 
and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of 
spirits too. Look at the word "to think" as a tool.” (Philosophical 
Investigations p113). Out of context, many of W’s comments may appear 
insipid or just wrong, but the perspicacious will find that they usually repay 
prolonged reflection—he was nobody’s fool. 
 
Hofstadter, in all his writings, follows the common trend and makes much of 
“paradoxes”, which he regards as self references, recursions or loops, but 
there are many “inconsistencies” in intentional psychology (math, language, 
perception, art etc.) and they have no effect, as our psychology evolved to 
ignore them. Thus, “paradoxes” such as “this sentence is false” only tell us 
that “this” does not refer to itself. Any symbolic system we have (i.e., 
language, math, art, music, games etc.) will always have areas of conflict, 
insoluble or counterintuitive problems or ill definitions. Hence, we have 
Gödel’s theorems, the liar’s paradox, inconsistencies in set theory, prisoner’s 
dilemmas, Schrodinger’s dead/live cat, Newcomb’s problem, Anthropic 
principles, Bayesian statistics, notes you can’t sound together or colors you 
can’t mix together and rules that can’t be used in the same game. A set of 
subindustries within Decision Theory, Behavioral Economics, Game Theory, 
Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology, Law, Political Science etc. and even 
the Foundations of Physics and Math (where it is commonly disguised as 
Philosophy of Science) has arisen which deals with endless variations on 
“real” (e.g., quantum mechanics) or contrived (e.g., Newcomb’s problem—
see Analysis V64, p187- 89(2004)) situations where our psychology –evolved 
only to get food, find mates and avoid becoming lunch—gives ambivalent 
results, or just breaks down. 
 
Virtually none of those writing the hundreds of articles and countless books 
on these issues which appear yearly seem aware they are studying the limits 
of our innate psychology and that Wittgenstein usually anticipated them by 
over half a century. Typically, he took the issue of paradox to the limit, 
pointing to the common occurrence of paradox in our thinking, and insisted 
that even inconsistencies were not a problem (though Turing, attending his 
classes, disagreed), and predicted the appearance of inconsistent logical 
systems. Decades later, dialetheic logics were invented and Priest in his recent 
 232  
book on them has called W’s views prescient. If you want a good recent 
review of some of the many types of language paradoxes (though with no 
awareness that W pioneered this in the 1930’s and largely innocent of any 
grasp of intentional context) see Rosenkranz and Sarkohi’s “Platitudes 
Against Paradox” in Erkenntnis V65, p319-41(2006). Appearance of many W 
related articles in this journal is most appropriate as it was founded in the 
30’s by logical positivists whose bible was W’s Tractus Logico Philosophicus. 
Of course, there is also a journal devoted to W and named after his most 
famous work— “Philosophical Investigations”. 
 
H, in line with nearly universal practice, refers often to our “beliefs” for 
“explanations” of behavior, but our shared psychology does not rest on 
belief—we just have awareness and pains and know from infancy that 
animals are conscious, self-propelled agents that are different from trees and 
rocks. Our mother does not teach us that any more than a dog’s mother does 
and in could not teach us! And, if this is something we learn, then we might 
teach a child (or a dog) that a bird and a rock are really the same kind of thing 
(i.e., to ignore innate intentional psychology). 
 
W clearly and repeatedly noted the underdetermination of all our concepts 
(e.g., see his comments on addition and the completion of series in Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics), which mandated their becoming innate 
(ie, evolution had to solve this problem by sacrificing countless quadrillions 
of creatures whose genes did not make the right choices). 
 
Nowadays this is commonly called the problem of combinatorial explosion 
and often pointed to by evolutionary psychologists as compelling evidence 
for innateness, unaware that W anticipated them by over 50 years. 
 
Our innate psychology does not rest on “beliefs” when it is clearly not subject 
to test or doubt or revision (e.g., try to give a sense to “I believe I am reading 
this review” and mean (i.e., find a real use in our normal life for) something 
different from “I am reading this review”). Yes, there are always derivative 
uses of any sentence including this one, but these are parasitic on the normal 
use. Before any “explanations” (really just clear descriptions, as W noted) are 
possible, it has to be clear that the origins of our behavior lie in the axioms of 
our innate psychology, which are the basis for all understanding, and that 
philosophy, math, literature, science, and society are their cultural extensions. 
 
Dennett (and anyone who is tempted to follow him—i.e., everyone) is forced 
into even more bizarre claims by his skepticism (for I claim it is a thinly veiled 
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secret of all reductionists that they are skeptics at heart—i.e., they must deny 
the “reality” of everything). In his book “The Intentional Stance” and other 
writings he tries to eliminate this bothersome psychology that puts animals 
in a different class from computers and the universe by including our innate 
evolved intentionality with the derived intentionality of our cultural 
creations (i.e., thermometers, pc’s and airplanes) by noting that it’s our genes, 
and so ultimately nature (i.e., the universe), and not we that “really” has 
intentionality, and so it’s all “derived”. Clearly something is gravely amiss 
here! One thinks immediately that it must then also be true that since nature 
and genes produce our physiology, there must be no substantive difference 
between our heart and an artificial one we make from plastic. For the grandest 
reductionist comedy in recent years see Wolfram’s “A New Kind of Science” 
which shows us how the universe and all its processes and objects are really 
just “computers” and “computation” (which he does not realize are 
intentional concepts having no meaning apart from our psychology and that 
he has NO TEST to distinguish a computation from a noncomputation—i.e., 
he eliminates psychology by definition). 
 
One sees that Dennett does not grasp the basic issues of intentionality by the 
title of his book. Our psychology is not a stance or attribution or posit about 
ourself, or other being’s mental lives, any more than it’s a “stance” that they 
possess bodies. A young child or a dog does not guess or suppose and does 
not and could not learn that people and animals are agents with minds and 
desires and that they are fundamentally different from trees and rocks and 
lakes. They know (live) these concepts (shared psychology) from birth and if 
they weaken, death or madness supervene. 
 
This brings us again to W who saw that reductionist attempts to base 
understanding on logic or math or physics were incoherent. We can only see 
from the standpoint of our innate psychology, of which they are all 
extensions. Our psychology is arbitrary only in the sense that one can imagine 
ways in which it might be different, and this is the point of W inventing odd 
examples of language games (i.e., alternative concepts (grammars) or forms 
of life). In doing so, we see the boundaries of our psychology. The best 
discussion I have seen on W’s imaginary scenarios is that of Andrew Peach 
in PI24: p299-327(2004). 
 
It seems to me that W was the first one to understand in detail (with due 
respects to Kant) that our life is based on our evolved psychology, which 
cannot be challenged without losing meaning. If one denies the axioms of 
math, one cannot play the game. 
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One can place a question mark after every axiom and every theorem derived 
from them but what is the point? Philosophers, theologians and the common 
person can play at this game as long as they don’t take it seriously. Injury, 
death, jail or madness will come quickly to those who do. Try to deny that 
you are reading this page or that these are your two hands or there is a world 
outside your window. The attempt to enter into a conceptual game in which 
these things can be doubted presupposes the game of knowing them—and 
there cannot be a test for the axioms of our psychology—anymore than for 
those of math (derived, as W showed, from our intuitive concepts) --they just 
are what they are. In order to jump there must be some place to stand. This is 
the most basic fact of existence, and yet, it is a remarkable consequence of our 
psychology being automated that it is the hardest thing for us to see. 
 
It is an amusing sight indeed to watch people (everyone, not just 
philosophers) trying to use their intuitive psychology (the only tool we have) 
to break out of the bounds of our intuitive psychology. How is this going to 
be possible? How will we find some vantage point that lets us see our mind 
at work and by what test will we know we have it? We think that if we just 
think hard enough or acquire enough facts we can get a view of “reality” that 
others do not have. But there is good reason to think that such attempts are 
incoherent and only take us further away from clarity and sanity. W said 
many times in many ways that we must overcome this craving for “clarity”, 
the idea of thought underlaid by “crystalline logic”, the discovery of which 
will “explain” our behavior and our world and change our view of what it is 
to be human. 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 On 
his return to philosophy in 1930 he said: 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for 
the future.” (Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979) 
p183 and in his Zettel P 312-314 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
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philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. ‘We have already said everything. 
---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!” 
 
“This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, 
whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right 
place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond 
it.” 
 
Some might also find it useful to read “Why there is no deductive logic of 
practical reason” in Searle’s superb “Rationality in Action” (2001). Just 
substitute his infelicitous phrases “impose conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction” by “relate mental states to the world by moving 
muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to world” and 
“world to mind directions of fit” by “cause originates in the world” and 
“cause originates in the mind”. 
 
Another basic flaw in H (and throughout scientific discourse, which includes 
philosophy since it is armchair psychology) concerns the notions of 
explanations or causes. We have few problems understanding how these 
concepts work in their normal contexts but philosophy is not a normal 
context. They are just other families of concepts (often called grammar or 
language games by W and roughly equivalent to cognitive modules, 
inference engines, templates or algorithms) comprising our EP (roughly, our 
intentionality) but, out of context, we feel compelled to project them onto the 
world and see “cause” as a universal law of nature that determines events. 
As W said, we need to recognize clear descriptions as answers which 
terminate the search for ultimate “explanations”. 
 
This gets us back to my comment on WHY people go astray when they try to 
“explain” things. Again, this connects intimately with judgements, decision 
theory, subjective probability, logic, quantum mechanics, uncertainty, 
information theory, Bayesian reasoning, the Wason test, the Anthropic 
principle (Bostrum “The Anthropic Principle” (2002)) and behavioral 
economics, to name a few. There is no space here to get into this rat’s nest of 
tightly linked aspects of our innate psychology, but one might recall that even 
in his pre-Tractatus writings, Wittgenstein commented that “The idea of 
causal necessity is not A superstition but the SOURCE of superstition”. I 
suggest that this seemingly trite remark is one of his most profound –W was 
not given to platitude nor to carelessness. What is the “cause” of the Big Bang 
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or an electron being at a particular “place” or of “randomness” or chaos or 
the “law” of gravitation? But there are descriptions which can serve as 
answers.  Thus, H feels all actions must be caused and “material” and so, with 
his pal D and the merry band of reductionist materialists, denies will, self and 
consciousness. D denies that he denies them, but the facts speak for 
themselves. His book “Consciousness Explained” is commonly referred to as 
“Consciousness Denied” and was famously reviewed by Searle as 
“Consciousness Explained Away”. 
 
This is especially odd in H’s case as he started out a physicist and his father 
won the Nobel prize in physics so one might think he would be aware of the 
famous papers of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and of von Neumann in the 
20’s and 30’s, in which they explained how quantum mechanics did not make 
sense without human consciousness (and a digital abstraction won’t do at all). 
In this same period others including Jeffreys and de Finetti showed that 
probability only made sense as a subjective (i.e., psychological) method and 
Wittgenstein’s close friends John Maynard Keynes and Frank Ramsey first 
clearly equated logic with rationality, and Popper and others noted the 
equivalence of logic and probability and their common roots in rationality. 
There is a vast literature on interrelationships of these disciplines and the 
gradual growth of understanding that they are all facets of our innate 
psychology. Those interested might start with Ton Sales article inthe 
Handbook of Philosophical Logic 2nd Ed. Vol 9 (2002) since it will also 
introduce them to this excellent source, now extending to about 20 Volumes 
(all on p2p). 
 
Ramsey was one of the few of his time who was capable of understanding 
W’s ideas and in his seminal papers of 1925-26 not only developed Keynes’ 
pioneering ideas on subjective probability, but also extended W’s ideas from 
the Tractatus and conversations and letters into the first formal statement of 
what later became known as substitutional semantics or the substitutional 
interpretation of logical quantifiers. (See Leblanc’s article in Handbook of 
Philosophical Logic 2nd Ed. V2, p53- 131(2002)). Ramsey’s premature death, 
like those of W, Von Neumann and Turing, were great tragedies, as each of 
them alone and certainly together would have altered the intellectual climate 
of the 20th century to an even greater degree. Had they lived, they might well 
have collaborated but as it was, only W realized he was discovering facets of 
our innate psychology. W and Turing were both Cambridge professors 
teaching classes on the Foundations of Mathematics—though W from the 
position that it rested on unstated axioms of our innate psychology and 
Turing from the conventional view that it was a matter of logic that stood by 
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itself. Had these two homosexual geniuses become intimately involved, 
amazing things might have ensued. 
 
I think everyone has these “deflationary” reductionist tendencies, so I suggest 
this is due to the defaults of intuitive psychology modules which are biased 
to assigning causes in terms of properties of objects, and cultural phenomena 
we can see and to our need for generality. Our inference engines 
compulsively classify and seek the source of all phenomena. When we look 
for causes or explanations, we are inclined to look outward and take the third 
person point of view, for which we have empirical tests or criteria, ignoring 
the automatic invisible workings of our own mind, for which we do not have 
such tests (another arena pioneered by W some 75 years ago). As noted here, 
one of W’s takes on this universal “philosophical” problem was that we lack 
the ability to recognize our normal intuitive explanations as the limits of our 
understanding, confusing the untestable and unchallengeable axioms of our 
psychology with facts of the world which we can investigate, dissect and 
explain. This does not deny science, only the notion that it will provide the 
“true” and “real” meaning of “reality”. 
 
There is a vast literature on causes and explanations so I will only refer to 
Jeffrey Hershfield’s excellent article “Cognitivism and Explanatory 
Relativity” in Canadian J. of Philosophy V28 p505-26(1998) and to Garfinkel’s 
book “Forms of Explanation” (1981). This literature is rapidly fusing with 
those on epistemology, probability, logic, game theory, behavioral 
economics, and the philosophy of science, which seem almost completely 
unknown to H. Out of the hundreds of recent books and thousands of articles, 
one can start on this with Nancy Cartwright’s books, which provide a partial 
antidote to the “Physics and Math Rule the Universe” delusion. Or, one can 
just follow the links between rationality, causality, probability, information, 
laws of nature, quantum mechanics, determinism, etc. in Wikipedia and the 
online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for decades (or, with W’s 
comments in mind, maybe only days) before one realizes he got it right and 
that we do not get clearer about our psychological “reality” by studying 
nature. One way to look at ISL is that its faults remind us that scientific laws 
and explanations are frail and ambiguous extensions of our innate 
psychology and not, as H would have it, the reverse. 
 
It is a curious and rarely noticed fact that the severe reductionists first deny 
psychology, but, in order to account for it (since there is clearly something 
that generates our mental and social life), they are forced into camp with the 
blank slaters (all of us before we get educated), who ascribe psychology to 
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culture or to very general aspects of our intelligence (i.e., our intentionality is 
learned) as opposed to an innate set of functions. H and D say that self, 
consciousness, will, etc. are illusions—merely “abstract patterns” (the “spirit” 
or “soul” of the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism). They believe that our 
“program” can be digitized and put into computers, which thereby acquire 
psychology, and that “believing” in “mental phenomena” is just like 
believing in magic (but our psychology is not composed of beliefs—which are 
only its extensions-- and nature is magical). I suggest it is critical to see why 
they never consider that “patterns” (another lovely language game!) in 
computers are magical or illusory. And, even if we allow that the reductionist 
program is really coherent and not circular (e.g., we are too polite to point out 
–as do W and Searle and many others—that it has NO TEST for it’s most 
critical assertions and requires the NORMAL functioning of will, self, reality, 
consciousness etc., to be understood), can we not reasonably say “well Doug 
and Dan, a rose by any other name smells as sweet!” I don’t think 
reductionists see that even were it true that we could put our mental life in 
algorithms running in silicon (or--in Searle’s famous example—in a stack of 
beer cans), we still have the same “hard problem of consciousness”: how do 
mental phenomena emerge from brute matter? This would add yet another 
mystery with no obvious way to recognize an answer— what does it mean 
(why is it possible) to encode “emergent properties” as “algorithms”? If we 
can make sense out of the idea that the mind or the universe is a computer 
(i.e., can say clearly what counts for and against the idea), what will follow if 
it is or it isn’t? 
 
“Computational” is one of the major buzzwords of modern science, but few 
stop to think what it really means. It’s a classic Wittgensteinian language 
game or family of concepts (uses) that have little or nothing in common. There 
are analog and digital computers, some made of blocks or mechanical gears 
only (Babbage etc.), we compute by hand (as is well known, Turing’s first 
comments on this referred to humans who computed and only later did he 
think of machines simulating this), and physicists speak of leaves computing 
“their” trajectory as they fall from the tree, etc. etc. Each game has its own use 
(meaning) but we are hypnotized by the word into ignoring these. W has 
analyzed word games (psychological modules) with unsurpassed depth and 
clarity (see esp. the long discussion of knowing how to continue a calculation 
in the Brown Book), understanding of which should put an end to the 
superstitious awe which generally surrounds this word and all words, 
thoughts, feelings, intuitions etc. 
 
It’s dripping with irony that D wrote a book on the EP of religion, but he 
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cannot see his own materialism as a religion (ie, it’s likewise due to innate 
conceptual biases). Timothy O’Connor has written (Metaphilosophy V36, 
p436- 448 (2005)) a superb article on D’s Fundamentalist Naturalism (though 
he does not really get all the way to the EP point of view I take here), noting 
that simply accepting the emergence of intentionality is the most reasonable 
view to take. But pastors D and H read from the Churchland’s books and the 
other bibles of CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) and exhort one and all 
to recognize their pc’s and toaster ovens as sentient beings (or at least they 
soon will be). Pastor Kurzweil does likewise, but few attend his sermons as 
he has filled the pews with pc’s having voice recognition and speech systems 
and their chorus of identical synthetic voices shout “Blessed be Turing” after 
every sentence.  See my review of his book “Will Hominoids or Androids 
Destroy the Earth? —A Review of How to Create a Mind” by Ray Kurzweil 
(2012) in the next section.  
 
Emergence of “higher order properties” from “inert matter” (more language 
games!) is indeed baffling, but it applies to everything in the universe, and 
not just to psychology. Our brains had no reason (i.e., there are no selective 
forces operative) to evolve an advanced level of understanding of themselves 
or the universe, and it would be too genetically costly to do so. What selective 
advantage could there have been in seeing our own thought processes? The 
brain, like the heart, was selected to function rapidly and automatically and 
only a minute part of its operations are available to awareness and subject to 
conscious control. Many think there is no possibility of an “ultimate 
understanding” and W tells us this idea is nonsense (and if not then what test 
will tell us that we have reached it)? 
 
Perhaps the last word belongs to Wittgenstein. Though his ideas changed 
greatly, there are many indications that he grasped the essentials of his 
mature philosophy in his earliest musings and the Tractatus can be regarded 
as the most powerful statement of reductionist metaphysics ever penned 
(though few realize it is the ultimate statement of computationalism). It is also 
a defensible thesis that the structure and limits of our intentional psychology 
were behind his early positivism and atomism. So, let us end with the famous 
first and last sentences of his Tractatus, seen as summarizing his view that the 
limits of our innate psychology are the limits of our understanding. “The 
world is everything that is the case.” “Concerning that of which we cannot 
speak, we must remain silent.” 
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Another cartoon portrait of the mind from the 
reductionist metaphysicians--a Review of Peter 
Carruthers ‘The Opacity of Mind’ (2011) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems 
theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by 
Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of 
human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the 
conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates 
with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which 
Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). After summarizing the 
framework worked out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as extended by modern 
reasoning research, I show the inadequacies in Carruther’s views, which 
pervade most discussions of behavior including contemporary behavioral 
sciences. I maintain that his book is an amalgam of two books, one a summary 
of cognitive psychology and the other a summary of the standard 
philosophical confusions on the mind with some new jargon added. I suggest 
that the latter should be regarded as incoherent or as a cartoon view of life 
and that taking Wittgenstein at his word, we can practice successful self 
therapy by regarding the mind/body issue as a language/body issue. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of John 
Searle (S) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) (jointly WS) as I consider S the 
successor to W and one must study their work together. It will help to see my 
reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the 
Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these two geniuses, who 
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provide a clear description of behavior that I will refer to as the WS 
framework. Only given this framework, which Searle calls the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher 
Order Thought (DPHOT), is it possible to have clear descriptions of behavior 
but it is entirely missing from nearly all discussions of behavior. 
 
Even in the works of WS it is not laid out clearly and in virtually all others it 
is only hinted at, with the usual disastrous consequences. I will begin with 
some quotes from W and S. These quotes are not chosen at random but result 
from a decade of study and together they are an outline of behavior (human 
nature) from our two greatest descriptive psychologists. If one understands 
them, they penetrate as deeply as it is possible to go into the mind (largely 
coextensive with language as W made clear) and provide as much guidance 
as one needs—it is then just a matter of looking at how language works in 
each case and by far the best place to find perspicuously analyzed examples 
of language is in the 20,000 pages of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for 
instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods 
and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and 
methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem 
and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency 
is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.”  Wittgenstein The Blue Book 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. 
---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel 
p312-314 
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"The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the 
very one we thought quite innocent." Wittgenstein, PI para.308 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and 
false."Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6 (1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway."Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the 
problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's 
guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
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of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost 
invariably matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, 
duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action...these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons 
for action...The general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of 
desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of 
desire-independent reasons for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created 
by collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic 
powers...With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional 
reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech 
acts that have the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional 
reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that havethe 
same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that 
are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description." Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive 
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science is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete 
biological reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference 
by the fact that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used 
to record both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational 
model of vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is 
simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle 
PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that 
can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of 
human cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at 
once, in a way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the 
speaker intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the 
utterance represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol 
itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has 
a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs" MSW p74" 
 
...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed 
according to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. 
This is true not just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
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Searle's (S) work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order 
S2/S3 social behavior which is due to the recent evolution of genes for 
dispositional psychology, while the later Wittgenstein (W) shows how it is 
based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and 
UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) 
which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic 
functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 
and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating-- the dispositional (and 
often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a 
fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic 
physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle 
and Hacker (Human Nature)for disquisitions). 
 
One should take seriously W's comment that even if God could look into our 
mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of 
Cognitive Psychology. Yes, a cognitive psychologist of the future may be able 
to see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking 
and acting, since these S1 functions are always causal mental states (CMS) but 
S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS and so not realized or visible. This 
is not a theory but description of our language, mind, life, grammar (W). S, 
Carruthers (C) and others muddy the waters here because they sometimes 
refer to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, S, Hacker 
and others show that the language of causality just does not apply to the 
higher order emergent S2 descriptions-- again not a theory but a description 
of how our dispositional states (language, thinking) work. 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-
propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the 
mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it 
is the default operation of our evolved psychology (EP) which seeks 
explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly (S2), 
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rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious--called 
by S in PNC `The Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless 
philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which 
produces the illusion that we control our life and among the consequences 
are the inexorable collapse of what passes for civilization. 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense as S1 states), 
and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But 
disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", 
which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the 
true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are 
Causally Self Referential (CSR)—i.e., to see a cat makes it true and in the 
normal case no test is possible, and the S2 use, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home')--i.e., they have external, public, testable Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized 
psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive 
illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too 
are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and 
later Searle call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 
activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about 
throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in 
certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over 
prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
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The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural 
deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure 
of behavior. 
 
These descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 of 
MSW, which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended 
one I have created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern 
psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only 
vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-
only perception, memory and prior intention, while S2 refers to dispositions 
such as belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and 
is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and 
Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from MSW p39 
beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as 
follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via 
prior intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire 
things to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire 
(and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and 
other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second 
self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid 
automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology 
there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) 
or remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in 
the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast 
arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
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just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so 
wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 
(i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have 
COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality 
of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it 
would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy 
before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W 
showed countless times and biology demostrates, life must be based on 
certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no 
philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations 
of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of 
magnitude higher for visual information. 
 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that 
spontaneous utterances and actions are the primitive reflexes or Primary 
Language Games (PLG) of S1, while conscious representations are the 
dispositional Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and 
indeed it is, but this is the most basic statement of how behavior works and 
hardly anyone has ever understood it. 
 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which 
produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for 
genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his 
description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the 
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paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate 
reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious 
DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which 
produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or 
speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of 
the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological 
Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The 
Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but 
anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes (as quoted above) that there is a general way to characterize the act of 
meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction 
on conditions of satisfaction" which is an act and not a mental state. This can 
be seen as another statement of W’s argument against private language 
(personal interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule 
following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts--no 
private rules or private interpretations either. And one must note that many 
(most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W's frequent 
referrals to community practice into thinking it's just arbitrary public practice 
that underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many times 
that such conventions are only possible given an innate shared psychology 
which he often calls the background, and it this which underlies all behavior 
and which is schematized in the table. 
 
As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood the 
later W and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is not surprising. Thus, one can 
understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the 
domination of S2 by S1. There is no test for my inner experiences, so whatever 
comes to mind when I imagine Jack's face is the image of Jack. Similarly, with 
reading and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination and there 
is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where the lack of 
 250  
any test makes them inapplicable. Two of W's famous examples used for 
combatting this temptation are playing tennis without a ball (`S1 tennis'), and 
a tribe that had only S2 calculation so `calculating in the head (`S1 
calculating') was not possible. 
 
`Playing' and `calculating' describe actual or potential acts--i.e., they are 
disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before 
one really ought to keep them straight by writing `playing1' and `playing2' 
etc. But we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss 
`calculating1' as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until 
later. Hence another of W's famous comments--"The decisive movement in 
the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite 
innocent." That is, the first few sentences or often the title commit one to a 
way of looking at things (a language game) which prevents clear use of 
language in the present context. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, and 
this means has public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When 
I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of 
thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's 
lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note 
here that `grammar' in W can usually be interpreted as the logical structure 
of language, and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and 
generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and 
higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
Likewise, with the question "What makes it true that my image of Jack is an 
image of him?" Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the 
image I have in my head is Jack and that's why I will say `YES' if shown his 
picture and `NO' if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the 
photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) 
to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked 
into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were 
speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
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without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that 
should happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my wish 
is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing 
does not mean that it fulfills it. 
 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? 
If I have learned to talk, then I do know." Disposition words refer to Potential 
Events (PE's) which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my mental states, 
emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way dispositions 
function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, desiring etc. 
depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express. 
Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be expressed by 
reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look 
at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from 
Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in 
modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional 
with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of 
minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about 
brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but 
I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
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Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******    (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and 
charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle 
and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may 
consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind 
and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
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EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions that can be described 
as Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s)—i.e., one class of reflexes 
of the fast associative unconscious automated System 1, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, informationless, 
true only mental stateswith a precise time and location) and gradually 
developed the further ability to encompass displacements in space and time 
to describe memories, attitudes and potential events (the past and future and 
often counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or 
dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of 
System 2 slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having 
public COS), representational, true or false propositional attitudinal thinking, 
which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental states). Preferences 
are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, Capacities, 
Hypotheses. Some Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 148). “I 
believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts 
typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are 
true-only (excluding lying) while third person statements about others are 
true or false (see my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, 
reflexive acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) 
in the 1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have 
commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a 
misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are 
often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, 
observer independent mental representations (as opposed to presentations or 
representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle- C+L p53). 
 
They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily 
more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always 
here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 –the major advance 
in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and 
to think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty 
of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S2 
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dispositions are abilities to act (contract muscles producing speech or body 
movements via S1 at which time they become causal and mental states). 
Sometimes dispositions may be regarded as unconscious since they can 
become conscious later-Searle- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as 
S1 or Primary Language Games’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, 
in the normal case, NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see 
the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do 
I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act—see above quotes from W). 
Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being 
acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 
1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto 
etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary 
psychology and his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our 
axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2. Though few 
have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) it wasfurther 
developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version 
of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s 
survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from 
his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work On 
Certainty (OC)(written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or 
DPHOT, and in my view the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Basic Emotions are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in 
which the mind automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential—
Searle) --the unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over 
which no control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are 
descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be 
described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world. 
 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive 
psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions with Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) which S calls 
The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI). W understood this and described itwith 
unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to working memory and so 
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we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect reasons to explain 
behavior (the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions 
can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind 
to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, and IntentionsIn Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to 
match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. 
Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other 
dispositions. Inclination words can be used as nouns which seem to describe 
mental states (e.g. belief), or as verbs which describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act) (e.g., believing) and are often incorrectly called 
“Propositional Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(actual 
or potential PUBLIC ACTS also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, 
thought) of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private 
language). 
 
Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. Perceptions: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, 
temperature 
 
Memories:  Remembering, Dreaming (S1) 
 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X might become True) (S2) 
 
CLASS 1: Believing, Judging, Thinking, Representing, Understanding, 
Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and 
abilities), Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, 
Intending, Considering, Desiring, expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a 
special class), Seeing As (Aspects), CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-- 
Dreaming , Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and 
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anger. 
 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my 
thoughts): Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, 
obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing 
Trying, Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, 
Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or 
Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and 
Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the 
Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of 
behavior. 
 
ALL WORDS ARE PARTS OF COMPLEX LANGUAGE GAMES (THOUGHTS LEADING TO ACTIONS) 
HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A 
SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT.  
 
We drive a car but also own it, see it, see its photo, dream about it, imagine it, 
expect it, remember it. The social interactions of humans are governed by 
cognitive modules— roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social 
psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, 
with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which 
lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology 
can be taken to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions 
and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive 
neurosciences when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and 
neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all 
the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules which produce 
behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development and individual 
action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms 
or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our 
understanding by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend 
them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), 
math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster 
andmore efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as 
conditional probabilities and they are algorithmatized by Spohn etc. 
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Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
(however defined) which create and require consciousness, will and self and 
in normal human adults all dispositions are purposive, require public acts 
(e.g., language), and commit us to relationships (called Desire Independent 
Reasons for Action- DIRA by Searle) in order to increase our inclusive fitness 
(maximum expected utility— sometimes called-controversially-Bayesian 
utility maximization) via dominance and reciprocal altruism and impose 
Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate 
thoughts to the world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, 
language, art, music, sex, sports etc.).  The basics of this were figured out by 
our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 
1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911 (“The general tree of 
psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the 
whole.” RPP Vol 1 P895 cf Z P464), and with refinements by many, but above 
all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. Much of our S2 intentionality 
admits of degrees or kinds (principally language games). As W noted, 
inclinations (e.g. thinking) are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our 
templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some 
contexts as they must to be useful. There are at least two types of thinking 
(i.e., two language games or ways of using the dispositional verb 
“thinking“)—non-rational without awareness and rational with partial 
awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2. It is 
useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W 
RPP2 129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can 
play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all 
dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) is not a mental state, and 
contains no information until it becomes a public act (realizes a COS) in 
speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and 
memories can have information (meaning-COS) when they are manifested in 
public actions via S2, for only then do they have any meaning (consequences) 
even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon. Developing 
language means manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. 
The common term TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called (UA-
Understanding ofAgency).  
 
Intentionality is the innate genetically programmed production of 
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consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions 
by contracting muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is a confusing term for 
normal intuitive rational or non-rational speech and action but I give it as a 
synonym for dispositions as it’s still widely used by those unfamiliar with W 
and S. The efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. 
by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how 
the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) 
than we already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full 
public view (W). Any phenomena that are hidden in neurophysiology, 
biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant 
to our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” 
(can be described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on 
it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about 
the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the 
workings of language. 
 
Language was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering 
of resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar functions automatically 
and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences 
have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person expressive use of inclinational verbs such as “I 
believe” describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not 
descriptive of my mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the 
usual sense of those words (W). “I believe its raining”, “I believed it was 
raining”, “he believes its raining”, “he will believe its raining,”, “I believe it 
will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts 
displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation) 
and so have COS which are their truth (or falsity) makers. 
 
Non-reflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior 
Intent have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by DMS in her paper in 
Philosophical Psychology in 2000) are typical of much of our behavior as they 
bridge S1 and S2 which interact in both directions most of our waking life. 
 
Perceptions, Memories, some Emotions and many “Type 1 Dispositions” are 
better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, non-reflective, NON-
Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, 
algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after 
Wittgenstein). 
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Now for some comments on “The Opacity of Mind” (OM). 
 
By the time I finished the first page of the preface, I realized this book was 
just another hopeless mess (the norm in philosophy). He made it clear that he 
had no grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different 
uses of ‘I know I’m awake’, ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it 
is’) nor the nature of dispositions (which he calls by the misleading and 
obsolete term ‘propositional attitudes’) and was basing his ideas about 
behavior on such notions as private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ 
and the computational description of mind, which were laid to rest by W ¾ 
of a century ago and by S and many others since. But I knew most books on 
human behavior are just as confused and that he was going to give a 
summary of recent scientific work on the brain functions corresponding to 
higher order thought (HOT), so I kept on. 
 
Before I read any book in philosophy or cognitive science, I go to the index 
and bibliography to see whom they cite and then try to find some reviews 
and especially an article in BBS since it has peer feedback, which is generally 
highly informative. As noted above, W and S are two of the most famous 
names in this field but in the index and bibliography I found only 3 trivial 
mentions of W and not one for S or Hacker—surely the most remarkable 
achievement of this volume. As expected, several reviews from philosophical 
journals were useless and the BBS responses to his précis of this book appear 
devastating--though, characteristically (with the exception of one mention of 
W) -- they too are clueless about WS. More remarkable, though he includes 
many references as recent as 2012, the 2009 BBS article is not among them 
and, so far as I can recall, he does not provide substantive responses to its 
criticisms in this book. Consequently, the powerful WS inspired LSR 
framework is totally absent and all the confusions it has cleared away are 
abundant on nearly every page. If you read the above and my other reviews 
and then the BBS article (readily available free on the net) your view of this 
book (and most writing in this arena) will likely be quite different. Of course, 
the major defect of BBS is apparent--- the commenters get only a one page 
comment and no reply, while the authors get a long article and a long reply, 
so it always appears that they prevail. It is clear however that C’s ISA theory, 
like most (all?) philosophical theories is a shape shifter which alters to 
“explain” every objection. Thus, the line between a meaningful theory 
(actually a description) tied to facts and a vague notion that “explains” 
nothing blurs. Of course, C often says that his theory “predicts” such and 
such observation but this appears to occur after the fact and of course the 
opposing theories shape shift as well. A powerful theory predicts things 
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which nobody was expecting and even the opposite of what they were 
expecting. We are also reminded of W’s constant injunctions to stick to 
describing the facts and avoid otiose “explanations”. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are 
noted in my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are 
as clear as day—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and 
tests can only be external and public. He famously illustrated this with the 
‘Beetle in the Box’. If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. 
and call what is inside a ‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in 
language, for every box could contain a different thing or it could even be 
empty. So, there is no private language that only I can know and no 
introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly demonstrable it cannot be 
a word in our language. This shoots down Carruther’s (C’s) ISA theory of 
mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references and a 
huge # of other books and articles. I have explained W’s dismantling of the 
notion of introspection and the functioning of dispositional language 
(‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and 
several of S’s books. Basically, he showed that the causal relation and word 
and object model that works for S1 does not apply to S2. 
 
Regarding ISA, many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ 
but in my view none better than W in BBB p37 —, “if we keep in mind the 
possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, 
the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. 
For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just 
such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” 
 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophical theories have no practical 
impact whatsoever- the real role of philosophy being to clear up confusions 
about how language is being used in particular cases (W). Like various 
‘physical theories’ but unlike other cartoon views of life (i.e., the standard 
religious, political, psychological, sociological, biological, medical, economic, 
anthropological and historical views of most people), it is too cerebral and 
esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so unrealistic that 
even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. Likewise, with other 
academic ‘theories of life’ such as the Standard Social Science or Blank Slate 
Model widely shared by sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, history 
and literature. However, religions big and small, political movements, and 
sometimes economics often generate or embrace already existing cartoons 
that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit forces terrestrial or 
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cosmic that reinforce our superstitions (our innately inspired psychological 
defaults), and help to lay waste to the earth (the real purpose of nearly every 
social practice and institution which are there to facilitate replication of genes 
and consumption of resources). The point is to realize that these are on a 
continuum with philosophical cartoons and have the same source. All of us 
could be said to have various cartoon views of life when young and only a 
few ever grow out of them. 
 
Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and 
confusing in most (maybe all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ in this book, 
substitute ‘cognition’ or ‘thinking’, since thinking about what we or others 
believe or know is thinking like any other and does not have to be seen as 
‘mindreading’ (UA in my terminology) either. In S’s terms, the COS are the 
test of what is being thought and they are identical for ‘it’s raining’, I believe 
it’s raining’, ‘I believe you believe it’s raining’ and ‘he believes it’s raining’ 
(likewise for ‘knows’, wishes, judges, understands, etc.), namely that it’s 
raining. This is the critical fact to keep in mind regarding ‘metacognition’ and 
‘mindreading’ of dispositions (‘propositional attitudes’) which C promotes. 
 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s 
illusions), who seems to find these ideas quite good, except that C should 
eliminate the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a higher self (the aim 
being hard reduction of S2 to S1). Of course, the very act of writing, reading 
and all the language and concepts of anything whatsoever presuppose self, 
consciousness and will (as S often notes), so such an account would be just a 
cartoon of life without any value whatsoever, which one could probably say 
of most philosophical accounts of behavior. The WS framework has long 
noted that the first person point of view is not eliminable or reducible to a 3rd 
person one, but this is no problem for the cartoon view of life. Likewise, with 
the description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, ‘information 
processing’ etc, -- all well debunked countless times by WS, Hutto, Read, 
Hacker and many others. Worst of all is the crucial but utterly unclear 
“representation”, for which I think S’s use as a condition of satisfaction (COS) 
of representing (i.e., the same form as for all dispositional nouns and their 
verbs) is by far the best. That is, the ‘representation’ of ‘I think it’s raining’ is 
the COS that it’s raining. 
 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett) thinks he is an expert on W, having 
studied him early in his career and decided that the private language 
argument is to be rejected as ‘behaviorism’! W famously rejected behaviorism 
and much of his work is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a 
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description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t 
you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a 
fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) 
And one can also point to real behaviorism in C in its modern 
‘computationalist’ form. WS insist on the indispensability of the first person 
point of view while C apologizes to D in the BBS article for using “I” or “self”. 
This is in my view the difference between an accurate description of language 
use and the use one can imagine in a cartoon. 
 
Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve 
to characterize C as well, since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s 
and many others) to be on the same page. S is one of many who have 
deconstructed D in various writings and these can all be read in opposition 
to C. And let us recall that W sticks to examples of language in action, and 
once one gets the point he is mostly very easy to follow, while C is 
captivatedby ‘theorizing’ (i.e., chaining numerous sentences with no clear 
COS) and rarely bothers with specific language games, preferring 
experiments and observations that are quite difficult to interpret in any 
definitive way (see the BBS responses), and which in any case have no 
relevance to higher level descriptions of behavior (e.g., exactly how do they 
fit into the Intentionality Table). One book C praises as definitive (Memory 
and the Computational Brain) presents the brain as a computational 
information processor—a sophomoric view thoroughly and repeatedly 
annihilated by S and others. In the last decade, I have read thousands of pages 
by and about W and it is quite clear that C does not have a clue. In this he 
joins a long line of distinguished philosophers and scientists whose reading 
of W was fruitless—Russell, Quine, Godel, Kreisel, Chomsky, Dummett, 
Kripke, Dennett, Putnam etc. (though Putnam began to see the light later). 
They just cannot see that most philosophy is grammatical jokes and 
impossible vignettes—a cartoon view oflife. 
 
Books like this that attempt to bridge two levels of description are really two 
books and not one. There is the description (not explanation, as W made clear) 
of our language and nonverbal behavior and then the experiments of 
cognitive psychology. “The existence of the experimental method makes us 
think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though 
problem and method pass one another by."(W PI p232), C et al are enthralled 
by science and just assume that it is a great advance to wed high level 
descriptive psychology to neuroscience and experimental psychology, but 
WS and many others have shown this is a mistake. Far from making the 
description of behavior scientific and clear, it makes it incoherent. And it 
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must have been by the grace of God that Locke, Kant, Nietzsche, Sartre, 
Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give such memorable accounts of 
behavior without any experimental science whatsoever. Of course, like 
politicians, philosophers rarely admit mistakes or shut up so this will go on 
and on for reasons W diagnosed perfectly. The bottom line has to be what is 
useful and what makes sense in our everyday life. I suggest the philosophical 
views of CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), as opposed to those of WS, 
are not useful and their ultimate conclusions that will, self and consciousness 
are illusions make no sense at all—i.e., they are meaningless having no clear 
COS. Whether the CDC comments on cognitive science have any heuristic 
value remains to be determined. 
 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of 
other animals and to reduce behavior to brain functions (to absorb 
psychology into physiology). The philosophy is a disaster but, provided one 
first reads the many criticisms in the BBS, the commentary on recent 
psychology and physiology may be of interest. Like Dennett, Churchland and 
so many others often do, C does not reveal his real gems til the very end, 
when we are told that self, will, consciousness (in the senses in which these 
words normally function) are illusions (supposedly in the normal sense of 
this word). Dennett had to be unmasked by S, Hutto et al for explaining away 
these ‘superstitions’ (i.e., not explaining at all and in fact not even describing) 
but amazingly C also admits it at the beginning, though of course he thinks 
he is showing us these words do not mean what we think and that his cartoon 
use is the valid one. 
 
One should also see Hacker’s criticisms of cog sci with replies by S and 
Dennett in "Neuroscience and Philosophy” and well explored in Hacker’s 
books "Human Nature" and "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" 
(see my reviews). It is remarkable that virtually nobody in all the behavioral 
disciplines (in which I include literature, history, politics, religion, law, art etc 
as well as the obvious ones) ever states either their logical framework or what 
it is that they are trying to accomplish and what role language analysis and 
science play, so all those interested in behavior might consider memorizing 
Hacker’s lovely summary of what philosophy (DPHOT) aims to do and how 
this relates to scientific pursuits. 
 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
... We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
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that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p 
be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he believes that p, but 
it is not the case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not 
the case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, 
attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why 
can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? 
Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can 
one know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? 
And so on - through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only 
to knowledge and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, 
forgetting, observing, noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being 
conscious of, not to mention the numerous verbs of perception and their 
cognates. What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is 
the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts 
hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and 
incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and 
different forms of context dependency. To this venerable exercise in 
connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self-
styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever." (Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15-2005). Of course, I would add 
that it is the study of our evolved psychology, of DPHOT, of the contextual 
sensitivity of language (W’s language games). It is not trivial to state these 
facts as it is quite rare to find anyone who grasps the big picture and even my 
hero’s such as Searle, Priest, Pinker, Read, etc. fall embarrassingly short when 
they try to define their professions. 
 
There have long been books on chemical physics and physical chemistry but 
there is no sign that the two will merge (nor is it a coherent idea) nor that 
chemistry will absorb biochemistry nor it in turn will absorb physiology or 
genetics, nor that biology will disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, 
sociology, etc. This is not due to the ‘youth’ of these disciplines but to the fact 
that they are different levels of description with entirely different concepts, 
data and explanatory mechanisms. But physics envy is powerful and we just 
cannot resist the ‘precision’ of physics, math, information, and computation 
vs the vagueness of higher levels. It ‘must’ be possible. 
 
Reductionism thrives in spite of the incomprehensibility of quantum 
mechanics, uncertainty, wave/particles, live/dead cats, quantum 
entanglement, and the incompleteness and algorithmic randomness of math 
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(Godel/Chaitin—see my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) 
and its irresistible pull tells us it is due to EP defaults. Again, a breath of badly 
needed fresh air from W: “For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.” PI p107. And once again 
W from the Blue Book-“Philosophers constantly see the method of science 
before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way 
science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness.” It is hard to resist throwing down most 
books on behavior and rereading W and S. Just jump from anything to e.g. 
these quotes from PI 
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-         
138_239-309.html. 
 
I suggest viewing the question of mind as essentially the same as all the ‘deep’ 
philosophical questions. We want to understand the ‘reality’ perceived by S1, 
but S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious machinations of 
S1 via DNA. We don’t know but our DNA does courtesy of the death of 
trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. So, we struggle with science 
and ever so slowly describe the mechanisms of mind (i.e., of brain), knowing 
that even should we arrive at “complete” knowledge of the brain, we would 
just have a description of what neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red or 
making a choice and an “explanation” of why is not possible (not intelligible). 
 
It is obvious to me after reading tens of thousands of pages of philosophy that 
the attempt to do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, where 
ordinary language morphs into special uses both deliberately and 
inadvertently, is essentially impossible (i.e., the normal situation in 
philosophy and other behavioral disciplines). Using special jargon words 
(e.g., intensionality, realism etc.) does not work either as there are no 
philosophy police to enforce a narrow definition and the arguments on what 
they mean are interminable. Hacker is good but his writing so precious and 
dense it’s often painful. Searle is very good but requires some effort to 
embrace his terminology and I believe he makes a few major mistakes, while 
W is hands down the clearest and most insightful, once you grasp what he is 
doing, and nobody has ever been able to emulate him. His TLP remains the 
ultimate statement of the mechanical reductionist view of life, but he later 
saw his mistake and diagnosed and cured the ‘cartoon disease’, but few get 
the point and most simply ignore him and biology as well, and so there are 
tens of thousands of books and millions of articles and most religious and 
political organizations (and until recently most of economics) and almost all 
people with cartoon views of life. But the world is not a cartoon, so a great 
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tragedy is being played out as the cartoon views of life collide with reality 
and universal blindness and selfishness bring about the collapse of 
civilization over the next twocenturies. 
 
I hesitate to recommend C’s writings to anyone, as the experienced ought to 
have about the same perspective I do, and the naïve will be wasting their time. 
Either read philosophy or cognitive science and avoid the amalgams. 
 
Among the endless books and articles available, I commend the 3 volumes on 
Human Nature edited by Carruthers (yes, the same), the 3 on Human Nature 
written by Hacker, the Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd Ed, and my 
reviews of W/S, Hutto, DMS, Hacker et al. and the original books. Finally, I 
suggest that if we accept W’s equation of language and mind and regard the 
‘mind/body problem’ as the ‘language/body problem’ it may help achieve his 
therapeutic aim. 
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Will Hominoids or Androids Destroy the Earth? —A 
Review of How to Create a Mind by Ray Kurzweil 
(2012) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Some years ago, I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of 
a book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical 
mistakes will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific 
works these may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax 
philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or long 
term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact 
are generously interlarded with philosophical gibberish as to what these facts 
mean. The clear distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago 
between scientific matters and their descriptions by various language games 
are rarely taken into consideration, and so one is alternately wowed by the 
science and dismayed by its incoherent analysis. So it is with this volume. 
 
If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical 
structure for rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought 
(dual process theory). If one is to philosophize about this, one needs to 
understand the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the 
philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and of how 
to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like nearly 
all students of behavior, is largely clueless. He, is enchanted by models, 
theories, and concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed 
us that we only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways 
of using language (language games) which have value only insofar as they 
have a clear test (clear truthmakers, or as John Searle (AI’s most famous critic) 
likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)). I have attempted to 
provide a start on this in my recent writings.   
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
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Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
Also, as usual in ‘factual’ accounts of AI/robotics, he gives no time to the very 
real threats to our privacy, safety and even survival from the increasing 
‘androidizing’ of society which is prominent in other authors (Bostrum, 
Hawking, etc.) and frequent in scifi and films, so I make a few comments on 
the quite possibly suicidal utopian delusions of ‘nice’ androids, humanoids, 
democracy, diversity, and genetic engineering. 
 
I take it for granted that technical advances in electronics, robotics and AI will 
occur, resulting in profound changes in society. However, I think the changes 
coming from genetic engineering are at least as great and potentially far 
greater, as they will enable us to utterly change who we are. And it will be 
feasible to make supersmart/super strong servants by modifying our genes 
or those of other monkeys. As with other technology, any country that resists 
will be left behind. But will it be socially and economically feasible to 
implement biobots or superhumans on a massive scale? And even if so, it 
does not seem remotely possible, economically or socially to prevent the 
collapse of industrial civilization. 
 
So, ignoring the philosophical mistakes in this volume as irrelevant, and 
directing our attention only to the science, what we have here is another 
suicidal utopian delusion rooted in a failure to grasp basic biology, 
psychology and human ecology, the same delusions that are destroying 
America and the world. I see a remote possibility the world can be saved, but 
not by AI/robotics, CRISPR, nor by democracy and equality. 
 
Some years ago, I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of 
a book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical 
mistakes will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific 
works these may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax 
philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or long 
term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact 
are generously interlarded with philosophical gibberish as to what these facts 
mean. The clear distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago 
between scientific matters and their descriptions by various language games 
are rarely taken into consideration, and so one is alternately wowed by the 
science and dismayed by its incoherent analysis. So, it is with this volume. 
 
If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical 
structure for rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought 
 272  
(dual process theory). If one is to philosophize about this, one needs to 
understand the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the 
philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and of how 
to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like nearly 
all students of behavior, is largely clueless. He, is enchanted by models, 
theories, and concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed 
us that we only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways 
of using language (language games) which have value only insofar as they 
have a clear test (clear truthmakers, or as John Searle (AI’s most famous critic) 
likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)).  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my art The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
Actually, “reduction” is a complex language game or group of games (uses 
of words with various meanings or COS) so its use varies greatly depending 
on context and often it’s not clear what it means. Likewise, with modeling or 
simulating or reproducing or equivalent to or the same as etc. Likewise, with 
the claims here and everywhere that “computation” of biological or mental 
processes is not done as it would take too long but not computable or 
calculable means many things or nothing at all depending on context and this 
is usually just totally ignored. 
 
Chapter 9 is the typical nightmare one expects. Minsky’s first quote “Minds 
are simply what brains do” is a truism in that in some games one can e.g., say 
‘my brain is tired’ etc. but like most he has no grasp at all of the line between 
scientific questions and those about how the language games are to be played 
(how we can use language intelligibly). Descriptions of behavior are not the 
same as descriptions of brain processes. This ‘reductionism’ is a hopelessly 
bankrupt view of life, -- it just does not work, i.e., is not coherent, and this has 
been explained at length, first by Wittgenstein and subsequently by Searle, 
Hacker and many others. For one thing, there are various levels of description 
(physics, chemistry, biochemistry, genetics, neurophysiology, brain, 
thought/behavior) and the concepts (language games) useful and intelligible 
(having clear meaning or COS) at one level work differently at another. Also, 
one ‘mental state’, ‘disposition’ or ‘thought’ or ‘action’, can be described in 
first person or third person by many statements and vice versa, one statement 
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may describe many different ‘mental states’, ‘dispositions’, ‘thoughts’ or 
‘actions’ depending intricately on context, so the match between behavior 
and language is hugely underdetermined even for ‘simple’ acts or sentences. 
and as these become more complex there is a combinatorial explosion. 
 
There is no clear meaning to describing my desire to see the sun set at the 
lower levels and their never will be. They are different levels of description, 
different concepts (different language games) and one cannot even make 
sense of reducing one to the other, of behavior into neurophysiology into 
biochemistry into genetics into chemistry into physics into math or 
computation and like most scientists Kurzweil’s handwaving and claims that 
it’s not done because its inconvenient or impractical totally fails to see that 
the real issue is that ‘reduction’ has no clear meaning (COS), or rather many 
meanings depending acutely on context, and in no case can we give a 
coherent account that eliminates any level. 
 
Nevertheless, the rotting corpse of reductionism floats to the surface 
frequently (e.g., p37 and the Minsky quote on p199) and we are told that 
chemistry “reduces” to physics and that thermodynamics is a separate 
science because the equations become “unwieldy”, but another way to say 
this is that reduction is incoherent, the language games (concepts) of one level 
just do not apply (make sense) at higher and lower levels of description, and 
it is not that our science or our language is inadequate. I have discussed this 
in my other articles and it is well known in the philosophy of science, but it 
is likely never going to penetrate into “hard science”. 
 
The psychology of higher order thought is not describable by causes, but by 
reasons, and one cannot make psychology disappear into physiology nor 
physiology into biochemistry nor it into physics etc. They are just different 
and indispensable levels of description. Wittgenstein famously described it 
80 years ago in the Blue Book. 
 
“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the 
method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural 
phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, 
in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a 
generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. 
This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher 
into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to 
reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 
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“purely descriptive.” 
 
Like nearly all ‘hard’ scientists and even sadly ‘soft’ ones as well, he has no 
grasp at all of how language works, e.g., of how ‘thinking’ and other 
psychological verbs work, so misuses them constantly throughout his 
writings (e.g., see his comments on Searle on p170). I won’t go into an 
explanation here as I have written extensively on this (see my recent ebook 
Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and 
Reviews 2006-2017 by Michael Starks 3rd Ed. 675p (2017)). So, like most 
scientists, and even most philosophers, he plays one language game (uses the 
words with one meaning or Condition of Satisfaction) but mixes it up with 
other quite different meanings, all the while insisting that his game is the only 
one that can be played (has any ‘real’ sense). Like most, he also is not clear on 
the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the issues of how language 
can be used intelligibly. Also, he does not have a clear grasp of the distinction 
between the two systems of thought, the automaticities of nonlinguistic 
system S1 and the conscious deliberations of linguistic system S2 but I have 
described this extensively in my writings and will not do so here. 
 
Another thing that Kurzweil never mentions is the obvious fact that there will 
be severe and probably frequently fatal conflicts with our robots. Just think 
about the continual daily problems we have living with other humans, about 
the number of assaults, abuses and murders every day. Why should these be 
any less with androids--and then who takes the blame? There would not seem 
to be any reason at all why androids should be less in conflict with each other, 
and with us, than other humans are already. 
 
Asimov’s law of robotics –do not harm humans, is a fantasy that is 
unattainable in practice for androids just as it is for us. I admit (as Searle has 
many times) that we are ‘androids’ too, though designed by natural selection, 
not having ‘intelligence’ from one viewpoint, but having limitless 
‘intelligence’ from another. 
 
What is to stop androids having all the mental ailments we have—neuroses, 
psychoses, sociopathies, egomania, greed, selfish desire to produce endless 
copies of one’s own ‘genome’ (electrome, digitome, silicome?), racism 
(programism?), something equivalent to drug addiction, homicidal and 
suicidal tendencies? Of course, humans will try to exclude bad behavior from 
the programs but this will have to be after the fact, i.e., when it’s already 
dispersed, and as they will be self programming and updating, any badness 
that confers a survival advantage will spread rapidly. This is of course just 
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the android equivalent of humanoid evolution by natural selection (inclusive 
fitness). 
 
John Searle killed the idea of strong AI with the Chinese room and other 
descriptions of the incoherence of various language games (as Wittgenstein 
had done superbly long before there were computers, though few have 
noticed). He is regarded by some as the nemesis of AI, but in fact he has just 
kept it on track and has no antipathy to it at all.  Searle has said repeatedly 
that of course machines can think and feel, for we are such machines! Made 
of proteins etc., and not metal, but machines in a very fundamental sense 
nevertheless. And machines that took about 4 billion years of 
experimentation in a lab the size of the earth with trillions or trillions of 
machines being created and only a tiny number of the most successful 
surviving. The efforts of AI seem or at least robotics, seem trivial by 
comparison. And as he notes it is possible that much or all of our psychology 
may be unique to fleshy beings, just as much of AI may be to solid state 
androids. How much might be true overlap and how much vague simulation 
is impossible to say. 
 
Darwinian selection or survival of the fittest as it applies to machines, is a 
major issue that is never addressed by Kurzweil, nor most others, but is the 
subject of a whole book by philosopher-scientist Nik Bostrum and of repeated 
warnings by black hole physicist and world’s longest surviving ALS sufferer 
Stephen Hawking. Natural selection is mostly equivalent to inclusive fitness 
or favoritism towards close relatives (kin selection). And there is no 
countervailing ‘group selection’ for ‘niceness’ (see my review of Wilson’s The 
Social of Conquest of Earth (2012)). Yes, we do not have DNA and genes in 
robots (yet), but in what is perhaps philosopher Daniel Dennett’s most (only?) 
substantive contribution to philosophy, it is useful to regard inclusive fitness 
as the ‘universal acid’ which eats through all fantasies about evolution, nature 
and society. So, any self-replicating android or program that has even the 
slightest advantage over others will automatically eliminate them and 
humans and all other lifeforms, protein or metal, that are competitors for 
resources, or just for ‘amusement’ as human do with other animals. 
 
Exactly what will prevent programs from evolving selfishness and replacing 
all other competing machines/programs or biological life forms? If one takes 
the ‘singularity’ seriously, then why not take this just a seriously?  I 
commented on this a long ago and of course it is a staple of science fiction. So, 
AI is just the next stage of natural selection with humans speeding it up in 
certain directions until they are replaced by their creations, just as the 
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advantages in our ‘program’ resulted in the extinction of all other hominoid 
subspecies. 
 
As usual in ‘factual’ accounts of AI/robotics, Kurzweil gives no time to the 
very real threats to our privacy, safety and even survival from the increasing 
‘androidizing’ of society which are prominent in other nonfiction authors 
(Bostrum, Hawking etc.) and frequent in scifi and films. It requires little 
imagination to see this book as just another suicidal utopian delusion 
concentrating on the ‘nice’ aspects of androids, humanoids, democracy, 
computers, technology, ethnic diversity, and genetic engineering. It is 
however thanks to these that the last vestiges of our 
stability/privacy/security/prosperity/tranquility/sanity are rapidly 
disappearing. Also, drones and autonomous vehicles are rapidly increasing 
in capabilities and dropping in cost, so it will not be long before enhanced AI 
versions are used for crime, surveillance and espionage by all levels of 
government, terrorists, thieves, stalkers, kidnappers and murderers. Given 
your photo, fingerprints, name, workplace, address, mobile phone #, emails 
and chats, all increasingly easy to get, solar powered or self-charging drones, 
microbots, and vehicles will be able carry out almost any kind of crime. 
Intelligent viruses will continue to invade your phone, pc, tablet, refrigerator, 
car, TV, music player, health monitors, androids and security systems to steal 
your data, monitor your activities, follow you, and if desired, extort, kidnap 
or kill you. Its crystal clear that if the positives will happen then the negatives 
will also. This dark side of AI/Robotics/The internet of things goes 
unmentioned in this book, and this is the norm. 
 
Though the idea of robots taking over has been in scifi for many years, I first 
started to think seriously about it when I read about nanobots in Drexler’s 
Engines of Creation in 1993. And many have worried about the ‘grey goo’ 
problem—i.e., of nanobots replicating until they smother everything else. 
 
Another singularity that Kurzweil and most in AI do not mention is the 
possibility that genetic engineering will soon lead to DNA displacing silicon 
as the medium for advanced intelligence. CRISPR and other techniques will 
let us change genes at will, adding whole new genes/chromosomes in months 
or even hours, with superfast development of organisms or brains in vats 
without bothersome bodies to encumber them. Even now, without genetic 
engineering, there are precocious geniuses mastering quantum mechanics in 
their early teens or taking the cube of a 10 digit number in their head. And 
the programming of genes might be done by the same computers and 
programs being used for AI. 
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Anyone who takes AI seriously also might find of interest my article on David 
Wolpert’s work on the ultimate law in Turing Machine Theory which 
suggests some remarkable facets of and limits to computation and 
‘intelligence’. I wrote it because his work has somehow escaped the attention 
of the entire scientific community.  It is readily available on the net and in my 
book: Wolpert, Godel, Chaitin and Wittgenstein on impossibility, 
incompleteness, the liar paradox, theism, the limits of computation, a 
nonquantum mechanical uncertainty principle and the universe as 
computer—the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory (2015). 
 
To his credit, Kurzweil makes an effort to understand Wittgenstein (p220 
etc.), but (like 50 million other academics) has only a superficial grasp of what 
he did.  Before computers existed, Wittgenstein discussed in depth the basic 
issues of what computation was and what makes humans distinct from 
machines, but his writings on this are unknown to most. Gefwert is one of the 
few to analyze them in detail, but his work has been largely ignored. 
 
On p222 Kurzweil comments that it is ‘foolish’ to deny the ‘physical world’ 
(an intricate language game), but it is rather that one cannot give any sense to 
such a denial, as it presupposes the intelligibility (reality) of what it denies. 
This is the ever-present issue of how we make sense of (are certain about) 
anything, which brings us back to Wittgenstein’s famous work ‘On Certainty’ 
(see my various reviews of his books) and the notion of the ‘true only’ 
proposition. Like all discussions of behavior, Kurzweil’s needs a logical 
structure for rationality (intentionality) and (what is equivalent) a thorough 
understanding of how language works, but it is almost totally absent. As 
much of my book deals with these issues I won’t go into them here except to 
provide the summary table of intentionality. 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the 
pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown 
Books) to 1951, and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, 
Moyal- Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I 
have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The 
rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems 
(dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can 
also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality  (LSOR),  of  Intentionality  (LSI)  -the  classical philosophical  term,  
 278  
the  Descriptive  Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very 
recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much 
simpler table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the 
three recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in 
mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He 
showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences 
(language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— 
showing the correct context. 
 
On p 278 he comments on our improving life and references ‘Abundance’ by 
his colleague Diaminidis – another utopian fantasy, and mentions Pinker’s 
recent work “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined”, 
but fails to note that these improvements are only temporary, and are bought 
at the cost of destroying our descendant’s futures. As I have reviewed 
Pinker’s book and commented in detail on the coming collapse of America 
and the world in my articles, I will not repeat it here. 
 
Every day we lose about 200 million tons of topsoil into the sea (ca. 
12kg/person/day) and about 20,000 hectares of agricultural land becomes 
salinified and useless. Fresh water is disappearing in many areas. And every 
day the mothers of the 3rd world (the 1st world now decreasing daily) ‘bless’ 
us with another 300,000 or so babies, leading to a net increase of about 
200,000—another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every month. 
About 4 billion more by 2100, most in Africa, most of the rest in Asia. The 
famously tolerant Muslims will likely rise from about 1/5th to about 1/3 of the 
earth and control numerous H bombs. Thanks to the social delusions of the 
few hundred politicians who control it, America’s love affair with ‘diversity’ 
and ‘democracy’ will guarantee its transformation into a 3rd world hellhole 
and the famously benevolent Chinese will take center stage. Sea level is 
projected to rise at least one to three meters by 2100 and some projections are 
ten times higher. There is no doubt at all that it will eventually rise much 
higher and cover much of the world’s prime cropland and most heavily 
populated areas.  It’s also clear that the oil and natural gas and good quality 
easy to get coal will be gone, much of the earth stripped of topsoil, all the 
forests gone, and fishing dramatically reduced. I would like to see a plausible 
account of how androids/AI will fix this. Even if theoretically possible, at 
what cost in money and pollution and social distress to created and maintain 
them? The second law of thermodynamics and the rest of physics, chemistry 
and economics works for androids as well as hominoids. And who is going 
to force the world to cooperate when its obvious life is a zero-sum game in 
 282  
which your gain is my loss? There is no free lunch. Even if robots could do all 
human tasks right now it would not save the world from constant 
international conflicts, starvation, disease, crime, violence and war. When 
they cannot be made to cooperate in this limited time of abundance (bought 
by raping the earth) it is hopelessly naïve to suppose that they will do it when 
anarchy is sweeping over the planet. 
 
I take it for granted that technical advances in electronics, robotics and AI will 
occur, resulting in profound changes in society. However, I think the changes 
coming from genetic engineering are at least as great and potentially far 
greater, as they will enable us to utterly change who we are. And it will be 
feasible to make supersmart/super strong servants by modifying our genes 
or those of other monkeys. As with other technology, any country that resists 
will be left behind. But will it be socially and economically feasible to 
implement biobots or superhumans on a massive scale? And even if so, it 
does not seem remotely possible, economically or socially to prevent the 
collapse of industrial civilization. 
 
So, ignoring the philosophical mistakes in this volume as irrelevant, and 
directing our attention only to the science, what we have here is another 
suicidal utopian delusion rooted in a failure to grasp basic biology, 
psychology and human ecology, the same delusions that are destroying 
America and the world. I see a remote possibility the world can be saved, but 
not by AI/robotics, CRISPR, nor by democracy and equality. 
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What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, 
Computable and Incomplete mean? A Review of 
Godel's Way: Exploits into an undecidable world by 
Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da 
Costa 160p (2012) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as 
undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and 
paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint 
that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. 
There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world 
that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to 
how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in 
mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at how we 
actually use words in particular contexts. When we get clear about which 
language game we are playing, these topics are seen to be ordinary scientific 
and mathematical questions like any others. Wittgenstein’s insights have 
seldom been equaled and never surpassed and are as pertinent today as they 
were 80 years ago when he dictated the Blue and Brown Books. In spite of its 
failings—really a series of notes rather than a finished book—this is a unique 
source of the work of these three famous scholars who have been working at 
the bleeding edges of physics, math and philosophy for over half a century. 
Da Costa and Doria are cited by Wolpert (see below or my articles on Wolpert 
and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) since they wrote 
on universal computation and among his many accomplishments, Da Costa 
is a pioneer in paraconsistency. 
 
 
 
In spite of its failings—really a series of notes rather than a finished book—
this is a unique source of the work of these three famous scholars who have 
been working at the bleeding edges of physics, math and philosophy for over 
half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by Wolpert (see below or my 
articles on Wolpert and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of 
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Reason’) since they wrote on universal computation, and among his many 
accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer in paraconsistency. 
 
Chaitin’s proof of the algorithmic randomness of math (of which Godel’s 
results are a corollary) and the Omega number are some of the most famous 
mathematical results in the last 50 years and he has documented them in 
many books and articles. His coauthors from Brazil are less well known in 
spite of their many important contributions. For all the topics here, the best 
way to get free articles on the cutting edge is to visit ArXiv.org, viXra.org, 
academia.edu, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu or philpapers.org where there are tens of 
thousands of preprints on every topic (be warned this may use up all your 
spare time for the rest of your life!). 
 
As readers of my other articles are aware, in my view there are two basic 
issues running throughout philosophy and science which have completely 
different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts 
about the world that need to be investigated observationally, and 
philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly, which need 
to be decided by looking at how we actually use certain words in particular 
contexts and how these are extended to new uses in new contexts. 
Unfortunately, there is almost no awareness that these are two different tasks 
and so this work, like all scientific writing that has a ‘philosophical’ aspect, 
mixes the two with unfortunate results. And then there is scientism, which 
we can here take as the attempt to treat all issues as scientific ones and 
reductionism which tries to treat them as physics and/or mathematics. Since 
I have noted in my reviews of books by Wittgenstein (W), Searle and others, 
how an understanding of the language used in what Searle calls the Logical 
Structure of Reality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher 
Order Thought (DPHOT), along with the Dual Process Description (the Two 
Systems of Thought) helps to clarify philosophical problems, I will not repeat 
the reasons for that view here. 
 
Since Godel’s theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing 
algorithmic randomness (incompleteness) throughout math (which is just 
another of our symbolic systems that may result in public testable actions-i.e., 
if meaningful it has COS), it seems inescapable that thinking (dispositional 
behavior having COS) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements 
and situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems 
evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be 
regarded as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says 
this ‘randomness’ (another group of language games) shows there are 
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limitless theorems that are ‘true’ but unprovable—i.e., ‘true’ for no ‘reason’. 
One should then be able to say that there are limitless statements that make 
perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe actual situations attainable 
in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s views. 
He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his 
work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context 
sensitivity of language, math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, 
Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the 
foundations of mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed 
in symbolic systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” 
and full of tasks or situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible 
(i.e., they have no solution-see below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems 
unavoidable that everything derived from it by using higher order thought 
(system 2 or S2) to extend our innate axiomatic psychology (system 1 or S1) 
into complex social interactions such as games, economics, physics and math, 
will be “incomplete” also. 
 
The first of these in what is now called Social Choice Theory or Decision 
Theory (which are continuous with the study of logic and reasoning and 
philosophy) was the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow 63 years ago, and 
there have been many since such as the recent impossibility or 
incompleteness proof by Brandenburger and Kreisel (2006) in two-person 
game theory. In these cases, a proof shows that what lookslike a simple choice 
stated in plain English has no solution. There are also many famous 
“paradoxes” such as Sleeping Beauty (dissolved by Rupert Read), 
Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and Doomsday, where what 
seems to be a very simple problem either has no one clear answer, or it proves 
exceptionally hard to find. A mountain of literature exists on Godel’s two 
“incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more recent work, but I think that 
W’s writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. Although Shanker, Mancosu, 
Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and others have done insightful 
work in explaining W, it is only recently that W’s uniquely penetrating 
analysis of the language games being played in mathematics and logic have 
been clarified by Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a Variation 
on Cantor and Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s 
Reasons’ , and ‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes Paraconsistent Sense’ 
, and Rodych ( e.g., ‘Wittgenstein and Godel: the Newly Published Remarks’ 
and ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments about Wittgenstein and New 
Remarks by Wittgenstein’). Berto is one of the best recent philosophers, and 
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those with time might wish to consult his many other articles and books 
including the volume he co- edited on paraconsistency. Rodych’s work is 
indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are free online (but see 
also his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles). 
 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics-i.e., the use 
by Godel of a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for W’s 
“notorious” interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept 
W’s argument, I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of 
metalanguages, metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that such 
concepts (words) as metamathematics, undecidability and incompleteness, 
accepted by millions (and even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, 
Dyson et al to reveal fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) are 
just simple misunderstandings about how language works? Isn’t the proof in 
this pudding that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind 
and will as illusions a la Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchland’s etc.), they 
have no practical impact whatsoever? Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this 
framework, it is not possible that the very same sentence…turns out to be 
expressible, but undecidable, in a formal system… and demonstrably true 
(under the aforementioned consistency hypothesis) in a different system (the 
meta-system). If, as Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes the very 
meaning of the proved sentence, then it is not possible for the same sentence 
(that is, for a sentence with the same meaning) to be undecidable in a formal 
system, but decided in a different system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein 
had to reject both the idea that a formal system can be syntactically 
incomplete, and the Platonic consequence that no formal system proving only 
arithmetical truths can prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the 
meaning of arithmetical sentences, then there cannot be incomplete systems, 
just as there cannot be incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent 
arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are 
nowadays a reality. What is more important, the theoretical features of such 
theories match precisely with some of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian 
intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from Godel’s First 
Theorem, and from Church’s undecidability result: they are, that is, 
demonstrably complete and decidable. They therefore fulfil precisely 
Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there cannot be mathematical 
problems that can be meaningfully formulated within the system, but which 
the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the decidability of 
paraconsistent arithmetics harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein 
maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
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W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or 
our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as 
a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. 
“Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can 
say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems 
derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions (from which results follow necessarily and algorithmically), and 
this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies a test (the 
results of which are unpredictable and debatable). W often noted that to be 
acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other 
proofs and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case with 
Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system 
(here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used 
in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of Peano Arithmetic, it cannot be used in 
the real world either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal 
calculus is only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) 
if it has an extra-systemic application in a system of contingent propositions 
(e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to 
say this is that one needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like 
‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a 
result in the tangle of games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ 
signs etc., and with ‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it 
up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an 
incomplete mathematical calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is 
algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and makes many 
other penetrating comments (see Rodych and Floyd). Of course, the same 
remarks apply to all forms of logic and any other symbolic system. 
As Rodych, Berto and Priest (another pioneer in paraconsistency) have noted, 
W was the first (by several decades) to insist on the unavoidability and utility 
of inconsistency (and debated this issue with Turing during his classes on the 
Foundations of Mathematics). We now see that the disparaging comments 
about W’s remarks on math made by Godel, Kreisel, Dummett and many 
others were misconceived. As usual, it is a very bad idea to bet against W. 
Some may feel we have strayed off the path here—after all in ‘Godel’s Way’ 
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we only want to understand ‘science’ and ‘mathematics’ (in quotes because 
part of the problem is regarding them as ‘systems’) and why these 
‘paradoxes’ and ‘inconsistencies’ arise and how to dispose of them. But I 
claim that is exactly what I have done by pointing to the work of W. Our 
symbolic systems (language, math, logic, computation) have a clear use in the 
narrow confines of everyday life, in what we can loosely call the mesoscopic 
realm--the space and time of normal events we can observe unaided and with 
certainty (the innate axiomatic bedrock or background as W and later Searle 
call it). But we leave coherence behind when we enter the realms of particle 
physics or the cosmos, relativity, math beyond simple addition and 
subtraction with whole numbers, and language used out of the immediate 
context of everyday events. The words or whole sentences may be the same, 
but the meaning is lost (i.e., to use Searle’s preferred term, their Conditions 
of Satisfaction (COS) are changed or opaque). It looks to me like the best way 
to understand philosophy is to enter it via Berto, Rodych and Floyd’s work 
on W, so as to understand the subtleties of language as it is used in math and 
thereafter “metaphysical” issues of all kinds may be dissolved. As Floyd 
notes “In a sense, Wittgenstein is literalizing Turing’s model, bringing it back 
down to the everyday and drawing out the anthropomorphic command- 
aspect of Turing’s metaphors.” 
 
W pointed out how in math, we are caught in more LG’s (Language Games) 
where it is not clear what “true”, “complete”, “follows from”, “provable”, 
“number” ,”infinite”, etc. mean (i.e., what are their COS or truthmakers in 
THIS context), and hence what significance to attach to ‘incompleteness’ and 
likewise for Chaitin’s “algorithmic randomness”. As W noted frequently, do 
the “inconsistencies” of math or the counterintuitive results of metaphysics 
cause any real problems in math, physics or life? The apparently more serious 
cases of contradictory statements –e.g., in set theory---have long been known 
but math goes on anyway. Likewise for the countless liar (self-referencing) 
paradoxes in language and in the ”incompleteness” and “inconsistency” 
(groups of complex LG’s) of mathematics as well. 
 
It is a constant struggle to keep in mind that different contexts mean different 
LG’s (meanings, COS) for “time”, “space”, “particle” “object” , ”inside”, 
“outside”, “next”, “simultaneous”, ”occur”, “happen”, “event” ,”question”, 
“answer” ,“infinite”, “past”, “future”, “problem”, “logic”, “ontology”, 
“epistemology”, “solution”, “paradox”,“prove”, “strange”, “normal”, 
“experiment”, ”complete”, “uncountable”, “decidable”, “dimension”, 
“complete”, “formula”, “process”, “algorithm”, “axiom”, ”mathematics”, 
“number”, “physics”, “cause”, “place”, “same”,“moving”, “limit”, “reason”, 
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“still”, “real” “assumption”, “belief”, ‘know”, “event”, ”recursive”, “meta—
“, “self- referential” “continue”, “particle”, “wave”,, “sentence” and even (in 
some contexts) “and”, “or”, “also”, “add” , “divide”, “if…then”, “follows” 
etc. 
 
As W noted, most of what people (including many philosophers and most 
scientists) haveto say when philosophizing is not philosophy but its raw 
material. Chaitin, Doria, and Da Costa join Yanofsky (Y), Hume, Quine, 
Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. in 
repeating the mistakes of the Greeks with elegant philosophical jargon mixed 
with science. I suggest quick antidotes via my reviews and some Rupert Read 
such as his books ‘A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes’ and ‘Wittgenstein 
Among the Sciences’, or go to academia.edu and get his articles , especially 
‘Kripke’s Conjuring Trick’ and ‘Against Time Slices’ and then as much of 
Searle as feasible, but at least his most recent such as ‘Philosophy in a New 
Century’, ‘Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy’, ‘Making the Social 
World’ and ‘Thinking About the Real World’ (or at least my reviews) and his 
forthcoming volume on perception. There are also over 100 youtubes of 
Searle, which confirm his reputation as the best standup philosopher since 
Wittgenstein. 
 
A major overlap that now exists (and is expanding rapidly) between game 
theorists, physicists, economists, mathematicians, philosophers, decision 
theorists and others, all of whom have been publishing for decades closely 
related proofs of undecidability, impossibility, uncomputability, and 
incompleteness. One of the more bizarre is the recent proof by Armando Assis 
that in the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics one can setup a 
zero-sum game between the universe and an observer using the Nash 
Equilibrium, from which follow the Born rule and the collapse of the wave 
function. Godel was first to demonstrate an impossibility result and (until 
Wolpert— see my article on his work) it is the most far reaching (or just 
trivial/incoherent) but there have been an avalanche of others. As noted, one 
of the earliest in decision theory was the famous General Impossibility 
Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for which he got the 
Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his students are now Nobel 
laureates so this is not fringe science). It states roughly that no reasonably 
consistent and fair voting system (i.e., no method of aggregating individuals’ 
preferences into group preferences) can give sensible results. The group is 
either dominated by one person and so GIT is often called the “dictator 
theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original paper was 
titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated like 
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this:” It is impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies 
all of the following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; 
Unanimity; Freedom From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group 
Rank.” Those familiar with modern decision theory accept this and the many 
related constraining theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may 
find it (and all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find 
a career path that has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See 
”The Arrow Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and 
Imperfection”(2013) among legions of publications. 
 
Another recent famous impossibility result is that of Brandenburger and 
Keisler (2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and 
like all these impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind), 
which shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. 
One interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically 
just logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or 
beliefs that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually 
hold. But note W’s characterization of ‘thinking’ as a potential action with 
COS, which says they don’t really have a meaning (use), like Chaitin’s infinity 
of apparently well-formed formulas that do not actually belong to our system 
of mathematics. “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s 
assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and multiple layers of 
‘recursion’ (another LG) have been assumed in argumentation, linguistics, 
philosophy etc., for a century at least, but B&K showed that it is impossible 
for Ann and Bob to assume these beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body 
of such impossibility results for one person or multiplayer decision situations 
(e.g., they grade into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc.). For a good 
technical paper from among the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get 
Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from arXiv which takes us back to the liar 
paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title notes it is about “interactive forms 
of diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W 
and Godel. Many of these papers quote Yanofsky’s (Y’s) paper “A universal 
approach to self- referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin of Symbolic 
Logic, 9(3):362–386,2003. 
 
Abramsky (a polymath who is among other things a pioneer in quantum 
computing) is a friend of Y’s and so Y contributes a paper to the recent 
Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum 
Foundations’(2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) commentary on the BK 
and related paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes 
Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes about Knowledge and 
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Belief’. For a good multi-author survey see ’Collective Decision Making 
(2010). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some 
stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see 
arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of 
the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human 
behavior, which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical 
computer that can be assured of correctly processing information faster than 
the universe does. The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, 
general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, 
general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that 
are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also 
hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also 
published what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective 
intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific 
footing. Although he has published various versions of these proofs over two 
decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., 
Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news 
items in major science journals, few seem to have noticedand I have looked 
in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision theory and computation 
without finding a reference. 
 
W’s prescient grasp of these issues, including his embrace of strict finitism 
and paraconsistency, is finally spreading through math, logic and computer 
science (though rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has recently 
suggested the necessity of a Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. 
“Any mathematical theory presented in first order logic has a finite 
paraconsistent model.” Berto continues: “Of course strict finitism and the 
insistence on the decidability of any meaningful mathematical question go 
hand in hand. As Rodych has remarked, the intermediate Wittgenstein’s view 
is dominated by his ‘finitism and his view […] of mathematical 
meaningfulness as algorithmic decidability’ according to which ‘[only] finite 
logical sums and products (containing only decidable arithmetic predicates) 
are meaningful because they are algorithmically decidable.’”. In modern 
terms this means they have public conditions of satisfaction (COS)-i.e., can be 
stated as a proposition that is true or false. And this brings us to W’s view 
that ultimately everything in math and logic rests on our innate (though of 
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course extensible) ability to recognize a valid proof. Berto again: 
“Wittgenstein believed that the naïve (i.e., the working mathematician’s) 
notion of proof had to be decidable, for lack of decidability meant to him 
simply lack of mathematical meaning: Wittgenstein believed that everything 
had to be decidable in mathematics…Of course one can speak against the 
decidability of the naïve notion of truth on the basis of Godel’s results 
themselves. But one may argue that, in the context, this would beg the 
question against paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein too. Both 
Wittgenstein and the paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the 
standard view on the other, agree on the following thesis: the decidability of 
the notion of proof and its inconsistency are incompatible. But to infer from 
this that the naïve notion of proof is not decidable invokes the 
indispensability of consistency, which is exactly what Wittgenstein and the 
paraconsistent argument call into question...for as Victor Rodych has 
forcefully argued, the consistency of the relevant system is precisely what is 
called into question by Wittgenstein’s reasoning.” And so: “Therefore the 
Inconsistent arithmetic avoids Godel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. It also 
avoids the Second Theorem in the sense that its non-triviality can be 
established within the theory: and Tarski’s Theorem too—including its own 
predicate is not a problem for an inconsistent theory” [As Graham Priest 
noted over 20 years ago]. 
 
This brings to mind W’s famous comment. 
 
“What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy, but 
it is its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to 
say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy 
of mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.” PI 234 
 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, 
which rests on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have 
in common with language. And this is not just a remote historical issue but is 
totally current. I have read much of Chaitin and never seen a hint that he has 
considered these matters.  The work of Douglas Hofstadter also comes to 
mind. His Godel, Escher, Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National Book 
Award for Science, sold millions of copies and continues to get good reviews 
(e.g. almost 400 mostly 5 star reviews on Amazon to date) but he has no clue 
about the real issues and repeats the classical philosophical mistakes on 
nearly every page. His subsequent philosophical writings have not improved 
(he has chosen Dennett as his muse), but, as these views are vacuous and 
unconnected to real life, he continues to do excellent science. 
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Once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have 
meaning in specific human contexts— that is, as Searle has emphasized, they 
are all observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe 
apart from our psychology is neither finite nor infinite and cannot compute 
nor process anything. Only in our language games do our laptop or the 
universe compute. 
 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem 
becomes a philosophical one-i.e., one of how language can be used 
intelligibly. Virtually all scientists and most philosophers, do not get that 
there are two distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions” (both families of 
Language Games). There are those that are matters of fact about how the 
world is—that is, they are publicly observable propositional (True or False ) 
states of affairs having clear meanings (COS)—i.e., scientific statements, and 
then there are those that are issues about how language can coherently be 
used to describe these states of affairs, and these can be answered by any sane, 
intelligent, literate person with little or no resort to the facts of science, though 
of course there are borderline cases where we have to decide. Another poorly 
understood but critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, 
inferring, understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of 
a true or false statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our 
slow, conscious System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are 
entangled, the star shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part 
that involves seeing that the symbols are used correctly in each line of the 
proof), is always made by the fast, automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via 
seeing, hearing, touching etc. in which there is no information processing, no 
representation (i.e., no COS) and no decisions in the sense in which these 
happen in S2 ( which receives its inputs from S1). 
 
This two systems approach is now a standard way to view reasoning or 
rationality and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, of which 
science and math are special cases. There is a huge and rapidly growing 
literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of behavior or 
science. A recent book that digs into the details of how we actually reason 
(i.e., use language to carry out actions—see W and S) is ‘Human Reasoning 
and Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008), which, in 
spite of its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of W/S and the broad 
structure of intentional psychology), is (as of early 2015) the best single source 
I know. There are endless books and papers on reasoning, decision theory, 
game theory etc. and many variants of and some alternativesto the two 
systems framework, but I am one of a rapidly increasing number who find 
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the simple S1/S2 framework the best one for most situations. The best recent 
book on reason from the dual systems approach is Dual-Process Theories of 
the Social Mind (2014) edited by Sherman et al. and Manktelow et al ‘The 
Science of Reason’ (2011) is also indispensable. 
 
What is only now coming to the fore, after millennia of discussion of 
reasoning in philosophy, psychology, logic, math, economics, sociology etc., 
is the study of the actual way in which we use words like and, but, or, means, 
signifies, implies, not, and above all ‘if’ (the conditional being the subject of 
over 50 papers and a book (‘IF’) by Evans, one of the leading researchers in 
this arena. Of course, Wittgenstein understood the basic issues here, likely 
better than anyone to this day, and laid out the facts beginning most clearly 
with the Blue and Brown Books starting in the 30’s and ending with the 
superb ‘On Certainty’ (which can be viewed as a dissertation on how the two 
systems work), but sadly most students of behavior don’t have a clue about 
his work. 
 
Yanofsky’s book (The Outer Limits of Reason) is an extended treatment of 
these issues, but with little philosophical insight. He says math is free of 
contradictions, yet as noted, it has been well known for over half a century 
that logic and math are full of them—just google inconsistency in math or 
search it on Amazon or see the works of Priest, Berto or the article by Weber 
in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. W was the first to predict 
inconsistency or paraconsistency, and if we follow Berto we can interpret this 
as W’s suggestion to avoid incompleteness. In any event, paraconsistency is 
now a common feature and a major research program in geometry, set theory, 
arithmetic, analysis, logic and computer science. Y on p346 says reason must 
be free of contradictions, but it is clear that “free of” has different uses and 
they arise frequently in everyday life but we have innate mechanisms to 
contain them. This is true because it was the case in our everyday life long 
before math and science. Until very recently only W saw that it was 
unavoidable that our life and all our symbolic systems are paraconsistent and 
that we get along just fine as we have mechanisms for encapsulating or 
avoiding it. W tried to explain this to Turing in his lectures on the foundations 
of mathematics, given at Cambridge at the same time as Turing’s course on 
the same topic. 
 
Now I will make a few comments on specific items in the book. As noted on 
p13, Rice’s Theorem shows the impossibility of a universal antivirus for 
computers (and perhaps for living organisms as well) and so is, like Turing’s 
Halting theorem, another alternative statement of Godel’s Theorems, but 
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unlike Turing’s, it is rarely mentioned. 
 
On p33 the discussion of the relation of compressibility, structure, 
randomness etc. is much better stated in Chaitin’s many other books and 
papers. Also of fundamental importance is the comment by Weyl on the fact 
that one can ‘prove’ or ‘derive’ anything from anything else if one permits 
arbitrarily ‘complex’ ‘equations’ (with arbitrary ‘constants’) but there is little 
awareness of this among scientists or philosophers. As W said we need to 
look at the role which any statement, equation, logical or mathematical proof 
plays in our life in order to discern its meaning since there is no limit on what 
we can write, say or ‘prove’, but only a tiny subset of these has a use. ‘Chaos’, 
‘complexity’, ‘law’, ‘structure’, ‘theorem’, ‘equation’, ‘proof’, ‘result’, 
‘randomness’, ‘compressibility’ etc.are all families of language games with 
meanings (COS) that vary greatly, and one must look at their precise role in 
the given context. This is rarely done in any systematic deliberate way, with 
disastrous results. As Searle notes repeatedly, these words have intrinsic 
intentionality only relevant to human action and quite different (ascribed) 
meanings otherwise. It is only ascribed intentionality derived from our 
psychology when we say that a thermometer ‘tells’ the temperature or a 
computer is ‘computing’ or an equation is a ‘proof’. 
 
 
As is typical in scientific discussion of these topics, the comments on p36 (on 
omega and quasi-empirical mathematics) and in much of the book cross the 
line between science and philosophy. Although there is a large literature on 
the philosophy of mathematics, so far asI know, there is still no better analysis 
than that of W’s, not only in his comments published as ‘Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics’ and ‘Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics’, but throughout the 20,000 pages of his nachlass (awaiting a 
new edition on CDROM). Math, like logic, language, art, artefacts and music 
only have a meaning (use or COS in a context) when connected to life by 
words or practices. 
 
Likewise, on p54 et seq. it was W who has given us the first and best rationale 
for paraconsistency, long before anyone actually worked out a paraconsistent 
logic. Again, it is critical to be aware that not everything is a ‘problem’, 
‘question’, ‘answer’, ‘proof’ or a ‘solution’ in the same sense and accepting 
something as one or the other commits one to an often confused point of view. 
In the discussion of physics on p108-9 we must remind ourselves that ‘point’, 
‘energy’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘infinite’, ‘beginning’, ‘end’, ‘particle’, ’wave’, 
‘quantum’ etc. are all typical language games that seduce us into incoherent 
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views of how things are by applying meanings (COS) from one game to a 
quite different one. 
 
So, this book is a flawed diamond with much value and I hope the authors 
are able to revise and enlarge it. It makes the nearly universal and fatal 
mistake of regarding science, especially mathematics, logic and physics, as 
though they were systems—i.e., domains where “number”, “space”, “time”, 
“proof”, “event”, “point”, “occurs”, “force”, “formula” etc. can be used 
throughout its “processes” and “states” without changes in meaning—i.e., 
without altering the Conditions of Satisfaction, which are publicly observable 
tests of truth or falsity. And when it’s an almost insuperable problem for such 
truly clever and experienced people as the authors, what chance do the rest 
of us have? Let us recall W’s comment on this fatal mistake. 
 
“The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes 
and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall 
know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a 
particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of 
what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in 
the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought 
quite innocent.)” PI p308 
 
While writing this article I came upon Dennett’s infamous ‘damning with 
faint praise’ summary of W’s importance, which he was asked to write when 
Time Magazine, with amazing perspicacity, choose Wittgenstein as one of the 
100 most important people of the 20th century. As with his other writings, it 
shows his complete failure to grasp the nature of W’s work (i.e., of 
philosophy) and reminds me of another famous W comment that is pertinent 
here. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say--- is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. 
---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
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Chaitin is an American and his many books and articles are well known and 
easy to find, but Da Costa (who is 85) and Doria (75) are Brazilians and most 
of Da Costa’s work is only in Portuguese, but Doria has many items in 
English. You can find a partial bibliography for Doria here 
http://www.math.buffalo.edu/mad/PEEPS2/doria_franciscoA.html 
 
The best collections of their work are in Chaos, Computers, Games and Time: 
A quarter century of joint work with Newton da Costa by F. Doria 132p(2011), 
On the Foundations of Science by da Costa and Doria 294p(2008), and 
Metamathematics of science by da Costa and Doria 216p(1997), but they were 
published in Brazil and almost impossible to find. You will likely have to get 
them through interlibrary loan or as digital files from the authors. 
 
There is a nice Festschrift in honor of Newton C.A. Da Costa on the occasion 
of his seventieth birthday edited by Décio Krause, Steven French, Francisco 
Antonio Doria. (2000) which is an issue of Synthese (Dordrecht). Vol. 125, no. 
1-2 (2000), also published as a book, but the book is in only 5 libraries 
worldwide and not on Amazon. 
 
Another relevant item is New trends in the foundations of science : papers 
dedicated to the 80th birthday of Patrick Suppes, presented in Florianópolis, 
Brazil, April 22-23, 2002 by Jean-Yves Beziau; Décio Krause; Otávio Bueno; 
Newton C da Costa; Francisco Antonio Doria; Patrick Suppes; (2007), which 
is vol. 154 # 3 of Synthese, but again the book is in only 2 libraries and not on 
Amazon. 
 
Brazilian studies in philosophy and history of science: an account of recent 
works by Decio Krause; Anto ̂nio Augusto Passos Videira; has one article by 
each of them and is an expensive book but cheap on Kindle. Though it is a 
decade old, some may be interested in “Are the Foundations of Computer 
Science Logic-dependent?” by Carnielli and Doria, which says that Turing 
Machine Theory (TMT) can be seen as ‘arithmetic in disguise’, in particular 
as the theory of Diophantine Equations in which they formalize it, and 
conclude that ‘Axiomatized Computer Science is Logic-Dependent’. Of 
course, as Wittgensteinians, we want to look very carefully at the language 
games (or math games), i.e., the precise Conditions of Satisfaction 
(truthmakers) resulting from using each of these words (i.e., ‘axiomatized’, 
‘computer science’, and ‘logic- dependent’). Carnielli and Agudello also 
formalize TMT in terms of paraconsistent logic, creating a model for 
paraconsistent Turing Machines (PTM’s) which has similarities to quantum 
computing and so with a quantic interpretation of it they create a Quantum 
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Turing Machine model with which they solve the Deutsch and Deutsch-Jozsa 
problems. 
 
This permits contradictory instructions to be simultaneously executed and 
stored and each tape cell, when and if halting occurs, may have multiple 
symbols, each of which represents an output, thus permitting control of 
unicity versus multiplicity conditions, which simulate quantum algorithms, 
preserving efficiency. 
 
 
The articles, and especially the group discussion with Chaitin, Fredkin, 
Wolfram et al at the end of Zenil H. (ed.) ‘Randomness through computation’ 
(2011) is a stimulating continuation of many of the topics here, but again 
lacking awareness of the philosophical issues, and so often missing the point. 
Chaitin also contributes to ‘Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied 
Cognition’ (2010), replete with articles having the usual mixture of scientific 
insight and philosophical incoherence, and as usual nobody is aware that 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) provided deep and unsurpassed insights into the 
issues over half a century ago, including Embodied Cognition (Enactivism). 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
Finally, I would like to mention the work of physicist/philosopher Nancy 
Cartwright whose writings on the meaning of natural ‘laws’ and ‘causation’ 
are indispensable to anyone interested in these topics. 
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Wolpert, Chaitin and Wittgenstein on impossibility, 
incompleteness, the liar paradox, theism, the limits 
of computation, a non-quantum mechanical 
uncertainty principle and the universe as 
computer—the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine 
Theory 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the 
universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work 
of polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not 
found a single citation and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert 
proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 
2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general 
they are independent of the device doing the computation, and even 
independent of the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, 
and human behavior. They make use of Cantor's diagonalization, the liar 
paradox and worldlines to provide what may be the ultimate theorem in 
Turing Machine Theory, and seemingly provide insights into impossibility, 
incompleteness, the limits of computation, and the universe as computer, in 
all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms, generating, among other 
things, a non- quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and a proof of 
monotheism. There are obvious connections to the classic work of Chaitin, 
Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and to the notion that no program 
(and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with greater 
complexity than it possesses. One might say this body of work implies 
atheism since there cannot be any entity more complex than the physical 
universe and from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is 
meaningless (has no conditions of satisfaction, i.e., truth-maker or test). Even 
a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’with limitless time/space and energy) cannot determine 
whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’ nor can find a certain way to show that 
a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all these being complex 
language games) is part of a particular ‘system’. 
 
Those interested in more of my writings in their most recent versions may  
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I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the 
universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work 
of polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not 
found a single citation and so I present this very brief abstract. Wolpert 
proved some stunning impossibility or incompletenesstheorems (1992 to 
2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general 
they are independent of the device doing the computation, and even 
independent of the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, 
and human behavior, which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build 
a physical computer that can be assured of correctly processing information 
faster than the universe does. The results also mean that there cannot exist an 
infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there cannot be 
an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on 
systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. 
They also hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, 
with computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also 
published what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective 
intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific 
footing.  Although he has published various versions of these over two 
decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., 
Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news 
items in major science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have looked 
in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision theory and computation 
without finding areference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that almost nobody is aware of Wolpert, since his work 
can be seen as the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, 
incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in 
Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantors 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or 
mechanisms and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, 
but on cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by 
partitioning the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it 
does and not how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent 
of any particular physical laws or computational structures in establishing 
the physical limits of inference for past, present and future and all possible 
calculation, observation and control. He notes that even in a classical universe 
Laplace was wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or even 
perfectly depict the past or present) and that his impossibility results can be 
viewed as a “non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there 
cannot be an infallible observation or control device). Any universal physical 
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device must be infinite, it can only be so at one moment in time, and no reality 
can have more than one (the “monotheism theorem”). Since space and time 
do not appear in the definition, the device can even be the entire universe 
across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of incompleteness with 
two inference devices rather than one self-referential device. As he says, 
“either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of 
computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic 
information complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it that 
can be applicable throughout our universe.” Another way to say this is that 
one cannot have two physical inference devices (computers) both capable of 
being asked arbitrary questions about the output of the other, or that the 
universe cannot contain a computer to which one can pose any arbitrary 
computational task, or that for any pair of physical inference engines, there 
are always binary valued questions about the state of the universe that cannot 
even be posed to at least one of them. One cannot build a computer that can 
predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical system before it occurs, 
even if the condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it— 
that is, it cannot process information (though this is a vexed phrase, as many 
including John Searle and Rupert Read note) faster than the universe. 
 
 The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have 
to be physically coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, 
quantum mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of 
light. The inference device does not have to be spatially localized but can be 
nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe. He is well 
aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd 
etc., concerning the universe as computer or the limits of ”information 
processing”, in a new light (though the indices of their writings make no 
reference to him and another remarkable omission is that none of the above 
are mentioned by Yanofsky in his recent comprehensive book ‘The Outer 
Limits of Reason’ (see my review). Wolpert says he shows that ‘the universe’ 
cannot contain an inference device that can ‘process information’ as fast as it 
can, and since he shows you cannot have a perfect memory nor perfect 
control, its past, present or future state can never be perfectly or completely 
depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also proved that no 
combination of computers with error correcting codes can overcome these 
limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the observer (“the 
liar”) and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, math and 
language. As noted in my other articles I think that definitive comments on 
many relevant issues here (completeness, certainty, the nature of 
computation etc.) were made long ago by Ludwig Wittgenstein and here is 
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one relevant comment of Juliet Floyd on Wittgenstein:  
 
”He is articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The 
argument is thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to 
any purported listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely 
on any particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of 
signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is 
not essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be 
diagrammed and insofaras it is a logical argument, its logic may be 
represented formally). Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any 
particular formalism. Unlike Turing’s arguments, it explicitly invokes the 
notion of a language-game and applies to (and presupposes) an everyday 
conception of the notions of rules and of the humans who follow them. Every 
line in the diagonal presentation above is conceived as an instruction or 
command, analogous to an order given to a human being...”   The parallels to 
Wolpert are obvious. 
 
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only 
have meaning (i.e., are transitive (Wittgenstein) or have COS--Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle) in specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has 
emphasized, they are all observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically 
intentional. The universe apart from our psychology is neither finite nor 
infinite and cannot compute nor process anything. Only in our language 
games do our laptop or the universe compute. 
 
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert. Well known econometricians 
Koppl and Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has 
already crossed your mind” give three theorems on the limits to rationality, 
prediction and control in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the 
limits to computability to show some logical limits to forecasting the future. 
Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s 
incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as 
its social science analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the social 
implications. Since Godel’s theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem 
showing algorithmic randomness (incompleteness) throughout math (which 
is just another of our symbolic systems), it seems inescapable that thinking 
(behavior) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements and 
situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems 
evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be 
regarded as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says 
this ‘randomness’ (again a group of Language Games in Wittgenstein’s terms) 
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shows there are limitless theorems that are true but unprovable—i.e., true for 
no reason. One should then be able to say that there are limitless statements 
that make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe actual situations 
attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers 
W’s views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the 
whole of his work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme 
context sensitivity of language, math and logic, and the recent papers of 
Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks 
on the foundations of mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian 
(probabilistic) forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the 
impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents 
knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these theorems 
can be seen as versions of the liar paradox, and the fact that we are caught in 
impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves has 
been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again 
we have circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. 
K&R conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the product of something 
other than calculative rationality”. 
 
Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of 
papers and hundreds of books. And this seemingly abstruse work of 
Wolpert’s may have implications for all rationality. Of course, one must keep 
in mind that (as Wittgenstein noted) math and logic are all syntax and no 
semantics and they have nothing to tell us until connected to our life by 
language (i.e., by psychology) and so it is easy to do this in ways that are 
useful (meaningful or having COS) or not (no clear COS). 
 
Finally, one might say that many of Wolpert’s comments are restatements of 
the idea that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or 
device) with greater complexity than it possesses. There are obvious 
connections to the classic work of Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and 
Wittgenstein and to the notion that no program (and thus no device) can 
generate a sequence (or device) with greater complexity than it possesses. 
One might say this body of work implies atheism since there cannot be any 
entity more complex than the physical universe and from the Wittgensteinian 
viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (has no conditions of satisfaction, 
i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’ with limitless time/space 
and energy) cannot determine whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’ nor can 
find a certain way to show that a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or 
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‘device’ (all these being complex language games) is part of a particular 
‘system’. 
 305  
Review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson 
Yanofsky 403p (2013)  
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I give a detailed review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky 
from a unified perspective of Wittgenstein and evolutionary psychology. I 
indicate that the difficulty with such issues as paradox in language and math, 
incompleteness, undecidability, computability, the brain and the universe as 
computers etc., all arise from the failure to look carefully at our use of 
language in the appropriate context and hence the failure to separate issues 
of scientific fact from issues of how language works. I discuss Wittgenstein's 
views on incompleteness, paraconsistency and undecidability and the work 
of Wolpert on the limits to computation. To sum it up: The Universe 
According to Brooklyn---Good Science, Not So Good Philosophy. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my art The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
Alvy's Mom responding to his being depressed because the universe is 
expanding — “What has the universe got to do with it? You're here in 
Brooklyn! Brooklyn is not expanding!” 
 
This famous Woody Allen joke makes a profound point about the context 
sensitivity of language that applies throughout philosophy and science. It’s 
funny because it is obvious that the meaning of “expanding” in the two cases 
is quite different. Brooklyn might expand if the population increases or the 
city annexes outlying land, but the universe is said to expand due to cosmic 
telescopes that show a red shift indicating that stars are receding from each 
other or to measurements of matter density etc. Different meanings (language 
games) (LG’s) were famously characterized by the Austrian-English 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) as the central problem of philosophy 
and shown to be a universal default of our psychology. Though he did this 
beginning with the Blue and Brown Books (BBB) in the early 30’s, left a 20,000 
 306  
page nachlass, and is the most widely discussed philosopher of modern 
times, few understand him. 
 
To Yanofsky’s (Y’s) credit, he has given much attention to philosophy and 
even quotes W a few times but without any real grasp of the issues. It is the 
norm among scientists and philosophers to mix the scientific questions of fact 
with the philosophical questions of how language is being used and, as W 
noted, — ‘Problem and answer pass one another by’. Yanofsky (a Brooklyn 
resident like many of his friends and teachers) has read widely and does a 
good job of surveying the bleeding edges of physics, mathematics and 
computer science in a clear and authoritative manner, but when we come to 
the limits of scientific explanation and it’s not clear what to say, we turn to 
philosophy. 
 
Philosophy can be seen as the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
or as the study of the contextual variations of language used to describe 
cognition or intentionality (my characterizations), or the study of the logical 
structure of rationality(LSR)(Searle). Regarding LSR, Berkeley philosopher 
John Searle (S) is one of the best since W and his work can be seen as an 
extension of W.  I have reviewed many books by them and others and 
together these reviews constitute a skeletal outline of higher order thought or 
intentionality, and so of the foundations of science. 
 
Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may 
download from this site my e-book ‘Language Games of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science and Religion - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by 
Michael Starks First Ed. 648p (2016). 
 
 
It is common for books to betray their limitations in their titles and that is the 
case here. “Reason” and “limits” are complexes of language games. So I 
should stop here and spend the whole review showing how Y’s title reveals 
the deep misunderstanding of what the real issues are. I knew we were in for 
a rough time by p5 where we are told that our normal conceptions of time, 
space etc., are mistaken and this was known even to the Greeks. This brings 
to mind W: “People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really 
progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as 
were the Greeks… at something which no explanation seems capable of 
clearing up…And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, 
because in so far as people think they can see the ‘limits of human 
understanding’, they believe of course that they can see beyond these. - CV 
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(1931)” and also "The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to 
describe a fact which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without 
simply repeating the sentence…” So, I would say we just have to analyze the 
different types of language games. Looking deeper is essential but 
surrendering our prior use is incoherent. 
 
Think about what is implied by “The Outer Limits of Reason”. “Outer”, 
“Limits” and “Reason” all have common uses, but they are frequently used 
by Y in different ways, and they will seem “quite innocent”, but this can only 
be discussed in some specific context. 
 
We are using the word “question” (or “assertion”, “statement” etc.) with 
utterly different senses if we ask “Does 777 occur in the decimal expansion of 
Pi?” than if we ask “Does 777 occur in the first 1000 digits of the decimal 
expansion of Pi? (W)” In the latter case it’s clear what counts as a true or false 
answer but in the former it has only the form of a question. On p10 we find a 
group of “statements” which have quite different meanings. The first three 
are definitions and one could understand them without knowing any facts 
about their use—e.g., X cannot be Y and not Y. 
 
Y recommends the documentary “Into the Infinite” but actually it cannot be 
viewed unless you are in the UK. I found it free on the net shortly after it came 
out and was greatly disappointed. Among other things it suggests Godel and 
Cantor went mad due to working on problems of infinity—for which there is 
not a shred of evidence— and it spends much time with Chaitin, who, though 
a superb mathematician, has only a hazy notion about the various 
philosophical issues discussed here. If you want a lovely whirlwind “deep 
science” documentary I suggest “Are We Real?” on Youtube, though it makes 
some of the same mistakes. 
 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem 
becomes a philosophical one-i.e., one of how language can be used 
intelligibly. Yanofsky, like virtually all scientists and most philosophers, does 
not get that there are two distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions” (i.e., 
Language Games or LG’s) here. There are those that are matters of fact about 
how the world is—that is, they are publicly observable propositional (True or 
False) states of affairs having clear meanings (Conditions of Satisfaction --
COS) in Searle’s terminology—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are 
those that are issues about how language can coherently be used to describe 
these states of affairs, and these can be answered by any sane, intelligent, 
literate person with little or no resort to the facts of science. Another poorly 
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understood but critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, 
inferring, understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of 
a true or false statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our 
slow, conscious System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are 
entangled, the star shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part 
that involves seeing that the symbols are used correctly in each line of the 
proof), is always made by the fast, automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via 
seeing, hearing, touching etc. in which there is no information processing, no 
representation (i.e., no COS) and no decisions in the sense in which these 
happen in S2 ( which receives its inputs from S1). This two systems approach 
is now the standard way to view reasoning or rationality and is a crucial 
heuristic in the description of behavior, of which science, math and 
philosophy are special cases. There is a huge and rapidly growing literature 
on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of behavior or science. A 
recent book that digs into the details of how we actually reason (i.e., use 
language to carry out actions—see W and S) is ‘Human Reasoning and 
Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008), which, in spite of 
its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of W/S and the broad structure of 
intentional psychology), is (as of mid 2016) the best single source I know. 
 
Regarding “incompleteness” or “randomness” in math, Y’s failure to mention 
the work of Gregory Chaitin is truly amazing, as he must know of his work, 
and Chaitin’s proof of the algorithmic randomness of math (of whichGodel’s 
results are a corollary) and the Omega number are some of the most famous 
mathematical results in the last 50 years. 
 
Likewise, one sees nothing about unconventional computing such as those 
with membranes, DNA etc., that have no logic gates and follow the biological 
patterns of “information processing”. The best way to get free articles on the 
cutting edge is to visit ArXiv.org, viXra.org, academia.edu, 
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, researchgate.net, or philpapers.org where there are tens 
of thousands of free preprints on every topic here (be warned this may use 
up all your spare time for the rest of your life!). 
 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed 
in symbolic systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” 
and full of tasks or situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible 
(i.e., they have no solution-see below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems 
unavoidable that everything derived from it—e.g. physics and math) will be 
“incomplete” also. Afaik the first of these in what is now called Social Choice 
Theory or Decision Theory (which are continuous with the study of logic and 
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reasoning and philosophy) was the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow 63 
years ago, and there have been many since. Y notes a recent impossibility or 
incompleteness proof in two-person game theory. In these cases, a proof 
shows that what looks like a simple choice stated in plain English has no 
solution. 
 
Although one cannot write a book about everything, I would have liked Y to 
at least mention such famous “paradoxes” as Sleeping Beauty (dissolved by 
Read), Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and Doomsday, where 
what seems to be a very simple problem either has no one clear answer, or it 
proves exceptionally hard to find one. A mountain of literature exists on 
Godel’s two “incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more recent work, but 
I think that W’s writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. Although Shanker, 
Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and others have done 
insightful work, it is only recently that W’s uniquely penetrating analysis of 
the language games being played in mathematics have been clarified by 
Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a Variation on Cantor and 
Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Reasons , and 
‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes Paraconsistent Sense’ and the book 
‘There’s Something about Godel ‘, and Rodych ( e.g., Wittgenstein and Godel: 
the Newly Published Remarks’, ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments 
about Wittgenstein’, ‘New Remarks by Wittgenstein’ and his article in the 
online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Mathematics’ ). Berto is one of the best recent philosophers, and those with 
time might wish to consult his many other articles and books including the 
volume he co-edited on paraconsistency (2013). Rodych’s work is 
indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are free online with the 
usual search but of course it’s all free online if one knows where to look. 
 
Berto notes that W also denied the coherence of metamathematics--i.e., the 
use by Godel of a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for 
his “notorious” interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we 
accept his argument, I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of 
metalanguages, metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that such 
concepts (words) as metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted by 
millions (and even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to 
reveal fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple 
misunderstandings about how language works? Isn’t the proof in this 
pudding that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and 
will as illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no 
practical impact whatsoever? Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this 
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framework, it is not possible that the very same sentence…turns out to be 
expressible, but undecidable, in a formal system… and demonstrably true 
(under the aforementioned consistency hypothesis) in a different system (the 
meta-system). If, as Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes the very 
meaning of the proved sentence, then it is not possible for the same sentence 
(that is, for a sentence with the same meaning) to be undecidable in a formal 
system, but decided in a different system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein 
had to reject both the idea that a formal system can be syntactically 
incomplete, and the Platonic consequence that no formal system proving only 
arithmetical truths can prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the 
meaning of arithmetical sentences, then there cannot be incomplete systems, 
just as there cannot be incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent 
arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are 
nowadays a reality. What is more important, the theoretical features of such 
theories match precisely with some of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian 
intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from Godel’s First 
Theorem, and from Church’s undecidability result: there are, that is, 
demonstrably complete and decidable. They therefore fulfil precisely 
Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there cannot be mathematical 
problems that can be meaningfully formulated within the system, but which 
the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the decidability of 
paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein 
maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or 
our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as 
a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. 
“Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can 
say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. W 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems 
derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one 
applies a test. W often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual 
sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world 
applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it 
cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much 
wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ 
of PA it cannot be used in the real world either. As Rodych notes 
“…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus 
(i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra-systemic application in 
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a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring 
or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply 
our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, 
‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with 
‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with ‘Incompleteness’ this 
warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s 
account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus 
because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is 
meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other 
comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
 
As Rodych, Berto and Priest (another pioneer in paraconsistency) have noted, 
W was the first (by several decades) to insist on the unavoidability and utility 
of inconsistency (and debated this issue with Turing during his classes on the 
Foundations of Mathematics). We now see that the disparaging comments 
about W’s remarks on math made by Godel, Kreisel, Dummett and many 
others were misconceived. As usual, it is a very bad idea to bet against W. 
Some may feel we have strayed off the path here—after all in “The Limits of 
Reason” we only want to understand science and math and why these 
paradoxes and inconsistencies arise and how to dispose of them. But I claim 
that is exactly what I have done by pointing to the work of W and his 
intellectual heirs. Our symbolic systems (language, math, logic, computation) 
have a clear use in the narrow confines of everyday life, of what we can 
loosely call the mesoscopic realm-- the space and time of normal events we 
can observe unaided and with certainty (the innate axiomatic bedrock or 
background). But we leave coherence behind when we enter the realms of 
particle physics or the cosmos, relativity, math beyond simple addition and 
subtraction with whole numbers, and language used out of the immediate 
context of everyday events. The words or whole sentences may be the same, 
but the meaning is lost. It looks to me like the best way to understand 
philosophy is enter it via Berto, Rodych and Floyd’s work on W, so as to 
understand the subtleties of language as it is used in math and thereafter 
“metaphysical” issues of all kinds may be dissolved. As Floyd notes “In a 
sense, Wittgenstein is literalizing Turing’s model, bringing it back down to 
the everyday and drawing out the anthropomorphic command-aspect of 
Turing’s metaphors.” 
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W pointed out how in math, we are caught in more LG’s (Language Games) 
where it is not clear what “true”, “complete”, “follows from”, “provable”, 
“number”, ”infinite”, etc. mean (i.e., what are their COS or truthmakers in 
THIS context), and hence what significance to attach to ‘incompleteness’ and 
likewise for Chaitin’s “algorithmic randomness”.  As W noted frequently, do 
the “inconsistencies” of math or the counterintuitive results of metaphysics 
cause any real problems in math, physics or life? The apparently more serious 
cases of contradictory statements –e.g., in set theory---have long been known 
but math goes on anyway. Likewise for the countless liar (self-referencing) 
paradoxes in language which Y discusses, but he does not really understand 
their basis, and fails to make clear that self-referencing is involved in the 
”incompleteness” and “inconsistency” (groups of complex LG’s) of 
mathematics as well. 
 
Another interesting work is “Godel’s Way” (2012) by Chaitin, Da Costa and 
Doria (see my review). In spite of its many failings—really a series of notes 
rather than a finished book—it is a unique source of the work of these three 
famous scholars who have been working at the bleeding edges of physics, 
math and philosophy for over half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by 
Wolpert (see below) since they wrote on universal computation and among 
his many accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer on paraconsistency.  
Chaitin also contributes to ‘Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied 
Cognition’ (2010), replete with articles having the usual mixture of insight 
and incoherence and as usual, nobody is aware that W can be regarded as the 
originator of the position current as Embodied Cognition or Enactivism. 
Many will find the articles and especially the group discussion with Chaitin, 
Fredkin, Wolfram et al at the end of Zenil H. (ed.) ‘Randomness through 
computation’ (2011) a stimulating continuation of many of the topics here, 
but lacking awareness of the philosophical issues and so mixing science (fact 
finding) with philosophy (language games). 
 
It is a constant struggle to keep in mind that different contexts mean different 
LG’s (meanings, COS) for “time”, “space”, “particle” “object”, ”inside”, 
“outside”, “next”, “simultaneous”, ”occur”, “happen”, “event” 
,”question”, “answer” ,“infinite”, “past”, “future”, “problem”, “logic”, 
“ontology”, “epistemology”, “solution”, “paradox”, “prove”, “strange”, 
“normal”, “experiment”, ”complete”, “uncountable”, “decidable”, 
“dimension”, “complete”, “formula”, “process”, “algorithm”, “axiom”, 
”mathematics”, “physics”, “cause”, “place”, “same”,“moving”, “limit”, 
“reason”, “still”, “real” “assumption”, “belief”, ‘know”, “event”, ”recursive”, 
“meta—“, “self- referential” “continue”, “particle”, “wave”,, “sentence” and 
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even (in some contexts) “and”, “or”, “also”, “add” , “divide”, “if…then”, 
“follows” etc. 
 
To paraphrase W, most of what people (including many philosophers and 
most scientists) have to say when philosophizing is not philosophy but its 
raw material. Yanofsky joins Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, 
Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. in repeating the mistakes of the Greeks 
with elegant philosophical jargon mixed with science. As antidotes, I suggest 
some my reviews and some Rupert Read such as his books ‘A Wittgensteinian 
Way with Paradoxes’ and ‘Wittgenstein Among the Sciences’, or go to 
academia.edu and get his articles , especially ‘Kripke’s Conjuring Trick’ and 
‘Against Time Slices’ and then as much of S as feasible, but at least his most 
recent such as ‘Philosophy in a New Century’, ‘Searle’s Philosophy and 
Chinese Philosophy’,‘Making the Social World’ and ‘Thinking About the Real 
World’ (or my reviews if time is short) and his forthcoming volume on 
perception. There are also over 100 youtubes of Searle which confirm his 
reputation as the best standup philosopher since Wittgenstein. 
 
Y does not make clear the major overlap that now exists (and is expanding 
rapidly) between game theorists, physicists, economists, mathematicians, 
philosophers, decision theorists and others, all of whom have been 
publishing for decades closely related proofs of undecidability, impossibility, 
uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more ‘bizarre’ (i.e., not so 
if we clarify the language games) is the recent proof by Armando Assis that 
in the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics one can setup a zero-
sum game between the universe and an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, 
from which follow the Born rule and the collapse of the wave function. Godel 
was first to demonstrate an impossibility result and (until Wolpert) it is the 
most far reaching (or just trivial/incoherent) but there have been an avalanche 
of others. As noted, one of the earliest in decision theory was the famous 
General Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 
(for which he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his 
students are now Nobel laureates so this is not fringe science). It states 
roughly that no reasonably consistent and fair voting system (i.e., no method 
of aggregating individuals’ preferences into group preferences) can give 
sensible results. The group is either dominated by one person and so GIT is 
often called the “dictator theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. 
Arrow’s original paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social 
Welfare" and can be stated like this:” It is impossible to formulate a social 
preference ordering that satisfies all of the following conditions: 
Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; Freedom From 
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Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those familiar with 
modern decision theory accept this and the many related constraining 
theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find it (and all these 
theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find a career path that has 
nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow Impossibility 
Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) among 
legions of publications. 
 
Y mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler 
(2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like 
all these impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind) 
which shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. 
One interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically 
just logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or 
beliefs that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually 
hold. “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s 
assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ (another LG) 
has been assumed in argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century 
at least, but they showed that it is impossible for Ann and Bob to assume these 
beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body of such impossibility results for 
1 or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., it grades into Arrow, Wolpert, 
Koppel and Rosser etc). For a good technical paper from among the avalanche 
on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from arXiv which 
takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title notes it is 
about “interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus to 
Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote Y’s paper 
“A universal approach to self-referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin 
of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386, 2003. Abramsky (a polymath who is among 
other things a pioneer in quantum computing) is a friend of Y’s and so Y 
contributes a paper to the recent Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, 
Games and Quantum Foundations’ (2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) 
commentary on the BK and related paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint 
lecture free on the net by Wes Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and 
Paradoxes about Knowledge and Belief’. For a good multi-author survey see 
’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some 
stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see 
arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of 
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the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human 
behavior, which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical 
computer that can be assured of correctly processing information faster than 
the universe does. The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, 
general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, 
general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that 
are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also 
hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” 
 
He also published what seems to be the first serious work on team or 
collective intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound 
scientific footing. Although he has published various versions of these over 
two decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals 
(e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten 
news items in major science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have 
looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision theory and 
computation without finding a reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of 
Wolpert, since his work is the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, 
inference, incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many 
proofs in Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantors 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or 
mechanisms and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, 
but on cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by 
partitioning the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it 
does and not how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent 
of any particular physical laws or computational structures in establishing 
the physical limits of inference for past, present and future and all possible 
calculation, observation and control. He notes that even in a classical universe 
Laplace was wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or even 
perfectly depict the past or present) and that his impossibility results can be 
viewed as a “non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there 
cannot be an infallible observation or control device). Any universal physical 
device must be infinite, it can only be so at one moment in time, and no reality 
can have more than one (the “monotheism theorem”). 
 
Since space and time do not appear in the definition, the device can even be 
the entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of 
incompleteness with two inference devices rather than one self-referential 
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device. As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a 
certain type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike 
algorithmic information complexity) in that there is one and only one version 
of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.” Another way to say this 
is that one cannot have two physical inference devices (computers) both 
capable of being asked arbitrary questions about the output of the other, or 
that the universe cannot contain a computer to which one can pose any 
arbitrary computational task, or that for any pair of physical inference 
engines, there are always binary valued questions about the state of the 
universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. One cannot build 
a computer that can predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical system 
before it occurs, even if the condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can 
be posed to it— that is, it cannot process information (though this is a vexed 
phrase as S and Read and others note) faster than the universe. The computer 
and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to be physically 
coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, quantum 
mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of light. The 
inference device does not have to be spatially localized but can be nonlocal 
dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe. He is well aware 
that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., 
concerning the universe as computer or the limits of ”information 
processing”, in a new light (though the indices of their writings make no 
reference to him and another remarkable omission is that none of the above 
are mentioned by Yanofsky either). 
 
Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot contain an inference device 
that can process information as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot 
have a perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can 
never be perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. 
He also proved that no combination of computers with error correcting codes 
can overcome these limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of 
the observer (“the liar”) and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of 
physics, math and language that concern Y. Again cf. Floyd on W: ”He is 
articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The 
argument is thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to 
any purported listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely 
on any particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of 
signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is 
not essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be 
diagrammed and insofar as it is a logical argument, its logic may be 
represented formally). Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any 
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particular formalism. [The parallels to Wolpert are obvious.] Unlike Turing’s 
arguments, it explicitly invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to 
(and presupposes) an everyday conception of the notions of rules and of the 
humans who follow them. Every line in the diagonal presentation above is 
conceived as an instruction or command, analogous to an order given to a 
human being...” 
 
W’s prescient grasp of these issues including his embrace of strict finitism and 
paraconsistency is finally spreading through math, logic and computer 
science (though rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has recently 
suggested the necessity of a Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. 
“Any mathematical theory presented in first order logic has a finite 
paraconsistent model.” Berto continues: “Of course strict finitism and the 
insistence on the decidability of any meaningful mathematical question go 
hand in hand. As Rodych has remarked, the intermediate Wittgenstein’s view 
is dominated by his ‘finitism and his view […] of mathematical 
meaningfulness as algorithmic decidability’ according to which ‘[only] finite 
logical sums and products (containing only decidable arithmetic predicates) 
are meaningful because they are algorithmically decidable.’” In modern 
terms this means they have public conditions of satisfaction-i.e., can be stated 
as a proposition that is true or false. And this brings us to W’s view that 
ultimately everything in math and logic rests on our innate (though of course 
extensible) ability to recognize a valid proof. Berto again: “Wittgenstein 
believed that the naïve (i.e., the working mathematicians) notion of proof had 
to be decidable, for lack of decidability meant to him simply lack of 
mathematical meaning: Wittgenstein believed that everything had to be 
decidable in mathematics…Of course one can speak against the decidability 
of the naïve notion of truth on the basis of Godel’s results themselves. But one 
may argue that, in the context, this would beg the question against 
paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein too. Both Wittgenstein and the 
paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the standard view on the 
other, agree on the following thesis: the decidability of the notion of proof 
and its inconsistency are incompatible. But to infer from this that the naïve 
notion of proof is not decidable invokes the indispensability of consistency, 
which is exactly what Wittgenstein and the paraconsistent argument call into 
question...for as Victor Rodych has forcefully argued, the consistency of the 
relevant system is precisely what is called into question by Wittgenstein’s 
reasoning.” And so: “Therefore the Inconsistent arithmetic avoids Godel’s 
First Incompleteness Theorem. It also avoids the Second Theorem in the sense 
that its non-triviality can be established within the theory: and Tarski’s 
Theorem too—including its own predicate is not a problem for an 
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inconsistent theory “[As Priest noted over 20 years ago]. Prof. Rodych thinks 
my comments reasonably represent his views, but notes that the issues are 
quite complex and there are many differences between he, Berto and Floyd. 
 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, 
which rests on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have 
in common with language. And this is not just a remote historical issue but is 
totally current. I have read much of Chaitin and never seen a hint that he has 
considered these matters. The work of Douglas Hofstadter also comes to 
mind. His Godel, Escher, Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National Book 
Award for Science, sold millions of copies and continues to get good reviews 
(e.g. almost 400 mostly 5 star reviews on Amazon to date) but he has no clue 
about the real issues and repeats the classical philosophical mistakes on 
nearly every page. His subsequent philosophical writings have not improved 
(he has chosen Dennett as his muse), but, as these views are vacuous and 
unconnected to real life, he continues to do excellent science. 
 
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only 
have meaning in specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has emphasized, 
they are all observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The 
universe apart from our psychology is neither finite nor infinite and cannot 
compute nor process anything. Only in our language games do our laptop or 
the universe compute. 
 
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert. Well known econometricians 
Koppl and Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has 
already crossed your mind” give three theorems on the limits to rationality, 
prediction and control in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the 
limits to computability to show some logical limits to forecasting the future. 
Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s 
incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as 
its social science analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the social 
implications. Since Godel’s are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing 
algorithmic randomness (incompleteness) throughout math (which is just 
another of our symbolic systems), it seems inescapable that thinking 
(behavior) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements and 
situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems 
evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be 
regarded as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says 
this ‘randomness’ (again a group of LG’s) shows there are limitless theorems 
that are true but unprovable—i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able 
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to say that there are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” 
sense that do not describe actual situations attainable in that domain. I 
suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s views. He wrote many 
notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his work concerns 
the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of language, 
math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best 
introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics 
and so to philosophy. 
 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian 
(probabilistic) forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the 
impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents 
knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these theorems 
can be seen as versions of the liar paradox and the fact that we are caught in 
impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves has 
been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again 
we have circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. 
K&R conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the product of something 
other than calculative rationality”. Bounded rationality is now a major field 
in itself, the subject of thousands of papers and hundreds of books. 
 
On p19 Yanofsky says math is free of contradictions, yet as noted, it has been 
well known for over half a century that logic and math are full of them—just 
google inconsistency in math or search it on Amazon or see the works of 
Priest, Berto or the article by Weber in the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. W was the first to predict inconsistency or paraconsistency, and 
if we follow Berto we can interpret this as W’s suggestion to avoid 
incompleteness. In any event, paraconsistency is now a common feature and 
a major research program in geometry, set theory, arithmetic, analysis, logic 
and computer science. Y returns to this issue other places such as on p346 
where he says reason must be free of contradictions, but it is clear that “free 
of” has different uses and they arise frequently in everyday life but we have 
innate mechanisms to contain them. This is true because it was the case in our 
everyday life long before math and science 
 
Regarding time travel (p49), I suggest Rupert Read’s “Against Time Slices” in 
his free online papers or “Time Travel-the very idea” in his book “A 
Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes.” 
 
Regarding the discussion of famous philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn on 
p248, those interested can see the work of Rupert Read and his colleagues, 
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most recently in his book “Wittgenstein Among the Sciences” and while 
there, you may make a start at eliminating the hard problem of consciousness 
by reading “Dissolving the hard problem of consciousness back into ordinary 
life” (or his earlier essay on this which is free on the net). 
 
It is in the last chapter “Beyond Reason” that philosophical failings are most 
acute as we return to the mistakes suggested by my comments on the title. 
Reasoning is another word for thinking, which is a disposition like knowing, 
understanding, judging etc. As Wittgenstein was the first to explain, these 
dispositional verbs describe propositions (sentences which can be true or 
false) and thus have what Searle calls Conditions of Satisfaction (COS). That 
is, there are public states of affairs that we recognize as showing their truth 
or falsity. “Beyond reason” would mean a sentence whose truth conditions 
are not clear and the reason would be that it does not have a clear context. It 
is a matter of fact if we have clear COS (i.e., meaning) but we just cannot make 
the observation--this is not beyond reason but beyond our ability to achieve, 
but it’s a philosophical (linguistic) matter if we don’t know the COS. “Are the 
mind and the universe computers?” sounds like it needs scientific or 
mathematical investigation, but it is only necessary to clarify the context in 
which this language will be used since these are ordinary and unproblematic 
terms and it is only their context which is puzzling. E.G, the “self-referential” 
paradoxes on p344 arise because the context and so the COS are unclear. 
 
On p140 we might note that 1936 was not actually “long” before computers 
since Zeus in Germany and Berry and Atanasoff in Iowa both made primitive 
machines in the 30’s, though these pioneers are quite unknown to many in 
the field. Some of Zeus’s are in the Deutsches Museum in Munich while the 
B & A machine was reconstructed from his design recently at Iowa State 
University where they worked. 
 
Wittgenstein discussed the philosophical aspects of computers some years 
before they existed. 
 
On p347, what we discovered about irrational numbers that gave them a 
meaning is that they can be given a use or clear COS in certain contexts and 
at the bottom of the page our “intuitions” about objects, places, times, length 
are not mistaken- rather we began using these words in new contexts where 
the COS of sentences in which they are used were utterly different. This may 
seem a small point to some but I suggest it is the whole point. Some “particle” 
which can “be in two places” at once is just not an object and/or is not “being 
in places” in the same sense as a soccer ball. 
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Regarding his reference on p366 to the famous experiments of Libet, which 
have been taken to show that acts occur before our awareness of them and 
hence negate will, this has been carefully debunked by many including Searle 
and Kihlstrom. 
 
It is noteworthy that on the last page of the book he comments on the fact that 
many of the basic words he uses do not have clear definitions but does not 
say that this is because it requires much of our innate psychology to provide 
meaning, and here again is the fundamental mistake of philosophy. “Limit” 
or “exist” has many uses but the important point is-- what is its use in this 
context. “Limit of reason” or “the world exists” do not (without further 
context) have a clear meaning (COS) but “speed limit on US 15” and “a life 
insurance policy exists for him” are perfectly clear. 
 
Regarding solipsism on p369, this and other classical philosophical ‘positions’ 
were shown by W to be incoherent. 
 
And finally, why exactly is it that quantum entanglement is more paradoxical 
than making a brain out of proteins and other goop and having it feel and see 
and remember and predict the future? 
 
Is it not just that the former is new and not directly present to our senses (i.e., 
we need subtle instruments to detect it) while animal nervous systems have 
been evolved to do the latter hundreds of millions of years ago and we find 
it natural since birth? I don’t see the hard problem of consciousness to be a 
problem at all, or if one insists then ok but it’s on all fours with endless others 
–why there is (or what exactly is) space, time, red, apples, pain, the universe, 
causes, effects, or anything at all. 
 
Overall an excellent book provided it is read with this review in mind.
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE RELIGIOUS DELUSION – A 
BENEVOLENT UNIVERSE WILL SAVE US 
 
 
 323  
Review of Religion Explained-- The Evolutionary 
Origins of Religious Thought by Pascal Boyer (2002) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
You can get a quick summary of this book on p 135 or 326. If you are not up 
to speed on evolutionary psychology you should first read one of the 
numerous recent texts with this term in the title. One of the best is "The 
Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology" by Buss, but it is big and expensive. 
Until about 15 years ago, ´explanations´ of behavior have not really been 
explanations of mental processes at all, but rather vague and largely useless 
descriptions of what people did and what they said, with no insight into why. 
We might say that people gather to commemorate an event, praise god, 
receive his (or her or their) blessings, etc, but none of this describes the 
relevant mental processes so we might say they are explanations in much the 
same way that it explains why an apple drops to the ground if we say its 
because we released it and it's heavy-there is no mechanism and no 
explanatory or predictive power. This book continues the elucidation of the 
genetic basis of human behavior which has been almost universally ignored 
and denied by academia, religion, politics and the public (see Pinker´s 
excellent book ``The Blank Slatè`). His statement (p3) that it is meaningless to 
ask if religion is genetic is mistaken as the percentage of variation due to 
genes and environment can be studied, just as they are for all other behaviors 
(see e.g., Pinker). The title should be "Preliminary Attempts to Explain Some 
Aspects of Primitive Religion" since he does not treat higher consciousness at 
all (e.g., satori, enlightenment etc.) which are by far the most interesting 
phenomena and the only part of religion of personal interest to intelligent, 
educated people in the 21st century. Reading this entire book, you would 
never guess such things exist. Likewise, for the immense field of drugs and 
religion. It lacks a framework for rationality and does not mention the dual 
systems of thought view which is now so productive. For these I suggest my 
own recent papers. Nevertheless, the book has much of interest and in spite 
of being dated is still worth reading. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my art The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
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may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
“God is dead and man is free” Nietzsche 
 
“This very body the Buddha, this very earth the lotus paradise” Osho 
 
´´I can well imagine a religion in which there are no doctrines, so that nothing 
is spoken. Clearly, then, the essence of religion can have nothing to do with 
what is sayable´´ Wittgenstein 
 
When this book appeared, it was a pioneering effort, but now there are 
endless discussions of this topic and so I will give a sufficiently detailed and 
accurate summary that only specialists will need to read it. You can get a 
quick summary of this book on p 135 or 326. If you are not up to speed on 
evolutionary psychology you should first read one of the numerous recent 
texts with this term in the title. The best are “The Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology” 2nd ed (2015) and The 5th ed. of Evolutionary Psychology by Buss, 
but they are big and expensive. 
 
Until about 15 years ago, ´explanations´´ of behavior have not really been 
explanations of mental processes at all, but rather vague and largely useless 
descriptions of what people did and what they said, with no insight into why. 
We might say that people gather to commemorate an event, praise god, 
receive their blessings, etc., but none of this describes the relevant mental 
processes so we might say they are explanations in much the same way that 
it explains why an apple drops to the ground if we say it’s because we 
released it and it’s heavy--there is no mechanism and no explanatory or 
predictive power. 
 
This book continues the elucidation of the genetic basis of human behavior 
which has been almost univerally ignored and denied by academia, religion, 
politics and the public (see Pinker´s excellent book ``The Blank Slate``). His 
statement (p3) that it is meaningless to ask if religion is genetic is mistaken as 
the percentage of variation due to genes and environment can be studied, just 
as they are for all other behaviors (see e.g., Pinker). 
 
The title should be ´´Preliminary Attempts to Explain Some Aspects of 
Primitive Religion´´ since he does not treat higher consciousness at all (e.g., 
satori, enlightenment etc.) which are by far the most interesting phenomena 
and the only part of religion of personal interest to intelligent, educated 
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people in the 21st century. Reading this entire book, you would never guess 
such things exist. Likewise, for the immense field of drugs and religion. How 
and why do entheogens trigger the inference engines and what role have they 
played in religion and life for the last million years? There is a huge mine of 
info on drugs and behavioral templates, but you won´t find even a clue here. 
You can start with the recent books ´´Entheogens and the Future of Religion” 
and ´´Buddhism and Psychedelics´´ or you can read my friend Alexander 
Shulgin’s amazing probing of the ´cognitive templates in PHIKAL and 
TIKAL, available, as almost everything now, free on the net. One of the most 
unusual of the drug probes is ketamine, described by many, most notably in 
“Journeys into the Bright World” by Altounian and Moore, Jansen in 
“Ketamine” and in probably the most detailed account of a single entheogenic 
drug by a single user in the last two chapters of John Lilly´s ´´The Scientist``. 
Lilly, almost single handedly the founder of dolphin research, was a 
generation or more ahead of nearly everyone on many topics and he also 
probed his own mind with LSD and isolation tanks. See his `Simulations of 
God`(1975)(and my review of it) for his speculations on Mind, God and Brain 
and more aspects of the spiritual and mental not touched upon by Boyer. Also 
for recent heroic self therapy with entheogens see ‘Xenolinguistics’ by 
Slattery and ‘DMT & My Occult Mind’ by Khan.  
 
There is also virtually nothing here about the relation between physical and 
mental states. The practice of the many forms of yoga was highly advanced 
thousands of years ago. Its primary aim was to trigger spiritual states with 
body energy and the reverse. There is an immense literature and hundreds of 
millions have practiced it. The best personal account I know of by a mystic 
detailing the interaction of the mental and physical via yoga is found in `The 
Knee of Listening` by Adi Da (see my review here). Interwoven with the 
spellbinding account of his spiritual progress are the details of his work with 
the shakti energy of yoga (e.g., p95-9, 214-21, 249,281-3, 439-40 of the 1995 
edition--preferable to the later ones). These few pages are worth more than a 
whole shelf of yoga books if you want to get to the heart of the mind/body 
relation in spirituality. 
 
Zen and other practices probe the brain´s templates with meditation and 
tricks. Boyer does not understand that the major religions (and countless 
minor ones) were started by persons who broke the mold—i.e., somehow 
blocked or evaded some templates to destroy much of the ego and to discover 
aspects of their mind normally hidden. It is not hard to see why full blown 
enlightenment is rare, as those who have it stop behaving like monkeys (i.e., 
fighting, deceiving, reproducing) and this would be heavily selected against. 
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One might say those who achieved it are the only ones who became fully 
human (i.e., Jesus, Adi Da, Mohammed, Buddha, Mahavira, Rumi, Osho and 
1000 or so others we know of). It seems Boyer has no personal experience with 
meditation, entheogens and higher consciousness (e.g., see pages 317, 320-
324) so he clearly does not treat all of religion. This is again evident (p32) 
when he says religion has no origin or clear explanation. Of course, this is 
true of the primitive religions he discusses, but Buddhism, Christianity, 
Islam, etc., have very clear origins and explanations in the enlightenment of 
Jesus, Buddha, Mohammed etc. He is mistaken (p308) in his belief that 
Eastern religion is mostly about ritual, rather than personal experience and 
inner states and that it got such ideas from Western philosophy (3000 years 
ago!). Amazingly, he rejects William James´s notion that religion is a result of 
the experiences of exceptional individuals that are subsequently degraded by 
the masses (p310). James is clearly right and Boyer is again, only thinking of 
primitive religion. Perhaps the best personal account of the various states of 
samadhi, enlightenment, etc. is Adi Da´s book--`The Knee of Listening` but 
by far the best source for personal accounts by an enlightened master are the 
numerous books, audios and videos by Osho, all free on the net. 
 
Witnessing one´s thoughts is one of the commonest techniques of beginning 
meditators in many different traditions. Further progress fuses the perceiver 
and perceived (all is one). One wonders how this relates to the templates—
do they enter consciousness, does spiritual change open new neural 
connections or close some? Cognitive psychology has barely started on this 
but is would be interesting to see PET or fMRI on an enlightened person or 
one in a samadhi state with good controls. Though he is right that many 
experiences are of some agent, advanced states have been described in a vast 
literature which shows they typically have no thoughts, no mind, no person, 
no god. This would seem to be the ultimate in decoupling templates in a 
functional person. 
 
For supernatural types of religious concepts to evolve and survive, they 
should belong to one of the basic ontological categories or templates (plant, 
tool, natural object, animal, person etc.) which the brain uses to organize 
perception and thought. These are commonly given counterintuitive 
properties such as prescience, telepathy, immortality, abilility to hear one’s 
words or read one’s thoughts, ability to heal or confer great power etc. Good 
supernatural concepts usually allow all inferences not specifically barred by 
the violation of intuition—i.e., a god will have all human properties but does 
not age or die. The huge number of religious concepts is contained in this 
short list of templates. It is the counterintuitive nature of the concepts that 
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makes them easy to remember and to transmit to others and this seems to by 
one reason why supernatural concepts are a central part of nearly all 
religions. Supernatural concepts interact with other types of templates such 
as intuitive psychology, intuitive physics, structure function and goal 
detection. If it activates physics, goal detection, intuitive psychology and 
intentional use then it will be a human-like being with superhuman 
properties. This is standard cognitive psychology and counterintuitive parts 
are added on for religious use. There is abundant evidence that brain areas 
that are activated when we do something are also activated when we see 
someone else doing a similar thing (mirror neurons). It is feasible that this is 
correlated with the need to join in and the satisfaction from participating in 
the rituals integral to society (sports, politics, music etc.) and religion. 
 
There is also evidence that seeing other people’s emotions activates the same 
areas as our own. Our theory of mind (i.e., of other people’s mental life-- 
intuitive psychology) seems not to be one inference engine, but the sum of 
many and, as more research is done, more modules will be discovered. 
Another critical feature of inference engines is that they often run in 
decoupled or imaginary mode while we consider the past or the future. This 
starts quite early as shown by the common presence of imaginary playmates 
in children, their ability to grasp stories and TV, and he notes that research 
seems to show that children who create playmates seem to be better at 
grasping other people’s mental states and emotions. The point in this context 
is that it seems quite natural to ascribe humanlike characteristics to spirits, 
ghosts, gods, etc. when there is no evidence at all for their actual presence. 
 
The innate inference engines are automatic as they have to be fast and not 
distract us. The mind was not evolved as an explanation machine and before 
the recent rise of science, nobody ever tried to explain why our foot moves 
when we walk, an apple falls to the ground, we get hungry or angry or why 
we experience or do anything. Only bizarre or cosmic occurrences like 
lightning or sunrise needed a cause. Our intuitive psychology and agency 
templates also prompted us to ascribe good and bad luck to some agent. 
Much of this may sound speculative but now that EP (evolutionary 
psychology) is a major paradigm, the evidence of such innate functions in 
early childhood and infancy is mounting rapidly. 
 
Supernatural agents (including deceased ancestors) are treated by intuitive 
psychology as intentional agents, by the social exchange system (a part of or 
variant on the cost/benefit systems) by the moral system as witnesses to moral 
actions, and by the person-file system as individuals. Since all these systems 
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can operate in decoupled mode, there is no need to consider whether these 
agents really exist. They are driven by relevance, by the richness of inferences 
that result and by the ease with which they can be remembered and 
communicated. The templates are highly tuned to gather info, get 
cooperation and calculate benefits in a very rapid, subconscious and normally 
error-free way, while conscious reason is slow and fallible. In modern times, 
the ego has time to waste on debate, explanation, and interpretation in 
endless attempts to deceive and manipulate others for personal gain. With 
large, mobile populations and fast communication the results of our social 
exchange, evaluation of trust, cheater detection and other templates are often 
useless and self-destructive. Strategic info (that which passes the relevance 
filters) activates the engines related to social interaction and our knowledge 
of what info others have is a critical part of the social mind. The supernatural 
agents typically have perfect knowledge. Though he does not seem to 
mention it, powerful people often come to have some of the characteristics of 
supernatural agents and so people will start to respond to them as to gods. 
Aliens, UFO´s, new age mysticism, astrology, fantasy and sci-fi draw great 
attention due to activation, and often possess agents with strategic info. 
However, hundreds of millions have followed charismatic leaders with false 
strategic info (i.e., quasi-supernatural agents) to their deaths (The Branch 
Davidians of Waco, Communism, Nazism, Vietnam, Jonestown, George 
Bush, Comet Kahoutek etc.). 
 
Social interactions require a social mind—i.e., mental systems that organize 
them. Like most behavior, it is only recently that it was generally realized that 
we needed built-in mechanisms to do this. Strategic information is whatever 
activates the social mind. Our theory of mind tells us to what agents this info 
is also available. It is common to attribute to supernatural agents the ability 
to fully access info that would normally be partly or totally unavailable to 
others. 
 
All the engines must have some kind of relevance filter so that they are not 
constantly activated by trivia. We have taxonomies that tell us how to group 
things in ways relevant to their behavior or properties in the world. We 
expect large catlike things with big teeth and claws to be predators and not 
herbivores. Spirits fit human taxonomy and automatically have needs and 
desires, likes and dislikes and will thus give rewards and punishments and 
all any culture has to do is specify what these are. Those concepts giving the 
richest inferences with the least effort will survive. 
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A common viewpoint is given by relevance theory, which tries to determine 
how and why some concepts are more easily transmitted. Presumably, 
concepts which trigger engines more intensely or frequently, or more 
different engines, will be superior. So, we may have many concepts that are 
easier to remember and apply, rather than because they make sense or are 
useful in some way. This may help to explain the existence of many concepts 
or practices that seem arbitrary or stupid or which make life more difficult 
and applies to all of culture, not just to religion. 
 
Nearly all religions have full access agents—i.e., they know all or nearly all 
about us and Boyer distinguishes 3 classes--divine brutes with little or no 
access but which nevertheless have power, Aquinas agents which know 
everything and full strategic agents which have access to all the strategic or 
important info. He says that this may account for our interest in knowing 
other person’s religious ideas or in converting them to ours. Only in this way 
can we understand how they may behave and interact. 
 
Agents that are aware of and able to affect our social interaction are richer in 
inferences, and so are easier to mentally represent and remember and thus 
enjoy a great advantage in cultural transmission. Thus, we can now say that 
religion does not create or even support morality, but that our built in moral 
intuitions make religion plausible and useful.   Likewise, our mechanisms to 
explain good and bad luck makes their connection with supernatural agents 
simple. And since we share our moral system and our information with them, 
it is natural to expect they will enforce our attitudes. 
 
Altruism and cheating are central parts of human behavior. To show 
passionate feelings and honesty that are genuine (difficult to fake) is of great 
social (and genetic) value. This can be reinforced by religion as one would 
choose to cooperate with such persons rather than with rational calculators 
who may change their mind or cheat anytime their inference engines 
calculate that it is in their best interests. This system also requires that cheaters 
be punished, even when the cheating has minimal social cost. One common 
group of religious concepts are those that make cheating immoral. The 
mechanism is feelings (e.g., anger, jealousy, resentment, confusion) rather 
thanrational cogitation. We feel that it is wrong for someone to steal another’s 
money rather than needing to sit down and think--well if he takes that money, 
then maybe he will take mine or he will have some future advantage over me 
etc. Perhaps here is one place that guilt enters in order to make the socially 
(genetically) destructive practice of cheating less appealing. This takes us into 
the huge literature on cheaters and cooperators, hawks and doves and 
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pretenders and into reciprocal altruism and game theory. 
 
Many types of commitment gadgets have evolved which tend to ensure 
cooperation--keeping track of reputation, legal or quasi-legal binds 
(contracts), strong passions, compulsive honesty, resentment and need to 
punish cheaters. Cooperation gadgets are built in also--moral intuitions, guilt, 
pride, gratefulness, hostility. In contrast to the nearly universal idea that 
moral realism (that behavior itself has a specific moral value that does not 
depend on one’s viewpoint) is only developed by adults or is given by 
religion, it is now clear that this appears in 3 and 4 year olds and changes little 
with age. Methods have now been developed to study infants and in late 2007 
a study appeared in Nature which showed that they can distinguish helper 
from non- helper objects. But intuitive morality will often give the wrong 
results for adults in the modern world. 
 
Most of the basics of what has formerly been regarded as culture, is now 
known or suspected to be inherited. Pinker lists hundreds of different aspects 
of human societies that are universal and thus good candidates. One can 
compile a very long list of religious concepts that we don´t need to be taught-
--spirits understand human thoughts, emotions and intentions and 
differentiate between wishes or images and reality etc. 
 
It seems that the only feature of humans that is always projected onto gods, 
spirits, ghosts, etc, is a mind much like our own. Intuitive psychology applies 
to intentional agents in general (i.e., persons, animals and anything that 
appears to move in pursuit of its own goals). Intuitive physics is probably 
also composed of many subsegments and must be connected with the 
intentionality module –e.g., when a lion is chasing an antelope, we know that 
if it changes course, the lion will probably do so. One would expect that 
detecting such agents was a very ancient evolutionary priority and even 500 
million years ago a trilobite that lacked such genes would soon be lunch. 
When the genes are mapped we can expect to find similar ones in fruitflies, 
just as we have for other genes such as the ones controlling body 
segmentation and immunity. 
 
Like our other concepts, religious ones are often vague and their use 
idiosyncratic due to the fact that they result from the unconscious functioning 
of inference engines. We cannot say precisely even what simple words mean, 
but we know how to use them. Just as Chomsky discovered depth grammar, 
one might say that Wittgenstein   discovered depth semantics. 
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Wittgenstein was the first (and still one of the few) who understood that what 
philosophy (and all attempts to understand behavior) was struggling with 
was these built-in functions that are inaccessible to conscious thought. 
Though I have never seen it stated, it seems reasonable to regard him as a 
pioneer in cognitive and evolutionary psychology. 
 
Boyer takes a new view of death also. Corpses have properties that make 
supernatural concepts relevant apart from our need for comfort and this part 
of religion may be less about death than about dead bodies. They produce a 
dissociation between the animacy, intuitive psychology and person file 
systems. We see such dissociation in autism and odd neurological states such 
as Capgras syndrome. 
 
He sees this as another way that culture makes use of salient gadgets (events, 
objects etc.) which are highly relevant and grab the attention of the inference 
engines. And since this book appeared, evidence continues to accumulate that 
genes create culture to a much greater extent than most people (including 
scholars) ever imagined. 
 
Nobody ever thinks to inquire as to the motives if a rock that falls and hits us, 
but we always do if it comes from the hand of a person. Even a very young 
child knows this, due to its intuitive psychology, agency, animism and other 
engines. These engines must, in their orginal forms, be hundreds of millions 
of years old. A carboniferous dragonfly differentiated between animate and 
inanimate objects and calculated the trajectory of its prey. 
 
Religion originally worked in an atmosphere of perpetual fear. Inference 
engines evolved to find mates and food and shelter and avoid death, hence 
the approach to the gods as a powerless supplicant and the use of 
appeasement rituals and offerings (as we would to a person). Our danger 
avoidance is highly imperfect in the modern world due to guns, drugs and 
fast transport (cars, skis). Everywhere in the world you can see people 
walking in the streets just a step away from speeding vehicles, even though 
at least a million a year are run down. 
 
He says (p40) that memes (Dawkins famous cultural analog of the gene) are 
not a very good concept for cultural transmission since ideas are changed by 
each person, while genes remain the same. However, what about media—i.e., 
film, TV, print, email?  They replicate more precisely than genes. These are 
now the prime means for transmitting and checking the validity of memes, 
not just what someone says. In any case, genes are not perfect either. Just as 
 332  
there is a phenotype corresponding to the geneotype, there is a phene 
corresponding to the meme. 
 
Why do we invoke supernatural agents for good and bad luck? They activate 
our social exchange systems and since we regard them as having strategic 
info they can control what happens. 
 
It occurs to me that perhaps there is such great opposition to genetic 
explanations for behavior because people feel anyone who accepts this will 
automatically reject the social exchange and other templates and will always 
cheat. Or perhaps they fear the intuitive psychology will no longer work. 
 
Social rituals are examples of what psychologists have termed precautionary 
rules and these commonly include concerns about pollution, purification 
rituals (activation of the contagion system), contact avoidance, special types 
of touching, special attention to boundaries and thresholds, rule violations, 
use of certain numbers of bright colors, symmetrical arrays and precise 
patterns, special sounds or music, special dance and other movements, etc. 
All these trigger certain groups of templates, create satisfying feelings and are 
commonly coupled to religious concepts, and to politics, sports, hunting and 
agriculture, marriage, child rearing, music, art, folklore, literature etc. 
 
The agency detecting systems (e.g., predator and prey detection) are biased 
for over-detection—i.e., they do not need to see a lion or a person to be 
activated, but only a footprint or a sound of the right kind. Based on very little 
info, these systems then produce feelings and expectations about the agents’ 
nature and intentions. In the case of supernatural agencies our intuitive 
psychology templates are also activated and generally produce a person-like 
entity plus the counterintuitive features, but their precise characteristics are 
generally left vague. 
 
The attaching of a counterintuitive tag (e.g., rising from the dead) to an agent 
(e.g., Jesus) or other ontological category makes it easy to remember and a 
good candidate for religion. 
 
All these modules are inherited but of course a baby does not have them fully 
developed and only with time and a `normal` environment will they emerge. 
 
I read this shortly before reading Ken Wilber´s ´´Sex, Ecology and 
Spirituality´´ and could see on nearly every page how outdated and empty 
are most of the works which Wilber is discussing. A large part of Wilbur´s 
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book and of the hundreds he analyzes on religion, psychology and 
philosophy are now archaic. However, Wilbur has written many books of 
great interest on spirituality and it is sad that Boyer does not even reference 
him-- but neither does he reference drugs, Wittgenstein, meditation, yoga, 
satori or enlightenment in his index! 
 
One might speculate that the Nobel peace prize is given to those who are best 
at encouraging us to extend coalitions to include other countries or the world. 
Or, one might say they get the prize for efforts to turn off the `cheater 
detector` or social exchange templates which require that only those who 
reciprocate are included in one´s group and given access to resources (which 
most of the world´s poor clearly cannot do). 
 
He gives a brief summary of some of the self-deceptive inferences which play 
a role in religion as in all of life--consensus, false consensus, generation effect, 
memory illusions, source monitoring defects, confirmation bias and cognitive 
dissonance. Like the other templates, these gave very good results 100,000 
years ago but with life in the fast lane they can now prove fatal for individuals 
and for the world. Coalitional intuitions and essence concepts are delineated 
as critical parts of human behavior. Humans automatically form groups and 
show hostility to persons not in the group and wholly undeserved friendship 
to those in the group (coalitional intuitions), even when the group is 
composed of total strangers.  This relates to operation engines such as 
cost/benefit and calculation of reliability mentioned before. Essences are the 
concepts we use to describe our feelings (intuitions) about coalitions and 
other social categories (e.g., hierarchies and dominance). Although these 
mechanisms evolved in small groups, nowadays these are commonly 
operating with people to whom we are not closely related, so they often give 
false results. Stereotyping, racism and its accompaniments (i.e., arbitrary (or 
not so arbitrary) set distinctions) are probably the results of the operation of 
coalitional intuitions built into our brains, rather than stereotyping being a 
primary psychological function and the coalitions with their exclusion, 
dominance, and antipathy being the results. These engines may well explain 
the `social magic` that forms and guides societies. 
 
He suggests that one might explain fundamentalism as a natural reaction to 
the common violation of coalitional thinking in modern societies. Freedom to 
act as one chooses and in direct opposition to others in the same community 
creates strong and often violent feelings in those without the education or 
experience to deal with diversity and change. They often want public and 
spectacular punishment to assuage their feelings. Fundamentalism may best 
 334  
be explained as attempts to preserve hierarchies based on coalitions, when 
these are threatened by easy defection or inattention. These are functioning 
in all people all the time but they come to the surface mainly when there is a 
situation that creates some special threat (i.e., modern life). Of course, as 
always, we need to keep in mind that the ultimate source and payoff for all 
behavior is in the genes. 
 
Though he says little about it, the notions of ontological categories and 
counterintuitive tags that `stick´ to them also go far to explain magic, the 
paranormal, folklore, mythology, folk medicine, astrology, theology, miracle 
workers, demonic and angelic possession, the arts, and formerly even much 
of science. Rituals act as snares for thought. Our contagion templates are 
powerful activators of behavior and it is natural to include many purification 
rituals in religion. They also make use of our planning systems, which we can 
see in extreme form in obsessive compulsive disorder. There is preoccupation 
with colors, spaces, boundaries, movements and contact. Salient gadgets are 
incorporated. We have a powerful need to imitate others. 
 
Rituals activate our undetected hazard systems. Sacrificial offerings to the 
unseen agents make use of our social exchange systems. Our coalitional 
intuitions are satisfied by group rites and marriage. The `naive sociology` of 
the common man extends into much philosophy, sociology, theology, 
anthropology, psychology, economics, politics and is the result of our 
attempts to make sense of our own behavior but this is the result of the 
automatic and unconscious functioning of our templates. Thus, much of 
culture seems magical-- hence the term `social magic`. Inevitably, naive 
sociology is weak, so rituals and belief systems emphasize the benefits of 
cooperation and the costs of cheating or defection. The rituals and gadgets 
stimulate memory and satisfy the contagion system. Participation signals 
cooperation and the gods and spirits are optional. So, templates lead to 
religion which leads to doctrines and not the reverse. 
 
I think he goes seriously astray when discussing science vs. religion (p320). 
He says it is wrong to talk about religion as a real object in the world 
(whatever that might be), but of course the external and internal (mental) 
phenomena can be studied as well as any other, and he shows in this book 
that religion is a branch of cognitive psychology. He says there is no science 
as such, and we know that he means it´s complex, but then there is no 
religion, law, sports, auto racing or anything at all, as such. He objects to `pop 
theology` which says religion makes the world more beautiful or meaningful 
or that it addresses ultimate questions, but all religion addresses the ultimate 
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questions and tries to make the world meaningful and less ugly. In addition, 
what I call `advanced religion` --i.e., the way it starts in the no-minds of Jesus, 
Buddha, Osho etc.-- has a quite different take on the world than the primitive 
religion he discusses in this book (e.g., see the 200 books and DVD´s of Osho 
at Oshoworld.com or on p2p, or see Wilber, Adi Da etc.). Again, on p 327 he 
thinks there is no religious center in the brain and though this is probably true 
for primitive religion, it seems more likely that there are centers (networks of 
connections) for the experiences of satori and enlightenment and maybe for 
entheogens too. He also thinks (p321) that science is less natural and more 
difficult than religion, but in view of the huge number of scientists and the 
facts that nearly everyone is able to absorb science in grade school, and that 
there have probably been less than 1000 enlightened persons in all of human 
history, it seems clear that situation is quite the reverse. It is vastly less 
difficult to become a botanist or a chemist than to dissolve one´s ego! Natural 
selection will clearly eliminate higher consciousness genes but the rational 
calculus of science is quite consistent with gathering resources and producing 
children. Of course, the problem is that he is again fixated on primitive 
religion. 
 
He sums it up by saying (p 135) that religious activities activate inference 
systems that ‘govern our most intense emotions, shape our interaction with 
other people, give us moral feelings and organize social groups`. Of course, 
these have nothing to do with satori or enlightenment! He notes that religious 
ideas are parasitic upon our intuitive ontology (i.e., they are relevant). They 
are transmitted successfully due to mental capacities that evolution has 
already created. As with other behaviors, religion is a result of aggregate 
relevance—i.e., the sum of the operation of all the inference engines. Thus, 
religious concepts and behavior are present not because they are necessary or 
even useful, but because they easily activate our templates, are easy to 
remember and transmit and so they survive over time. He gives a final 
summary (p326) of ``The Full History of all Religion (ever)`` as follows (of 
course it leaves out ` advanced religion`). Among the millions of things people 
discussed were some which violated our intuitions and this made them easier 
to remember and transmit. Those that were about agents were especially 
salient as they activated rich domains of possible inferences such as those 
about predators and intuitive psychology. Agents with counterintuitive 
properties, especially ability to understand and affect human behavior or the 
world were strongly transmitted. They became connected with other strange 
and somewhat counterintuitive events such as death and feelings about the 
continued presence of the dead. Somehow rituals arise and become 
associated with the powerful supernatural agents. Some persons will be more 
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skilled at conducting such rituals and guiding the interactions with the 
spirits. Inevitably they will create more abstract versions and start to acquire 
power and wealth. However, people will continue to have their own 
inferences about religion. 
 
He notes that religion owes much to the probably recent (in hominoid 
evolution) appearance of the decoupling ability and it occurs to me that one 
might regard entheogenic drug experiences, satori and enlightenment as the 
ultimate in decoupling--no past, no future, and not even a present-- no here, 
no there, no me, no you and all is one thing and illusory. The other key 
transition in evolution is posited to be the ability to accept the violation of 
intuitive expectations at the level of ontological domains (i.e., the classes of 
things--plants, people, moving things etc.). He regards these capacities as 
leading to the invention of religion (and of course much else) but it´s clear 
that Buddha and Jesus went quite a bit further. He rejects the idea that 
religious thoughts made minds more flexible and open (rather they became 
susceptible to certain concepts that activated the inferences of agency, 
predation, morality, social exchange, death etc.), but something made us 
susceptible also to the entheogens, satori and enlightenment and this is as 
flexible and open as people can be and remain sane. So it is clear that much 
remains to be discovered about spirituality. 
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Review of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality by Ken Wilber 
2nd ed 851p (2001)  
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is both amazing and fitting that this huge, jargon-laden (this book really 
needs a glossary!), heavily academic work has become a best seller in the 
world of the educated. One has to be dedicated to learn the jargon and then 
plow through 551 pages of text and 238 pages of notes. Meanwhile, we are 
told time and again that this is just an outline of what is to come! 
 
Though he severely criticizes the excesses of the three movements, this is a 
deconstructive and New Age Mystical and postmodern interpretation of 
religion, philosophy and the behavioral sciences from a very liberal, spiritual 
point of view—i.e., without the worst of decon, pm and NAM jargon, rabid 
egalitarianism and anti-scientific anti-intellectualism. 
 
He analyzes in some detail the various world views of philosophy, 
psychology, sociology and religion, exposing their fatal reductionistic flaws 
with (mostly) care and brilliance, but most of the sources he analyzes are of 
almost no relevance today.  They use terminology and concepts that were 
already outdated when he was researching and writing 20 years ago. One has 
to slog thru endless pages of   jargon –laden discussion of Habermas, Kant, 
Emerson, Jung   et.al. to get to the pearls. 
 
You get a terrific sampling of bad writing, confused and outdated ideas and 
obsolete jargon. 
 
If one has a good current education, it is doubly painful to read this book (and 
most writing on human behavior).  Painful because it´s so tortured and 
confusing and then again when you realize how simple it is with modern 
psychology and philosophy. The terminology and ideas are horrifically 
confused and dated (but less so in Wilber´s own analysis than in his sources). 
 
This book and most of its sources are would-be psychology texts, though 
most of the authors did not realize it. It is about human behavior and 
reasoning-about why we think and act the way we do and how we might 
change in the future. But (like all such discussion until recently) none of the 
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explanations are really explanations, and so they give no insight into human 
behavior. Nobody discusses the mental mechanisms involved. It is like 
describing how a car works by discussing the steering wheel and metal and 
paint without any knowledge of the engine, fuel or drive train. In fact, like 
most older ´explanations` of behavior, the texts quoted here and the 
comments by Wilber are often more interesting for what kinds of things they 
accept (and omit!) as explanations, and the kind of reasoning they use, than 
for the actual content. 
 
If one is up on philosophy and cognitive and evolutionary psychology, most 
of this is archaic. Like nearly everyone (scholars and public alike--eg, see my 
review of Dennett´s Freedom Evolves and other books), he does not 
understand that the basics of religion and ethics-- in fact all human behavior, 
are programmed into our genes. A revolution in understanding ourselves 
was taking place while he was writing his many books and it passed him by. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my art The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
 
 
´Anything that can be said can be said clearly` Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
`Heaven and Earth are inhumane--they view the myriad creatures as straw 
dogs` TaoTe Ching 
 
It is both amazing and fitting that this huge, jargon-laden (this book really 
needs a glossary!), heavily academic work has become a best seller in the 
world of the educated. One has to be dedicated to learn the jargon and then 
plow through 551 pages of text and 238 pages of notes. Meanwhile, we are 
told time and again that this is just an outline of what is to come! 
 
This book and most of its sources are would-be psychology texts, though 
most of the authors did not realize it.  It is about human behavior and 
reasoning-about why we think and act the way we do and how we might 
change in the future. But (like all such discussion until recently) none of the 
explanations are really explanations and so they gave no insight into human 
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behavior. Nobody discusses the mental mechanisms involved. It is like 
describing how a car works by discussing the steering wheel and metal and 
paint and the wheels without any knowledge of the engine or drive train. In 
fact, like most older ´explanations` of behavior, the texts quoted here and the 
comments by Wilber are often more interesting for what kinds of things they 
accept (and omit!) as explanations, and the kind of reasoning they use, than 
for the actual content. 
 
As with all reasoning and explaining one now wants to know which of the 
brains inference engines are activated to produce the results.   It is the 
relevance filters which determine what sorts of things we can accept as 
appropriate data for each engine and their automatic and unconscious 
operation and interaction that determines   what we can produce as an 
answer. 
 
Cognitive and evolutionary psychology are still not evolved enough to 
provide full explanations but an interesting start has been made. Boyer´s 
`Religion Explained` is a good place to see what a modern scientific 
explanation of human behavior looks like (though it completely misses 
enlightenment!).  Pinker´s `How the mind Works` is a good general survey   
and his `The Blank Slate` (see my reviews) by far the best discussion of the 
heredity-environment issue in human behavior. They do not explain all of 
intelligence or thinking but summarize what is known. See several of the 
recent texts (ie, 2004 onwards) with evolutionary psychology in the title or 
the web for further info. 
 
We now recognize that the bases for art, music, math, philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, language and religion are found in the automatic 
functioning of templates or inference engines. This is why we can expect   
similarities and puzzles and inconsistencies or incompleteness and often, 
dead ends. The brain has no general intelligence but numerous specialized 
modules, each of which works on certain aspects of some problem and the 
results are then added, resulting in the feelings which lead to behavior.   
Wilber, like everyone, can only generate or recognize explanations that are   
consistent with the operations of his own inference engines, which were 
evolved to deal with such things as resource accumulation, coalitions in small 
groups, social exchanges and the evaluation of the intentions of other 
persons. It is amazing they can produce philosophy and science, and not 
surprising that figuring out how they work together to produce 
consciousness or choice or spirituality is way beyond reach. 
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Wilber is a bookworm and he has spent decades analyzing classic and 
modern texts. He is extremely bright, has clearly had his own awakening, and 
also knows the minutiae of Eastern religion as well as anyone. I doubt there 
are more than a handful in the world who could write this book. However, 
this is a classic case of being too smart for your own good and his fascination 
with intellectual history and his ability to read, analyze and write about 
hundreds of difficult books has bogged him down in the dead past. 
 
Though he severely criticizes the excesses of the three movements, this is a 
deconstructive and New Age Mystical and postmodern interpretation of 
religion, philosophy and the behavioral sciences from a very liberal, spiritual 
point of view—i.e., without the worst of decon, pm and NAM jargon, rabid 
egalitarianism and antiscientific antiintellectualism.  As Boyer points out 
(p20), when fear and poverty give way to security and wealth, the results of 
the inference engines change and you find religion changing from 
appeasement rituals for the powerful gods in a hostile universe to self 
empowerment and control in a benevolent one (i.e., New Age Mysticism). 
 
He analyzes in some detail the various world  views of  philosophy, 
psychology,  sociology and religion, exposing their fatal reductionistic flaws 
with (mostly) care and brilliance, but most of  the sources  he analyzes are of 
questionable relevance today. They use terminology and concepts that were 
already outdated when he was researching and writing 20 years ago.  One 
has to slog thru endless pages of   jargon –laden discussion of Habermas, 
Kant, Emerson, Jung et.al. to get to the pearls. He immerses himself in Freud 
and the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams (eg, p92), though most now   
regard these as merely quaint artifacts of intellectual history. 
 
If one is up on philosophy and cognitive and evolutionary psychology, most 
of this is archaic. Like nearly everyone (scholars and public alike--eg, see my 
review of Dennett´s Freedom Evolves and other books), he does not 
understand that the basics of religion and ethics-- in fact all human behavior, 
are programmed into our genes. A revolution in understanding ourselves 
was taking place while he was writing his many books and it largely passed 
him by, though I have not read his latest works. 
 
If one has a good current education, it is doubly painful to read this book (and 
most writing on human behavior).  Painful because it´s so tortured and 
confusing and then again when you realized how simple it is with modern 
psychology and philosophy. The terminology and ideas are horrifically 
confused and dated (but less so in Wilber´s own analysis than in his sources). 
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We now think in terms of cognitive templates which evolved about 100,000 
years ago (in most cases several hundreds of millions of years earlier in their 
original forms). They operate automatically, are not accessible to 
consciousness and there is abundant evidence that they severely limit the 
behaviorial options for individuals and for society. His new preface notes one 
such study, but the book needs a total rewriting. 
 
There is an enormous resistance in us to accepting ourselves as part of nature, 
and in particular, any gene based explanations of behavior. Like all our 
thinking, these feelings are due to the operation of the cognitive templates, so 
perhaps it is the conflict between biological explanations and our automatic 
intuitive psychology or social mind systems that is responsible. These genetic 
systems have probably operated for hundreds of thousands of years and the 
new data from science is telling us the results of their operations (our feelings   
about what to do) are wrong. There is much interesting work to be done 
explaining social, economic and political behavior from this new viewpoint. 
 
Some jargon you will need is on pg X of the new preface where you find that 
the constantly used vision-logic is postformal cognition or network-logic or 
integral-aperspectival (all points of view are equal and must be considered). 
He also states the postmodern manifesto here: all views equal, dependent on 
limitless contexts, and merely interpretations. As he notes in great detail, this 
puts one on the slippery slope leading to much irrational and incoherent rant 
and there are very basic flaws in it. Nevertheless, it virtually took over US 
and European universities for several decades and is far from dead. You will 
also need his definition of eros from p528. 
 
You get a terrific sampling of bad writing, confused and outdated ideas and 
obsolete jargon. On p52 there is a quote from Jakobson which can be replaced 
by `the inference engines for psychology and language develop as we 
mature´; and paragraphs from Jantsch (p58) which say that evolution is 
evolution and cells are cells and (p71) the environment changes as organisms 
evolve. There is a quote from Foucault to open Book Two (p327) which, 
translated from deconstructese, says `knowledge helps to understand the 
world`. 
 
There is a long quote (p60-61) from Rupert Sheldrake which, when it is 
intelligible at all, says things that translate as ´proteins are proteins´ and ´cells 
are cells´. There are numerous linguistic disasters from Habermas (e.g., if you 
have time to waste, try figuring out the quotes on p77 or 150), but some are 
actually translatable, such as those on p153-4, which say that people have 
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morals so society has laws and language evolved so society evolved. And lots 
of this from Wilber himself, as on p109 where he spends most of the page to 
say most mutations and recombinations fail and the surviviors are compatible 
with their evirons. In spite of his acquaintance with Searle´s work, he is often 
confused about consciousness. He says (p117-8) that we can regard whatever 
we want as conscious, but clearly, once we leave the realm of animals that 
have eyes and a brain and walk around, it becomes a joke. Likewise, he is on 
very thin ice when discussing our interior and the need to interpret the minds 
of others. This is very far off the mark if one knows some Searle, Wittgenstein 
and cognitive psychology.  Likwise with the `explanations´ of Wolf on p742 
which are wrong for the same reasons that ´explanations´ of consciousness 
are wrong. It must be true that mind and spirit are based in physics (at least 
there is no intelligible alternative) but we don´t know how to conceptualize 
this or even how to recognize such a concept. Many suspect we will never 
understand this nor any of the fundamentals of the universe (eg, see my 
review of Kaku´s `Hyperspace` and Dennett). 
 
His notes (p129) that cultural studies have made little headway but neither 
he nor his sources understand that they lacked any framework to do so and 
often because they embraced the sterile idea of the blank slate. They want to 
be factual, even scientific, but they constantly veer off into fantasy. He 
delineates the integration of art, science and morality as the great task of 
postmodernism and he and others go to immense lengths to make 
connections and organize it all into a coherent plan for thinking and living. 
However, I wonder if it´s really sensible or even possible. Life is not a game 
of chess.  Even in the limited realm of art or morality it is not at all clear that   
there is anything other than that these are parts of human experience which   
draws them together. One can put paintings and sculpture and clothing and 
buildings and stick figures in an art book but is this really getting us 
anywhere? Please see my review of Hofstadter´s `Godel, Escher, Bach´ for 
much more on this. Boyer shows in detail how religion is due to a complex of 
brain systems that serve many different functions which evolved long before 
there was anything like religion. 
 
The brain has numerous templates that take in data, organize it and relate it 
realtime to other data, but they each serve a specific purpose and those 
purposes are not ART, MORALITY, RELIGION, and SCIENCE. 
 
Cognitive psychology shows that we have many modules working 
simultaneously to produce any behavior and that we relate to people in many   
ways for many reasons.  One basic function is coalitional intuition.  This gives 
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us feelings that guide our entrance into groups and our interactions with 
other groups. We automatically and immediately overestimate the qualities 
of those in our group even if it´s composed of randomly chosen total strangers 
we met five minutes before. Likewise, we immediately underestimate the 
good qualities of those in other groups. This and many other automatisms 
guide and commonly rule individual behavior, groups, nations and the 
world, but hardly anyone had a real understanding of this until quite 
recently. So, it is not surprising that almost all of his sources from Plato to 
Kant to Habermas have been wandering around in the dark and that Wilber 
is frantically running from one to the other with a flashlight trying to help 
them find their way out of the woods. 
 
He notes (p199) that the only serious global social movement to date was 
Marxism but thinks its fatal flaw was reductionism.  It seems far more cogent   
to note that, like virtually all of   modern society (and most of his sources and 
to a significant extent this book), it denied (or ignored or failed to understand) 
human nature and basic biology. Nobody seems to notice that most social 
institutions and ideals, (including equality and democracy) have this same 
flaw. Debate on human nature, the environment and the future is endless, but 
reality is an acid that will eat through all fantasy. To paraphrase Lincoln, you 
can fool some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the 
time but you can´t fool mother nature anytime. 
 
He details intellectual history (philosophy, psychology, religion, ecology, 
feminism, sociology, etc) and shows where nearly everyone went too far in 
the direction of Ascent (to the spirit or religious life only) or Descent (to 
science, materialism, reductionism or Flatland). He trys to show how to heal 
the rifts by combining sense and soul (spiritual and material life, science and 
religion, internal and external, individual and social).  Everything is related   
to everything else (holons in holarchies--ie, things in nested hierarchies—see   
p26,135 for his definition). 
 
The Age of Enlightenment denied the the spirit, the individual and the 
interior life but developed art, morals and science and led to democracy, 
feminism, equality and ecology.  This reductionism compressed the intellect 
and the spirit into the Flatland of science, rationality and materialism.  He 
sees the loss of the spiritual point of view with the Age of Enlightenment as 
the major factor responsible for the malaise of modern times, but `true 
spirituality` or`advanced religion`--my terms--(ie., the quest for 
enlightenment), as opposed to `primitive religion`(everything else-see Boyer) 
was always rare. It is advanced religion he sees as the panacea, but it is 
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primitive religion that the masses understand, and it too has only 
materialistic goals (money, power and all else serving to replicate genes). 
 
He understands that Jesus was a mystic in the same sense as Buddha and 
many others, and that what was to become the Catholic church largely 
destroyed his mystical aspects (personal search for enlightenment) in favor 
of primitive religion, priests, tithes and a structure seemingly modeled on the 
Roman army (p363). But, for the early Christian church, as for most religion, 
the cognitive templates were servants of the genes and enlightenment was 
not on the menu. Jesus was not a Christian, he had no bible, and he did not 
believe in a god any more than did Buddha. We have Christianity without 
the real intelligence of Jesus and this, as he explains in detail, is one cause of 
the West´s extended stay in Flatland.  I am not a Christian nor even a theist 
but it is one of the saddest things in history that the enlightened master who 
was to serve as the model of spirituality for the West had his vision of 
personal enlightenment destroyed and distorted by his own followers (but of 
course they are not really HIS followers). See the Gnostics and the Nag 
Hammadi manuscripts and above all Osho’s discourses on the Gospel of 
Thomas. 
 
Like everyone until recently, the many authors he discusses lacked any real 
explanation for human behavior. It rarely occurred to them to ask why we 
have such ideas and behavior and the few who did had no coherent solution. 
 
Though he has read some of John Searle´s superb philosophy, and has 
passing references to research in cognitive psychology, it is amazing that he 
could do 20 years research in philosophy without studying Wittgenstein, 
religion without reading Osho and watching his videos, and psychology 
without Buss, Tooby, Cosmides et al.  Much of cognitive and evolutionary   
psychology was only published in journals at the time he was writing and 
Wilber has almost no references to journals. But, Wittgenstein is the most 
famous philosopher of modern times and Osho the most famous spiritual 
teacher. It is remarkable that although he spends much time in his books 
discussing the intellectual aspects of therapy (Freud, Beck, Maslow etc) and 
clearly understands that the spiritual path is the ultimate therapy, he totally 
ignores Osho, who had the most advanced   therapeutic community in history 
functioning worldwide for the last 30 years. Osho never wrote a thick book 
containing a theory of human behavior, though his 200 books and many 
DVD´s explain it as beautifully and clearly as has ever been done. 
 
Though he tries hard to heal the world, Wilber spends too much time in the 
 345  
airy realms of intellectual debate.  As a postmodernist, and holist new age 
mystic, he wants to unite art, morality and science, but science gets the short 
straw. As in some of his other books (e.g., A Brief History of Everything- see 
my review), by far the worst mistakes he makes (along with nearly all his 
sources and most of the planet) are ignoring and misunderstanding basic 
biology.  This is apparent thoughout the book. He starts chapter 7 with a 
quote from Aurobindo, who had the same failing. They have no grasp of the 
fact that the eugenic effects of evolution are driven by natural selection and 
when society became firmly established, this ceased and it´s been totally 
dysgenic ever since.   Genetic engineers have been at work and they have 
released on a helpless world the most horrifically destructive mutant 
imaginable. Society is the engineer and we are that mutant.  If one gets the 
big picture, preoccupation with the possible destructive effects of GMOs 
(genetically modified organisms) -- other than ourselves-- is simply stupid 
and is perhaps a result of the operation of the contagion templates discussed 
by Boyer. That is, the potential destructive effect of all the GMOs we will ever 
make is unlikely to approach what humans have already done themselves. 
 
He says (p 508, p519) that Darwin does not explain evolution, supposedly 
well known before him, and accuses him of `massive obscurantism´ (he 
should be saying this about most of his sources!). The truth is that nothing in 
human behaviour or the world or the universe makes sense except in the light   
of evolution and no person did more to make this clear than Darwin. The 
work before him was little more than idle speculation and did not even 
approach a serious scientific treatment. This is why it had NO EFFECT on   
science or society. 
 
Of course, Darwin did not know genetics nor plate tectonics, and modern 
Neodarwinism adds many refinements, but it shows a total 
misunderstanding of science and history to say that this invalidates or 
diminishes his contributions. Wilber is clearly sliding sideways into the 
Creationist camp and one can only speculate as to which of his inference 
engines produce this. He shows in many places that he has a poor grasp of 
genetics and evolution.  Eg., on p561--as Dawkins has so patiently explained, 
the unit of evolution is the gene, and none of the other things Wilber mentions 
work as a genetic unit. Though he lists `The Selfish Gene` in his bibliography, 
it´s clear he has not understood it, and it´s 30 years old. Dawkins has written 
half a dozen superb works since and there are hundreds of others. 
 
Wilber seems to have an allergy to good biology books--most of those he 
quotes are very old and others are classics of confusion. He wastes a page 
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(p51) on the idea (mostly due to Gould and Eldredge) of punctuated 
evolution, which is of very little interest. Gould loved to make a big fuss about 
his `discoveries` and his energy got him alot of airtime, but when all was said 
and done, he had nothing new to say and dragged millions into his own 
confusions (as Dawkins, Conway Morris and many others have noted). Yes, 
evolution is sometimes faster but so what? Sometimes it rains a little, 
sometimes a lot.  If you zoom in, in time or space, you always see more detail, 
and if you zoom out it starts to look the same.  Gould was also responsible 
for the `spandrels of San Marcos` debacle and, with his Marxist colleagues 
Lewontin and Rose, for endless insipid attacks on `determinist biology`, 
including the scandalous verbal and physical assaults on E.O Wilson (who, 
unlike themselves, made numerous major contributions to biology, though 
he recently disgraced himself—see my review of his ‘The Social Conquest of 
Earth’). Modern research (e.g., see Pinker and Boyer) makes it clear that 
Wilson was right on the money regarding evolution, except for his 
unfortunate recent embrace of ‘group selection’. 
 
It is quite careless to say (p775) that there is no single pregiven world. Perhaps 
he only means we ought to be multicultural, egalitarian etc., but if there really 
were none, then how can we live and communicate? This is the ugliness of 
postmodernism creeping in. A large dose of Wittgenstein and cognitive 
psychology is an appropriate cure. Neither Wilber nor Derrida nor Foucault 
(nor most people) understand that there MUST be a single point of view or 
life would be impossible. This single point of view, resident in our genes, is 
integral to how we think and behave and largely dictates the vagaries of 
philosophy, politics and religion. The cognitive templates that underlie   
language, thought and our perception of reality logically must be the same   
and the evidence for this is overwhelming. Even the smallest changes, a few 
genes gone wrong, and you have autism, imbecility or schizophrenia. 
 
The brute fact that Wilber (and most of the world) largely ignores, is that there   
are 7 billion (11 billion by 2100) sets of selfish genes carrying out their 
programs to destroy the earth. They are an acid that will eat through any 
intellectual conclusions, egalitarian fanatasies and spiritual rebirths. 
Selfishness, dishonesty, tribalism and shortsightedness are not due to 
accidents of intellectual or spiritual history.  He says that the lack of spirit is 
destroying the earth, and though there is this aspect to things, it is much more   
to the point to say that it is selfish genes that are responsible. Likewise, he 
says `Biology is no longer Destiny`, but it is an easily defensible point of view 
that the reverse is far more likely. The attempt to understand history in terms 
of ideas ignores biology and denies human nature.  Selfish genes always live 
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in Flatland and less than 1000 people in all of human history have escaped   
the tyranny of the monkey mind into enlightenment. 
 
Most of chapter 6 on myth and magic is outdated, confused or just wrong. To 
give just a few examples, we now understand that most of a child´s 
psychological and social development is built in and does not have to be 
learned (eg, pg 233-4). The child does not have to deconstruct anything--the 
inferences engines do it all (p260). Joseph Campbell is quoted extensively and 
he too was clueless about how we develop and how to explain the differences 
and similarities in cultures (p245-50). E.g., Campbell says mythology can only 
lay claim to childhood, but a look around the world shows how false this is 
and a reading of Boyer tells why. His discussion of thinking about the 
nonfactual on pg 279 to 80 is now referred to as running the inference engines 
in decoupled mode. To his contorted comments in the middle of pg 560 (and 
finally....) I want to say `explanation ends with the templates! P580-4 and 591-
3 are so full of dubious and plain wrong statements I don´t even want to begin 
but suggest that Wilber and the reader start with Searle´s `The Mystery of 
Consciousness`. Time and again, it is clear he shares the lack of a scientific 
viewpoint with most of his sources. What info or procedures can solve the 
questions of consciousness or of any social science and philosophical 
theories? How do you recognize an answer when you see it? He and they go 
on for pages and whole books without ever having any idea (e.g., see my 
review of Dennett´s Freedom Evolves). 
 
On p702- bottom- he talks about the fulcrum driving development but if one 
understands templates (and I mean here and elsewhere the entire corpus of 
cognitive and evolutionary psychology) then one either needs to rewrite this 
or eliminate it. Ditto for most of pgs 770-77. The tortured prose on pg 771-2 is 
only saying that the templates are probed by drugs or other input but not 
changed and that nobody knows (in a way they can clearly convey) what 
these are. The background or intersubjective worldspace is the templates and 
they develop very early in children and then stay fixed for life. The deliberate 
destruction of Jesus` mysticism has created a powerful bias against higher 
consciousness in the West. Though he does not understand or discuss 
enlightenment, Boyer gives the basis for understanding how and why this 
happened. 
 
Wilber embraces a simple utilitarianism (greatest good for greatest 
number)—i.e., the greatest depth for he greatest span (p334). This basic 
principle of much philosophy, religion and economics has serious problems 
and is probably unworkable. Which people should we make happy and how 
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happy and when (ie, now or in the future)?  On what basis do we distribute   
resources now and how much do we save for the future population, and who 
decides and how to enforce this? He calls upon our Basic Moral Intuition (ie, 
the operation of our templates, as we now know), but our BMI is not really to 
help others but to help ourselves, and the few thousand (or let´s be very 
optomistic and say few million) who are spritually advanced do not run the 
world and never will. The BMI-- eg, social exchange, coalitional intuitions, 
intuitive psychology, etc, evolved to serve our own interests (not those of the   
group--if, like Wilber, you think this way please read some of Dawkin´s books 
or my recent review of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’ in this volume) 
and in any case is hopelessly at sea in the modern world with it´s advanced 
education, instant communications, firearms, mood altering drugs, clothes 
and cosmetics, a huge and mobile population and vanishing  resources. 
 
Instead of the intellectual or spiritual approach Wilber takes to history, others 
take ecological, genetic or technogical approaches (eg, Diamond’s ´Guns, 
Germs and Steel´ or Pinkers ´The Blank Slate´).  In the long run, it appears 
that only biology really matters and we see daily how overpopulation is 
overwhelming all attempts to civilize the masses.  The democracy and 
equality which Wilber values so highly are means created by selfish genes to 
facilitate their destruction of the planet. In spite of the hope that a new age is 
dawning and we will see the biological and psychic evolution of a new 
human, the fact is that we are the most degenerate species there ever was and 
the planet is nearing collapse. The billions of years of eugenics (natural 
selection) that thrust life up out of   the slime and gave us   the amazing ability 
to write and read   books like this is now over. There is no longer selection for 
the healthier and more intelligent and in fact they produce a smaller 
percentage of the children every year.  Nature does not tolerate physical and 
mental aberrations but society encourages them. Our physical and mental 
peak was probably CroMagnon man or maybe even Neanderthals (who had 
larger brains (yes, I know they seem not to have contributed more than a few 
percent of our DNA) about 100,000 years ago. It seems plausible that only 
genetic engineering and   an enlightened oligarchy can save us. 
 
He thinks (eg, p12 etc.) that it is our fractured world view (ie, denial of the 
spirit) that is responsible for our ecological catastrophes and preoccupation 
with material goods but this is another example of the denial of human 
nature. Nobody views heart conditions or Alzheimer disease as due to a 
fractured world view, but few seem to have any problem thinking you can 
change the fundamentals of behavior just by education or psychological 
manipulation. Modern science refutes this view conclusively (see Pinker, 
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Boyer etc).  The intuitive psychology templates tell us that we can manipulate 
the behavior of others, but these templates were evolved hundreds of 
thousands of years ago, and they often fail to give correct   results in modern 
contexts. Nearly every parent thinks they can profoundly influence the adult 
character (patience, honesty, irritability, depression, persistence, 
compulsiveness etc.) of their children in spite of clear evidence to the contrary 
(e.g., Pinker). 
 
He thinks that animal rights people are illogical and excessive when they 
value animals over humans and likewise with those who value the 
environment over people´s needs. This may be logical in his system but of 
course humans are typically (and often reasonably) illogical. In any case, if 
we always put human needs first, then it is surely the end of peace, 
tranquility, beauty and sanity. 
 
Wilber defends Piaget, but like him he shows many places that he does not 
understand that the child does not have to learn the important things--they 
are built in and it only has to grow up. There seems to be no evidence that 
any of our templates change with time. The things that we learn are mostly 
trivial in comparison (ie, even a computer can learn them!). 
 
His sources are mostly lost in confusion and jargon but he is brilliant and if 
one bothers to read his explanations and translate Wilberspeak into English, 
it usually makes sense.   On pg 545- 7 he explains holonic ecology.  Here is a 
translation. All organisms have value in themselves and are related to all 
others in the ecosystem and we must wake up spiritually. There is a web of 
life (i.e., Gaia or ecosystem) and all have intrinsic value but higher organisms 
have more value, which requires a spiritual point of view. Neither the 
spiritual or scientific approach works alone (i.e., dualism is bad). 
 
Translated, it loses most of it´s appeal but it is not fair to deny the poetry and 
majesty of his vision. But, this does not excuse him from writing clearly. 
Opacity is a nearly   universal characteristic of the books he treats here. 
However, when Katz wrote a book denigrating mysticism Wilber took the 
time to do a `Searleian` analysis to show how incoherence has passed for 
scholarship (p629-31).  Unfortunately, he does not continue this throughout 
the book and uses the jargon-laden incoherence of Habermas and others to 
explain other vague or incoherent texts (e.g., using Habermas instead of 
Searle or Wittgenstein or cognitive psychology to explicate Emerson p633). 
 
In the USA, some 120 million (about 250 million by 2100) third world refugees 
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from unrestrained motherhood are now the most powerful single force for 
destruction, having easily displaced fundamentalist European Christians. But 
all lowclass people are united in being against (or at least unwilling/unable 
to practice) population control and for environmental devastation in order to 
maximize the number of and resource use by their genes (though lacking any 
insight into this of course).  This was a rational survival strategy when it was 
fixed in the genes millions of years ago, but it is suicidal now. The spiritual 
rebirth he talks about is not that of the “diverse” or the lower classes 
anywhere. 
 
His view is that it is the poor and ignorant who are the major environmental 
problem and that this is somehow due to our Flatland approach, so if we just 
wake up, get spritual and help them out this will solve it. However, the rich 
destroy as much as 20 times more than the poor per capita and the third world 
will pass the first in C02 production about 2025. But there is nothing noble 
about the poor—they are only the rich in waiting. 
 
Everyone is part of the problem and if one does the math (vanishing resources 
divided by increasing population) it´s clear that the worldwide collapse of 
industrial society and a drastic reduction in population will happen and its 
only a matter of how and when (2150 is a good guess). Like so many, he 
suggests living lightly on the earth, but to live (and above all, to reproduce), 
is to do harm and if reproduction remains a right then it´s hard to see any 
hope for the future. As is politically correct, he emphasizes rights and says 
little about responsibilities.   It is a reasonable view that if society is to accept 
anyone as human, they must take responsibility for the world and this must 
take precedence over their personal needs. It is unlikely that any government 
will implement this, and equally unlikely that the world will continue to be a 
place any civilized person will wish to live in (or be able to). 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of the analysis of behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). I reproduce the table of intentionality from it 
here. 
 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show 
the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two 
systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), 
which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-
Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind(LSM), of language 
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(LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical 
term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive 
Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very 
recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much 
simpler table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the 
three recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
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Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others ( or COS1 by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s PriorIntentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
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The most profound spiritual autobiography of all 
time? - a review of "The Knee of Listening" by Adi 
Da (Franklin Jones) (1995) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American 
mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says 
`The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well 
be true. I am in my 70´s and have read many books by spiritual teachers and 
on spirituality, and this is one of the greatest. Certainly, it is by far the fullest 
and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I have ever seen. Even if 
you have no interest at all in the most fascinating of all human psychological 
processes, it is an amazing document that reveals a great deal about religion, 
yoga, and human psychology and probes the depths and limits of human 
possibilities. I describe it in some detail and compare his teaching with that 
of the Indian mystic Osho. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
There are many editions of the spiritual autobiography of the unique 
American mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The first edition was 1972 and new 
editions with more material and much advertising about the group continue 
to appear. The latest one I have seen (2004) is about 3 times the size and 
weight of the 1995 editon I prefer, as the hundreds of pages of new material 
are more of the opaque prose and advertising. So, I recommend one of the 
earlier paperpack editions such as the 1995 one to which my page citations 
refer. 
 
A brief review of the life and spiritual autobiography of the unique American 
mystic Adi Da (Franklin Jones). The sticker on the cover of some editions says 
`The most profound spiritual autobiography of all time` and this might well 
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be true. I am in my 70´s and have read many books by spiritual teachers and 
on spirituality, and this is one of the greatest ones. Certainly, it is by far the 
fullest and clearest account of the process of enlightenment I have ever seen. 
Even if you have no interest at all in the most fascinating of all human 
psychological processes, it is an amazing document that reveals a great deal 
about religion, yoga, and human psychology and probes the depths and 
limits of human possibilities. 
 
As I have read and experienced alot in various religious traditions, I naturally 
compare his writings with those of others, particularly with the great Indian 
mystic Osho. Though they clearly agree on the major points of how to 
proceed on the path, letting go of the attachment to the spiritual quest etc, 
their styles are vastly different. Both are highly intelligent and well read 
(Osho could speed read and read a huge number of books) and were at home 
in the spiritual literature of the major religious traditions. However, like so 
much of the spiritual literature, most of Da´s books are essentially unreadable 
as he struggles to express in language the ineffable realms of the enlightened 
mind. Even in this, by far his most readable book, he often veers off into pages 
of opacity as he tries to explain the unexplainable. A great pity he seems never 
to have read Wittgenstein –the greatest natural psychologist of all time—who 
showed that we must abandon the attempts at explanation and accept 
descriptions of our innate psychological functions in language, which is the 
mind. 
 
Osho by contrast is the clearest, most jargon free expositor of the spiritual life 
who has ever lived. He wrote very little and nearly all of his more than 200 
books are transcriptions of spontaneous talks he gave-- with no notes or 
preparation. They are nonetheless unexcelled masterpieces of spiritual 
literature. His amazing àutobiography` (actually compiled after his death) 
has been published by St. Martins and the full version, as well as all his books 
(many also available on DVD), are available online many places. 
Unfortunately, he has very little to say about the exact details of his spiritual 
progress. 
 
As Da lived most of his later life in seclusion on an island in Fiji it was not 
easy to get to hear him but the Dawn Horse Press sells a few videotapes on 
their web page. Da is not a very engaging or facile speaker, unlike Osho who 
is by turns amusing, shattering and hypnotic. But, as both of them 
understand, it´s what the master is and not he says that is important. 
 
Both of them were utterly honest and uncompromising in their life and 
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teachings and Da omits nothing of relevance, including his youthful 
adventures with sex and drugs as well as his exposure to LSD, psilocybin and 
mescaline as a volunteer in government experiments. However, as with many 
or perhaps all of those destined to become enlightened, he was different from 
birth and experienced the Shakti energy (which he calls the Bright) from 
childhood.  And, when he entered college, he said his primary interest was to 
discover what living beings are and what is living consciousness.  Clearly not 
your typical freshman. 
 
A major problem in describing advanced spiritual states is that no criteria or 
language for them exists in common discourse so mystics have to try to bend 
language in mostly vain attempts to capture their experiences. It is far worse 
than trying to describe seeing to a congenitally blind person since they at least 
have the cognitive structures and experience of the world. But mystics are 
quite rare and most of them have left little or no description of their mental 
states. 
 
Unlike Osho, who rejected miracles, paranormal phenomena and all the other 
nonsense that commonly accompanies religion, Da seems to lack any science 
background at all and embraces precognition (p120), reincarnation 
(p555),`meditating` other persons, living on air (p287) etc., and regards the 
phenomena that I would say are happening in his brain as being `out there`. 
From comments included in newer editions it is clear that many of his 
disciples believe he can perform miracles like stopping a raging forest fire at 
their California retreat. Nevertheless, most of the time he is amazingly 
levelheaded, going thru over a decade of stress and psychic terrors that 
would drive most from the spiritual path. Millions of years of evolution have 
solidified the ego and it does not leave peacefully. 
 
Interwoven with the spellbinding account of his spiritual progress are the 
details of the mind’s interaction with the body, described in the East in terms 
of various forms of Yoga (eg., p95-9, 214-21, 249,281-3, 439-40 in the 1995 
edition I recommend). These few pages are worth more than a whole shelf of 
yoga books if you want to get to the heart of the mind/body relation in 
spirituality. 
 
Unlike most who have become enlightened, he had a thorough grounding in 
Christian practice and made a major effort to become a protestant, and then 
Greek Orthodox minister.  Even years later, after he was far along the path 
with Muktananda, he had an amazing and totally unexpected series of 
visitations from Mary and Jesus that went on for weeks (p 301-3 et seq.). 
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Regarding drugs, as is nearly universal among spiritual teachers, he notes 
that although they may remove certain barriers at times, they do not provide 
a shortcut to understanding. However, nearly everyone is now aware that 
they put many on the path to higher consciousness throughout human 
history, especially in the last few decades. 
 
He describes in detail the many stages in his ego death or self realization (eg, 
p72-4, 198-200, 219,20, 238-9, 245, 249, 258-9, 281, 355-65, 368-72, 406). Along 
the way, he realized the ultimate disutility of all practices and all traditions 
(337-9) including yoga (281-3), which are all attached to seeking and goals, 
ultimately winding up in the present.  He discovered, as have many others, 
that seeking and meditation became obstacles and gave them up for devotion 
to his guru Muktananda (p420-22). His detailed accounts of his interactions 
with the famous Swami Muktananda and his ultimate realization of his 
limitations are of rare insight and honesty. He constantly encounters his 
attachment to his ego (Narcissus-- eg, p108-110) and asks himself--`Avoiding 
Relationship? ` by which he seems to mean avoiding the divine or ego death 
by preoccupation with spiritual seeking. 
 
After enlightenment, he teaches the ´only by me revealed and given Way of 
the heart`, finding all other paths to be `remedial` and ´egoic´ and merely 
pursuing God or reality (p359 +), but after a careful reading of this and several 
other books I never got any idea what that way consists in. Undoubtedly 
being in his presence helps alot but in other places he has complained about 
the fact that his disciples just won´t let it happen and one wonders if even one 
has been able to follow him. Of course, the same considerations apply to all 
traditions and teachers and though some of Osho´s friends (he disavowed the 
master/disciple relationship) have claimed enlightenment, nobody of his 
status has emerged. It looks like you have to have the right genes and the 
right environment and a very advanced and preferably enlightened guru to 
stimulate you. I suspect that the time has passed when an enlightened one 
could start a movement that transforms much of the world. The world 
desperately needs higher consciousness and I hope that someone comes up 
with an easier way very soon, but I think it’s quite unlikely. 
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Do our automated unconscious behaviors reveal our 
real selves and hidden truths about the universe? -- 
A review of David Hawkins ‘Power vs Force--the 
hidden determinants of human behavior –author’s 
official authoritative edition’ 412p (2012)(original 
edition 1995). 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I am very used to strange books and special people but Hawkins stands out 
due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the 
“truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the 
person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well 
known is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and 
psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, 
sounds, touch, odors, ideas, people. So, muscle reading to find out their true 
feelings is not radical at all, unlike using it as a dousing stick (more muscle 
reading) to do “paranormal science”. 
 
Hawkins describes the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in 
response to increases in cognitive load thus causing the arm to drop in 
response to the constant pressure of someone’s fingers. He seems unaware 
that there is a long established and vast ongoing research effort in social 
psychology referred to by such phrases as ‘implicit cognition’, ‘automaticity’ 
etc., and that his use of ‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In addition to muscle 
tone (infrequently used) social psychologists measure EEG, galvanic skin 
response and most frequently verbal responses to words, sentences, images 
or situations at times varying from seconds to months after the stimulus. 
Many, such as Bargh and Wegner, take the results to mean we are automatons 
who learn and act largely without awareness via S1 (automated System 1) 
and many others such as Kihlstrom and Shanks say these studies are flawed 
and we are creatures of S2 (deliberative System 2). Though Hawkins seems 
to have no idea, as in other areas of the descriptive psychology of higher order 
thought, the situation regarding “automaticity” is still as chaotic as it was 
when Wittgenstein described the reasons for the sterility and barrenness of 
psychology in the 30’s. Nevertheless, this book is an easy read and some 
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therapists and spiritual teachers may find it of use. 
 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my art The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
I am very used to strange books and special people but Hawkins stands out 
due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the 
“truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the 
person being tested believes it but, whether it is really true! How could any 
sane person believe this? As a person with over 50 years adult experience 
with science, psychology, philosophy, religion and life I do not find it at all 
credible that it is even highly reliable about the person’s beliefs and there is 
no chance of getting to know reality this way. What is well known is that 
people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological 
responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, 
odors, ideas, people. So, muscle reading to find out their true feelings is not 
radical at all, unlike using it as a dousing stick (more muscle reading) to do 
“paranormal science”. 
 
Kinesiology, also known as human kinetics, is the study of human 
movement. Kinesiology studies physiological, mechanical (muscle tone), and 
psychological mechanisms as indices of people’s mental and physical status 
and often uses movement exercises as therapy. However, Hawkins (without 
saying so) is using the term to refer to a very narrow application of 
kinesiology—the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in 
response to increases in cognitive load (i.e., mention of some person, event or 
object), which causes the subject to be distracted by intellectual or emotional 
issues, thus decreasing the muscle tension and causing the arm to drop in 
response to the constant pressure of someone’s fingers. Hawkins seems 
unaware that there is a long established and vast ongoing research effort in 
social psychology referred to by such phrases as ‘implicit cognition’, 
‘automaticity’ etc., and that his use of ‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In 
addition to muscle tone (actually infrequently used) social psychologists 
measure EEG, galvanic skin response and most frequently verbal responses 
to words, sentences, images or situations at times varying from seconds to 
months after the stimulus. 
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It was just by chance that I read Hawkins book after reading several books 
and dozens of recent papers on implicit cognition and was greatly surprised 
that he uses it as a key to the universe--i.e., the ‘ultimate nature of reality’ and 
I am sure the hundreds of active researchers would be equally amazed. I 
relate his spiritual practice to contemporary work on implicit cognition. 
 
A major issue in most contemporary research on implicit social cognition is 
the degree to which it is automatic (‘unconscious’) and what constitutes 
‘evidence’ for this. Hundreds of papers and dozens of books have appeared 
in just the last few years with massive confusion and often acrimonious 
debates. Many, such as Bargh and Wegner, take the results to mean we are 
automatons who learn and act largely without awareness via S1 and many 
others such as Kihlstrom and Shanks say these studies are flawed and we are 
creatures of S2. 
 
Though Hawkins seems to have no idea, as in other areas of the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought, the situation regarding “automaticity” 
is still as chaotic as it waswhen Wittgenstein described the reasons for the 
sterility and barrenness of psychology in the 30’s. 
 
Often the issue is stated by researchers and philosophers in terms of System 
1 and System 2 functioning --a very useful, even indispensable division of 
behavior (intentionality) into our primitive reptilian automated, 
nonreflective S1 and our higher cortical primate conscious deliberative 
functions of S2. As noted in my other reviews, this division was pioneered by 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s, though nobody has realized 
it. 
 
I am quite familiar with mediation and the phenomena of enlightenment (see 
my review of Adi Da’s autobiography ‘The Knee of Listening’) and am 
willing to accept Hawkins’ claim to be in this rarefied group (it is often said 
that we know of less than 1000 enlightened persons in all of human history). 
I can also accept that he may have been a very effective ‘therapist’ who helped 
many persons and clearly, he is highly intelligent. This does not make me 
accept his many questionable or clearly false statements about the facts of the 
world. I am also (on the basis of a lifetime of study of science and philosophy) 
very skeptical about the relevance of chaos, attractors, complexity theory, 
computation, etc. to the study of human behavior (see my many book reviews 
here and on academia.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, vixra.org, 
Amazon etc.), claims which are often made by scientists as well. I hope to 
review various books on implicit cognition, so will not go into it here except 
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to say that it involves the usual horrific mixing of factual true or false scientific 
issues about causal brain functions (the S1 mind), with those about how 
language works (i.e., the mind, which as Wittgenstein showed us ¾ of a 
century ago, is public behavior --the S2 mind)—other topics I have covered 
extensively in my reviews. 
 
So, Hawkins makes much of his muscle reading and I’m sure it often works 
well but there is a major logical error here. Regardless of what it says about 
the beliefs of the person being tested, it clearly says nothing whatever about 
the world itself. So, I respect Hawkins and his therapeutic work but, with the 
vast array of approaches to spiritual and emotional healing there are lots of 
choices. And it is one thing to be treated by an enlightened master-whose very 
presence (or even the thought of them) can be galvanizing, and quite another 
to be treated by an ordinary person. By far the best source of books, audios 
and videos of an enlightened master at work are those of Osho (Bhagwan 
Shree Rajneesh) which are available to buy or free on the net. He therapized 
thousands at a time on occasion and created the most remarkable therapeutic 
community of all time around him. Though he is gone, his therapists still 
practice worldwide and his works can be transformative. 
 
Hawkins has other books which have many favorable reviews so those 
deeply interested may consult them. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ONE BIG HAPPY FAMILY DELUSION-- 
DEMOCRACY, DIVERSITY AND EQUALITY 
WILL SAVE US 
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The Transient Suppression of the Worst Devils of 
our Nature—a review of Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better 
Angels of Our  Nature: Why Violence Has 
Declined’(2012) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is not a perfect book, but it is unique, and if you skim the first 400 or so 
pages, the last 300 (of some 700) are a pretty good attempt to apply what's 
known about behavior to social changes in violence and manners over time. 
The basic topic is: how does our genetics control and limit social change? 
Surprisingly he fails to describe the nature of kin selection (inclusive fitness) 
which explains much of animal and human social life. He also (like nearly 
everyone) lacks a clear framework for describing the logical structure of 
rationality (LSR—John Searle’s preferred term) which I prefer to call the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). He should have 
said something about the many other ways of abusing and exploiting people 
and the planet, since these are now so much more severe as to render other 
forms of violence irrelevant. Extending the concept of violence to include the 
global long term consequences of replication of someone’s genes, and having 
a grasp of the nature of how evolution works (i.e., kin selection) will provide 
a very different perspective on history, current events, and how things are 
likely to go in the next few hundred years. One might start by noting that the 
decrease in physical violence over history has been matched (and made 
possible) by the constantly increasing merciless rape of the planet (i.e., by 
people's destruction of their own descendant’s future). Pinker (like most 
people most of the time) is often distracted by the superficialities of culture 
when it’s biology that matters. See my recent reviews of Wilson’s ‘The Social 
Conquest of Earth’ and Nowak and Highfield’s ‘SuperCooperators’ here and 
on the net for a brief summary of the vacuity of altruism and the operation of 
kin selection and the uselessness and superficiality of describing behavior in 
cultural terms. 
 
This is the classic nature/nurture issue and nature trumps nurture --infinitely. 
What really matters is the violence done to the earth by the relentless increase 
in population and resource destruction (due to medicine and technology and 
conflict suppression by police and military). About 200,000 more people a day 
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(another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every month), the 12 
tons or so of topsoil going into the sea/person/year –about 1% of the world’s 
total disappearing yearly, etc. mean that unless some miracle happens the 
biosphere and civilization will largely collapse in the next two centuries and 
there will be starvation, misery and violence of every kind on a staggering 
scale.  People's manners, opinions and tendencies to commit violent acts are 
of no relevance unless they can do something to avoid this catastrophe, and I 
don't see how that is going to happen. There is no space for arguments, and 
no point either (yes I'm a fatalist), so I'll just make a few comments as though 
they were facts. Don't imagine I have a personal stake in promoting one group 
at the expense of others. I am 75, have no descendants and no close relatives 
and do not identify with any political, national or religious group and regard 
the ones I belong to by default as just as repulsive as all the rest. 
 
Parents are the worst Enemies of Life on Earth and, taking the broad view of 
things, women are as violent as men when one considers the fact that 
women's violence (like most of that done by men) is largely done in slow 
motion, at a distance in time and space and mostly carried out by proxy -by 
their descendants and by men. Increasingly, women bear children regardless 
of whether they have a mate and the effect of stopping one woman from 
breeding is on average much greater than stopping one man, since they are 
the reproductive bottleneck. One can take the view that people and their 
offspring richly deserve whatever misery comes their way and (with rare 
exceptions) the rich and famous are the worst offenders. Meryl Streep or Bill 
Gates and each of their kids may destroy 50 tons of topsoil each per year for 
generations into the future, while an Indian farmer and his may destroy 1 ton. 
If someone denies it that's fine, and to their descendants I say "Welcome to 
Hell on Earth"(WTHOE). 
 
The emphasis nowadays is always on Human Rights, but it is clear that if 
civilization is to stand a chance, Human Responsibilities must replace Human 
Rights. Nobody gets rights without being a responsible citizen and the first 
thing this means is minimal environmental destruction. The most basic 
responsibility is no children unless your society asks you to produce them. A 
society or a world that lets people breed at random will always be exploited 
by selfish genes until it collapses (or reaches a point where life is so horrific 
it's not worth living). If society continues to maintain Human Rights as 
primary, that's fine and to their descendants one can say with confidence 
"WTHOE". 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
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from the modern two systems view may consult my art The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
This is not a perfect book, but it is unique, and if you skim the first 400 or so 
pages, the last 300 (of some 700) are a pretty good attempt to apply what's 
known about behavior to social changes in violence and manners over time. 
The basic topic is: how does our genetics control and limit social change? 
Surprisingly he fails to describe the nature of kin selection (inclusive fitness) 
which explains much of animal and human social life. He also (like nearly 
everyone) lacks a clear framework for describing the logical structure of 
rationality (LSR—John Searle’s preferred term) which I prefer to call the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). Mostly the 
criticisms given by others are nit-picking and irrelevant and, as Pinker has 
said, he could not write a coherent book about "bad things", nor could he give 
every possible reference and point of view, but he should have said at least 
something about the many other ways of abusing and exploiting people and 
the planet, since these are now so much more severe as to render other forms 
of violence irrelevant. 
 
Extending the concept of violence to include the global long term 
consequences of replication of someone’s genes, and having a grasp of the 
nature of how evolution works (i.e., kin selection) will provide a very 
different perspective on history, current events, and how things are likely to 
go in the next few hundred years. One might start by noting that the decrease 
in physical violence over history has been matched (and made possible) by 
the constantly increasing merciless rape of the planet (i.e., by people's 
destruction of their own descendant’s future). Pinker (like most people most 
of the time) is often distracted by the superficialities of culture when it’s 
biology that matters. See my recent reviews of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest 
of Earth’ and Nowak and Highfield’s ‘SuperCooperators’ for a brief summary 
of the vacuity of altruism and the operation of kin selection and the 
uselessness and superficiality of describing behavior in cultural terms. 
 
This is the classic nature/nurture issue and nature trumps nurture --infinitely. 
What really matters is the violence done to the earth by the relentless increase 
in population and resource destruction (due to medicine and technology and 
conflict suppression by police and military). About 200,000 more people a day 
(another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every month), the 12 
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tons or so of topsoil going into the sea/person/year etc. mean that unless some 
miracle happens the biosphere and civilization will largely collapse in the 
next two centuries and there will be starvation, misery and violence of every 
kind on a staggering scale. 
 
People's manners, opinions and tendencies to commit violent acts are of no 
relevance unless they can do something to avoid this catastrophe, and I don't 
see how that is going to happen. There is no space for arguments, and no 
point either (yes, I'm a fatalist), so I'll just make a few comments as though 
they were facts. Don't imagine I have a personal stake in promoting one group 
at the expense of others. I am 75, have no descendants and no close relatives 
and do not identify with any political, national or religious group and regard 
the ones I belong to by default as just as repulsive as all the rest. 
 
Parents are the worst Enemies of Life on Earth and, taking the broad view of 
things, women are as violent as men when one considers the fact that 
women's violence (like most of that done by men) is largely done in slow 
motion, at a distance in time and space and mostly carried out by proxy -by 
their descendants and by men. Increasingly, women bear children regardless 
of whether they have a mate and the effect of stopping one woman from 
breeding is on average much greater than stopping one man, since they are 
the reproductive bottleneck. One can take the view that people and their 
offspring richly deserve whatever misery comes their way and (with rare 
exceptions) the rich and famous are the worst offenders. Meryl Streep or Bill 
Gates and each of their kids may destroy 50 tons of topsoil each per year for 
generations into the future, while an Indian farmer and his may destroy 1 ton. 
If someone denies it that's fine, and to their descendants I say "Welcome to 
Hell on Earth"(WTHOE). 
 
The emphasis nowadays is always on Human Rights, but it is clear that if 
civilization is to stand a chance, Human Responsibilities must replace Human 
Rights. Nobody gets rights (i.e., privileges) without being a responsible 
citizen and the first thing this means is minimal environmental destruction. 
The most basic responsibility is no children unless your society asks you to 
produce them. A society or a world that lets people breed at random will 
always be exploited by selfish genes until it collapses (or reaches a point 
where life is so horrific it's not worth living). If society continues to maintain 
Human Rights as primary, that's fine and to their descendants one can say 
with confidence "WTHOE". 
 
"Helping" has to be seen from a global long term perspective. Almost all 
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"help" that's given by individuals, organizations or countries harms others 
and the world in the long run and must only be given after very careful 
consideration. If you want to hand out money, food, medicine, etc., you need 
to ask what the long term environmental consequences are. If you want to 
please everyone all the time, that's fine and again to your descendants I say 
"WTHOE". 
 
Dysgenics: endless trillions of creatures beginning with bacteria-like forms 
over 3 billion years ago have died to create us and all current life and this is 
called eugenics, evolution by natural selection or kin selection (inclusive 
fitness). We all have "bad genes" but some are worse than others. It is 
estimated that up to 50% of all human conceptions end in spontaneous 
abortion due to "bad genes". Civilization is dysgenic. This problem is 
currently trivial compared to overpopulation but getting worse by the day. 
Medicine, welfare, democracy, equality, justice, human rights and "helping" 
of all kinds have global long term dysgenic consequences which will collapse 
society even if population growth stops. Again, if the world refuses to believe 
it or doesn't want to deal with it that's fine and to their (and everyone’s) 
descendants we can say "WTHOE". 
 
Beware the utopian scenarios that suggest doomsday can be avoided by 
judicious application of technologies. As they say you can fool some of the 
people all of the time and all of the people some of the time but you can't fool 
mother nature any of the time. I leave you with just one example. Famous 
scientist Raymond Kurzweil proposed nanobots as the saviors of humankind. 
They would make anything we needed and clean every mess. They would 
even make ever better versions of themselves. They would keep us as pets. 
But think of how many people treat their pets, and pets are overpopulating 
and destroying and becoming dysgenic almost as fast as humans (e.g. feral 
cats alone kill perhaps 100 billion wild animals a year). Pets only exist because 
we destroy the earth to feed them and we have spay and neuter clinics and 
euthanize the sick and unwanted ones. We practice rigorous population 
control and eugenics on them deliberately and by omission, and no form of 
life can evolve or exist without these two controls—not even bots. And what's 
to stop nanobots from evolving? Any change that facilitated reproduction 
would automatically be selected for and any behavior that wasted time or 
energy (i.e., taking care of humans) would be heavily selected against. What 
would stop the bots program from mutating into a homicidal form and 
exploiting all earth's resources causing global collapse? There is no free lunch 
for bots either and to them too we can confidently say "WTHOE". 
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This is where any thoughts about the world and human behavior must lead 
an educated person but Pinker says nothing about it. So, the first 400 pages of 
this book can be skipped and the last 300 read as a nice summary of EP 
(evolutionary psychology) as of 2011. However, as in his other books and 
nearly universally in the behavioral sciences, there is no clear broad 
framework for intentionality as pioneered by Wittgenstein, Searle and many 
others. I have presented such a framework in my many reviews of works by 
and about these two natural psychological geniuses and will not repeat it 
here. 
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The Dead Hands of Group Selection and 
Phenomenology -- A Review of Individuality and 
Entanglement by Herbert Gintis 357p (2017) 
 
Michael Starks 
 ABSTRACT 
Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books 
with interest, I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he 
makes the dead hands of group selection and phenomenology into the 
centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this largely invalidates the work. 
Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into question all his 
previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at 
Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a few years ago was one of the major scandals 
in biology in the last decade, and I have recounted the sad story in my article 
‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the Templeton Foundation 
bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked Evolution, Rationality and 
Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) 
and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’ Unlike Nowak, Gintis 
does not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by the strong 
desire to generate an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, made 
easy by the (near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology 
and blank slateism of behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general 
public. 
 
Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists 
and other behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to 
describe behavior. Of course, the framework needed to understand behavior 
is an evolutionary one. Unfortunately, he fails to provide one himself 
(according to his many critics and I concur), and the attempt to graft the rotten 
corpse of group selection onto whatever economic and psychological theories 
he has generated in his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. 
 
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the 
genetics, like Wilson and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the 
math just blinds him to the biological impossibilities and of course this is the 
norm in science. As Wittgenstein famously noted on the first page of Culture 
and Value “There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of 
metaphysical expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in 
mathematics.” 
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It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which 
decreases its own frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion 
of group selection. Furthermore, it has been well known and often 
demonstrated that group selection just reduces to inclusive fitness (kin 
selection), which, as Dawkins has noted, is just another name for evolution 
by natural selection. Like Wilson, Gintis has worked in this arena for about 
50 years and still has not grasped it, but after the scandal broke, it took me 
only 3 days to find, read and understand the most relevant professional work, 
as detailed in my article. It is mind boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson 
were unable to accomplish this in nearly half a century. 
 
I discuss the errors of group selection and phenomenology that are the norm 
in academia as special cases of the near universal failure to understand 
human nature that are destroying America and the world. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books 
with interest, I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly, he 
makes the dead hands of group selection and phenomenology into the 
centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this largely invalidates the work. 
Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into question all his 
previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at 
Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a few years ago was one of the major scandals 
in biology in the last decade, and I have recounted the sad story in my article 
‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the Templeton Foundation 
bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked Evolution, Rationality and 
Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) 
and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’ Unlike Nowak, Gintis 
does not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by the strong 
desire to generate an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, made 
easy by the (near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology 
and blank slateism of behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general 
public. 
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Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists 
and other behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to 
describe behavior. Of course, the framework needed to understand behavior 
is an evolutionary one. Unfortunately, he fails to provide one himself 
(according to his many critics and I concur), and the attempt to graft the rotten 
corpse of group selection onto whatever economic and psychological theories 
he has generated in his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. 
 
Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the 
genetics, like Wilson and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the 
math just blinds him to the biological impossibilities and of course this is the 
norm in science. As Wittgenstein famously noted on the first page of Culture 
and Value “There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of 
metaphysical expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in 
mathematics.” 
 
It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which 
decreases its own frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion 
of group selection. Furthermore, it has been well known and often 
demonstrated that group selection just reduces to inclusive fitness (kin 
selection), which, as Dawkins has noted, is just another name for evolution 
by natural selection. Like Wilson, Gintis has worked in this arena for about 
50 years and still has not grasped it, but after the scandal broke, it took me 
only 3 days to find, read and understand the most relevant professional work, 
as detailed in my article. It is mind boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson 
were unable to accomplish this in nearly half a century. 
 
 
In the years after the Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita paper was published in Nature, 
several population geneticists recounted chapter and verse on the subject, 
again showing conclusively that it is all a storm in a teacup. It is most 
unfortunate that Gintis, like his friends, failed to ask a competent biologist 
about this and regards as misguided the 140 some well known biologists who 
a signed a letter protesting the publication of this nonsense in Nature. I refer 
those who want the gory details to my paper, as it’s the best account of the 
melee that I am aware of.  For a summary of the tech details see Dawkins 
Article The Descent of Edward Wilson 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/edward-wilson-social-
conquest-earth-evolutionary-errors-origin-species.  As Dawkins wrote ‘For 
Wilson not to acknowledge that he speaks for himself against the great 
majority of his professional colleagues is—it pains me to say this of a lifelong 
 373  
hero —an act of wanton arrogance’. Sadly, Gintis has assimilated himself to 
such inglorious company. There are also some nice Dawkins youtubes such 
as https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBweDk4ZzZ4. 
 
Gintis has also failed to provide the behavioral framework lacking in all the 
social sciences. One needs to have a logical structure for rationality, an 
understanding of the two systems of thought (dual process theory), of the 
division between scientific issues of fact and philosophical issues of how 
language works in the context at issue, and of how to avoid reductionism and 
scientism, but he, like nearly all students of behavior, is largely clueless. He, 
like them, is enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the urge to 
explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we only need to describe, and 
that theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using language (language games) 
which have value only insofar as they have a clear test (clear truthmakers, or 
as eminent philosopher John Searle likes to say, clear Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS)).  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my art The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’(2017). 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness (intentionality, 
behavior) is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s 
(the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from the 50’s to the present by his 
successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, 
Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for 
furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and 
the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors 
comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR- Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind 
(LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the 
classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the 
Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms 
introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
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The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much 
simpler table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the 
three recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in 
mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He 
showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences 
(language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— 
showing the correct context. 
 
Gintis starts making dubious, vague or downright bizarre claims early in the 
book. It begins on the first page of the overview with meaningless quotes 
from Einstein and Ryle. On pxii the paragraph beginning ‘Third Theme’ 
about entangled minds needs rewriting to specify that language games are 
functions of System 2 and that’s how thinking, believing etc. work (what they 
are), while the Fourth Theme which tries to explain behavior as due to what 
people ‘consciously believe’ is right. That is, with ‘nonconsequentialism’ he’s 
trying to ‘explain’ behavior as ‘altruistic’ group selection mediated by 
conscious linguistic System 2. But if we take an evolutionary long term view, 
it’s clearly due to reciprocal altruism, attempting to serve inclusive fitness, 
which is mediated by the unconscious operation of System 1. Likewise, for 
the Fifth Theme and the rest of the Overview. He favors Rational Choice but 
has no idea this is a language game for which the exact context must be 
specified, nor that both System 1 and System 2 are ‘rational’ but in quite 
different ways. This is the classic error of most descriptions of behavior, 
which Searle has called The Phenomenological Illusion, Pinker the Blank 
Slate and Tooby and Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science Model’) and I 
have discussed it extensively in my other reviews and articles. As long as one 
does not grasp that most of our behavior is automated by nonlinguistic 
System 1, and that our conscious linguistic System 2 is mostly for 
rationalization of our compulsive and unconscious choices, it is not possible 
to have more than a very superficial view of behavior, i.e., the one that is 
nearly universal not only among academics but politicians, billionaire owners 
of high tech companies, movie stars and the general public. Consequently, 
the consequences reach far beyond academia, producing delusional social 
policies that are bringing about the inexorable collapse of industrial 
civilization. See my ‘Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and the 
World’. It is breathtaking to see America and the European democracies 
helping citizens of the third world destroy everyone’s future. 
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On pxiii one can describe the ‘nonconsequentialist’ (i.e., apparently ‘true’ 
altruistic or self- destructive behavior) as actually performing reciprocal 
altruism, serving inclusive fitness due to genes evolved in the EEA 
(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., that of our  very distant 
ancestors), which stimulates the dopaminergic circuits in the ventral 
tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens, with the resulting release of 
dopamine which makes us feel good—the same mechanism that appears to 
be involved in all addictive behavior from drug abuse to  soccer moms. 
 
And more incoherent babble such as “In the context of such environments, 
there is a fitness benefit to the ‘epigenetic transmission’ of such ‘information’ 
concerning the ‘current state’ of the ‘environment’, i.e., transmission through 
non-genetic ‘channels’. This is called ‘cultural transmission’” [scare quotes 
mine]. Also, that ‘culture’ is ‘directly encoded’ in the brain (p7), which he says 
is the main tenet of gene-culture coevolution, and that democratic institutions 
and voting are altruistic and cannot be explained in terms of self-interest (p17-
18). The major reason for these peculiar views does not really come out until 
p186 when he finally makes it clear that he is a group selectionist. Since there 
is no such thing as group selection apart from inclusive fitness, it’s no surprise 
that this is just another incoherent account of behavior—i.e., more or less 
what Tooby and Cosmides famously termed The Standard Social Science 
Model or Pinker ‘The Blank Slate’. 
 
What he calls ‘altruistic genes’ on p188 should be called ‘inclusive fitness 
genes’ or ‘kin selection genes’. Gintis is also much impressed with the idea of 
gene-culture coevolution, which only means that culture may itself be an 
agent of natural selection but he fails to grasp that this can only happen 
within the context of natural selection (inclusive fitness). Like nearly all social 
scientists (and scientists, philosophers etc.), it never crosses his mind that 
‘culture’, ‘coevolution’,’ symbolic’,’ ‘epigenetic’, ‘information’, 
‘representation’ etc., are all families of complex language games, whose COS 
(Conditions Of Satisfaction, tests for truth) are exquisitely sensitive to context. 
Without a specific context, they don’t mean anything. So, in this book, as in 
most of the literature on behavior, there is much talk that has the appearance 
of sense without sense (meaning or clear COS). 
 
His claim on pxv, that most of our genes are the result of culture, is clearly 
preposterous as e.g., it is well known that we are about 98% chimpanzee. 
Only if he means those relating to language can we accept the possibility that 
some of our genes have been subject to cultural selection and even these 
merely modified ones that already existed—i.e., a few base pairs were 
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changed out of hundreds of thousands or millions in each gene. 
 
He is much taken with the ‘rational actor’ model of economic behavior. but 
again, is unaware that the automaticities of S1 underlie all ‘rational’ behavior 
and the conscious linguistic deliberations of S2 cannot take place without 
them. Like many, perhaps the vast majority of current younger students of 
behavior, I see all human activities as easily comprehensible results of the 
working of selfish genetics in a contemporary context in which police 
surveillance and a temporary abundance of resources gotten by raping the 
earth and robbing our own descendants leads to relative temporary 
tranquility. In this connection, I suggest my review of Pinker’s recent book—
The Transient Suppression of the Worst Devils of Our Nature—A Review of 
The Better Angels of Our Nature’.  
 
Many behaviors look like true altruism, and some are (i.e., they will decrease 
the frequency of the genes that bring them about – i.e, lead to the extinction 
of their own descendants), but the point which Gintis misses is that these are 
due to a psychology which evolved long ago in small groups on the African 
plains in the EEA and made sense then (i.e., it was inclusive fitness, when 
everyone in our group of a few dozen to a few hundred were our close 
relatives), and so we often continue with these behaviors even though they 
no longer make sense (i.e., they serve the interests of unrelated or distantly 
related persons which decreases our genetic fitness by decreasing the 
frequency of the genes that made it possible). This accounts for his promoting 
the notion that many behaviors are ‘truly altruistic’, rather than selfish in 
origin (such as in sect. 3.2). He even notes this and calls it ‘distributed 
effectivity’ (p60-63) in which people behave in big elections as though they 
were small ones, but he fails to see this is not due to any genes for ‘true 
altruism’ but to genes for reciprocal altruism (inclusive fitness), which is of 
course selfish. Thus, people behave as though their actions (e.g., their votes) 
were consequential, even though it is clear that they are not.  E.g., one can 
find on the net that the chances of any one person’s vote deciding the outcome 
of an American presidential election is in the range of millions to tens of 
millions to one. And of course, the same is true of our chances of winning a 
lottery, yet our malfunctioning EEA psychology makes lotteries and voting 
hugely popular activities. 
 
He also seems unaware of the standard terminology and ways of describing 
behavior used in evolutionary psychology (EP). E.g., on pg. 75 Arrow’s 
description of norms of social behavior are described in economic terms 
rather than as EP from the EEA trying to operate in current environments, 
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and at the bottom of the page, people act not as ‘altruistic’ punishers (i.e., as 
‘group selectionists’) but as inclusive fitness punishers. On p 78, to say that 
subjects act ‘morally’ or in accord with a norm ‘for its own sake’, is again to 
embrace the group selectionist/phenomenological illusion, and clearly it is 
groups of genes that are trying to increase their inclusive fitness via well-
known EP mechanisms like cheater detection and punishment.  Again, on 
p88, what he describes as other-regarding unselfish actions can just as easily 
be described as self-regarding attempts at reciprocal altruism which go astray 
in a large society. 
 
Naturally, he often uses standard economics jargon such as ‘the subjective 
prior must be interpreted as a conditional probability’, which just means a 
belief in the likelihood of a particular outcome (p90-91), and ‘common 
subjective priors’ (shared beliefs) p122. Much of the book and of behavior 
concerns what is often called ‘we intentionality’ or the construction of social 
reality, but the most eminent theorist in this arena, John Searle, is not 
discussed, his now standard terminology such as COS and DIRA (desire 
independent reasons for action) does not appear, he is not in the index, and 
only one of his many works, and that over 20 years old, is found in the 
bibliography. 
 
On p97 he comments favorably on Bayesian updating without mentioning 
that it is notorious for lacking any meaningful test for success (i.e., clear COS), 
and commonly fails to make any clear predictions, so that no matter what 
people do, it can describe their behavior after the fact. 
 
However, the main problem with chapter 5 is that ‘rational’ and other terms 
are complex language games that have no meaning apart from very specific 
contexts, which are typically lacking here. Of course, as Wittgenstein showed 
us, this is the core problem of all discussion of behavior and Gintis has most 
of the behavioral science community (or at least most of those over 40) as 
coconspirators. Likewise, throughout the book, such as chapter 6, where he 
discusses ‘complexity theory’, ‘emergent properties’, ‘macro and micro 
levels’, and ‘nonlinear dynamical systems’ and the generation of ‘models’ 
(which can mean almost anything and ‘describe’ almost anything), but it’s 
only prediction that counts (i.e., clear COS). 
 
In spite of his phenomenological illusion (i.e., the near universal assumption 
that our conscious deliberations describe and control behavior—at odds with 
almost all the research in social psychology for the last 40 years), he also 
shares the reductionist delusion, wondering why the social sciences have not 
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got a core analytical theory and have not coalesced. This of course is a 
frequent subject in the social sciences and philosophy and the reason is that 
psychology of higher order thought is not describable by causes, but by 
reasons, and one cannot make psychology disappear into physiology nor 
physiology into biochemistry nor it into physics etc. They are just different 
and indispensable levels of description. Wittgenstein famously described it 
80 years ago in the Blue Book. 
 
“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the 
method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural 
phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, 
in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a 
generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. 
This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher 
into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to 
reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 
“purely descriptive.” 
 
He is also quite out of touch with the contemporary world, thinking that 
people are going to be nice because they have internalized altruism (i.e., 
group selection), and with demographic realities, when he opines that 
population growth is under control, when in fact predictions are for another 
4 billion by 2100 (p133). 
 
He sees a need to “carve an academic niche for sociology” (p148), but the 
whole discussion is typical gibberish (no clear COS), and all one really needs 
(or can give) is a clear description of the language games (the mind at work) 
we play in social situations, and how they show how our attempts at inclusive 
fitness work or go astray in contemporary contexts. Over and over he pushes 
his fantasy that “inherently ethical behavior” (i.e., group selectionist altruism) 
explains our social behavior, ignoring the obvious facts that it’s due to 
temporary abundance of resources, police and surveillance, and that always 
when you take these away, savagery quickly emerges (e.g., p151). It’s easy to 
maintain such delusions when one lives in the ivory tower world of abstruse 
theories, inattentive to the millions of scams, robberies, rapes, assaults, thefts 
and murders taking place every day. 
 
Again, and again, (e.g., top p170) he ignores the obvious explanations for our 
‘rationality’, which is natural selection –i.e., inclusive fitness in the EEA 
leading to ESS (Evolutionarily Stable Strategies), or at least they were more 
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or less stable in small groups 100,000 to 3 million years ago. 
 
Chapter 9 on the Sociology of the Genome is inevitably full of mistakes and 
incoherence—e.g., there are not special ‘altruistic genes’, rather, all genes 
serve inclusive fitness or they disappear (p188). The problem is that the only 
way to really get selfish genetics and inclusive fitness across is to have Gintis 
in a room for a day with Dawkins, Franks, Coyne etc., explaining why it is 
wrong. But as always, one has to have a certain level of education, 
intelligence, rationality and honesty for this to work, and if one is just a little 
bit short in several categories, it will not succeed. The same of course is true 
for much of human understanding, and so the vast majority will never get 
anything that is at all subtle. As with the Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita paper, I am 
sure that Dawkins, Franks and others would have been willing to go over this 
chapter and explain where it goes astray, but wanton arrogance is an absolute 
barrier to truth. 
 
The major problem is that people just do not grasp the concept of natural 
selection by inclusive fitness nor of subconscious motivations, and that many 
have ‘religious’ motivations for rejecting them. This includes not just the 
general public and non-science academics, but a large percentage of biologists 
and behavioral scientists.   I recently came across a lovely review by Dawkins 
of a discussion of the selfish gene idea by top level professional biologists, in 
which he had to go over their work line by line to explain that they just did 
not grasp how it all works. But only a small number of people like him could 
do this, and the sea of confusion is vast, and so these delusions about human 
nature that destroy this book, and are destroying America and the world will, 
as the Queen said to Alice in a slightly different context, go on until they come 
to the end and then stop. 
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Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the 
Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard 
Professorship and attacked Evolution, Rationality 
and Civilization. A review of E.O. Wilson 'The 
Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and 
Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’(2012) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Famous ant-man E.O. Wilson has always been one of my heroes --not only an 
outstanding biologist, but one of the tiny and vanishing minority of 
intellectuals who at least dares to hint at the truth about our nature that others 
fail to grasp, or insofar as they do grasp, studiously avoid for political 
expedience. Sadly, he is ending his long career in a most sordid fashion as a 
party to an ignorant and arrogant attack on science motivated at least in part 
by religious fervor. It shows the vile consequences when universities accept 
money from religious groups, science journals are so awed by big names that 
they avoid proper peer review, and when egos are permitted to get out of 
control. It takes us into the nature of evolution, the basics of scientific 
methodology, how math relates to science, what constitutes a theory, and 
even what attitudes to religion and generosity are appropriate as we 
inexorably approach the collapse of industrial civilization. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
Famous ant-man E.O. Wilson has always been one of my heroes--not only an 
outstanding biologist, but one of the tiny and vanishing minority of 
intellectuals who at least dares to hint at the truth about our nature that others 
fail to grasp, or insofar as they do grasp, studiously avoid for of political 
expedience. Sadly, he is ending his long career in a most sordid fashion as a 
party to an ignorant and arrogant attack on science motivated at least in part 
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by religious fervor. It shows the vile consequences when universities accept 
money from religious groups, science journals are so awed by big names that 
they avoid proper peer review, and when egos are permitted to get out of 
control. It takes us into the nature of evolution, the basics of scientific 
methodology, how math relates to science, what constitutes a theory, and 
even what attitudes to religion and generosity are appropriate as we 
inexorably approach the collapse of industrial civilization. 
 
I found sections in ‘Conquest’ with the usual incisive commentary (though 
nothing really new or interesting if you have read his other works and are up 
on biology in general) in the often-stilted prose that is his hallmark, but was 
quite surprised that the core of the book is his rejection of inclusive fitness 
(which has been a mainstay of evolutionary biology for over 50 years) in favor 
of group selection. One assumes that coming from him and with the articles 
he refers to published by himself and Harvard mathematics colleague Nowak 
in major peer reviewed journals like Nature, it must be a substantial advance, 
in spite of the fact that I knew group selection was nearly universally rejected 
as having any major role in evolution. 
 
I have read numerous reviews on the net and many have good comments but 
the one I most wanted to see was that by renowned science writer and 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins. Unlike most by professionals, which 
are in journals only available to those with access to a university, it is readily 
available on the net, though apparently, he decided not to publish it in a 
journal as it is suitably scathing. 
 
Sadly, one finds a devastating rejection of the book and the most acerbic 
commentary on a scientific colleague I have ever seen from Dawkins-- 
exceeding anything in his many exchanges with late and unlamented 
demagogue and pseudoscientist Stephan Jay Gould. Although Gould was 
infamous for his personal attacks on his Harvard colleague Wilson, Dawkins 
notes that much of ‘Conquest’ reminds one uncomfortably of Gould’s 
frequent lapses into "bland, unfocussed ecumenicalism". The same is more or 
less true of all Wilson’s popular writing including his most recent book ‘The 
Meaning of Human Existence’—another shameless self-promotion of his 
discredited ideas on Inclusive Fitness (IF). 
 
Dawkins points out that the notorious 2010 paper by Nowak, Tarnita and 
Wilson in Nature was almost universally rejected by over 140 biologists who 
responded with letters and that there is not one word about this in Wilson's 
book. Nor have they corrected this in the subsequent 4 years of articles, 
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lectures and several books. There is no choice but to agree with Dawkin's 
trenchant comment "For Wilson not to acknowledge that he speaks for 
himself against the great majority of his professional colleagues is--it pains 
me to say this of a lifelong hero --an act of wanton arrogance." In view of 
Nowak’s subsequent behavior one must include him as well. I feel like one of 
the stunned people one sees on TV being interviewed after the nice man next 
door, who has been babysitting everyone's children for 30 years, is exposed 
as a serial killer. 
 
Dawkins also points out (as he and others have done for many years) that 
inclusive fitness is entailed by (i.e., logically follows from) neo- Darwinism 
and cannot be rejected without rejecting evolution itself. Wilson again 
reminds us of Gould, who denounced creationists from one side of his mouth 
while giving them comfort by spewing endless ultraliberal Marxist-tinged 
gibberish about spandrels, punctuated equilibrium and evolutionary 
psychology from the other. The vagueness and mathematical opacity (to most 
of us) of the mathematics of group or multilevel selection is just what the soft-
minded want to enable them to escape rational thinking in their endless 
antiscientific rants, and (in academia) postmodernist word salads. 
 
Worse yet, Wilson's ‘Conquest’ is a poorly thought out and sloppily written 
mess full of nonsequiturs, vague ramblings, confusions and incoherence. A 
good review that details some of these is that by graduate student Gerry 
Carter which you can find on the net. Wilson is also out of touch with our 
current understanding of evolutionary psychology (EP) (see e.g., the last 300 
pages of Pinker's ‘The Better Angels of our Nature’). If you want a serious 
book length account of social evolution and some relevant EP from a by an 
expert see Principles of Social Evolution by Andrew F.G. Bourke, or a not 
quite so serious and admittedly flawed and rambling account but a must read 
nevertheless by Robert Trivers--The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and 
Self-Deception in Human Life and older but still current and penetrating 
works such as The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition by Robert 
Axelrod and The Biology of Moral Systems by Richard Alexander. 
 
After reading this book and its reviews, I dug into some of the scientific 
articles which responded to Nowak and Wilson and to Van Veelen’s critiques 
of the Price equation upon which they heavily relied. The reviews noted that 
it has always been clear that the math of group or multilevel selection reduces 
to that of inclusive fitness (kin selection) and that it is not logically possible to 
select for behavior that does not benefit the genes that are unique to the actor 
and its immediate relatives. To put it bluntly, ‘altruistic’ behavior is always 
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selfish in the end in the sense that it increases survival of the genes in the 
altruist. This to me is obvious from daily life and any scientists who claim 
otherwise have clearly lost their way. Yes, it does happen in the weirdness of 
modern life (i.e., so unlike the stone age society in which we evolved) that one 
sometimes sees a person give their life to protect a nonrelated person, but 
clearly, they will not do it again and (provided its done before they replicate) 
any tendency to do it will not be inherited either. Even if they have already 
replicated they will on average leave behind fewer descendants than if they 
held back. This guarantees that any genetic tendency for ‘true altruism’- i.e., 
behavior that decreases one’s genes in the population-- will be selected 
against and no more than this very basic logic is needed to grasp evolution 
by natural selection, kin selection and inclusive fitness—all the mathematical 
niceties serving only to quantitate things and to clarify strange living 
arrangements in some of our relatives (e.g., ants, termites and mole rats). 
 
The major focus of the group selectionist’s (‘groupies’) attack was the famous 
Extended Price Equation that has been used to model inclusive fitness, 
published by Price about 40 years ago. The best papers debunking these 
attacks that I have found are those of Frank and Bourke and I will start with 
a few quotes from Frank ‘Natural selection. IV. The Price equation’ J. EVOL. 
BIOL. 25 (2012) 1002–1019. 
 
‘The critics confuse the distinct roles of general abstract theory and concrete 
dynamical models for particular cases. The enduring power of the Price 
equation arises from the discovery of essential invariances in natural 
selection. For example, kin selection theory expresses biological problems in 
terms of relatedness coefficients. Relatedness measures the association 
between social partners. The proper measure of relatedness identifies distinct 
biological scenarios with the same (invariant) evolutionary outcome. 
Invariance relations provide the deepest insights of scientific 
thought…Essentially, all modern discussions of multilevel selection and 
group selection derive from Price (1972a), as developed by Hamilton (1975). 
Price and Hamilton noted that the Price equation can be expanded 
recursively to represent nested levels of analysis, for example individuals 
living in groups… All modern conceptual insights about group selection 
derive from Price’s recursive expansion of his abstract expression of 
selection… A criticism of these Price equation applications is a criticism of the 
central approach of evolutionary quantitative genetics. Such criticisms may 
be valid for certain applications, but they must be evaluated in the broader 
context of quantitative genetics theory…[and in a quote from Price … ‘Gene 
frequency change is the basic event in biological evolution. The following 
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equation…which gives frequency change under selection from one 
generation to the next for a single gene or for any linear function of any 
number of genes at any number of loci, holds for any sort of dominance or 
epistasis, for sexual or asexual reproduction, for random or nonrandom 
mating, for diploid, haploid or polyploid species, and even for imaginary 
species with more than two sexes’…]… Path (contextual) analysis follows as 
a natural extension of the Price equation, in which one makes specific models 
of fitness expressed by regression. It does not make sense to discuss the Price 
equation and path analysis as alternatives… Critiques of the Price equation 
rarely distinguish the costs and benefits of particular assumptions in relation 
to particular goals. I use van Veelen’s recent series of papers as a proxy for 
those critiques. That series repeats some of the common misunderstandings 
and adds some new ones. 
 
Nowak recently repeated van Veelen’s critique as the basis for his 
commentary on the Price equation (van Veelen, 2005; Nowak et al., 2010; van 
Veelen et al., 2010; Nowak& Highfield, 2011; van Veelen, 2011; van Veelen et 
al., 2012… This quote from van Veelen et al. (2012) demonstrates an 
interesting approach to scholarship. They first cite Frank as stating that 
dynamic insufficiency is a drawback of the Price equation. They then disagree 
with that point of view and present as their own interpretation an argument 
that is nearly identical in concept and phrasing to my own statement in the 
very paper that they cited as the foundation for their disagreement… The 
recursive form of the full Price equation provides the foundation for all 
modern studies of group selection and multilevel analysis. The Price equation 
helped in discovering those various connections, although there are many 
other ways in which to derive the same relations… Kin selection theory 
derives much of its power by identifying an invariant informational quantity 
sufficient to unify a wide variety of seemingly disparate processes (Frank, 
1998, Chapter 6). The interpretation of kin selection as an informational 
invariance has not been fully developed and remains an open problem. 
Invariances provide the foundation of scientific understanding: ‘It is only 
slightly overstating the case to say that physics is the study of symmetry’ 
(Anderson, 1972). Invariance and symmetry mean the same thing (Weyl, 
1983). Feynman (1967) emphasized that invariance is The Character of 
Physical Law. The commonly observed patterns of probability can be unified 
by the study of invariance and its association with measurement (Frank & 
Smith, 2010, 2011). There has been little effort in biology to pursue similar 
understanding of invariance and measurement (Frank, 2011; Houle et 
al.,2011).’ 
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I hope it is becoming clear why I chose the title I did for this article. To attack 
the Price equation and inclusive fitness is to attack not only quantitative 
genetics and evolution by natural selection, but the universally used concepts 
of covariance, invariance and symmetry, which are basic to science and to 
rationality. Furthermore, the clearly voiced religious motivation of Nowak 
invites us to consider to what extent such Christian virtues as true 
(permanently genetically self-diminishing) altruism and the brotherhood of 
man (woman, child, dog etc.) can be part of a rational program for survival 
in the near future. My take is that true altruism is a luxury for those who don’t 
mind being evolutionary dead ends and that even in it’s ‘make believe’ 
inclusive fitness version, one will be hard pressed to find it when the wolf is 
at the door (i.e., the likely universal scenario for the 12 billion in the next 
century). 
 
There is much more in this gem, which goes into exquisite logical and 
mathematical detail (and likewise his many other papers-you can get all 7 in 
this series in one pdf) but this will give the flavor. Another amusing episode 
concerns tautology in math. Frank again: ‘Nowak & Highfield (2011) and van 
Veelen et al. (2012) believe their arguments demonstrate that the Price 
equation is true in the same trivial sense, and they call that trivial type of truth 
a mathematical tautology. Interestingly, magazines, online articles and the 
scientific literature have for several years been using the phrase mathematical 
tautology for the Price equation, although Nowak & Highfield (2011) and van 
Veelen et al. (2012) do not provide citations to previous literature. As far as I 
know, the first description of the Price equation as a mathematical tautology 
was in the study of Frank (1995).’ 
 
Unlike Frank, Lamm and others, the ‘groupies’ have not shown any 
understanding of the philosophy of science (the descriptive psychology of 
higher order thought, as I like to call it) in these recent books and articles, nor 
in any of Wilson’s numerous popular books and articles over the last half 
century, so I would not expect them to have studied Wittgenstein (the most 
penetrating philosopher of mathematics) who famously remarked that in 
math ‘everything is syntax, nothing is semantics’. Wittgenstein exposes a 
nearly universal misunderstanding of the role of math in science. All math 
(and logic) is a tautology that has no meaning or use until it is connected to 
our life with words. Every equation is a tautology until numbers and words 
and the system of conventions we call evolutionary psychology are 
employed. Amazingly Lamm in his recent excellent article ‘A Gentle 
Introduction to The Price Equation’ (2011) notes this: 
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‘The Price equation deals with any selection process. Indeed, we can define 
selection using it. It says nothing in particular about biological or genetic 
evolution, and is not tied to any particular biological scenario. This gives it 
immense power, but also means that it is quite possible to apply it incorrectly 
to the real world. This leads us to the second and final observation. The Price 
equation is analytic [true by definition or tautologous]. It is not a synthetic 
proposition [an empirical issue as to its truth or falsity]. We derived it based 
on straightforward definitions, and universal mathematical principles. The 
equation simply provides a useful way of interpreting the meaning of the 
straightforward definitions we started from. This however is not the case 
once you put the equation into words, thereby interpreting the mathematical 
relationships. If you merely say: _I define 'selection' to be the covariance blah 
blah blah, you might be safe. If you say: _the covariance blah blah blah is 
selection, you are making a claim with empirical content. More 
fundamentally, the belief that the rules of probability theory and statistics, or 
any other mathematical manipulation, describe the actual world is synthetic.’ 
 
In this regard, also recommended is Helantera and Uller’s ‘The Price 
Equation and Extended Inheritance’ Philos Theor Biol (2010) 2: e101. ‘Here 
we use the Price Equation as a starting point for a discussion of the differences 
between four recently proposed categories of inheritance systems; genetic, 
epigenetic, behavioral and symbolic. Specifically, we address how the 
components of the Price Equation encompass different non-genetic systems 
of inheritance in an attempt to clarify how the different systems are 
conceptually related. We conclude that the four classes of inheritance systems 
do not form distinct clusters with respect to their effect on the rate and 
direction of phenotypic change from one generation to the next in the absence 
or presence of selection. Instead, our analyses suggest that different 
inheritance systems can share features that are conceptually very similar, but 
that their implications for adaptive evolution nevertheless differ substantially 
as a result of differences in their ability to couple selection and inheritance.’ 
 
So, it should be clear that there is no such thing as sidestepping the Price 
equation and that like any equation, it has limitless applications if one only 
connects it to the world with suitable words. 
 
As Andy Gardner put it in his article on Price (Current Biology 18#5 R198). 
Also see his ‘Adaptation and Inclusive Fitness’ Current Biology 23, R577–
R584, July 8, 2013 
 
‘Such ideas were rather confused until Price, and later Hamilton, showed that 
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the Price equation can be expanded to encompass multiple levels of selection 
acting simultaneously (Box 2). This allows selection at the various levels to be 
explicitly defined and separated, and provides the formal basis of group 
selection theory. Importantly, it allows the quantification of these separate 
forces and yields precise predictions for when group-beneficial behavior will 
be favoured. It turns out that these predictions are always consistent with 
Hamilton’s rule, rb – c > 0. 
 
Furthermore, because kin selection and group selection theory are both based 
upon the same Price equation, it is easy to show that the two approaches are 
mathematically exactly equivalent, and are simply alternative ways of 
carving up the total selection operating upon the social character. Irrespective 
of the approach taken, individual organisms are expected to maximize their 
inclusive fitness — though this result follows more easily from a kin selection 
analysis, as it makes the key element of relatedness more explicit.’ 
 
Consequently, to have the ‘groupies’ attacking the Price is bizarre. And here 
is Bourke’s recent summary of inclusive fitness vs ‘groupism’: (haplodiploid 
and eusocial refer to the social insects which provide some of the best tests). 
 
‘Recent critiques have questioned the validity of the leading theory for 
explaining social evolution and eusociality, namely inclusive fitness (kin 
selection) theory. I review recent and past literature to argue that these 
critiques do not succeed. Inclusive fitness theory has added fundamental 
insights to natural selection theory. These are the realization that selection on 
a gene for social behaviour depends on its effects on co-bearers, the 
explanation of social behaviours as unalike as altruism and selfishness using 
the same underlying parameters, and the explanation of within-group 
conflict in terms of non-coinciding inclusive fitness optima. A proposed 
alternative theory for eusocial evolution assumes mistakenly that workers’ 
interests are subordinate to the queen’s, contains no new elements and fails 
to make novel predictions. The haplodiploidy hypothesis has yet to be 
rigorously tested and positive relatedness within diploid eusocial societies 
supports inclusive fitness theory. The theory has made unique, falsifiable 
predictions that have been confirmed, and its evidence base is extensive and 
robust. Hence, inclusive fitness theory deserves to keep its position as the 
leading theory for social evolution.’ 
 
However inclusive fitness (especially via the Extended Price Equation) 
explains much more than ant society, it explains how multicellular organisms 
came into being. 
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‘The third insight of inclusive fitness theory is the demonstration that conflict 
between members of a society is potentially present if they are unequally 
related to group offspring, since differential relatedness leads to unequal 
inclusive fitness optima. From this has sprung an understanding of an 
immense range of kin-selected conflicts, including conflicts within families 
and eusocial societies and intragenomic conflicts that follow the same 
underlying logic. The corollary of this insight is that societies are stable to the 
extent that the inclusive fitness optima of their members coincide. This in turn 
provides the rationale for the entire ‘major transitions’ view of evolution, 
whereby the origin of novel types of group in the history of life (e.g. genomes 
within cells, multicellular organisms and eusocial societies) can be explained 
as the result of their previously independent constituent units achieving a 
coincidence of inclusive fitness optima through grouping. From this 
standpoint, a multicellular organism is a eusocial society of cells in which the 
members of the society happen to be physically stuck together; the more 
fundamental glue, however, is the clonal relatedness that (barring mutations) 
gives each somatic cell within the organism a common interest in promoting 
the production of gametes…Nowak et al. argued that their perspective 
assumes a ‘gene-centred approach’ that ‘makes inclusive fitness theory 
unnecessary’. This is puzzling, because entirely lacking from their 
perspective is the idea, which underpins each of inclusive fitness theory’s 
insights, of the gene as a self-promoting strategist whose evolutionary 
interests are conditional on the kin class in which it resides…In their model 
of the evolution of eusociality, Nowak et al. deduced that the problem of 
altruism is illusory. They wrote that ‘There is no paradoxical altruism that 
needs to be explained’ because they assumed that potential workers 
(daughters of a colony-founding female or queen) are ‘not independent 
agents’ but rather can be seen ‘as “robots” that are built by the queen’ or the 
‘extrasomatic projection of [the queen’s] personal genome’. If this claim were 
correct, then only the queen’s interests would need to be addressed and one 
could conclude that worker altruism is more apparent than real. But it is 
incorrect, for two reasons. One is that, as has repeatedly been argued in 
response to previous ‘parental manipulation’ theories of the origin of 
eusociality, the inclusive fitness interests of workers and the mother queen 
do not coincide, because the two parties are differentially related to group 
offspring. The second is that worker behaviours such as eating of the queen’s 
eggs, egg-laying in response to perceived declines in queen fecundity, sex-
ratio manipulation by destruction of the queen’s offspring and lethal 
aggression towards the queen all demonstrate that workers can act in their 
own interests and against those of the queen. In the light of this proven lack 
of worker passivity, workers’ reproductive self-sacrifice is paradoxical at first 
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sight and this is the genuine problem of altruism that inclusive fitness theory 
has solved. (c) Alternative theory of eusocial evolution Nowak et al. [38] 
presented an ‘alternative theory of eusocial evolution’ (as alluded to in §2b), 
backed up by a ‘mathematical model for the origin of eusociality’. However, 
these do not represent true alternative theories, either alone or in 
combination, because they do not make any points or predictions that have 
not been made within inclusive fitness theory’ Speaking of various steps in a 
scheme suggested by Nowak et al, Bourke says: 
 
‘These steps constitute a reasonable scenario for the origin and elaboration of 
insect eusociality, but neither the sequence of steps nor the individual 
elements differ substantially from those that have been proposed to occur 
within the inclusive fitness framework…The alternative theory of eusocial 
evolution of Nowak et al. also exhibits two important weaknesses. To begin 
with, by allowing groups to form in multiple ways in step (i) (e.g. subsocially 
through parent–offspring associations but also by any other means, including 
‘randomly by mutual local attraction’), their scenario ignores two critical 
points that are inconsistent with it but consistent with inclusive fitness theory. 
First, the evidence is that, in almost all eusocial lineages, eusociality has 
originated in social groups that were ancestrally subsocial and therefore 
characterized by high within-group relatedness. Second, the evidence is that 
the origin of obligate or complex eusociality, defined as involving adult 
workers irreversibly committed to a worker phenotype, is associated with 
ancestral lifetime parental monogamy and hence, again, with predictably 
high within-group relatedness…In sum, Nowak et al. make a case for 
considering the effect of the population-dynamic context in which eusocial 
evolution occurs. But their alternative theory and its associated model add no 
fundamentally new elements on top of those identified within the inclusive 
fitness framework and, relative to this framework, exhibit substantial 
shortcomings…More fundamentally, as has long been recognized  and 
repeatedly stressed , the haplodiploidy hypothesis is not an essential 
component of inclusive fitness theory, since Hamilton’s rule for altruism can 
hold without the relatedness asymmetries caused by haplodiploidy being 
present. Highlighting the status of the haplodiploidy hypothesis to criticize 
inclusive fitness theory therefore misses the target. It also overlooks the fact 
that all diploid eusocial societies identified since the haplodiploidy 
hypothesis was proposed have turned out to be either clonal or family groups 
and so, as predicted by inclusive fitness theory, to exhibit positive 
relatedness. This is true of ambrosia beetle, social aphids, polyembryonic 
wasps, social shrimps and mole-rats. It is even true of a newly discovered 
eusocial flatworm. In short, the diploid eusocial societies, far from weakening 
 393  
inclusive fitness theory, serve to strengthen it…More broadly, the theory 
uniquely predicts the absence of altruism (involving lifetime costs to direct 
fitness) between non-relatives, and indeed no such cases have been found 
except in systems clearly derived from ancestral societies of relatives.  Finally, 
inclusive fitness theory is unique in the range of social phenomena that it has 
successfully elucidated, including phenomena as superficially dissimilar as 
the origin of multicellularity and the origin of eusociality, or intragenomic 
conflicts and conflicts within eusocial societies. Overall, no other theory 
comes close to matching inclusive fitness theory’s record of successful 
explanation and prediction across such a range of phenomena within the field 
of social evolution. The challenge to any approach purporting to replace 
inclusive fitness theory is to explain the same phenomena without using the 
insights or concepts of the theory…Recent critiques of inclusive fitness theory 
have proved ineffective on multiple fronts. They do not demonstrate fatal or 
unrecognized difficulties with inclusive fitness theory. They do not provide 
a distinct replacement theory or offer a similarly unifying approach. They do 
not explain previously unexplained data or show that explanations from 
inclusive fitness theory are invalid. And they do not make new and unique 
predictions. The latest and most comprehensive critique of inclusive fitness 
theory, though broad-ranging in the scope of its criticism, suffers from the 
same faults. Certainly, relatedness does not explain all variation in social 
traits. In addition, the long-standing message from inclusive fitness theory is 
that particular combinations of non-genetic (e.g. ecological) and genetic 
factors are required for the origin of eusociality. Nonetheless, relatedness 
retains a unique status in the analysis of eusocial evolution because no 
amount of ecological benefit can bring about altruism if relatedness is zero.’ 
Andrew F. G. Bourke ‘The validity and value of inclusive fitness theory’ Proc. 
R. Soc. B 2011 278, doi: 10.1098/rspb.2011.1465 14 September (2011) 
 
 
One thing rarely mentioned by the groupies is the fact that, even were ‘group 
selection’ possible, selfishness is at least as likely (probably far more likely in 
most contexts) to be group selected for as altruism. Just try to find examples 
of true altruism in nature –the fact that we can’t (which we know is not 
possible if we understand evolution) tells us that its apparent presence in 
humans is an artefact of modern life, concealing the facts, and that it can no 
more be selected for than the tendency to suicide (which in fact it is). One 
might also benefit from considering a phenomenon never (in my experience) 
mentioned by groupies--cancer. No group has as much in common as the 
(originally) genetically identical cells in our own bodies-a 100 trillion cell 
clone-- but we all born with thousands and perhaps millions of cells that have 
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already taken the first step on the path to cancer and generate millions to 
billions of cancer cells in our life.  If we did not die of other things first, we 
(and perhaps all multicellular organisms) would all die of cancer. Only a 
massive and hugely complex mechanism built into our genome that represses 
or derepresses trillions of genes in trillions of cells, and kills and creates 
billions of cells a second, keeps the majority of us alive long enough to 
reproduce. One might take this to imply that a just, democratic and enduring 
society for any kind of entity on any planet in any universe is only a dream, 
and that no being or power could make it otherwise. It is not only ‘the laws’ 
of physics that are universal and inescapable, or perhaps we should say that 
inclusive fitness is a law of physics. 
 
In a bizarre twist, it was apparently such thoughts that drove Price (creator 
of the Price equation and a devout Christian) to suicide. Regarding the notion 
of ‘theory’, it is a classic Wittgensteinian language game—a group of uses 
loosely linked but having critical differences. 
 
When it was first proposed, evolution by natural selection was indeed highly 
theoretical, but as time passed it became inextricably linked to so many 
observations and experiments that it’s basic ideas were no longer any more 
theoretical than that vitamins play critical roles in human nutrition. For the 
‘Theory of Deity’ however it is not clear what would count as a definitive test. 
Perhaps the same is true of String Theory. 
 
Many besides groupies note the pleasant nature of much human interaction 
and see a rosy future ahead-- but they are blind. It is crushingly obvious that 
the pleasantry is a transient phase due to abundant resources produced by 
the merciless rape of the planet, and as they are exhausted in the next two 
centuries or so, there will be misery and savagery worldwide as the (likely) 
permanent condition. Not just movie stars, politicians and the religious are 
oblivious to this, but even very bright academics who should know better. In 
his recent book ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature’ one of my most admired 
scholars Steven Pinker spends half the book showing how we have gotten 
more and more civilized, but he seems never to mention the obvious reasons 
why--the temporary abundance of resources coupled with massive police and 
military presence facilitated by surveillance and communication 
technologies. As industrial civilization collapses, it is inevitable that the 
Worst Devils of Our Nature will reappear. One sees it in the current chaos in 
the Middle East and Africa, and even the world wars were Sunday picnics 
compared to what’s coming. Perhaps half of the 12 billion then alive will die 
of starvation, disease and violence, and it could be many more. 
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Another unpleasant fact about altruism, generosity and helping, virtually 
never mentioned, is that if you take a global long term view, in an 
overcrowded world with vanishing resources, helping one person hurts 
everyone else in some small way. Each meal, each pair of shoes create some 
pollution and some erosion and use up some resources, and when you add 7 
billion of them together (soon to be 12) it is clear that one person’s gain is 
everyone else’s loss. Every dollar earned or spent damages the world and if 
countries cared about the future they would reduce their GDP (gross 
destructive product) every year. Even were groupism true this would not 
change. 
 
The facts that Wilson, Nowak et al have, for four years, persisted in 
publishing and making extravagant claims for grossly inadequate work is not 
the worst of this scandal. It turns out that Nowak’s professorship at Harvard 
was purchased by the Templeton Foundation—well known for its pervasive 
sponsorship of lectures, conferences and publications attempting to reconcile 
religion and science. Nowak is a devout Catholic and it appears that a large 
gift to Harvard was contingent on Nowak’s appointment. This made him 
Wilson’s colleague and the rest is history. 
 
However, Wilson was only too willing as he had long shown a failure to grasp 
Evolutionary theory—e.g., regarding kin selection as a division of group 
selection rather than the other way around. I noticed years ago that he co-
published with David Wilson, a longtime supporter of group selection, and 
had written other papers demonstrating his lack of understanding. Any of 
the groupies could have gone to the experts to learn the error of their ways 
(or just read their papers). The grand old men of kin selection such as 
Hamilton, Williams and Trivers, and younger bloods like Frank, Bourke and 
many others, would have been happy to teach them. But Nowak has received 
something like $14 million in Templeton grants in a few years and who wants 
to give that up? He is quite outspoken in his intent to prove that the 
gentleness and kindness of Jesus is built into us and all the universe. Jesus is 
conveniently absent, but one can guess from the qualities of other enlightened 
ones and the history of the church that the real story of early Christianity 
would come as a shock. Recall that the bible was expurgated of anything that 
did not meet the party line (e.g., check out the Nag-Hammadi manuscripts). 
And in any case, who would record the harsh realities of daily life? 
 
Almost certainly, the Nowak, Tarnita, Wilson paper would never have been 
published (at least not by Nature) if it had been presented by two average 
biologists, but coming from two famous Harvard professors it clearly did not 
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get the peer review that it should have. 
 
Regarding Nowak and Highland’s book ‘SuperCooperators’ I will let 
Dawkins do the honors: 
 
I have read the book by Nowak and Highfield. Parts of it are quite good, but 
the quality abruptly, and embarrassingly, plummets in the chapter on kin 
selection, possibly under the influence of E O Wilson (who has been 
consistently misunderstanding kin selection ever since Sociobiology, 
mistakenly regarding it as a subset of group selection). Nowak misses the 
whole point of kin selection theory, which is that it is not something 
additional, not something over and-above ‘classical individual selection’ 
theory. Kin selection is not something EXTRA, not something to be resorted 
to only if ‘classical individual selection’ theory fails. Rather, it is an inevitable 
consequence of neo-Darwinism, which follows from it deductively. To talk 
about Darwinian selection MINUS kin selection is like talking about 
Euclidean geometry minus Pythagoras’ theorem. It is just that this logical 
consequence of neo-Darwinism was historically overlooked, which gave 
people a false impression that it was something additional and extra. 
Nowak’s otherwise good book is tragically marred by this elementary 
blunder. As a mathematician, he really should have known better. It seems 
doubtful that he has ever read Hamilton’s classic papers on inclusive fitness, 
or he couldn’t have misunderstood the idea so comprehensively. The chapter 
on kin selection will discredit the book and stop it being taken seriously by 
those qualified to judge it, which is a pity. 
http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/03/16/new-book-shows-that-
humans-are-genetically-nice-ergo-jesus/ 
 
A scathing review of ‘SuperCooperators’ also appeared from eminent game 
theorist/economist/political scientist (and Harvard alumnus) Herbert Gintis 
(who recounts the Templeton scandal therein), which is quite surprising 
considering his own love affair with group selection— see the review of his 
book with Bowles by Price www.epjournal.net – 2012. 10(1): 45-49 and my 
review here of his most recent volume ‘Individuality and 
Entanglement’(2017). 
 
Regarding Wilson’s subsequent books, ‘The Meaning of Human Existence’ is 
bland and likewise confused and dishonest, repeating several times the 
groupies party line four years after its thorough debunking, and ‘A Window 
on Eternity’- is a meagre travel journal about the establishing of a national 
park in Mozambique. He carefully avoids mentioning that Africa will add 3 
 397  
billion in the near future (the official UN projection), eliminating all of nature 
along with peace, beauty, decency, sanity and hope. 
 
In the end, it is clear that this whole sad affair will be only the tiniest bump 
on the road and, like all things which exercise our attention now, will soon be 
forgotten as the horrors of unrestrained motherhood bring society crashing 
down. But one can be sure that even when global warming has put Harvard 
beneath the sea and starvation, disease and violence are the daily norm, there 
will be those who insist that it is not due to human activities (the opinion of 
half the American public currently) and that overpopulation is not a problem 
(the view of 40%), there will be billions praying to their chosen deity for a rain 
of Big Macs from the sky, and that (assuming the enterprise of science has not 
collapsed, which is assuming a lot) someone somewhere will be writing a 
paper embracing group selection. 
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A Review of The Murderer Next Door by David 
Buss (2005) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing 
specifically with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview 
available for a few dollars, so still well worth the effort. It makes no attempt 
to be comprehensive and is somewhat superficial in places, with the reader 
expected to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the vast literature 
on violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology 2nd ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 
and Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 
309–312, 410 and Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014). 
He has been among the top evolutionary psychologists for several decades 
and covers a wide range of behavior in his works, but here he concentrates 
almost entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause individual 
people to murder and their possible evolutionary function in the EEA 
(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during 
the last million years or so). 
 
Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations 
such as psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, 
drugs and alcohol etc. do not really explain, since the question still remains 
as to why these produce homicidal impulses, i.e., they are the proximate 
causes and not the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. As always, it 
inevitably boils down to inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle 
for access to mates and resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all 
behavior in all organisms. Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear 
that younger poorer males are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and 
others homicide data from industrialized nations, and tribal cultures, 
conspecific killing in animals, archeology, FBI data and his own research into 
normal people's homicidal fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues 
to accumulate of murders, including that of whole groups, or of groups minus 
young females, in prehistoric times. 
 
After surveying Buss’s comments, I present a very brief summary of 
intentional psychology (the logical structure of rationality), which is covered 
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extensively in my many other articles and books. 
 
Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence 
from an evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better 
Angels of Our Nature Why Violence Has Declined’(2012), and my review of 
it easily available on the net and in two of my recent ebooks. Briefly, Pinker 
notes that murder has decreased steadily and dramatically by a factor of 
about 30 since our days as foragers. So, even though guns now make it 
extremely easy for anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker 
thinks this is due to various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better 
angels’, but I think it’s due mainly to the temporary abundance of resources 
from the merciless rape of our planet, coupled with increased police presence, 
with communication and surveillance and legal systems that make it far more 
likely to be punished. This becomes clear every time there is even a brief and 
local absence of the police. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ (2017). Those interested in more of my writings 
may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and 
Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ (2017). 
 
Buss starts by noting that as with other behaviors, ‘alternative’ explanations 
such as psychopathology, jealousy, social environment, group pressures, 
drugs and alcohol etc. do not really explain, since the question still remains 
as to why these produce homicidal impulses, i.e., they are the proximate 
causes and not the ultimate evolutionary (genetic) ones. As always, it 
inevitably boils down to inclusive fitness (kin selection), and so to the struggle 
for access to mates and resources, which is the ultimate explanation for all 
behavior in all organisms. Sociological data (and common sense) make it clear 
that younger poorer males are the most likely to kill. He presents his own and 
others homicide data from industrialized nations, and tribal cultures, 
conspecific killing in animals, archeology, FBI data and his own research into 
normal people's homicidal fantasies. Much archeological evidence continues 
to accumulate of murders, including that of whole groups, or of groups minus 
young females, in prehistoric times. 
 
On p 12 he notes that the war between each individual and the world over 
resources begins at conception, when it begins growing by robbing its mother 
of food and stressing her body, and when her system fights back with 
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frequently fatal consequences for the conceptus. He does not tell us that 
estimates of spontaneous abortion are in the range of up to about 30% of all 
conceptions, so that as many as 80 million a year die, most so early that the 
mother does not even know she is pregnant, and perhaps her period is a bit 
late. This is part of nature’s eugenics which we have not succeeded in 
defeating, though the overall dysgenic effect of civilization continues and 
each day the approx. 300,000 who are born are on average just slightly less 
mentally a physically fit than the approx. 100,000 who die, with a net increase 
in world population of ca. 200,000 and an ever larger ‘unfit’ population to 
destroy the earth (while being partly or wholely supported by their ‘fit’ 
neighbors). 
 
On p13 he says that we don’t know for sure that OJ Simpson was guilty but I 
would say that regardless of the trial we do know he was, as it’s the only 
reasonable interpretation of the facts of the case, which include his bizarre 
behavior. Also, in the subsequent civil trial, where his multimillion dollar 
defense attorneys were not present to subvert justice, he was quickly 
convicted, which led to the attachment of his assets, his armed robbery 
conviction and imprisonment. 
 
He notes on p20 that there were about 100 million known murders worldwide 
in the last 100 years, with maybe as many as 300 million if all the unreported 
were included. It is also to be kept in mind that America’s murder rate is 
decreased by about 75% due to the world class medical system which saves 
most victims of attempts. I will add that Mexico has about 5X the murder rate 
of the USA and Honduras about 20X, and your descendants can certainly look 
forward to our rate moving in that direction due to America’s fatal embrace 
of Diversity. Ann Coulter in ‘Adios America’(2015) notes that Hispanics have 
committed about 23,000 murders here in the last few decades. For now, 
nothing will be done, and crime here will reach the levels in Mexico as the 
border continues to dissolve and environmental collapse and approaching 
bankruptcy dissolve the economy. Inside Mexico in 2014 alone, 100 U.S. 
citizens were known to have been murdered and more than 130 kidnapped 
and others just disappeared, and if you add other foreigners and Mexicans it 
runs into the thousands. See my article ‘Suicide by Democracy’ for further 
details. 
 
Even a tiny lightly traveled country like Honduras manages some 10 murders 
and 2 kidnappings a year of US citizens. And these are the best of times—it is 
getting steadily worse as unrestrained motherhood and resource depletion 
bring collapse ever closer.  In addition to continued increases in crime of all 
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kinds we will see the percentage of crimes solved drop to the extremely low 
levels of the third world. More resources are devoted to the solution of 
murders than any other crime and about 65% are solved in the USA, but in 
Mexico less than 2% are solved and as you get further from Mexico City the 
rate drops to near zero. Also note that the rate here used to be about 80%, but 
it has dropped in parallel with the increase in the Diverse. Also 65% is the 
average but if you could get statistics I am sure it would rise with the percent 
of Euro’s in a city and drop as the percent of Diverse increases. In Detroit 
(83% black) only 30% are solved. If you keep track of who robs, rapes and 
murders, it’s obvious that black lives matter lots more to Euros (those of 
European descent) than they do to other blacks. These are my observations. 
 
Throughout history women have been at a major disadvantage when it came 
to murdering, but with the ready availability of guns we would expect this to 
change, but on p22 we find that about 87% of USA murderers are men and 
for same sex killing this rises to 95% and is about the same worldwide. Clearly 
something in the male psyche encourages violence as a route to fitness that is 
largely absent in women. Also relevant is that murders by acquaintances are 
more common than those by strangers. 
 
On p37 he notes that with high likelihood of conviction, murder is now a 
more costly strategy than formerly, but I think this depends entirely on who 
you are. In a largely Euro USA city or among middle and upper class people, 
over 95% of murders might be solved, but in lower class cities maybe 20% 
might be, and for gang dominated areas even less than that. And in 3rd world 
countries the chances of justice are even lower, especially when committed 
by gang members, so it is a highly viable strategy, especially if planned ahead 
of time. 
 
Next, he deals with violence and murder as a part of mating strategies, which 
they have clearly been throughout our evolution and remain so especially 
among the lower classes and in third world countries. He notes the frequent 
murder of wives or lovers by men during or after breakups. He comments in 
passing on mate selection and infidelity but there is minimal discussion as 
these topics are treated in great detail in his other writings and edited 
volumes. It is now well known that women tend to have affairs with sexy 
men that they would not select as a permanent partner (the sexy son theory) 
and to mate with them on their most fertile days. All these phenomena are 
viewed from an evolutionary perspective (i.e., what would the fitness 
advantage have been formerly). 
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There is very strong selection for behaviors that prevent a man from raising 
children fathered by someone else for the same reasons that ‘group selection’ 
is strongly selected against. However modern life provides ample 
opportunities for affairs, and genetic studies have shown that a high 
percentage of children are fathered by other than the permanent partner of 
their mother, with the percentage increasing from a few percent to as much 
as 30% as one descends from upper to lower classes in various modern 
Western countries at various periods. In his book Sperm Wars: The Science of 
Sex (2006) Robin Baker summarizes: ‘Actual figures range from 1 percent in 
high-status areas of the United States and Switzerland, to 5 to 6 percent for 
moderate-status males in the United States and Great Britain, to 10 to 30 
percent for lower-status males in the United States, Great Britain and France’. 
One might suppose that in societies where both men and women are highly 
concentrated in cities and have mobile phones, this percentage is rising, 
especially in the third world where use of birth control and abortion is erratic. 
 
He finds that most men and women who murder their mates are young and 
the younger their mates are, the more likely they will be murdered. Like 
much of behavior, this is hard to explain without an evolutionary perspective. 
One study found men in their 40’s constituted 23% of mate murderers but 
men in their 50’s only 7.7%, and 79% of female mate killers where between 16 
and 39. It makes sense that the younger they are, the bigger the potential 
fitness loss to the male (decreased reproduction) and so the more intense the 
emotional response. As Buss puts it: “From Australia to Zimbabwe, the 
younger the woman, the higher the likelihood that she will be killed as a 
result of a sexual infidelity or leaving a romantic relationship. Women in the 
15 to 24 year old bracket are at the greatest risk.” A high percentage are killed 
within two months of separation and most in the first year. One study found 
that 88% of them had been stalked prior to being killed. In ssome chapters 
there are quotes from people giving their feelings about their unfaithful mates 
and these typically include homicidal fantasies, which were more intense and 
went on for longer periods for men than for women. 
 
He devotes some time to the increased risk of abuse and murder from having 
a stepparent with e.g., the risk to a girl of rape increasing about 10X if her 
father is a stepfather. It is now very well known that in a wide range of 
mammals, a new male encountering a female with young will attempt to kill 
them. One USA study found that if one or both parents are surrogates, this 
raises the child’s chance of being murdered in the home between 40 and 100X 
(p174). A Canadian study found the beating death rate rose by 27X if one 
parent in a registered marriage was a stepparent while it rose over 200X if the 
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surrogate was a live-in boyfriend. Child abuse rates in Canada rose 40X when 
there was a stepparent. 
 
In humans, being without resources is a strong stimulus for women to 
eliminate their existing children in order to attract a new mate. A Canadian 
study found that even though single women were only 12% of all mothers, 
they committed over 50% of infanticides (p169). Since younger women lose 
less fitness from an infant death than older ones, it is not surprising that a 
cross-cultural study found that teenagers killed their infants at rates about 
30X that of women in their twenties (p170). 
 
He then briefly discusses serial killers and serial rapists, the most successful 
of all time being the Mongols of Genghis Khan, whose Y chromosomes are 
represented in about 8% of all the men in the territories they controlled, or 
some 20 million men (and an equal number of women) or about half a percent 
of all the people on earth, which makes them easily the most genetically fit of 
all the people who have ever lived in historical times. 
 
Though this volume is a bit dated, there are few recent popular books dealing 
specifically with the psychology of murder and it’s a quick overview 
available for a few dollars, so still well worth the effort. It makes no attempt 
to be comprehensive and is somewhat superficial in places, with the reader 
expected to fill in the blanks from his many other books and the vast literature 
on violence. For an update see e.g., Buss, The Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology 2nd ed. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270–282, 388–389, 545–546, 547, 566 
and Buss, Evolutionary Psychology 5th ed. (2015) p 26, 96–97,223, 293-4, 300, 
309–312, 410 and Shackelford and Hansen, The Evolution of Violence (2014) 
He has been among the top evolutionary psychologists for several decades 
and covers a wide range of behavior in his works, but here he concentrates 
almost entirely on the psychological mechanisms that cause individual 
people to murder and their possible evolutionary function in the EEA 
(Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation—i.e., the plains of Africa during 
the last million years or so). 
 
Those with a lot of time who want a detailed history of homicidal violence 
from an evolutionary perspective may consult Steven Pinker’s ‘The Better 
Angels of Our Nature-Why Violence Has Declined’(2012) and my review of 
it easily available on the net and in two of my recent ebooks. Briefly, Pinker 
notes that murder has decreased steadily and dramatically by a factor of 
about 30 since our days as foragers. So, even though guns now make it 
extremely easy for anyone to kill, homicide is much less common. Pinker 
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thinks this is due to various social mechanisms that bring out our ‘better 
angels’, but I think it’s due mainly to the temporary abundance of resources 
from the merciless rape of our planet, coupled with increased police presence, 
with communication and surveillance and legal systems that make it far more 
likely to be punished. This becomes clear every time there is even a brief and 
local absence of the police. 
 
Others also take the view that we have a ‘nice side’ that is genetically innate 
and supports the favorable treatment of even those not closely related to us 
(‘group selection’). This is hopelessly confused and I have done my small part 
to lay it to rest in ‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the 
Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked 
Evolution, Rationality and Civilization. A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social 
Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield 
‘SuperCooperators’(2012)’.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems of thought viewpoint may consult my book 
‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle (2017). Those interested in more of my 
writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017). 
 
I now present a very brief summary of intentional psychology (the logical 
structure of rationality) which is covered extensively in my many other 
articles and books. Impulsive violence will involve the automated subcortical 
functions of System 1, but is sometimes deliberated upon ahead of time via 
cortical System 2. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 
years ago had evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, 
reflexive actions with basic utterances that can be described as Primary 
Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious 
automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass 
displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and 
potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or 
fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary 
Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false 
propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities 
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and not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality 
Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional 
Attitudes, Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. 
 
Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (Wittgenstein RPP2 p148). “I believe”, “he 
loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically 
displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-
only (excluding lying), while third person statements about others are true or 
false (see my review of Johnston - ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look 
at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from 
Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in 
modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional 
with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of 
Social Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and from many other 
viewpoints as well. 
 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s 
(the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his successors 
Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, 
Finkelstein, Coliva etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for 
furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and 
the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors 
comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
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Rationality (LSR), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of 
language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical 
philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my 
other very recent writings. 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
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simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and 
charts that should be compared with this one. 
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Suicide by Democracy-an Obituary for America and 
the World (2019 version) 
 
              
 Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive 
population growth, most of it for the last century, and now all of it, due to 3rd 
world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more 
ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, 
disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth loses about 2% of 
its topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of its food growing capacity 
will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, 
this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant 
reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved 
human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a 
nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America 
and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits 
selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology 
to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons 
as though they had common interests. The idea of human rights is an evil 
fantasy promoted by leftists to draw attention away from the merciless 
destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd world motherhood. This, plus 
ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering 
delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few 
understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no 
free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond 
repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one 
by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into 
anarchy or dictatorship. The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are 
that there are not enough resources in America or the world to lift a 
significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep them there.  The 
attempt to do this is bankrupting America and destroying the world. The 
earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. 
And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and 
not the rich. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for 
preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic 
system.  
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“I can’t understand why people are frightened of new ideas. I’m frightened 
of the old ones.” John Cage (1912-1992) 
 
At what point is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever 
reach us it must spring up amongst us; it cannot come from abroad. If 
destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a 
nation of freemen we must live through all time or die by suicide.” Abraham 
Lincoln (1838) 
 
         
   
 
THE SADDEST DAY IN US HISTORY. President Johnson, with 2 Kennedy’s 
and ex-President Hoover, gives America to Mexico— Oct 3rd, 1965. Wolves in 
sheep’s clothing, like most Democrats from that day onward. 
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PERCENT OF AMERICANS WHO ARE FOREIGN BORN -- the result of the 
“no significant demographic impact” immigration act of 1965—non-
Europeans (the Diverse) were a 16% share, are now (2016) 37% and will be 
about 60% by 2100, since they are now 100% of the population increase of 
about 2.4 million every year.  Suicide by democracy. 
 
 
 
PART OF THE COST OF DIVERSITY and of aging, being the world’s unpaid 
policeman, etc., (not counting future liabilities which are 5 to 10 times as  
much, barring major social changes).  
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Useful definitions for understanding contemporary 
American politics 
 
DIVERSITY: 1. USA government program for handing over control to 
Mexico. 2. USA government program for providing free or heavily subsidized 
goods and services to those from other countries. 3. A means for turning 
America into a 3rd world Hellhole. 4. Multiculturalism, multiethnicism, 
multipartisanism, inclusivity, third world supremacy.  
 
RACIST: 1. Person opposed to diversity in above sense. 2. Person of different 
ethnicity who disagrees with me on any issue. 3. Person of any ethnicity who 
disagrees with me on anything.  Also, called ‘bigot’ ‘hater’ or ‘nativist’. 
 
WHITE SUPREMACIST: Anyone opposed to diversity in the above sense, i.e., 
anyone trying to prevent the collapse of America and of industrial civilization 
worldwide. 
 
THIRD WORLD SUPREMACIST: Anyone in favor of diversity in above 
senses. Anyone working to destroy their descendant’s future. AKA 
Democrats, Socialists, Neomarxists, Democratic Socialists, Marxists, Leftists, 
Liberals, Progressives, Communists, Maternalists, Leftist Fascists, 
Multiculturalists, Inclusivists, Human Rightists. 
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HATE: 1. Any opposition to diversity in the above sense. 2. Expression of a 
desire to prevent the collapse of America and the world. 
 
EURO: White or Caucasian or European: one whose ancestors left Africa over 
50,000 years ago. 
 
BLACK: African or Afro-American: one whose ancestors stayed in Africa or 
left in the last few hundred years (so there has not been time for evolution of 
any significant differences from Euros). 
 
DIVERSE: Anyone who is not EURO (European, white, Caucasian). 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS:  An evil fantasy created by leftists to draw attention away 
from the merciless destruction of the earth by unrestrained 3rd world 
reproduction. Thus, temporary anomalies, such as democracy, equality, labor 
unions, women’s rights, child rights, animal rights, etc. are due to high 
standards of living created by the rape of the planet and will disappear as 
civilization collapses and China rules the world.  
 
 
 
I should first note that I have no investment in the outcome of any social or 
political movement. I am old, without kids or close relatives, and in the blink 
of an eye I will be gone (of course the most important thing to remember is 
that very soon we will all be gone and our descendants will face the horrific 
consequences of our stupidity and selfishness). I offer these comments in 
hope they will give perspective, since concise rational competent analyses of 
the perilous situation in America and the world are almost nonexistent. I have 
close friends of various ethnicities, several times given my only assets to an 
impoverished third world person (no I did not inherit anything significant, 
did not have rich relatives, a trust fund or a cushy job), have had third world 
friends, colleagues, girlfriends, wives and business partners, and helped 
anyone in any way I could regardless of race, age, creed, sexual preferences 
or national origin or position on the autism spectrum, and am still doing so. 
I have not voted in any kind of election, belonged to any religious, social or 
political group, listened to a political speech or read a book on politics in over 
50 years, as I considered it pointless and demeaning to have my views carry 
the same weight as those of morons, lunatics, criminals and merely 
uneducated (i.e., about 95% of the population). I find nearly all political 
dialog to be superficial, mistaken and useless. This is my first and last 
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social/political commentary. 
 
The millions of daily articles, speeches, tweets and newsbites rarely mention 
it, but what is happening in America and worldwide are not some transient 
and unconnected events, but the infinitely sad story of the inexorable collapse 
of industrial civilization due to overpopulation and of freedom due to it and 
to the malignant dictatorships that are the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) 
and Islam. Though these are the only important issues, they seldom are stated 
clearly in the endless debates and daily social convulsions, and few things in 
this article are ever discussed in any clear and intelligent way, in large part 
because the Diverse (i.e., those not of European ancestry) have a strangle hold 
on American and most Western media which make it impossible. Politics in 
democratic countries is dedicated almost entirely to providing the 
opportunity for every special interest group to get an ever-bigger share of the 
rapidly diminishing resources. The problem is that nearly all people are 
short-sighted, selfish, poorly educated, lacking experience and stupid and 
this creates an insoluble problem when there are 10 billion (by century’s end), 
or when they constitute a majority of any electorate in a democratic system.  
It’s one thing to make mistakes when there are time and resources to correct 
them, but quite another when it’s impossible.  The USA is the worst case as it 
seems to have vast resources and a resilient economy, and what I and most 
people grew up regarding as the wonderful traditions of justice, democracy, 
and equality, but I now see that these are invitations to exploitation by every 
special interest group (especially Hispanics, the CCP and Islam) and that 
giving privileges to everyone born, without imposing duties, has fatal 
consequences. Also, a system that operates this way cannot compete with 
ones that do not- Asia and above all China is eating America’s lunch (and that 
of all non-Asian countries), and nothing is likely to stop it, but of course 
overpopulation dooms everyone (the minority who will survive after the 
great 22nd/23rd century die-off) to a hellish life. A world where everyone is free 
to replicate their genes and consume resources as they wish will soon have a 
hard landing. The fact is that democracy has become a license to steal- from 
the government—i.e., from the shrinking minority who pay significant taxes, 
from the earth, from everyone everywhere, and from one’s own descendants, 
and that diversity (multiculturalism, multipartisanism, etc.) in an 
overcrowded world leads to insoluble conflict and collapse. 
 
The history in America is clear enough. In what can now be seen as the first 
major disaster stemming from the lunatic Christian idea of innate human 
rights, the politicians of the Northern states decided it was inappropriate for 
the South to have slaves. Slavery was certainly an outmoded and evil idea 
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and was disappearing worldwide, and it would have been eliminated with 
economic and political pressures after emancipation via the 13th amendment. 
But then as now, the utopian delusions prevailed, and so they attacked the 
South, killing and crippling millions and creating poverty and dysgenic chaos 
(the death and debility of a large percentage of able bodied Euro males) 
whose effects are still with us. The Africans replicated their genes at a higher 
rate, resulting in their coming to comprise an ever-increasing percentage of 
the country. Nobody realized it at the time and most still do not, but this was 
the beginning of the collapse of America and the defects in psychology which 
led the North to persecute the South were a continuation of the Christian 
fanaticisms which produced the murder and torture of millions during the 
middle ages, the Inquisition, the genocide of the new world Indians by the 
Europeans, the Crusades and the Jihads of the muslims for the last 1200 years.  
ISIS, Al-Queda, the Crusaders and the Army of the North have a great deal 
in common. 
 
Without asking the voters, a few thousand statesmen and congressmen and 
President Lincoln made ex-slaves citizens and gave them the right to vote via 
the 14th and 15th amendments. Gradually there came to be vast ghettos 
composed of ex slaves, where crime and poverty flourished, and where drugs 
(imported mostly by Hispanics) generated a vast criminal empire, whose 
users committed hundreds of millions of crimes every year. Then came the 
Democrats led by the Kennedys, who, raised in privilege and disconnected 
from the real world, and having like nearly all politicians no clue about 
biology, psychology, human ecology or history, decided in 1965 that it was 
only democratic and just that the country should change the immigration 
laws to decrease influx of Europeans in favor of 3rd world people (the 
Diverse). They passed the law and in 1965 president Lyndon Johnson signed 
it (see cover photo). There were misgivings from some quarters that this 
would destroy America, but they were assured that there would be “no 
significant demographic impact”! The American public never (to this day in 
2019) had a chance to express their views (i.e., to vote), unless you count the 
Trump election as that chance, and congress and various presidents changed 
our democracy into a “Socialist Democracy”, i.e., into a Neomarxist, third 
world supremacist fascist state. The Chinese are delighted as they do not have 
to fight the USA and other democracies for dominance, but only to wait for 
them to collapse. 
 
A few decades ago, William Brennen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
suggested that a law passed a century before, to guarantee citizenship to 
former slaves (the first fatal legislative mistake, the second giving them the 
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vote), should apply to anyone who happened to be born in America. 
Subsequently, other rulings of the court (not the people, who have never been 
asked) decided all those born in the USA, regardless of parental status (e.g., 
even if they were aliens from another solar system) had a right to US 
citizenship (anchor babies) and were subsequently permitted to make citizens 
of all their relatives – (the third and fourth fatal mistakes). Again, it never 
crossed the minds of congress or the courts that the constitution did not give 
any such rights, nor that the American public should be permitted to vote on 
this. In addition to the millions of 3rd world people here ‘’legally” (i.e., with 
the permission of a few hundred in congress, but not the people) millions 
began entering illegally and all produced children at about 3 times the rate of 
existing Americans and generated ever increasing social problems. Most of 
the Diverse pay little or no taxes, and so they live partly or wholly on 
government handouts (i.e., taxes paid by the ever shrinking minority of 
Americans who pay any, as well as money borrowed from future generations 
to the tune of $2.5 billion a day, added to the $18 trillion in debt and the $90 
trillion or more of unfunded future obligations—medicare, social security 
etc.), while the agricultural system, housing, streets and highways, sewers, 
water and electrical systems, parks, schools, hospitals, courts, public 
transportation, government, police, fire, emergency services and the huge 
defense spending needed to ensure the continued existence of our country 
and most others, were created, administered and largely paid for by Euros 
(i.e., those of European ancestry). The fact that the Diverse owe their well-
being (relative to the Diverse still in the 3rd world) and their very existence 
(medicine, technology, agriculture, suppression of war and slavery) to Euros 
is never mentioned by anyone (see below). 
 
Naturally, the Euros (and a minority of tax paying Diverse) are outraged to 
have to spend ever more of their working lives to support the legions of 
newly arrived Diverse, to be unsafe in their own homes and streets and to see 
their towns, schools, hospitals, parks etc. being taken over and destroyed. 
They try to protest, but the media are now controlled by the Diverse (with the 
help of deluded Euros who are dedicated to destroying their own 
descendants), and it is now almost impossible to state any opposition to the 
collapse of America and the world  without being attacked as “racist”, “white 
supremacist” or “a hater”, and often losing one’s job for exercising free 
speech. Words referring to the Diverse are almost banned, unless it’s to praise 
them and assist their genuine racism (i.e., living at the expense of and 
exploiting and abusing in every way possible the Euro’s, and their Diverse 
tax paying neighbors), so one cannot mention blacks, immigrants, Hispanics, 
Muslims etc. in the same discussion with the words rapist, terrorist, thief, 
 418  
murderer, child molester, convict, criminal, welfare etc., without being 
accused of “hatred” or “racism” or “white supremacy”. They are of course 
oblivious to their own racism and third world supremacy. Keep in mind there 
is not and almost certainly will never be any evidence of a significant genetic 
difference between Euros and Diverse in psychology, or IQ, and that their 
tendency to excessive reproduction and other shortcomings is wholly due to 
culture. 
 
Gradually, every kind of special interest group has succeeded in eliminating 
any negative reference to them in any easily identifiable way, so there has 
almost vanished from public discourse not only words referring to the 
Diverse, but to the short, tall, fat, thin, mentally ill, handicapped, genetically 
defective, disadvantaged, abnormal, schizophrenic, depressed, stupid, 
dishonest, crazy, lazy , cowardly, selfish, dull etc. until nothing but pleasant 
platitudes are heard and one is left puzzled as to who fills the jails, hospitals 
and mental wards to overflowing, litters  the streets with garbage, destroys 
the parks, beaches and public lands, robs, riots, assaults, rapes and murders, 
and uses up all the tax money, plus an extra 2.5 billion dollars a day, added 
to the  18 trillion national debt (or over 90 trillion if you extend the real 
liabilities into the near future). Of course, it’s not due all to the Diverse, but 
every passing day a larger percentage is as their numbers swell and those of 
the Euros decline. 
 
It is now over fifty years after passing the new immigration act and about 
16% of the population is Hispanic (up from less than 1% earlier), who have 
been reproducing at about 3X the rate of Euros , so that about half of children 
under 6 are now Hispanic,  while some 13% of the country are blacks, rapidly 
being displaced and marginalized by Hispanics (though few blacks realize it, 
so they continue to support the politicians favoring further immigration and 
handouts and promising short term gains). Virtually nobody grasps the 
eventual collapse of America and the whole world, in spite of the fact that 
you can see it in front of your eyes everywhere. In America and worldwide, 
the Euros (and all the “rich” generally) are producing less than two kids per 
couple, so their populations are shrinking, and in America in 2014, for the 
first time since Euros came here in the 16th century, more of them died than 
were born, so their marginalization is certain. And, showing the “success” of 
the Neomarxist, third world supremacist immigration and welfare policies, 
the population of Hispanics in California passed 50%, so within a decade, the 
6th largest economy in the world will be part of Mexico. 
 
The Diverse will, in, this century, eliminate all American “racism” (i.e., any   
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opposition or legal hindrance to takeover of all political power, and the 
appropriation of as much of their neighbor’s money and property as they can 
manage,) except their own racism (e.g., graduated income tax which forces 
the Euro’s to support them). Soon they will largely eliminate legal differences 
between citizens of Mexico and California and then Texas, who then will have 
full ‘rights’ (privileges) anywhere in the USA, so that citizenship will became 
increasingly meaningless (and an ever-lower percentage of the Diverse will 
pay any significant taxes or serve in the military, and a far higher percentage 
will continue to receive welfare and to commit crimes, and to get free or 
heavily subsidized schooling, medical care etc.). One cannot mention in the 
media that the predominant racism in the USA is the extortion by the Diverse 
of anyone with money (mainly Euros but also any Diverse who have money), 
the elimination of free speech (except their own), the biasing of all laws to 
favor this extortion, and their rapid takeover of all political and financial  
power, i.e., total discrimination against Euros and anyone belonging to the 
“upper classes”, i.e., anyone who pays any significant taxes. 
 
Gradually the poverty, drugs, gangs, environmental destruction and the 
corruption of police, army and government endemic in Mexico and most 
other 3rd world countries is spreading across America, so we will be able to 
cross over the increasingly porous border with Mexico without noticing we 
are in a different country –probably within a few decades, but certainly by 
the end of the century. The population continues to increase, and here as 
everywhere in the world, the increase is now 100% Diverse and, as we enter 
the next century (much sooner in some countries), resources will diminish 
and starvation, disease, crime and war will rage out of control. The rich and 
the corporations will mostly still be rich (as always, as things get worse they 
will take their money and leave), the poor will be poorer and more numerous, 
and life everywhere, with the possible exception of a few countries or parts 
of countries where population growth is prevented, will be unbearable and 
unsurvivable. 
 
The cooperation among the Diverse to wrest control of society from Euros 
will crumble as society disintegrates and they will split into blacks, Hispanics, 
Muslims, Chinese, Filipinos, gays, seniors, disabled, and further where 
possible into endless subgroups.  The rich will increasingly hire bodyguards, 
carry guns, drive bulletproof cars and use private police to protect them in 
their gated communities and offices, as is already commonplace in 3rd world 
countries. With much reduced quality of life and high crime, some will think 
of returning to their countries of origin, but there also overpopulation will 
exhaust resources and produce collapse even more severe than in the USA 
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and Europe, and the racism in the 3rd world, temporarily suppressed by a 
relative abundance of resources and police and military presence, will 
become ever  worse, so life will be hellish nearly everywhere. The population 
in the 22nd century will shrink as billions die of starvation, disease, drugs, 
suicide, and civil and international war. As third world nuclear countries 
collapse (Pakistan, India and maybe Iran by then, thanks to Obama) and are 
taken over by radicals, nuclear conflicts will eventually occur. Still, perhaps 
nobody will dare to suggest publicly that the prime cause of chaos was 
unrestricted motherhood. 
 
Of course, much of this story has already played out in America, the U.K. and 
elsewhere, and the rest is inevitable, even without climate change and the 
ravenous appetites of China, which just make it happen faster. It’s only a 
matter of how bad it will get where and when. Anyone who doubts this is out 
of touch with reality, but you can’t fool mother nature, and their descendants 
will no longer debate it as they will be forced to live it. 
 
The poor, and apparently, Obama, Krugman, Zuckerberg and most 
Democrats (Neomarxists), don’t understand the most basic operating 
principle of civilization—there is no Free Lunch. You can only give to one by 
taking from another, now or in the future. No such thing as helping without 
hurting. Every dollar and every item has value because somewhere, someone 
destroyed the earth. And leftists have the delusion that they can solve all 
problems by stealing from the rich. To get some idea of the absurdity of this, 
all US taxpayers earning over a million dollars have a total after tax profit of 
about 800 billion, while the annual deficit is about 1.5 trillion, and even taking 
it all does nothing to pay off the existing 18 trillion debt or the approx. 90 
trillion in near term unfunded liabilities (e.g., medicare and social security). 
Of course, you cannot increase their tax or corporate tax very much more or 
it will greatly depress the economy and produce a recession, job losses and 
the flight of capital, and they already pay the highest taxes, relative to what 
they earn as a % of the nation’s income, of any industrialized country. And 
once again, the top 1% of earners pay about 50% of total personal federal 
income tax while the bottom 47% (mostly Diverse) pay nothing. So the fact is 
we only  have a sort of democracy, as we have almost nothing to say about 
what the govt. does, and a sort of fascism, as the ever expanding govt. spies 
on our every move, controls ever more minutely our every action, and forces 
us at gunpoint to do whatever they decide, and a sort of communism as they 
steal whatever they want from whomever they want and use it to support 
anyone they like, here and all over the world, most of whom have no interest 
in democracy, justice, or equality, except as means to take advantage of our 
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fatally flawed system to get as much money and services as they can in order 
to support replicating their genes and destroying the earth. 
 
Speaking of Obama, Trump says that he is the worst president ever, and of 
course Obama, totally arrogant, dishonest and lacking any real grasp of the 
situation (or unwilling to be honest) just laughs, and babbles platitudes, but 
as I reflect a bit it’s clearly true.  Like Roosevelt, who gave us the first giant 
step into fascism and govt. waste and oppression with an illegal and 
unconstitutional tax (social security), Obamacare let the govt. swallow 1/6 of 
the economy and created his own illegal tax (called ‘penalties’ of Obamacare, 
where FDR called them ‘benefits’ and ‘contributions’). He tried to force the 
US to accept another 8 to 10 million illegals (nobody seems quite sure) which 
will ‘birthright’ into about 50 million by 2100. In the first 3 years of his office 
(2009 to 2012) the federal operating deficit increased about 44% from 10 to 15 
trillion, the largest percent increase since WW2, while by mid 2015 it had 
increased to over 71% of fiscal operating budget -- over $18 trillion or about 
$57,000 for every person in the USA, including children. His deferral of the 
deportation of millions of illegals, all of whom now receive social security, 
tax credits, medicare etc., is estimated to have a lifetime cost to the govt. (i.e., 
to the minority of us who pay any significant taxes) of ca. $1.3 trillion. Of 
course, this does not include free school, use of judicial system, jails and 
police, free ‘emergency’ care (i.e., just going to emergency for any problem 
whatsoever), degradation of all public facilities etc. so it’s likely at least twice 
as much. And we have seen 8 years of incompetent handling of the Iraq, 
Afghan and Syrian wars and the cancerous growth of the CCP and Islam He 
probably gave the ability to make nuclear weapons to Iran, which is highly 
likely to lead to a nuclear war by 2100 or much sooner. He was clearly elected 
for classist, racist, third world supremacist reasons-- because he had visible 
African genes, while the Euros, having left Africa some 50,000 years earlier 
have invisible ones. He, and most of the people he appointed, had little 
competence or experience in running a country and they were picked, like 
himself, on the basis of Diverse genes and Neomarxist, third world 
supremacist sympathies. If he is not a traitor (giving aid and comfort to the 
enemy) then who is? It is clear as day that, like nearly everyone, he operates 
totally on automatic primitive psychology, with his coalitional sympathies 
(biases) favoring  those who look and act more like him. He (like most 
Diverse) is in fact doing his best to destroy the country and system that made 
his exalted life possible. In an interview near the end of his term he said that 
the major reason for the backwardness of the third world was colonialism. As 
with all leftist third world supremacists, it has never crossed his mind that 
about 95% of all the third world people owe their existence and their 
 422  
relatively high standard of living to Euros and colonialism (i.e., medicine, 
agriculture, technology, science, trade, education, police and judicial system, 
communications, elimination of  war and crime etc.), nor that the real enemies 
of the poor are other poor, who are just as repulsive as the rich, whom it is 
their greatest desire to emulate.  I agree that, with the possible exception of 
Lincoln, he is the worst (i.e., most destructive to American quality of life and 
survival as a nation) for his lack of honesty, arrogance and assault on freedom 
and longterm survivability —a stunning achievement when his competition 
includes Nixon, Johnson, the Bushes and the Clintons, and which makes even 
Reagan look good.  
 
When considering bad presidents, we should start with Abraham Lincoln, 
who is revered as a saint, but he (with the help of congress) destroyed much 
of the country and the lives of millions of people fighting the totally 
unnecessary Civil War, and in many ways, the country will never recover as 
it led to the civil rights movement, the 1965 immigration act and the 1982 
supreme court anchor baby ruling. Slavery would have come to an end soon 
without the war, as it did everywhere and of course it was Euros who 
provided the main impetus to bring it to an end here and everywhere. After 
the war the slaves could have been repatriated to Africa, or just given 
residence, instead of making them citizens (14th amendment) and then giving 
them the vote (15th amendment).  He and his collaborators, like so many 
liberal upper class Euros then and now, was blinded by the utopian social 
delusions embodied in Christianity and democracy, which result from the 
inclusive fitness psychology of coalitional intuitions and reciprocal altruism, 
that was eugenic and adaptive in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptation-i.e., from ca. 50,000 to several million years ago) but is fatally 
dysgenic and maladaptive in modern times.  
 
Note the great irony of the quote from him that begins this book, which shows 
that even the brightest are victims of their own limits, and have no grasp of 
human biology, psychology or ecology. It never crossed his mind that the 
world would become horrifically overpopulated and that the Africans would 
grow to become a giant social problem, at home and for themselves and the 
world as Africa expands to over 4 billion. Likewise, in spite of the now clear 
disaster, it seems not to cross Obama’s that the Diverse at home and abroad 
will destroy America and the world, though any bright ten year old can see 
it. 
 
President Truman could have let McArthur use the atom bomb to end the 
Korean war, destroy communism and to avoid the continuing horror of China 
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run by 25 sociopaths (the Politburo) or really just seven sociopaths (the 
Politburo Standing Committee) or perhaps actually just one sociopath (Xi  
Jinping).  Johnson could have done likewise in Vietnam, Bush in Iraq and 
Obama in Afghanistan, Syria and Libya.  China and probably many 3rd world 
countries would have used nuclear weapons if the situations were reversed. 
Once a radical Muslim country gets the bomb a preemptive strike by them or 
on them will likely ensue, and this is probable by 2100 and near certain by 
2200. If Gaddafi had succeeded in his efforts to get the bomb it would very 
likely have happened. The US could have forced Japan, China and Korea, Iraq 
and Libya and all the countries of Europe (and the whole world for that 
matter) to pay for the costs of our military efforts in all the recent wars, and 
between wars, instead of taking on most of the cost and then helping them 
take over most of America’s manufacturing. Of course, these decisions, 
critical to the country’s survival, were made by a handful of politicians 
without consulting the voters. The Kennedy’s were an important part of 
changing the immigration laws in the mid 60’s, so they have to count as 
traitors and major enemies of America on a par with Obama, G.W Bush and 
the Clintons. We could have followed the universal pleas of US industry and 
refused to sign the GATT, which gave free access to all our patents years 
before they are granted, though of course the Chinese now hack and steal 
everything with impunity anyway. Eisenhower could have let the UK keep 
possession of the Suez canal, instead of blackmailing them into leaving Egypt, 
and on and on. 
 
Some may be interested in a few statistics to give an idea of where we 
currently are on the road to hell. See the tables at the beginning. In the USA, 
the population of Hispanics will swell from about 55 million in 2016 (or as 
much as 80 million if you accept some estimates of 25 million illegals—it’s a 
mark of how far the govt. has let things go that we don’t really know) to 
perhaps 140 million midcentury and 200 million as we enter the 22nd   
century, at which time the US population will be soaring past 500 million, and 
the world population will be about 11 billion, 3 billion of that added from 
now to then in Africa and 1 billion in Asia (the official UN estimates at the 
moment). The Hispanics are reproducing so fast that Euros, now a 63% 
majority, will be a minority by midcentury and about 40% by 2100. Most of 
the increase in the USA from now on will be Hispanics, with the rest blacks, 
Asians and Muslims, and all the increase here and in the world will be 100% 
Diverse. About 500,000 people are naturalized yearly and since they are 
mostly from the 3rd world and produce children at about twice the rate of 
Euros, that will add perhaps 2 million midcentury and 5 million by 2100 for 
every year it continues. 
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To show how fast things got out of control after the “no demographic impact” 
TKO (technical knock out or Ted Kennedy Outrage, though we could equally 
call it the LBJ outrage, the Neomarxist outrage, the Liberal outrage etc.) 
immigration act of 1965, there are now more Hispanics in California than 
there are people in 46 other states. In 1970 just after the TKO, there were about 
4 million Hispanics and now there are over 55 million “legals” (i.e., not made 
legal by the voters but by a handful of politicians and the Supremely Stupid 
court) and perhaps 80 million counting illegals. It never crosses the minds of 
the Democratic block-voting poor Diverse that the ones who will suffer by far 
the most from the “Diversification” of America are themselves. The U.S. has 
gone from 84 percent white, 11 percent black, 4 percent Hispanic and 1 
percent Asian in 1965, to 62 percent white, 11 percent black, 18 percent 
Hispanic and 6 percent Asian now, according to a recent Pew report. By 2055, 
no one group is expected to have a majority--a perfect scenario for chaos, but 
you can see countless idiots from academia (now a paradise for state funded 
Neomarxist third world supremacism) praising multipartisanism. The Asians 
are predicted to increase faster than any group, doubling their percentage in 
the next few decades, but at least they will have gone thru a minimal 
immigration procedure, except of course for anchor baby families (producing 
which is now a major industry as Asians fly here to give birth, though they 
are greatly surpassed by Hispanics who only have to walk across the border 
at night). Of course, the Asians are by and large a blessing for America as they 
are more productive and less trouble than any group, including Euros. 
 
The US government (alone of major countries) pushes “diversity” but in 
countries all over the world and throughout history attempts to weld 
different races and cultures into one have been an utter disaster. Many groups 
have lived among or alongside others for thousands of years without notably 
assimilating. Chinese and Koreans and Japanese in Asia, Jews and gentiles in 
thousands of places, Turks, Kurds and Armenians etc., have lived together 
for millennia without assimilating and go for each other’s throats at the 
slightest provocation. After over 300 years of racial mixing, the USA is still 
about 97% monoracial (i.e., white, Hispanic, black etc.) with only about 3% 
describing themselves as mixed race (and most of them were mixed when 
they came here). The Native Americans (to whom the whole New World 
really belongs if one is going to rectify past injustices against the Diverse, a 
fact which is never mentioned by the third world supremacists) are mostly 
still living isolated and (before the casinos) impoverished, as are the blacks 
who, 150 years after emancipation, largely still live in crime ridden, 
impoverished ghettos. And these have been the best of times, with lots of 
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cheap land and natural resources, major welfare and affirmative action 
programs (largely unique to ‘racist’ America), a mostly healthy economy and 
a  government which extorts over 30% of their money (i.e., 30% of their 
working lives, counting income tax, sales tax, real estate tax etc.), earned by 
the tax paying part of the middle and upper class, to give the poor massive 
handouts -- not only food stamps and other welfare, but police and 
emergency services, streets and parks, the government, the justice system, 
hospitals, national defense, schools, roads, bridges, power grid, etc., and the 
costs of environmental degradation,  and the financial and emotional costs of 
crime and it’s threat, etc., most of these never counted by anyone (and never 
mentioned by the Neomarxist third world supremacists) when considering 
the ‘costs of welfare’ or the huge downside to diversity. 
 
In any case, the liberal, democratic delusion is that such largesse and social 
policies will weld our ‘diverse’ (i.e., fatally fragmented) society into one 
happy family. But government handouts need to continually increase (for 
social security, wars, health care, schools, welfare, infrastructure, etc.) while 
the relative tax base shrinks, and our debt and unfunded entitlements grow 
by trillions a year, so the economy is in the process of collapse. The average 
family has less real net earnings and savings now than two decades ago and 
could survive about 3 months without income, about 40% of retired 
Americans have less than $25,000 savings etc. And again, these are the best of 
times with lots of ‘free’ resources (i.e., stolen from others and from our 
descendants) worldwide and about 4 billion less people than there will be by 
the next century. As economies fail and starvation, disease, crime and war 
spread, people will split down racial and religious lines as always, and in the 
USA Hispanics and Blacks will still dominate the bottom. It rarely occurs to 
those who want to continue (and increase) the numbers of and the 
subsidization of the Diverse that the money for this is ultimately stolen from 
their own descendants, on whom falls the burden of over $90 trillion debt if 
one counts the current entitlements (or up to $220 trillion if liabilities 
continued without reduction of handouts and no tax increase), and a society 
and a world collapsing into anarchy. 
 
 
As noted, one of the many evil side effects of diversity (e.g., massive increases 
in crime, environmental degradation, traffic gridlock, decreasing quality of 
schools, coming bankruptcy of local, state and federal governments, 
corruption of police and border officials, rising prices of everything, 
overloading of the medical system, etc.) is that our right to free speech has 
disappeared on any issue of possible political relevance and of course that 
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means just about any issue. Even in private, if any negative comment on 
‘diversity’ is recorded or witnessed by anyone credible, the racist, third world 
supremacist Diverse and their Euro servants will try to take away your job 
and damage your business or your person. This is certain when it involves 
public figures and racial or immigration issues, but nothing is off limits. 
Dozens of books in the last two decades address the issue including ‘The New 
Thought Police: Inside the Left's Assault on Free Speech and Free Minds’, 
‘End of Discussion: How the Left's Outrage Industry Shuts Down Debate, 
Manipulates Voters, and Makes America Less Free (and Fun)’ and ‘The 
Silencing: how the left is killing free speech’, but nothing will dissuade the 
Democratic Socialists (i.e., closet communists) and the lunatic fringe liberals. 
As noted, I am writing this book because nobody in Academia, nor any public 
figure, dares to do it. 
 
Another ‘side effect’ is the loss of much of our freedom and privacy as the 
government continues to expand its war on terror. There was never a 
compelling reason for admitting any serious number of Muslims (or any 
more Diverse for that matter). In any case, it seems a no-brainer to not admit 
and to expel single unmarried male Muslims aged 15 to 50, but even such 
obvious simple moves are beyond the capabilities of the retards who control 
congress and of course our beloved presidents, all of whom, with the 
members of congress, who voted for the immigration law changes starting in 
1965, could be held personally responsible for 9/11, the Boston Marathon 
Bombing etc. Of course, Trump is trying to change this but it’s too little, too 
late and barring his declaring martial law, running the country with the army, 
and deporting or quarantining 100 million of the least useful residents, 
America’s date with destiny is certain. 
 
A lovely example of how suppression of free speech leads to ever more 
insanity is the case of Major Hasan (courtesy Mark Steyn’s “After America”). 
An army psychiatrist at Fort Hood who had SoA (Soldier of Allah) on his 
business card, he was frequently reprimanded when a student army intern 
for trying to convert patients to Islam, and many complaints were filed for 
his constant anti-American comments--one day he gave a Power Point lecture 
to a room full of army doctors justifying his radicalism. Free speech and 
common sense being no more available in the military than civilian life, he 
was then promoted to Major and sent to Fort Hood, where he commented to 
his superior officer on a recent murder of two soldiers in Little Rock: “this is 
what Muslims should do—stand up to the aggressors” and “people should 
strap bombs on themselves and go into Times Square”, but the army did 
nothing for fear of being accused of bias. One day he walked out of his office 
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with an assault rifle and murdered 13 soldiers. It turned out two different 
anti-terrorism task forces were aware that he had been in frequent email 
contact with top radical Islamist terrorists. The Army Chief of Staff General 
George Casey remarked: “What happened at Fort Hood was a tragedy, but I 
believe it would be an even greater tragedy if our diversity becomes a 
casualty here”!!  Is it losing the 70 million on welfare or the 1.7 million in 
prison or the 3 million drug addicts that is more tragic? 
 
The invasion of the Southwest by Hispanics gives the flavor of what is coming 
and Coulter in her book “Adios America” tells of trashed parks, schools that 
dropped from A to D grade, billions for ‘free’ (i.e., paid for by the upper 
middle and upper class and businesses) medical care and other services in 
Los Angeles alone etc. Anyone living there who remembers what Texas or 
California were like 30 years ago has no doubts about the catastrophic 
consequences of diversity as they see it every day. In California, which I know 
personally, the urban areas (and even most parks and beaches) that I used to 
enjoy are now crowded with Hispanics and often full of trash and spray 
painted with gang signs, while the highways are horrifically crowded and the 
cities and towns overrun with drugs and crime, so most of it is now 
uninhabitable and the world’s 6th largest economy is headed for bankruptcy 
as it tries to move 20 million mostly lower class Hispanics into the upper 
middle class by using tax money from the Euros. One of the latest lunacies 
was to try to put all illegals on Obamacare. Some persons I know have had 
their annual medical coverage increase from under $1000 before Obamacare 
to about $4000 (2017 estimate) and the extra $3000 is what the Democrats are 
stealing from anyone they can to cover the costs of free or very low cost care 
for those who pay little or no taxes, and who already are bankrupting 
hospitals forced to give them free “emergency” care. Of course, the 
Republicans are trying to kill it, but like the whole government, it is already 
in a death spiral that only a huge increase in fees can fix. 
 
One of the most flagrant violations of US law by the left-wing lunatics who 
support immigration is the creation of ‘sanctuary cities’. The cities do not 
allow municipal funds or resources to be used to enforce federal immigration 
laws, usually by not allowing police or municipal employees to inquire about 
an individual's immigration status. This began with Los Angeles in 1979 (thus 
becoming the first large city donated to Mexico) and now includes at least 31 
major American cities. Presumably, the President could order the army or the 
FBI  to  arrest  the  city  officials  who  passed these regulations for obstruction 
of justice etc., but it’s a murky legal area as (in another indication of the total 
ineptness of congress and the courts and the hopelessness of the democratic 
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system as currently practiced) immigration violations are civil offenses and 
not federal or state felonies which they clearly should be. After I wrote this 
the courts (predictably) blocked Trump’s attempt to cut off funds to sanctuary 
cities, forgetting that their purpose is to protect the citizens of America, and 
not those of other countries here illegally. And recently California declared 
itself a sanctuary state, i.e., it’s now part of Mexico. 
 
A competent government (maybe we could import one from Sweden, China 
or even Cuba?) could pass such legislation in a few weeks. Also, it could force 
compliance by cutting off most or all federal funds to any city or state that 
failed to comply with federal immigration laws, and at least one such bill has 
been introduced into congress recently, but the Democrats prevented its 
passage, and of course Obama or Clinton would have vetoed any attempt at 
giving American back to Americans. Trump of course has a different view, 
though he cannot save America via democratic means.  
 
 As long as the Democrats (soon to return to power and, rumor has it, to 
change their name to Socialist Democratic Neomarxist Third World 
Supremacist Party of Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East) are in 
power, nothing will be done, and more cities and states will cease to be a part 
of America until Hispanics take over completely sometime in the second half 
of the century. Only a military coup can save America now and it’s very 
unlikely the generals have the courage. 
 
For this review, I read a few politically oriented books and articles in print 
and on the web of the kind that I have avoided for over 50 years, and in them 
and the comments on them saw repeated accusations of ‘racist’ against people 
who were only stating their desire to have the USA remain a prosperous and 
safe country. This claim is now almost always false in the normal meaning, 
but of course true in the new meaning—i.e., one opposed to letting Mexico 
and Africa annex America. So, I wrote a reply to this slander, since I have 
never seen a good one. 
 
Actually, it’s not ‘racism’ but self-defense –the Diverse in America are the 
racists, as on the average, your life here is largely an exploitation of other 
races, notably Europeans and Asians who actually pay taxes. For genuine 
racism look at how different groups native to your own country (or 
immigrants) are treated there. The vast majority of immigrants in the USA 
would not even be permitted to enter your countries, much less permitted 
citizenship, the privilege of voting, free or low cost housing, food, free or 
subsidized medical care, free school, affirmative action programs, the same 
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privileges as natives etc. And in the USA, it is the Diverse who have taken 
away the tranquility, beauty, safety and free speech that existed here before a 
handful of stupid politicians and supreme court justices let you in. We never 
voted to let you enter or become citizens--it was forced on us by halfwits in 
our government, beginning with Lincoln and his partners in crime. If we had 
a chance to vote on it, few foreigners except medical, scientific and tech 
experts and some teachers would have been admitted and perhaps 75% of the 
Diverse would be deported. In many cases, you have an alien religion (some 
of which demand the murder of anyone you take a dislike to) and culture 
(honor killings of your daughters etc.), do not pay a fair share of taxes 
(typically none) and commit far more crimes per capita (e.g., 2.5x for 
Hispanics, 4.5x for blacks). 
 
Furthermore, the middle class American pays about 30% of their income to 
the govt. This is about 66 days/year of their working life and maybe 20 days 
of that goes to support the poor, now mostly Diverse. And all the ‘free’ things 
such as welfare, food stamps, medical care and hospitals, schools, parks, 
streets, sanitation, police, firemen, power grid, postal system, roads and 
airports, national defense etc. exist largely because the ‘racist’ upper middle 
and upper class created, maintain and pay for them. Maybe another 4 
working days goes to support the police, FBI, justice system, DHS, Border 
Patrol and other govt. agencies that have to deal with aliens. Add another 10 
or so days to support the military, which is mostly needed to deal with the 
results of 3rd  world overpopulation (the real major cause of the Korean War, 
the Vietnam War, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Yemen and the major cause 
of most of the wars, social unrest and conflicts past, present and future), and 
this cost, added to welfare, medicare, social security and environmental 
degradation (an ever increasing percentage for immigrants and their 
descendants) is bankrupting the country, with the only possible solution 
being to decrease the benefits and increase the taxes, the burden of which will 
fall on everyone’s descendants. You take advantage of the freedom of speech 
we created to tell malicious lies about us and prevent rational discussion!  
Most of you, if doing this in your country of origin, would wind up in prison 
or dead! Shameless liars! What is your problem? --poor education, no 
gratitude, malicious, stupid, no experience with civilized society? (pick 5). 
And anyone who doubts any of this just does not know how to use their brain 
or the net as it's all there. These comments are just the facts that anyone can 
see, along with simple extrapolations into the future. 
 
Also, please let me ask the Diverse--do people in your country of origin work 
30 days a year to support tens of millions of aliens who commit crimes at 
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several times the rate of natives, overcrowd your schools, highways, cities 
and jails, trash your parks and beaches, spray paint graffiti on buildings and 
import and sell drugs to addicts who commit over a hundred million crimes 
a year (added to the 100 million or so they commit themselves)? And have 
you had a 9/11 and many bombings and murders at home? Do immigrants 
control the media so that you cannot even discuss these issues that are 
destroying your country and the world? Will your country be totally in their 
control in a few generations and be another impoverished, crime ridden, 
starving, corrupt 3rd world hellhole? Of course, for most of you it already is, 
and you came to America to escape it. But your descendants won't have to be 
homesick for the hellhole, as they will have re-created it here. The Diverse 
here (and their Euro servants) never tire of complaining in all the media every 
day about how they are not treated fairly and not given enough (i.e., the Euros 
and the relatively rich Diverse don't work hard enough to support them), and 
it never crosses their minds that if it were not for taxes paid mostly by Euros 
now and for over a century previous, there would be little or no police or fire 
or medical or school services or parks or public transport or streets or sewers 
in their communities, and of course there would not even be a country here, 
as it is mainly Euros who created, and support it and who serve in the military 
in all the wars. And it was primarily Euros and their descendants who created 
the net and the pc's that was used to create this and the electronic or print 
media you are reading this on, the tech that produces the food you eat and 
the medicine that keeps you alive. If not for the Euros technology and 
security, at least 90% of all the Diverse in the world would not exist. Everyone 
condemns colonialism, but it was the way that the Diverse were brought out 
of the dark ages into modern times via communications, medicine, 
agriculture, and enforcement of democratic government. Otherwise all their 
populations would have stayed very small, backwards, starving, disease 
ridden, impoverished, isolated and living in the dark ages (including slavery 
and its equivalents) to this day. To sum it up, the Euro’s antipathy to Diversity 
(‘racism’) is due to a desire that their children have a country and a world 
worth living in. Again, this is for everyone’s benefit, not just Euros or the rich. 
 
Likewise, all my life I have been hearing third world people saying that their 
disproportionate problems with drugs, crime and welfare are due to racism, 
and certainly there is some truth to that, but I wonder why Asians, who must 
be subject to racism as well ( insofar as it exists—and relative to most Diverse 
counties, it’s quite minimal here), and most of whom came here much more 
recently, spoke little or no English, had no relatives here and few skills, have 
a fraction of the crime, drugs and welfare (all less than Euros and so way less 
than blacks or Hispanics) and average about $10,000 more income per family 
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than Euros. Also, blacks never consider that they would not exist if their 
ancestors were not brought to the new world and they would never have been 
born or survived in Africa, that those who captured and sold them were 
usually African, that to this day Africans in Africa almost universally treat 
those of different tribes as subhuman (Idi Amin, Rwanda, Gaddafi etc. and 
far worse is soon to come as the population of Africa swells by 3 billion by 
2100), and that if they want to see real racism and economic exploitation and 
police maltreatment, they should go live almost anywhere in Africa or the 3rd 
world. Returning to Africa or Mexico etc. has always been an option, but 
except for criminals escaping justice, nobody goes back. And it was the Euros 
who put an end to slavery worldwide and, insofar as possible, to serfdom, 
disease, starvation, crime and war all over the 3rd world. If it were not for 
colonialism and the inventions of Euros there would be maybe 1/10 as many 
Diverse alive and they would mostly still be living as they did 400 years ago. 
Likewise, it’s never mentioned that if not for the Euro’s, who were about 95% 
responsible for paying for and fighting and dying in WW2, the Germans and 
Japanese and/or the Communists would now control the world and only the 
Euros can prevent the CCP and/or the Muslims from doing so in the future. 
Also, it was mostly Euros who fought, are fighting and will be fighting the 
communists in Korea and Vietnam, and the Muslim fanatics in Iraq, Syria, 
Libya and Afghanistan and the many others soon to come. 
 
Insofar as any revenge on the Euros is needed for their slavery (but slavery 
by other blacks in various forms has always existed), blacks have already had 
it abundantly. First, they have been largely supported and protected by the 
Euros for centuries. Second, the parasites they brought with them have 
infected and destroyed the lives of tens of millions of Euros. Malaria, 
schistosomes, filariasis, ascaris, yellow fever, smallpox etc., but above all 
hookworm, which was so common and so debilitating up to the early decades 
of this century that it was responsible for the widespread view of Southerners 
as stupid and lazy. 
 
All this is crushingly obvious, but I bet there is not one grade school or college 
text in the world that mentions any of it, as it’s clearly ‘racist’ to suggest that 
the Diverse owe anything to Euros or to point out that other Diverse in their 
countries of origin always have and always will treat them far worse than 
Euro do. And they are incapable of grasping the true horror that is coming or 
they would all be one in opposing any increase in the population by any 
group anywhere and any immigration into America. Well before 2100 the 
Hispanics will control America, and the rest of the world will be dominated 
by Chinese and the rest by Muslims, who will increase from about 1/5th of 
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the world now to about 1/3rd by 2100 and outnumber Christians, and neither 
group is noted for embracing multiculturalism, women’s rights,  child rights, 
animal rights, gay rights, or any rights at all. So, the obvious fact is that overall 
the Euros have treated the Diverse much better than they have treated each 
other. And we now have the best of times, while by 2100 (give or take a 
generation or two) economic collapse and chaos will reign permanently 
except perhaps a few places that forcibly exclude Diverse. Again, keep in 
mind that in my view there is not, and almost certainly will never be, any 
evidence of a significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse in 
psychology, or IQ, and that their tendency to excessive reproduction and 
other cultural limitations are accidents of history. 
 
Likewise, it never crosses Diverse, leftist, third world supremacist, 
Neomarxist minds that every year maybe 500 billion dollars are spent in the 
USA by federal, state and city govts. on education, medicine, transportation 
(highways, streets, rail, bus and airline systems), police, fire and emergency 
care, numerous welfare programs, the government and judicial systems--the 
vast majority of it created, maintained and paid for by the Euros, assisted by 
the taxes of the small minority of well-off Diverse. Also, there is the FBI, NSA, 
CIA, and the armed forces of the USA (another 500 billion a year) and other 
Euro countries, without which there would be no USA and little or no peace, 
security or prosperity anywhere in the world, and they have also been 
created, run and staffed largely by the Euros, who constitute most of the dead 
and wounded in every war (less an issue for Hispanics who serve in the 
military at about half the rate of Euros) and in every police force from 1776 to 
now. Without medicine and public health measures, most of their ancestors 
(and the whole third world) would have suffered and often died of leprosy, 
malaria, worms, bacteria, flu, tuberculosis, smallpox, syphilis, HIV, hepatitis, 
yellow fever, encephalitis, and the tech for high cholesterol and blood 
pressure, heart, cancer, and liver surgery, transplants, MRI, XRAY, 
Ultrasound etc., etc., has almost all been invented, administered and 
overwhelmingly paid for by the Euro ‘racists’ and ‘white supremacists’. 
 
You think colonialism was bad? Just think what the 3rd world would be like 
without it, or what it would be like living under the Nazis, communists or 
Japanese (and will be like living under the Chinese or Muslims once the 
Diverse destroy America). This excuses nothing but just points out the facts 
of history. But fine, let’s undo the ‘injustice’ and pass a Back to Africa (and 
Latin America and Asia etc.) law providing funds to repatriate everyone. 
They could sell their assets here and most could live like kings there, but of 
course there would be very few takers. And by the next century there will be 
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3 billion more Africans (the official estimate) and the whole continent will be 
a sewer, and 1 billion more Asians, and even India and China (who will add 
a hundred million or so  each) will look like paradise in comparison to Africa, 
at least until the resources run out (oil, gas, coal, topsoil, fresh water, fish, 
minerals, forests). 
 
If you look on the net you find the Diverse incessantly whining about their 
oppression, even when it occurred decades or centuries ago, but I don’t see 
how anything that’s done by others, even today, is my responsibility, and 
much less so in the past. If you want to hold every Euro responsible for what 
the vast majority now alive are completely innocent of, then we want to hold 
all Diverse responsible for all the crimes committed by any of them here or 
their relatives in their countries of origin over the last 400 years, and for their 
share of all the tens of trillions spent to build and defend the USA and to keep 
them safe, healthy and well fed. Yes, most blacks and Hispanics are poor due 
to historical factors beyond their control, just as Euros are often richer due to 
historical factors beyond theirs, but the important points are that we now 
alive did not cause this, and that here, as almost everywhere that the Diverse 
are a significant percentage, they commit most of the crime, collect most of 
the welfare, pay the least taxes and continue breeding excessively and 
dragging their countries and the world into the abyss. 
 
Consider as well that the evils of colonialism are only prominent because they 
were recent. If we look carefully, we find that nearly every group in every 
country has an endless history of murder, rape, plunder and exploitation of 
their neighbors that continues today. It’s not far off the mark to suggest that 
the best thing that could happen was to be conquered by the Euros. 
 
Once again, keep in mind that there is not and almost certainly will never be 
any evidence of a significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse 
and that their limitations are almost certainly due to culture. The problem is 
not the Diverse nor Euros, but that people are selfish, stupid, dishonest, lazy, 
crazy, and cowardly and will only behave decently, honestly, and fairly if 
forced to do so. Giving people rights instead of having privileges they must 
earn is a fatal mistake that will destroy any society and any world. In the tiny 
groups in which we evolved, where everyone was our relative, reciprocal 
altruism worked, but in a world soon swelling to 11 billion, this impulse to 
help others is suicidal. The world is totally preoccupied with terrorists, but 
their effects are actually trivial compared e.g., to traffic accidents, murders, 
drug addiction, disease, soil erosion etc., and every day the 7.7 billion do 
vastly more damage to the world just by living. The mothers of the third 
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world increase the population by about 200,000 every day, and so do hugely 
more damage every hour than all the terrorists worldwide will do in the 
whole 21st   century (until they get their hands on the bomb). Just the Diverse 
in the USA in one year will do far more damage to the USA and the world by 
destroying resources, eroding topsoil and creating CO2 and other pollution 
than all terrorism worldwide in all of history. Is there even one politician or 
entertainer or business person who has a clue? And if they did would they 
say or do anything— certainly not—who wants to be attacked for ‘racism’. 
 
People everywhere are lazy, stupid and dishonest and democracy, justice and 
equality in a large Diverse welfare state are an open invitation to limitless 
exploitation of their neighbors and few will resist. In 1979   7% of Americans 
got means-tested govt. benefits while in 2009 it was over 30% and of course 
the increase is mostly the diverse. Food stamps rose from 17 million persons 
in 2000 to about 43 million now. In the first few years of Obama over 3 million 
enrolled to get ‘disability’ checks and over 20% of the adult population is now 
on ‘disability’ which according to the Census Bureau includes categories such 
as “had difficulty finding a job or remaining employed “and “had difficulty 
with schoolwork”. There are now almost 60 million working age (16 to 65) 
adults who are not employed or about 40% of the labor force. Illegal families 
get about $2.50 in direct benefits for every dollar they pay in taxes and about 
another $2.50 indirect benefits (and not counting their damage to the 
biosphere) so they are a huge and ever increasing drain in spite of frequent 
fake ‘news stories’ on the net about their great value. 
 
Interest payments on our national debt are projected to rise to 85% of our total 
federal income by 2050. About half of our debt is owned by foreign govts., 
about a quarter by China, and if China continues to buy our debt at current 
rates, very soon our interest payments to them will cover their total annual 
military budget (ca. 80 billion vs U.S. of ca $600 billion) and (depending on 
interest rates) in a few years they would be able to triple or quadruple their 
military expenditures and it would all be paid for by US taxpayers. Actually, 
I have not seen it noted, but their lower costs mean that they are actually 
spending maybe 300 billion. And it is rarely mentioned why the US military 
budget is so enormous, and how it ties into the high life style and huge govt. 
subsidies in Europe and worldwide for that matter. The USA is the world’s 
free policeman, providing technology, money and troops for keeping the 
peace and fighting wars worldwide and is too stupid to ask the other 
countries to pay their share--until the recent comments by Trump. To a 
significant extent, the ability of the Europeans and countries worldwide to 
have a high standard of living is due to the American taxpayers (without of 
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course being asked) paying for their defense for the last 75 years. 
 
The CIS reports total immigration will reach about 51 million by 2023, about 
85% of the total population increase (all the rest due to the Diverse already 
here) and will soon comprise about 15% of the total population—by far the 
largest percentage in any big country in recent history. It was reported that 
the Dept. of Homeland Security New Americans Taskforce was directed to 
process the citizenship applications of the 9 million green card holders ASAP 
to try to influence the 2016 election. 
 
The federal govt. is a cancer which now takes about 40% of all income from 
the minority who pay significant taxes and federal govt. civilian employees 
are hugely overpaid, averaging ca. $81,000 salary and $42,000 benefits while 
private employees get about $51,000 salary and $11,000 benefits. About 25% 
of all the goods and services produced in the USA are consumed by the govt. 
and about 75% of total govt. income is given out as business and farm 
subsidies and welfare. If all federal taxes were increased by 30% and 
spending was not increased, the budget might balance in 25 years. Of course, 
the spending would increase immediately if more money was available, and 
also the economy would take a huge hit as there would be less incentive to 
earn or to stay in the USA and business investment and earnings would drop. 
It is estimated that private sector compliance with govt. regulations costs 
about 1.8 trillion a year or about 12% of our total GDP, and of course it is 
growing constantly, so we waste more on govt. paperwork every year than 
the GDP of most countries. The main push for evermore confiscation of our 
money (years of our working lives) by the govt. is the 
communism/socialism/fascism forced on us by the rapid increase of Diverse, 
but being the world’s police force for free has cost us trillions, which also 
translates into years of our working lives as detailed elsewhere here. 
 
The poor are almost always spoken of as though they were somehow superior 
to the rich and it is implicit that we ought to make sacrifices for them, but 
they are only the rich in waiting and when they get rich they are inevitably 
exactly as loathsome and exploitative. This is due to our innate psychology, 
which in the small groups in which we evolved made sense, as everyone was 
our relative, but in a world that is fast collapsing due to the expansion of the 
Diverse it makes no sense. The poor care no more about others than the rich. 
 
Marvelous that even Obama and the Pope speak about the coming horrors of 
climate change, but of course not a word about the irresponsible parenthood 
that is its cause. The most you get from any govt. official, academic or TV 
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documentary is a meek suggestion that climate change needs to be dealt with, 
but rarely a hint that overpopulation is the source of it and that most of it for 
the last century and all of it from now on is from the 3rd world. China now 
creates twice the C02 of the USA and this will rise as it is expected to about 
double the size of our GDP by 2030 or so,  and USA Diverse create about 20% 
of USA pollution, which will rise to about 50% by the next century.  
 
Ann Coulter in “Adios America” describes the outrageous story of what 
seems to be the only occasion on which Americans actually got to vote on the 
immigration issue—what some call “the great Prop 187 democracy ripoff”. 
 
In 1994 Californians, outraged to see ever more Hispanics crowding into the 
state and using up tax money, put on the ballot Proposition 187 which barred 
illegals from receiving state money. In spite of the expected opposition and 
outrageous lies from all the self-serving, boot licking Neomarxist third world 
supremacists, it passed overwhelmingly winning 2/3 of white, 56% of black, 
57% of Asian and even 1/3 of Hispanic votes (yes, many middle and upper 
class Hispanics realize being taken over by Mexico will be a disaster). Note 
that all these people are ‘racists’ or ‘white supremacists’ (or in slightly more 
polite columns of the Carlos Slim Helu controlled NY Times etc. ‘bigots’ or 
‘nativists’) according to the current use of this word by a large percentage of 
liberals, many Hispanics, the Sierra Club, the ACLU and even Nobel Prize 
winning economist Paul Krugman (who recently called Trump a ‘racist’ for 
daring to tell the truth while defending the USA from annexation by Mexico). 
 
It even carried the hopeless Republican candidate for Governor, Pete Wilson 
to a landslide victory, with 1/3 of his voters stating his support for Prop 187 
was their reason for voting for him. However, the “ACLU and other anti-
American groups” (Coulter) brought suit and it was soon struck down by a 
Democratic appointed (i.e., ‘honorary Mexican’) District Court Judge for 
being unconstitutional (i.e., protecting Americans rather than aliens). As with 
the 1898 and 1982 Supreme Court decisions giving citizenship to anyone who 
is born here, it was another hallucinatory interpretation of our laws and a 
clear demonstration of the hopelessness of the court system, or any branch of 
the government (at least a Democrat dominated one) in protecting Americans 
from a third world takeover. It has been suggested that the ACLU change its 
name to the Alien Civil Liberties Union and that it, along with the many other 
organizations and individuals working to destroy the USA, be forced to 
register as agents of a foreign government or preferably, be classified as 
terrorists and all their employees and donors deported or quarantined. 
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In spite of this, neither the state nor federal govt. has done anything 
whatsoever to prevent the takeover, and Coulter notes that when G.W. Bush 
ran for president, he campaigned in America with the corrupt Mexican 
president Gortari (see comments on Carlos Slim below), had brother Jeb 
‘Illegal Immigration is an act of love’ Bush speak in Spanish at the Republican 
National Convention, and after winning, gave weekly radio addresses in 
Spanish, added a Spanish page to the White House website, held a huge 
Cinco de Mayo party at the White House, and gave a speech to the blatantly 
racist National Council of La Raza, in which, among other outrages, he 
promised $100 million in federal money (i.e., our money) to speed 
immigration applications! Clearly with both the Republican and Democratic 
parties seeking annexation by Mexico, there is no hope for the democratic 
process in America unless it is drastically changed and clearly this will never 
happen by using the democratic process.  
 
California is the 6th largest in economy in the world, ahead of France, Brazil, 
Italy, South Korea, Australia, Spain, India, Russia, and Canada, and more 
than double that of Mexico, and in about 10 years, when their 10 million kids 
grow up and the total Hispanic population of Calif is about 22 million 
(counting only legals), they will own the state and it will have been annexed 
by Mexico. 
 
In recent years, Calif. Governor Brown signed legislation granting drivers 
licenses to illegals, and paying for free medical care for their children (i.e., of 
course we the taxpayers pay). He agreed to let noncitizens monitor polls for 
elections, and they have been appointed to other government positions such 
as city councils without state govt. approval. He also forced all state officials 
to commit obstruction of justice by signing a law known as the Trust Act (i.e., 
trust they won’t rob, rape, murder, sell drugs etc.), which specifies that unless 
immigrants have committed certain serious crimes, they cannot be detained 
(for delivery to the feds for deportation) past when they would otherwise 
become eligible for release. The batch of new “lets become part of Mexico” 
laws also included one that would allow immigrants without legal status to 
be admitted to the state bar and practice law in California. But he vetoed the 
bill allowing illegal aliens to serve on juries. So, the only thing that prevented 
the final step in turning over the Calif. Courts to Mexico was the arbitrary 
decision of one man! However, it won’t be more than a few years before an 
Hispanic is Governor and then this and endless other atrocities will ensue, 
including presumably giving illegals the right to vote perhaps by passing 
another state law that violates or obstructs the federal one. In any case, there 
will soon by little distinction in California between being a citizen of the USA 
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and a citizen of any other country who can sneak across the border. Note that 
as usual the Citizens of California were never permitted to vote on any of 
these issues, which were passed by the Democratic controlled state 
legislature. Why don’t they just be honest and change the name to 
Neomarxist Party of Mexico? At least they should be forced to register as the 
agent of a foreign govt. 
 
It is certain that California (and by the end of the century the USA) is lost to 
civilization (i.e., it will be like Mexico, which of course will be far worse by 
then since most of the world’s resources will be gone and another 3 billion 
people will by demanding them) unless the govt. sends federal troops into 
California (and other states with sanctuary cities) to deport illegals and arrest 
all those (including numerous elected officials) who are violating federal law. 
Even this will only slow up the catastrophe unless a law is passed terminating 
anchor babies (i.e., those getting citizenship because they are born here), 
preferably retroactively to 1982 or better to 1898, and rescinding citizenship 
for them and  all those who gained it from them—i.e. all their descendants 
and relatives. Also of course the 1965 immigration law must be declared 
unconstitutional and all those (and relatives and descendants) who 
immigrated since then have their status reviewed with the significant 
taxpayers remaining and the non or low payers repatriated.  Hard to get 
precise statistics, as its ‘racist’ to even think about it, but in Stockton, 
California and Dallas, Texas about 70% of all births are to illegals and maybe 
90% of the total counting all Hispanics, and of course the bills are almost all 
paid by Euros and ‘rich’ Diverse via forced taxation, which of course they 
never get to vote on. 
 
To end birthright, a new law has to be passed and not an old one repealed, as 
there is no such law— this was an utterly arbitrary opinion of Justice Willie, 
“anchor baby” Brennan and only a handful of justices ever voted for this 
hallucinatory interpretation of the law. Those who want to  see how the 
Supreme Court destroyed our country by eroding the boundary between 
being an American citizen and a person who was passing through (and the 
lack of basic common sense in the law and the hopelessness of the American 
legal system- and the contrary opinions of legal experts) can consult Levin’s 
‘Men in Black’ or see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (yes 
it was a Chinese who began the assault on America over a century ago) where 
6 lawyers (i.e., justices of the court) granted citizenship to the children of 
resident aliens and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) where 5 lawyers (with 4 
disagreeing) granted citizenship to the children of illegal aliens and anyone 
giving birth while visiting. If just one of the 5 morons who voted for this had 
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changed their mind we would have maybe 10 million fewer on the welfare 
rolls now and perhaps 50 million fewer by 2100. Of course, none of the other 
450 million or so adults alive between then and now have ever been permitted 
to vote on this or any of the basic issues leading inexorably to collapse. As we 
now see in the media every day, in a ‘representative’ democracy what is 
represented is not America’s interests, but egomania, greed, stupidity and 
third world supremacism. 
 
How many people did it take to hand America to Mexico? For the TKO 
Immigration disaster in 1965 there were 320 representatives and 76 senators, 
and for anchor babies the two Supreme Court decisions totaling 11 lawyers, 
most of these ‘outstanding citizens’ now dead, so out of the approx. 245 
million adult Americans citizens alive now, about 120 very senior citizens 
actually voted for the handover. As clear a demonstration of the hopelessness 
of representative democracy (as practiced here) as one could want. 
 
Clearly, if America is to remain a decent place to live for anyone, the 1965 act, 
and all subsequent ones, need to be repealed by a law that puts a moratorium 
on all immigration and naturalization, and preferably rescinds or at least 
reviews citizenship for everyone naturalized since 1965 (or preferably since 
the first absurd birthright ruling in 1898), along with all their relatives and 
descendants. All their cases could be reviewed and citizenship conferred on 
select individuals who scored high enough on a point scale, with welfare 
recipients, the chronically unemployed, felons, and their descendants 
ineligible, those with college or medical degrees, teachers, engineers, business 
owners etc., getting points towards eligibility, i.e., just basic common sense if 
America is to survive.  
 
Following Ann Coulter (‘Adios America’), we note that corporate tax in the 
USA is one the highest in the world of major countries at 39% and as the govt. 
continues to raise taxes to support the half of the country that is on some kind 
of welfare (if one includes social security, unemployment, food stamps, 
housing subsidies, welfare and veterans benefits), inevitably capital and jobs 
will leave, and entering the next century with vanishing resources, and since 
the entire annual population increase of 2.4 million is now Diverse, that 
means about 200 million more of them ( for a total of around 350  million out 
of about 500 million) by 2100, a fragmented populace fighting for resources, 
and a drastically reduced standard of living with eventual collapse is 
inevitable, even without the predatory evils of the Seven Senile Sociopaths 
(i.e., the CCP).. 
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Regarding the tax situation, in 2013, those with gross incomes above $250,000 
(nearly all of them Euros) paid nearly half (48.9%) of all individual income 
taxes, though they accounted for only 2.4% of all returns filed and their 
average tax rate was 25.6%. The bottom 50% of filers (those making under 
$34,000-maybe half Diverse and half Euros) paid an average of 1.2% federal 
income tax for total share of 2.4% while the next 35% of filers (those making 
$34k to $69k) averaged 21% tax rate for a total share of 10.5% of total federal 
income tax collected. So, it is obvious that contrary to the common view of 
the Democrats/third world supremacists/Neomarxists, the upper and upper 
middle class are giving the poor a largely free ride, and that we already have 
one foot in communism. However, we must not forget the $2.5 billion a day 
the US is going into debt and the total $80 trillion or more unfunded liabilities 
(e.g., social security and medicare), which will have to eventually be paid by 
some combo of increased taxes and decreased benefits to their descendants. 
Consider this: “When we combine the populations of non-payers and non-
filers and look to see what overall percentage of each group is not paying 
taxes, we find that: 50.7 percent of African American households pay no 
income taxes, 35.5 percent of Asian American households do not, 37.6 percent 
of White American households do not, and 52 percent of (legal) Hispanics 
pay no income taxes.” There are about 5X as many Euros (whites) as blacks 
and 4X as many Euros as Hispanics in the USA, and there are about the same 
% of whites and blacks on welfare (39%) and about 50% of Hispanics, so 
percentage wise that means blacks are about 5X and Hispanics about 8X as 
likely to be on welfare as Euros. 
 
Including property taxes, sales taxes etc. brings the average middle class 
($34k to $69k income) tax up to about 30%, so 4 months/year or about 15 years 
labor in a 50 year lifetime goes to the government, a large percentage to 
support immigrants who are destroying America and the world, and another 
large percentage for the military, which is a free police force for the rest of the 
world.  
 
Counting all support as enumerated above (i.e., not just food stamps etc., but 
the poor’s fair share of all other expenses) the average middle class family 
works roughly 5 weeks/year or 5 years of their working life to support the 
poor. Neither mass immigration, nor slavery, nor anchor babies, nor 
excessive breeding, nor unemployment, nor crimes and drugs are their fault, 
but the middle and upper class pay for the poor, and their kids will pay more 
(likely at least 10 years of their 50 year working life well before 2100) until the 
standard of living and quality of life is about the same as that of Diverse 
countries, and they will both drop continually every year until collapse, even 
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if the Gang of Seven Sociopaths is destroyed. 
 
Of course, every statistic has a counter statistic and the Neomarxist Third 
World Supremacists and the Fifty Cent Army of the CCP are busily spreading 
disinformation and trolling all social media, but as a rough guide we find a 
recent study that found that 37% of Hispanic immigrant households got the 
majority of their income from welfare while 17% of blacks did (whites were 
not reported but I would guess about 10%). Of the $ 3.5 trillion budget, about 
595 billion is deficit and about 486 billion goes to welfare, so eliminating 
welfare would almost balance it and eliminating all the costs associated with 
persons and their descendants naturalized since 1965 would put the USA 
solidly in the black and would probably allow paying off the $18 trillion 
national debt before the end of the century, while implementing a 
Naturalized Citizens Repatriation Act would likely allow this closer to 
midcentury. 
 
As I write this I see a ‘news item’ (i.e., one of the endless barrage of paid lies 
planted there every day by the Diverse and the Fifty Cent Army) on Yahoo 
that tells me that illegals are doing us a big favor as the majority are working 
and pay about $1000 each tax per year. But they don’t tell us that they cost 
the country maybe $25,000 each in direct traceable costs and if you add their 
share of all the other costs (to maintain the govt. the police, the courts, the 
army, the streets etc., etc.) it’s likely double that. As Coulter tells you on p47 
of Adios America, a college educated person pays an average $29k taxes more 
per year than they get back in govt. services. Legal immigrants however get 
back an average $4344 more than they pay, while those without a high school 
degree get back about $37k more than they pay. She says that about 71% of 
illegal households get welfare. 
 
About 20% of US families get 75% of their income from the govt (i.e., extorted 
from taxpayers and borrowed from banks at 2.5 billion/day) and another 20% 
get 40%. In the UK, which is about on a par with the USA on its 
Diverse/Neomarxist path to ruin, about 5 million persons or 10% of able 
adults live totally on welfare and have not worked a day since the Labour 
govt. took over in 1997, and another 30% receive partial support. Greece, 
famous for it’s recent huge bailout, is a typical case of how the masses always 
drag a country into chaos if permitted. People normally retire on full govt. 
pensions in their 50’s and as early as 45, and when retirement at 50 was 
permitted for a couple of hazardous jobs like bomb disposal, it soon was 
enlarged to cover over 500 occupations including hairdressers (hazardous 
chemicals like shampoo) and radio and TV announcers (bacteria on 
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microphones)—no I am not joking. 
 
People often praise European countries for their generous welfare, but in fact 
it is mainly possible because nearly all their defense since the 50’s (to say 
nothing about the two world wars, the Korean and Vietnamese wars, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Serbia etc., etc.), i.e., about $10 trillion in 
direct costs and perhaps another $10 trillion indirect) has been paid for by the 
USA (and by American lives and injuries), i.e., by the 20% of US taxpayers 
who pay any significant tax, plus much of the $18 trillion debt. In fact, like all 
the world, they would not even be independent countries if not for the USA 
who defeated the Germans in two wars and the Japanese and kept the 
communists and now the Muslims under control for half a century. So not 
only is the U.S. bled dry by the poor and Diverse here, but we pay for them 
all over the world as well as helping the rich there get richer. Typical of all 
Europe, in France, where the Muslims have become a huge problem, even 
when not slaughtering people, most of them are on welfare, paid for in part 
by the USA. For about a decade the biggest voting bloc in the U.N is the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation which controls e.g., the Human Rights 
Council, where they allow only the rights permitted by Islamic law, and so 
forget women’s rights, children’s rights, gay rights, freedom of religion, free 
speech etc. and in fact freedom of any kind.  As the Muslims unrestrained 
breeding increases their percent of world population from 1/5 to 1/3 by 2100 
or so and civilization collapses, this will get much worse.  
 
Islam is defended with such ferocity because in the poor 3rd world countries 
it has been the only defense against selfishness and it provides poor men with 
a guarantee of reproduction and survival. The same used to be the case for 
Christianity. It is also clear that as the 22nd century approaches and America 
collapses, China will replace it as the ‘Great Satan’ since it will be dominant 
worldwide, protecting its ever-growing investments and Chinese citizens, 
and eventually doing whatever it wants, as ‘Diversification’ results in control 
of America by Mexicans and Africans and it loses military superiority and the 
money and will to fight. And of course, the Chinese will not follow America’s 
path and be ‘diversified’ into collapse, unless via some great misfortune they 
become democratic/Neomarxist (they are of course now only communist in 
name). 
 
A bit off the mark but too nice to pass up is a lovely example of devolution 
(dysgenics) that is second only to overpopulation in bringing about the 
collapse of industrial civilization (though political correctness forbids 
discussion anywhere). U.K. Pakistanis, who often import their cousins to 
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marry and so are inbreeding with up to 5 children a family, sometimes with 
multiple wives, produce 30% of the rare diseases in the UK, though they are 
2% of the population. Of course, most are on welfare and the defectives result 
in huge expenses for full time nursing care and special education (for those 
not deaf and blind). And the European High Court, like the US Supreme 
Court, has forgotten its real reason for existing and enraptured by Suicidal 
Utopian Delusions, has ruled the govt must pay full spousal benefits to all the 
wives and can’t draw the line at two. 
 
A good part of Coulter’s book is spent on crime, and we should first note 
(Coulter does not seem to, though I expect she knows) that it is rarely 
considered that it is hugely underreported, especially among the poor and 
Diverse. Thus, the BJS says that about 3.4 million violent crimes per year go 
unreported and the figures for nonviolent ones (burglary, assault, petty theft, 
vandalism, drug dealing, etc.) must be in the hundreds of millions, 
disproportionately committed by (and suffered by) the Diverse. One finds 
that the percent of adult males incarcerated for whites is 0.7, for Hispanics 1.5 
and for blacks 4.7. It appears impossible to find any precise national figures 
for the cost of incarceration but $35K/year seems a minimum, and perhaps 
$50K for the legal system, and perhaps another $50k in medical and 
psychological costs, rehab programs, loss of work by their victims etc. 
According to the BJS non-Hispanic blacks accounted for 39.4% of the prison 
and jail population in 2009, while non-Hispanic whites were 34.2%, and 
Hispanics (of any race) 20.6%. According to a 2009 report by the Pew Hispanic 
Center, in 2007 Latinos "accounted for 40% of all sentenced federal offenders-
-more than triple their share (13%) of the total U.S. adult population”. Again, 
keep in mind there is not and almost certainly will never be any evidence of 
a significant genetic difference between Euros and Diverse in psychology, or 
IQ, and that their greater incidence of problems must be wholly due to their 
culture. 
 
If one counted only illegals, the crime and imprisonment rate would likely be 
double that reported for legal Hispanics. As Coulter notes (p101-2) it’s 
impossible to get the actual figures for immigrant crime since it’s of course 
‘racist’ to even suggest they should be collected (and as noted, all crime 
among Diverse is greatly underreported and many Hispanics are 
misclassified as whites), but it’s definitely above that stated, so their actual 
rate could be near that of blacks. One set of data showed about 1/3 of the 2.2 
million state and local prisoners are foreign born and maybe another 5% are 
American born Hispanics and another 30% black, leaving about 32% white. 
The foreign born were 70% more likely to have committed a violent crime 
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and twice as likely a class A felony. As Coulter notes, virtually all immigrant 
groups have a higher crime rate than natives. As the invasion continues, 
bribery and extortion will see huge increases as they rise to the third world 
standard. Bribes (the mildest form of extortion) in cash or equivalent is the 
normal interaction between people in the third world and police, the military, 
customs and immigration officers, health and fire inspectors, teachers, school 
admissions officers, and even doctors, surgeons and nurses. I am not guessing 
here as I spent a decade of my life in the third world and experienced and 
heard countless stories about all of the above. As time passes, we can expect 
this to become routine here as well (first of course in California and the other 
Western states) and the nationwide norm thereafter. In addition to continued 
increases in crime of all kinds we will see the percentage of crimes solved 
drop to the extremely low levels of the third world. More resources are 
devoted to the solution of murders than any other crime and about 65% are 
solved in the USA, but in Mexico less than 2% are solved and as you get 
outside Mexico City the rate drops to near zero. Also note that the rate here 
used to be about 80%, but it has dropped in parallel with the increase in 
Diverse. Also 65% is the average but if you could get statistics I am sure it 
would rise with the percent of Euro’s in a city and drop as the percent of 
Diverse increases. In Detroit only 30% are solved. If you keep track of who 
robs, rapes and murders, it’s obvious that black lives matter lots more to 
Euros than they do to other blacks. 
 
Spanish may become the official and mandatory language and Roman 
Catholicism the official religion, and of course the Mexican cartels will be the 
dominant criminal organizations, at least for the Southwestern states by 
midcentury and likely the whole country by 2100. 
 
Of course, as Coulter points out, it’s very hard to get statistics on race and 
crime or increasingly on race and anything, as it’s considered ‘racism’ even 
to ask and the govt. refuses to collect it. Finding the truth is made much more 
difficult since Hispanic special interest groups (i.e., third world 
supremacists), abetted by Euro liberals, who have lost or sold whatever 
common sense or decency they may have had, are hard at work spreading 
disinformation with hundreds of thousands of false or misleading items on 
the net and social media every week. She does not seem to mention the 
massive deception facilitated by Yahoo, Bing, Facebook and others, who 
present among their news items, paid disinformation which presents ‘news’ 
that is deliberately false or hugely misleading, such as the item mentioned 
above (repeated many times a day somewhere on the net) which says that 
illegals are a good thing as they are paying taxes.  
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In spite of being given a largely free ride, the Diverse take it all for granted 
(especially as it’s ‘racist’, ‘hate’ and ‘white supremacist’ to point out their free 
ride, so you won’t find it in the major media) and have no problem suing the 
police, hospitals, and every branch of government for any imagined 
infraction. The Euros should get a clue and sue them back! They and the US 
govt, now that Trump is president, could file millions of suits or criminal 
cases against people who riot in the streets, picket and protest disrupting 
traffic, smashing windows and causing business losses, psychological 
trauma, etc. Sue and/or arrest all the criminals and their families for the 
damages to property, police, loss of business income and work, etc. Also sue 
the police and every branch of government for failing to protect them every 
time a crime is committed, especially by illegal Diverse. 
 
As I wrote this the parents of a young San Francisco woman murdered by an 
illegal alien criminal, who had been deported numerous times, and then 
shielded from deportation by the San Francisco police (obstruction of justice), 
is suing them and the feds (and they should sue the board of Supervisors and 
Governor Brown and the state legislature who voted for the sanctuary rules 
and Trust Act as well). Predictably he was found not guilty and in the 
sanctuary city of San Francisco (and now the sanctuary state of California) is 
able to live out his life of crime while being supported at public expense. 
 
Hundreds of thousands are robbed, assaulted, raped or murdered by Diverse, 
and perhaps 100 million victimized in lesser ways every year, and the injured 
parties (most often Diverse) should sue every time. To facilitate this, the Euros 
could establish a fund and various organizations to eliminate illegals and 
crime against Euros. And of course, all the countries that foreign born 
criminals come from should be forced to pay the cost of policing and 
prosecuting them and of keeping them here—welfare, medical care, 
schooling, and their share of all the goods and services mentioned above, 
including national defense. Mexico should pay all the costs of policing the 
border and for all the crimes and for all the upkeep of illegals here since day 
one—i.e., back to say 1965. And they and Colombia etc. should pay for the 
cost of drug enforcement, addict treatment and jailing, and say a $20 million 
fine every time someone is raped, disabled or murdered by a drug addict or 
by an illegal or a naturalized citizen or descendant of a person originating in 
their country. If they won’t we could expel everyone born there and cut off 
all trade and visas, or just confiscate their oil, mineral and food production. 
Like many of the ideas here it sounds bizarre because the cowardice and 
stupidity of ‘our’ leaders (i.e., not actually ours as we are never asked) has 
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gotten us so used to being abused. We are the last country that should put up 
with abuse but the politicians and leftist morons have made us the easiest 
mark on the planet. Yes 9/11 is the most striking abuse, but in fact we suffer 
as many deaths and injuries from the Diverse every year (e.g., just from drugs 
and addicts or just from wars), and far more damage every day, if you 
extrapolate the consequences of their presence here into the future. 
 
Much controversy was generated when Trump mentioned we were letting 
rapists into the country, but he was just stating the facts. Most crimes in 
Diverse communities are never reported, often because they are committed 
by the Hispanic gangs who control them.  Coulter recounts a few (the 
publisher cut the book in half and she says she can easily produce 50 cases for 
every one cited) of the more outrageous immigrant rape crimes committed 
here, noting a study in which Latino women here reported childhood sexual 
abuse at about 80X the rate of other American women, and since it seems 
likely many did not want to talk about it, it could be higher. She notes that in 
much of Latin America raping teenagers is not considered a crime (e.g., the 
age of consent in Mexico is 12) and in any case, it is rare that anything is done 
about it, since it’s often connected to gang members or their families and if 
you protest you die. 
 
Coulter notes that illegals have made large areas of SouthWestern USA public 
lands and parks unsafe and some have been closed. Half of some 60 forest 
fires on federal or tribal land between 2006 and 2010 were started by illegals, 
many of them set deliberately to avoid capture. The cost of fighting these 30 
alone might pay for a good start on a secure border fence. 
 
I assume everyone knows about the massive marijuana growing operations 
conducted by the Mexican cartels in our national forests. In addition to the 
erosion and pollution, it is the norm for growers to kill numerous animals 
and threaten hikers. Most depressing of all is the sellout of the Sierra Club 
(who suddenly changed their tune after getting a $100 million contribution 
from billionaire David Gelbaum with the proviso that they support 
immigration—clearly confused as his right hand protects nature while the left 
destroys it), who are now devoted to mass immigration, denouncing anyone 
opposed as “white racists” even when they are Diverse. So, they are another 
group that should be made to register as an agent of a foreign government 
and their executives and major contributors made to join the other criminals 
quarantined on an island (the Aleutians would be perfect but even Cuba 
would do) where they can’t do more harm. Considering the blatant trashing 
of California by Hispanics, and the clear as day end of nature in America as 
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the immigrants about double the population during the next century or so, 
this is truly amazing from one viewpoint, but cowardice and stupidity are 
only to be expected. 
 
One murder in the USA is said to total about $9 million lifetime costs and if 
they get death it is several million more. At about 15,000/year that would be 
about $150 billion/year just for homicides-most by Diverse. Mexico has about 
5X the murder rate of the USA and Honduras about 20X and your 
descendants can certainly look forward to our rate moving in that direction. 
Coulter notes that Hispanics have committed about 23,000 murders here in 
the last few decades. As I write, this item appeared on the net. “In an undated 
file photo, Jose Manuel Martinez arrives at the Lawrence County Judicial 
Building in Moulton, Ala., before pleading guilty to shooting Jose Ruiz in 
Lawrence County, Ala., in March 2013. Martinez has admitted to killing 
dozens of people across the United States as an enforcer for drug cartels in 
Mexico.” Not of course rare, just one of the few to make the headlines 
recently. 
 
Figuring about 2.2 million prisoners (over 1% of the adult population) and a 
cost to put them in jail from the start of their criminal career of maybe $50,000 
each or about $100 billion and the cost to keep them there of about $35,000 
each or about $75 billion means a minimum of $150 billion a year, not 
including other governmental and social costs. I don’t see any really clear 
estimates on the net for the total cost of crime in the USA, but in 2013 it was 
estimated that violent crime alone cost the UK (where guns are much less 
frequent and the Mexican and Colombian  mafias  don’t operate significantly) 
ca. $150 billion or about $6000/household, or about 8% of GDP, but the USA 
has a much higher percentage of immigrants, guns and drugs, so including 
all the nonviolent crimes and figuring only 5% of the GDP, that would be 
about 900 billion per year. Figuring about 60% of crime due to the Diverse, or 
maybe 80% if you count that of Euros addicted to drugs imported by Diverse, 
we pay something like 700 billion a year to support Diverse crime. 
 
Of course, all those guilty of felonies, regardless of national origin, history or 
status could have their citizenship rescinded and be deported or quarantined 
on an island, where their cost of upkeep could be from $0 to $1000/year rather 
than $35,000 and it could be made a one-way trip to avoid recidivism. Yes, its 
sci-fi now, but as the 22nd century approaches and civilization collapses, the 
tolerance of crime will diminish of necessity. For now, nothing will be done, 
and crime here will reach the levels in Mexico as the border continues to 
dissolve and environmental collapse and approaching bankruptcy dissolve 
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the economy. Inside Mexico in 2014 alone, 100 U.S. citizens were known to 
have been murdered and more than 130 kidnapped and others just 
disappeared, and if you add other foreigners and Mexicans it runs into the 
thousands. Even a tiny lightly traveled country like Honduras manages some 
10 murders and 2 kidnappings a year of US citizens. And of course, these are 
the best of times—it is getting steadily worse as unrestrained breeding and 
resource depletion bring collapse ever closer. 
 
In another index of how far out of control Mexico is, the criminal cartels, 
believed to generate well over $21 billion each year from drugs, illegal 
mining, fishing and logging, theft, prostitution, extortion, kidnapping and 
embezzlement, are an increasing threat to Pemex, the Mexican oil 
monopoly. Between 2009 and 2016, thieves tapped the pipelines roughly 
every 1.4 kms along Pemex’s approximately 14,000 km pipeline network, 
getting more than $1 billion in annual revenue from the gas which they sell 
on the black market. They are able to do this by terrorizing Pemex 
employees to obtain info on its operations, offering them the same as they 
do for everyone in Mexico—silver or lead, i.e., take the bribes or you and 
your family die.  
Euros hear constantly about how bad they are not to want to give the Diverse 
even more. OK fine, lets agree to do it provided the third world country they 
are from lets in immigrants until they comprise about 30% of their population 
now and 60% by 2100, enforces legislation that gives all foreigners in their 
country, legally or not, citizenship for their babies, welfare, free food, free 
medical care, free schooling, immunity to deportation, free emergency care, 
drivers licenses, license to practice law, right to serve on juries, right to bring 
in all their relatives (who also get all these privileges), right to setup 
organizations that help them to lie on immigration forms, to evade 
deportation, to suppress free speech and to subvert the political process so 
that they can take  over the country. Actually, let’s make it easy and do it if 
even one of their countries implements even a few of these. Of course, it will 
never happen. 
 
Naturally, those with every kind of mental or physical deficiency are 
dissatisfied with their level of welfare and are getting organized too. Those 
with autism, actually a spectrum of genetic deficiencies due to as many as 
1000 genes, are now campaigning to be regarded as not deficient but 
‘neurodiverse’ and ‘neurotypicals’ should regard them as peers or even their 
superiors. No problem for me if someone wants to have a ‘friend’ or spouse 
who cannot experience love or friendship and who feels the same when they 
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die as they do when their goldfish does (except being more annoyed by the 
greater inconvenience). And those with more than mild cases will never hold 
a job and will be a burden to their relatives and society (i.e., the minority who 
pay taxes) all their lives, and have a strong tendency to pass the problem on 
to any offspring they have, so it will likely increase continually, the same as 
hundreds of other genetic problems with significant heritability. As diagnosis 
has improved, so has the incidence of autism, which now exceeds 1%, as does 
that for schizophrenia, schizotypal disorders, ADHD, drug addiction, 
alcoholism, alexithymia, low IQ, depression, bipolar disorder, etc., etc., so 
perhaps the combined incidence of disabling mental disorders exceeds 10% 
and those with physical problems who need partial or complete lifelong 
support is probably similar, and both are rising in number and percent, the 
inevitable results of ‘civilization’, ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’. Clearly, as 
the economy collapses, the costs of health care rise, and an ever-larger 
percentage are nonworking elderly and mentally or physically disabled, this 
lunatic system will collapse-i.e., the USA will eventually have about the same 
handouts for everyone as third world countries by the early 22nd century—
none. 
 
Coulter comments on Mexican citizen Carlos Slim Helu (the world’s third 
richest person as I write this) in the context of the near universal lying about 
and evasion of immigration issues by the New York Times and other media. 
He gave a huge loan to the Times a few years ago, to save it from bankruptcy, 
and this likely accounts for its subsequent failure to cover immigration issues 
in a meaningful way. Slim is the world’s premiere monopolist and his 
companies control 90% of the Mexican telephone market and many of its 
major industries (Mexican’s refer to their country as Slimlandia). His wealth 
is the equivalent of roughly 5% of Mexico's GDP. To add perspective, since 
the USA has about 15 times Mexico’s GDP, to be comparable, Bill Gates or 
Warren Buffet would have to be worth about a trillion dollars each or about 
20X their worth. California is the biggest money making US state for Slim, 
whose take of Mexican goods and services is about $140 million/day. To get 
the flavor of how things were when Slim managed to acquire the Mexican 
telephone company (and what can be expected here soon), Gortari (chosen by 
G.W. Bush to campaign with him) was president of the vicious Mexican 
political monopoly PRI, and in subsequent years Gortari’s brother was found 
murdered, his relatives were apprehended by Swiss police when they tried 
to withdraw $84 million from his brother’s bank account, and he fled Mexico 
for Ireland, where he remains. These are among the reasons Coulter calls Slim 
a robber baron and a baneful influence on Mexico and America. She notes 
that about $20 billion of Slim’s yearly income from his telephone monopoly 
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comes from Mexicans living here. He is Lebanese on both sides, so Mexico 
has experienced it’s own foreign takeover. 
 
The bleeding hearts insist Americans show ever more “humanity” and 
guarantee our own collapse to help the mob, but what humanity do the 
Diverse show? They breed like rabbits and consume without restraint, thus 
condemning everyone, including their own descendants, to Hell on Earth. 
There is nothing noble about the poor—they are just the rich in waiting. 
Showing the typical oblivion of the establishment, our Secretary of State 
Kerry praises China for ‘lifting 200 million people out of poverty’ but fails to 
note this placed a huge drain on the world resources, and is done by stealing 
from the future, including their own descendants, and that this is 
unsustainable. Ten or 11 billion (by 2100) all trying to stay out of poverty 
guarantees the collapse of the world. China’s higher QOL, like our own, is 
only temporary, obtained at the cost of their own descendants and the worlds 
future. 
 
The major deficiency of the first version of this essay was lack of any 
discussion of China.  The first thing we must keep in mind is that when saying 
that China says this or China does that, we are not usually speaking of the 
Chinese people, but of the Sociopaths of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party, 
i.e., the Seven Senile Sociopathic Serial Killers (SSS)of the Standing 
Committee of the CCP who rule China. There are 25 members of the Politburo 
but only 7 members of its Standing Committee, one of them usually being 
chosen as Premier. Currently and probably until he becomes senile or dies 
this is Xi Jinping.   I recently watched some typical leftist fake news programs  
(i.e., pretty much the only kind one can find in the media, i.e., nearly 
everything now –i.e., Yahoo, CNN, The New York Times, etc.) on Youtube,  
one by VICE which mentioned that 1000 economists (and 15 Nobel Prize 
winners) sent a letter to Trump telling him that the trade war was a mistake,  
and another which interviewed an academic economist who said that 
Trump’s move was a provocation for starting World War 3.  They are right 
about the disruption of global trade, but have no grasp of the big picture, 
which is that the Seven Sociopaths have total world domination, with the 
elimination of freedom everywhere, as their goal. and that there are only two 
ways to stop them—a total trade embargo that devastates the Chinese 
economy and leads their military to force out the CCP and hold elections, or 
WW3.  Clear as day, but all these “brilliant” academics can’t see it.  If the 
Sociopaths are not removed now, in as little as 15 years it will be too late and 
your descendants slowly but inexorably will be subject to the same fate as 
Chinese—kidnapping, torture and murder of any dissenters.  
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Of course, the CCP started WW3 long ago (you could see their invasion of 
Korea as the beginning) and is pursuing it in every possible way, except for 
bullets and bombs, and they will come soon.  The CCP fought the USA in 
Korea, invaded and massacred Tibet, and fought border skirmishes with 
Russia and India. It conducts massive hacking operations against all 
industrial and military databases worldwide and has stolen the classified 
data on virtually all current US and European military and space systems, 
analyzed their weaknesses and fielded improved versions within a few years. 
Tens of thousands, and maybe hundreds of thousands, of CCP employees 
have been hacking into military, industrial, financial and social media 
databases worldwide since the early days of the net and there are hundreds 
of known recent hacks in the USA alone.  As the major institutions and 
military have hardened their firewalls, the SSS have moved to minor 
institutions and to defense subcontractors and to our allies, which are easier 
targets.  While it ignores the crushing poverty of hundreds of millions and 
the marginal existence of most of its people, it has built up a massive military 
and space presence, which grows larger every year, and whose only reason 
for existence is waging war to eliminate freedom everywhere.  In addition to 
stripping the 3rd world of resources, a major thrust of the multi-trillion dollar 
Belt and Road Initiative is building military bases worldwide. They are 
forcing the free world into a massive high-tech arms race that makes the cold 
war with the Soviet Union look like a picnic.  The Russians are not stupid, 
and in spite of pretending friendship with the Sociopaths, they surely grasp 
that the CCP is going to eat them alive, that their only hope is to ally 
themselves with the West, and Trump is right on the money in befriending 
Putin. Of course, the Neomarxist Third World Supremacists will likely take 
total control of the USA in 2020 and nothing could be more to the liking of 
the CCP.  Snowden (another clueless twenty something) helped the SSS more 
than any other single individual, with the possible exception of all the 
American presidents since WW2, who have pursued the suicidal policy of 
appeasement.  The USA has no choice but to monitor all communications and 
to compile a dossier on everyone, as it’s essential not only to control criminals 
and terrorists, but to counter the SSS, who are rapidly doing the same thing, 
with the intent of removing freedom completely.   
 
Though the SSS, and the rest of the world’s military, are spending huge sums 
on advanced hardware, it is highly likely that WW3 (or the smaller 
engagements leading up to it) will be software dominated. It is not out of the 
question that the SSS, with probably more hackers (coders) working for them 
then all the rest of the world combined, will win future wars with minimal 
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physical conflict, just by paralyzing their enemy electronics via the net. No 
satellites, no phones, no communications, no financial transactions, no power 
grid, no internet, no advanced weapons, no vehicles, trains, ships or planes.   
 
Some may question that the CCP (and of course the top tiers of the police, 
army and 610 Office) are really mentally aberrant, so here are some of the 
common characteristics of Sociopaths (formerly called psychopaths) that 
you can find on the net.  Of course, some of these are shared by many 
autistics and alexithymics, and sociopaths differ from “normal” people only 
in degree.  
 
Superficial Charm, Manipulative and Cunning, Grandiose Sense of Self, Lack 
of Remorse, Shame or Guilt, Shallow Emotions, Incapacity for Love, 
Callousness/Lack of Empathy,  
Poor Behavioral Controls/Impulsive Nature, Believe they are all-powerful, 
all-knowing, entitled to every wish, no sense of personal boundaries, no 
concern for their impact on others.  
Problems in making and keeping friends. Aberrant behaviors such as 
cruelty to people or animals, Stealing, Promiscuity, Criminal or 
Entrepreneurial Versatility,  
Change their image as needed, Do not perceive that anything is wrong with 
them, Authoritarian, Secretive, Paranoid, Seek out situations where their 
tyrannical behavior will be 
 tolerated, condoned, or admired (e.g., CCP, Police, Military, Predatory 
Capitalism), Conventional appearance, Goal of enslavement of their 
victims, Seek to exercise despotic control over every aspect of other’s lives, 
Have an emotional need to justify their actions and therefore need their 
victim's affirmation (respect, gratitude), Ultimate goal is the creation of a 
willing victim, 
Incapable of real human attachment to another, Unable to feel remorse or 
guilt, Extreme narcissism and grandiosity, Their goal is to rule the world.  
Pathological Liars.  
 
This last is one of the most striking characteristics of the CCP. Virtually 
everything they say is an obvious lie, or distortion, mostly so absurd that 
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any well educated ten year old will laugh at them. Yet they persist in 
saturating all the media every day (a $10 billion annual budget just for 
foreign propaganda) with preposterous statements.  The fact that they are 
so out of touch with reality that they think they will be taken seriously 
clearly shows what any rational person will regard as mental illness 
(sociopathy). 
 
There are only two paths to removing the CCP, freeing 1.4 billion prisoners 
from the SSS, and ending the lunatic march to WW3.  The peaceful one is to 
launch an all-out trade war to devastate the Chinese economy until the 
military gets fed up and boots out the CCP.  The USA needs, by any means 
necessary, to join all its allies in reducing the trade with China to near zero—
no imports of any product from China or any entity with more that 10% 
Chinese ownership anywhere in the world, including any product with any 
component of such origin.  No export of anything whatsoever to China or any 
entity that reexports to China or that has more than 10 % Chinese ownership, 
with severe and immediate consequences for any violators.  Yes, it would 
temporarily cost millions of jobs and a major worldwide recession, and yes I 
know that a large part of their exports are from joint ventures with American 
companies, but the alternative is that every country will become the dog of 
the Seven Sociopaths (and like all animals they keep dogs in small cages while 
they fatten them for the kill) and/or experience the horrors of WW3.  Other 
possible steps are to send home all Chinese students and workers in science 
and tech, freeze all assets of any entity more than 10% Chinese owned, forbid 
foreign travel to any Chinese citizen, to prohibit any Chinese or any entity 
more than 10% owned by Chinese from buying any company, land, product 
or technology from the USA or any of its allies.   All these measures would be 
phased in as appropriate.  
 
We should keep in mind that the Chinese monster is largely due to the 
suicidal utopian delusions of our politicians.  President Carter gave them the 
right to  send students to the USA (there are currently about 300,000), use our 
intellectual property without paying royalties, gave them most favored 
nation trading status, and by decree canceled our recognition of Taiwan and 
our mutual defense agreement (i.e., with no vote by anyone – he should be 
an honorary CCP member, along with the Bushes,  the Obamas, the Clintons, 
Edward Snowden, etc.). These were the first in a long series of conciliatory 
gestures to the world’s most vicious dictatorship which made it possible for 
them to prosper, and set the stage for their coming invasion of Taiwan, the 
South Sea Islands and other countries as they wish. These measures along 
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with our failure to invade in the 40’s to prevent their takeover of China, our 
failure to nuke their army and hence the CCP out of existence during the 
Korean War, our failure to prevent their massacre of Tibet, our failure to do 
anything when they exploded their first nuclear weapons, our failure to take 
them out in 1966 when they launched their first nuclear capable ICBM, our 
(or rather Bush’s) failure to do anything about the Tiananmen massacre, our 
failure to shut down the Confucius Institutes present nn many universities 
worldwide, which are fronts for the CCP, our failure to ban the purchase of 
companies , property, mining rights etc. worldwide, which is another way to 
acquire high-tech and other vital assets,  our failure to do anything over the 
last 20 years about their countless acts of espionage and hacking into our 
databases stealing nearly all our advanced weaponry, our failure to stop their 
allies North Korea and Pakistan from developing nukes and ICBM’s and 
receiving equipment from China (e.g., their mobile missile launchers, which 
they claim were for hauling logs and it was pure coincidence they exactly fit 
the Korean missiles), our failure to stop them from violating our embargo on 
Iran’s oil (they buy much of it, registering their ships in Iran),  and its nuclear 
program (equipment and technicians go back and forth to N. Korea via 
China), our failure to stop them from providing military tech and weapons 
worldwide (e.g., North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, the cartels in Mexico, and over 
30 other countries, our failure to stop the flow of dangerous drugs and their 
precursors directly or indirectly (e.g., nearly all Fentanyl and Carfentanyl sent 
worldwide, and meth precursors for the Mexican cartels come from China), 
and our failure to do anything about their building “ports” (i.e., military 
bases) all over the world, which is ongoing.   
 
An alternative to shutting down China’s economy is a targeted strike by say 
50 thermobaric drones on the 20th Congress of the CCP, when all the top 
members are in one place, but that won’t take place until 2022.  The Chinese 
would be informed, as the attack happened, that they must lay down their 
arms and prepare to hold a democratic election or be nuked into the stone 
age. The other alternative is an all-out nuclear attack.  Military confrontation 
is unavoidable given the CCP’s present course.  It will likely happen over the 
islands in the South China Sea or Taiwan within a few decades, but as they 
establish military bases worldwide it could happen anywhere (see Crouching 
Tiger etc.).  Future conflicts will have hardkill an softkill aspects with the 
stated objectives of the CCP to emphasize cyberwar by hacking and 
paralyzing control systems of all military and industrial communications, 
equipment, power plants, satellites, internet, banks, and any device or vehicle 
connected to the net.  The Sociopaths are slowly fielding a worldwide array 
of manned and autonomous surface and underwater subs or drones capable 
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of launching conventional or nuclear weapons that may lie dormant awaiting 
a signal from China or even looking for the signature of US ships or planes.  
While destroying our satellites, thus eliminating communication between the 
USA and our forces worldwide, they will use theirs, in conjunction with 
drones to target and destroy our currently superior naval forces.  Of course, 
all of this is increasingly done automatically by AI.   
 
All this is totally obvious to anyone who spends a little time on the net and 
can understand English.  Two of the best sources to start with are the book 
Crouching Tiger (and the five Youtube videos with the same name), and the 
long series of short satirical pieces on the China Uncensored channel on 
Youtube or their new one www.chinauncensored.tv.  The CCP’s plans for 
WW3 and total domination are laid out quite clearly in Chinese govt 
publications and speeches.  They spend an estimated 10 billion dollars yearly 
to spread their propaganda worldwide. They or their puppets own or control 
newspapers, magazines, TV and radio channels and place fake news in most 
major media everywhere every day.  In addition, they have an army (maybe 
millions of people) who troll all the media placing more propaganda and 
drowning out legitimate commentary.  
 
The rule of the Seven Senile Sociopaths is a surrealistic tragicomedy like Snow 
White the Seven Dwarves, but without Snow White, endearing personalities, 
or a happy ending.  They are the wardens of the world’s biggest prison but 
they are they far the worst criminals, committing by proxy every day millions 
of assaults, rapes, robberies, bribes, kidnappings, tortures, and murders, most 
of them presumably by their own secret police of the 610 Office created on 
June 10, 1999 by Jiang Zemin to persecute the qigong meditators of Falun 
Gong, and anyone else deemed a threat, now including all religious and 
political groups not under their direct rule.   By far the biggest ally of the 
Seven Dwarves is the Democratic party of the USA, which, at a time when 
America needs more than ever to be strong and united, is doing everything 
possible to divide America into warring factions with ever more of its 
resources going to sustain the burgeoning legions of the lower classes and 
driving it into bankruptcy. The CCP is by far the most evil group in world 
history, robbing, raping, kidnapping, imprisoning, torturing starving to 
death and murdering more people that all the other dictators in history (an 
estimated 100 million), and in a few years will have a total surveillance state 
for every activity of everyone in China, which is already expanding 
worldwide.  
 
Though the SSS treat us as an enemy, in fact, the USA is the Chinese people’s 
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greatest friend and the CCP their greatest enemy. From another perspective, 
other Chinese are their greatest enemy as they demolish all the world’s 
resources. 
 
Of course, some say that China will collapse of its own accord, and it’s 
possible, but the price of being wrong is the end of freedom and WW3 or a 
long series of conflicts which the Seven Sociopaths will almost certainly win.  
One must keep in mind that they have controls on their population and 
weapons that Stalin, Hitler, Gaddafi and Idi Amin never dreamed of.  CCTV 
cameras (currently maybe 300 million and increasing rapidly) on highspeed 
networks with AI image analysis, tracking software on every phone which 
people are required to use, all transactions payable only by phone already 
dominant there and universal and mandatory soon, total automatic 
monitoring of all communications by AI and an estimated 2 million online 
censors, in addition to millions of police and army cadres there as many as 10 
million plainclothes secret police of 610 Office created by Jiang Zemin, with 
black prisons (i.e., unofficial and unmarked), instant updating of the digital 
dossier on all 1.4 billion Chinese and soon on everyone on earth who uses the 
net or phones. It’s often called the Social Credit System and it enables the 
Sociopaths to shut down the communications, purchasing ability, travel, 
bank accounts etc. of anyone.  This is not fantasy but already largely 
implemented for the Muslims of Xinjiang and spreading rapidly—see 
Youtube.   
 
How much Quality of Life (QOL- a general measure including wealth, crime 
rate, stress, traffic, drug problems, happiness etc.) might Americans gain by 
various measures? Banning anchor babies might up QOL 5% by mid-century 
and 10% by the end, relative to doing nothing. Making the ban retroactive to 
1982, or preferably to 1898, and thus deporting most of those naturalized by 
being related to anchor babies, might raise QOL another 5% immediately. 
Banning immigration might raise it another 10% by end of century, while 
making the ban retroactive to 1965 and deporting most immigrants along 
with their descendants and naturalized relatives might give Americans 
(Diverse and Euros) another 20% more QOL immediately. 
 
And there might be a Back to Africa or Slavery Restitution Act which sent all 
blacks, or at least those on welfare, unemployed or in prison, back to their 
homelands so we would never again have to listen to their inane complaints 
about being kidnapped (as noted, they never consider that if not for slavery 
they would not exist and if not for colonialism and Euro technology maybe 
90% of the people in the third world would not exist), not to mention if not 
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for Euro’s they would now be living (or dying ) under the Nazi’s or the 
Japanese or the communists. Of course, one could do this on a case by case 
basis, keeping all the skilled (e.g., medical and hitech personnel). Instead of 
or prior to the slow deportation process, one could cancel the citizenship or 
at least the voting privileges of all the naturalized citizens and their 
descendants since 1965. 
 
The 42 million African-Americans (about 74 million by 2100) who account for 
4.5x as many prisoners per capita as Euros, get a largely free ride for all 
essential services and welfare, take over and render uninhabitable large areas 
of cities, increase the crowding and traffic by about 13% etc., so they may 
decrease the QOL of all Americans about 20% on average but to unliveable 
for those who are in poor neighborhoods. Hispanics amount to about 18% (or 
about 25% including illegals) and they account for a minimum of 2.5X as 
many prisoners as Euros and have all the other issues, thus causing a QOL 
drop of about 30% or again to unliveable in areas they dominate, which soon 
will include the whole southwestern USA. So overall, it’s a fair guess that 
deporting most Diverse would about double the QOL (or say from just 
bearable to wonderful) right now for the average person, but of course much 
more increase for the poorer and less for the richer. If one compares likely 
QOL in 2119 (i.e., a century from now), if all the possible anti-diversity 
measures were adopted, relative to what it will be if little or nothing is done, 
I expect QOL would be about 3X higher or again from intolerable to fantastic. 
 
After documenting the incompetence of the INS and the govt., and the 
countless treasonous and blatantly anti-white racist (in the original 
meaningful sense of racist) organizations (e.g., the National Council of La 
Raza) helping to swamp us with immigrants (partial list on p247 of Adios 
America) Coulter says “The only thing that stands between America and 
oblivion is a total immigration moratorium” and “The billion dollar 
immigration industry has turned every single aspect of immigration law into 
an engine of fraud. The family reunifications are frauds, the “farmworkers” 
are frauds, the high-tech visas are frauds and the asylum and refugee cases 
are monumental frauds.” Her book is heavily documented (and most data 
were left out due to size constraints) and of course nearly all the data can be 
found on the net. 
 
As Coulter notes, a 2015 poll shows that more Americans had a favorable 
opinion of North Korea (11%) than wanted to increase immigration (7%,) but 
most Democrats, the Clintons, the Bush’s, Obama, casino mogul Sheldon 
Adelson, Hedge Fund billionaire David Gelbaum, Carlos Slim, Nobel Prize 
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winning economist Paul Krugman and megabillionaire Facebook founder 
Mark Zuckerberg don’t want Americans to ever vote on it. She also mentions 
that then Florida Governor Jeb Bush (with a Mexican wife) pushed for a bill 
to give drivers licenses to illegal aliens (copying California) just 3 years after 
13 of the 9/11 terrorists had used Florida drivers licenses to board the planes. 
Yes, the same Jeb Bush who recently called Illegal immigration “an act of 
love” (of course he means love for Mexico and hatred for the USA, or at least 
its Euros). 
 
The inexorable collapse of the USA (and other first world countries in Europe 
are just a step or two behind, as they have let in Diverse who are producing 
children at about 3 times Euro rates) shows the fatal flaws in representative 
democracy. If they are to survive and not turn into third world hellholes, they 
must establish a meritocracy. Change the voting age to 35 minimum and 65 
maximum, with minimum IQ 110, proof of mental stability, lack of drug or 
alcohol dependence, no felony convictions, and a minimum score on the SAT 
test that would get one into a good college. But the sorry state of what passes 
for civilization is shown by a recent Gallup poll which found that about 50% 
of Americans believed the Devil influences daily events, and that UFO’s are 
real, while 36% believe in telepathy and about 25% in ghosts. A yes on any of 
these would seem to be a good reason for lifetime exclusion from voting and 
preferably loss of citizenship as should a ‘yes’ or ‘possibly’ or ‘probably’ 
answer to “Do you think O.J. Simpson is innocent”. 
 
Perhaps it will lessen the pain slightly to realize that it is not only the 
American government that is moronic and treasonous, as versions of its 
suicide are happening in other democracies. In Britain, the National 
Children’s Bureau has urged daycare teachers to report any ‘racist’ utterance 
of children as young as three. About 40% of Britons receive some form of 
welfare. London has more violent crime than Istanbul or New York and is 
said to have almost 1/3 of the world’s CCTV cameras, which record the 
average citizen about 300 times a day. Of course, as usual, there are no 
trustworthy statistics for China, where some of the most successful 
electronics companies are in the CCTV business and where facial recognition 
software can often identify any random person in minutes. The UK has the 
highest rate in Europe of STD’s, unwed mothers, drug addiction and 
abortion. One fifth of all children have no working adult in their house, 
almost a million people have been on sick leave for over a decade, the courts 
forced the govt. to give a disabled man money to fly to Amsterdam to have 
sex with a prostitute because to deny it would be a “violation of his human 
rights”. The number of indictable offenses per 1000 rose from about 10 in the 
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1950’s to about 110 in the 1990’s in parallel with the increase in Diverse. 
Thanks to Mark Steyn’s “After America”, which is required reading for all 
bright, civilized Americans who want their country to survive, though 
barring a military coup, there is not a chance.  
 
Coulter points out the absurdity of politicians fawning on the Hispanic voters 
(Hispandering). If presidential candidate Mitt Romney had won 71% of the 
Hispanic vote instead of 27% he still would have lost, but if he had won only 
4% more of the white vote he would have won. In fact, 72% of voters are non-
Hispanic white, so even if someone got ALL the nonwhite votes, a 
presidential candidate could still win by a landslide, as we saw in the Trump 
election. The problem is a sizeable percent of white voters are morons and 
lunatics who are unable to act in their own self-interest. The absurdity of 
letting average citizens vote was shown when many were seriously 
considering Ben Carson for president in 2016--a Seventh Day Adventist bible 
thumping creationist Detroit ghetto homeboy of such obvious immaturity 
and stupidity that no sane country would permit him to occupy any public 
office whatsoever (of course one could say the same of most people and most 
politicians). He has however, the huge advantage that his defects give him 
much in common with the average American. It appears to me his limitations 
include autism-the reason for his famous “flat affect”. Do not be fooled by his 
occasional simulations of laughter--autistics learn to mimic emotions at an 
early age and some even have successful careers as comedians. Famous 
comedian Dan Aykroyd had this to say about his Asperger’s -- "One of my 
symptoms included my obsession with ghosts and law enforcement -- I carry 
around a police badge with me, for example. I became obsessed by Hans 
Holzer, the greatest ghost hunter ever. That’s when the idea of my film 
Ghostbusters was born." 
 
“Gentle Ben” Carson wants to outlaw abortion, even in cases of rape and 
incest, thinks we should ditch Medicare, and adheres to many weird 
conspiracy theories, such as the pyramids not being built by the pharaohs as 
tombs, but by the biblical Joseph for the storage of grain! He proposes to turn 
the Department of Education into a fascist overseer of proper morals, with 
students reporting professors who displayed political bias (i.e., anyone 
whatsoever) to the government so universities' funding could be cut. “I 
personally believe that this theory that Darwin came up with was something 
that was encouraged by the Adversary.” The Adversary is a nickname for the 
devil; it’s the actual translation of the word “Satan.” He also dismissed the 
Big Bang, calling it a “fairy tale.” Like all creationists, that means that he 
rejects most of modern science--i.e., everything that lets us make sense of 
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biology, geology, physics and the universe and puts them on all fours with 
people who lived 100,000 years ago--i.e., Neanderthals. Of course, to the sane, 
intelligent and educated, "fairy tales" are about heaven, hell, angels and 
devils, but these are at exactly the right level for the average low class 
American, Diverse or Euro. Hard to believe we could do worse than the 
Clinton’s, Nixon, Reagan, Obama and G.W. Bush, but it will happen, and 
your descendants will see an endless line of politicians who's only real 
qualifications are greed, dishonesty, stupidity, sociopathy, dark skin or a 
Spanish surname. In any case, it's unavoidable in a mobocracy that morons, 
lunatics and the merely clueless will take over and run the show until it 
collapses, which is inevitable unless democracy as currently practiced 
changes radically and Diversity decreases. 
 
Now that we have a reasonably sane, intelligent, patriotic person as president 
(though seeing this thru the massive disinformation and libel produced by 
the Neomarxist Third World Supremacists can be difficult) and enough 
Republicans in congress (the Democrats having sold out their country long 
ago) we could theoretically deport the illegals, but unless we terminate 
immigration and retroactively deport most of those naturalized since 1965, it 
will only slow the disaster and not stop it.  However nearly everything Trump 
tries to do is blocked by the Neomarxist judges and the democrats who long 
ago ceased to represent America’s interests.  
 
Hillary Clinton was preferable to Obama, who was trained as a constitutional 
lawyer, so he knew our systems fatal weaknesses, and how much further he 
could go in creating a communist state enforced by fascism, like his much-
admired model Cuba. I can easily forgive Hillary for Benghazi and her emails 
and Bill for Monica, but not for their utterly cynical pardoning of clients of 
Hillary’s brother Hugh, tax cheat Marc Rich and four Hasids convicted in 
1999 of bilking the federal government of more than $30 million in federal 
housing subsidies, small business loans and student grants, in order to curry 
favor with N.Y. Jews. This is very well known and in fact just about 
everything I say here is easily findable on the net. 
 
Even though our mobocracy is a slow-motion nightmare, if we had a direct 
democracy (as we easily could in the computer age) and people were actually 
polled on important issues, perhaps most of our major problems would be 
disposed of quickly. Suppose tomorrow there was a vote of every registered 
voter with an email address or smartphone on questions something like this: 
 
Should all illegal aliens be deported within one year? Should welfare be cut 
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in half within 1year? Should all convicted felons born in another country or 
one of whose parents were, have their citizenship canceled and be deported 
within 90 days? Should all immigration be terminated except temporary 
work visas for those with special skills? Should all child molesters, rapists, 
murderers, and drug addicts have their citizenship canceled and deported, or 
if a native citizen, quarantined on an island? 
 
So much the better if voting was restricted to those whose parents and/or all 
four grandparents are native born, who are non- felons, who have paid more 
than 5% of their income in taxes the last 3 years and passed mental health, 
current events and IQ tests. Again, the biggest benefactors would be the 
Diverse who remained here, but of course the majority will resist any change 
that requires intelligence or education to grasp. 
 
I am not against a Diverse society, but to save America for your children 
(recall I have no descendants nor close relatives), it should be capped at say 
20% and that would mean about 40% of the Diverse here now would be 
repatriated. Actually I would not object to keeping the % Diverse we have 
now (about 37%) provided half the ones here were replaced by carefully 
screened Asians or by people from anywhere provided they  are carefully 
screened (i.e., no criminals, mental or physical defectives, no religious nuts, 
no drug addicts, well educated with a proven useful profession), and that 
they agree to have no more than two children, with immediate deportation if 
they produce a third, commit a major felony, or remain on welfare for more 
than one year. And no relatives are permitted entry. In fact, it would be a 
huge step forward to replace all the Euro criminals, drug addicts, mental 
cases, welfare users, and chronically unemployed etc. with suitable Diverse. 
Of course, it’s impossible now, but as civilization collapses and the Seven 
Sociopaths of the CCP take over, many amazing things will happen, all of 
them extremely unpleasant for billions of people, with the Diverse having the 
most suffering and dying. Coulter jokingly suggests inviting Israel to occupy 
the border with Mexico, as they have shown how to guard one. However, I 
would suggest really doing it—either giving them the Southern portion of 
each border state or perhaps just occupying the border section of Mexico 
(which we could do in a few days). Israel should be delighted to have a 
second country, since their position in Israel will become untenable as the 
USA, France etc. lose the ability to be the world’s policemen, and nuclear 
capable third world countries collapse. However, we should require the 
Israelis to leave the strict orthodox at home where the Muslims will soon get 
them, as we already have enough rabbit breeding religious lunatics. 
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Speaking of the collapse of nuclear capable third world countries, it should 
be obvious that as this happens, probably before the end of this century, but 
certainly in the next, with H Bombs in possession of fanatics, it is just a matter 
of time before they begin vaporizing American and European cities. The only 
definitive defense will be preemptive “nucleation” of any such country that 
collapses, or where Muslim radicals take over. It must be obvious to Israel 
that they will have no other choice but a preemptive strike on Pakistan, Iran 
and maybe others. Another lovely gift from the Diverse. 
 
In a late 2015 poll by You.Gov, 29 percent of respondents said they can 
imagine a situation in which they would support the military taking control 
of the federal government – that translates into over 70 million American 
adults. And these again are the best of times. At this time in the next century, 
give or take a few decades, (much sooner in many third world countries), 
with industrial civilization collapsing, starvation, crime, disease and war 
worldwide, military coups will be happening everywhere. It’s almost 
certainly the only cure for America’s problems, but of course nobody will get 
to vote on it. 
 
In sum, this is the American chapter of the sad story of the inexorable 
destruction of the world by unrestrained motherhood. Fifty-four years ago, 
396 US politicians voted to embrace the destruction of America by the third 
world, via the “no significant demographic impact” immigration act. Without 
the changes they and the Supreme Idiots Court made (along with failure to 
enforce our immigration laws), we would have about 80 million fewer people 
now and at least 150 million fewer in 2100, along with tens of trillions of 
dollars in savings. We would have a chance to deal with the immense 
problems America and the world face. But, burdened with a fatally 
fragmented (i.e., Diverse) population about twice the size we might have had, 
half of which will not contribute to the solution, but rather constitute the 
problem, it is impossible. What we see is that democracy as practiced here 
and now guarantees a fatally inept government. Peace and prosperity 
worldwide will vanish and starvation, disease, crime, military coups, 
terrorism and warlords will become routine, prbably in this century, certainly 
during the next. 
 
To me it’s clear that nothing will restrain motherhood and that there is no 
hope for America or the world regardless of what happens in technology, 
green living or politics anywhere. Everything tranquil, pure, wild, sane, safe 
and decent is doomed. There is no problem understanding the stupidity, 
laziness, dishonesty, self-deception, cowardice, arrogance, greed and insanity 
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of hairless monkeys, but it ought to seem a bit odd that so many reasonably 
sane and more or less educated people could welcome into their country (or 
at least permit the entry and tolerate the presence of) large numbers of 
immigrants who proceed to take over and destroy it. Monkey psychology 
(shared by all humans) is only capable of seriously considering oneself and 
immediate relatives for a short time into the future (reciprocal altruism or 
inclusive fitness), maybe decades at most, so there is no internal restraint. 
Democracy is the ideal breeding ground for catastrophe. 
 
Most people are neither smart nor well educated, but one can see collapse 
happening in front of us, and above all in the big urban areas and in the 
Southwest, especially California and Texas. Sheer laziness, ignorance and a 
lack of understanding of ecology and the nature of population growth is part 
of it, but I think that the innate  reciprocal altruism we share with all animals 
must have a big role. When we evolved in Africa we lived in small groups, 
probably seldom more than a few hundred and often less than 20, and so all 
those around us were our close relatives, and our behavior was selected to 
treat them reasonably well as they shared our genes (inclusive fitness) and 
would reciprocate good deeds (reciprocal altruism). We stopped evolving 
and began devolving, replacing evolution by natural selection with 
devolution (genetic degeneration) by unnatural selection about 100,000 years 
ago, when culture evolved to the point where language, fire and tools gave 
us a huge advantage over other animals, and there was no longer major 
selective force for changing behavior or increasing or maintaining health and 
intelligence. So, to this day we still have the tendency, when we do not feel in 
immediate physical danger, to act in a more or less friendly manner to those 
around us. The temporary peace, brought about by advanced 
communications and weaponry and the merciless rape of the planets 
resources, has expanded this ‘one big family’ delusion. Though the more 
intelligent and reflective persons (which of course includes many Diverse) 
can see the danger to their descendants, those who are poorly educated, dull 
witted, or emotionally unstable, sociopathic, autistic, or mentally ill (i.e., the 
vast majority) won’t see it or won’t act on it. But how about Adelson, 
Zuckerberg, Gelbaum, Biden, Clinton, Obama, Krugman and a very long list 
of the rich and famous? They have at least some education and intelligence, 
so how can they want to destroy their country and their own children’s 
future? Actually, they are no more well educated, perceptive and future 
oriented than the average college graduate (i.e., not very), and also, they and 
their relatives live in gated communities and often have bodyguards, so they 
will not be seriously concerned about or even aware of trashed 
neighborhoods, beaches and parks, drive by shootings, home invasions, rapes 
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and murders, nor about paying taxes or making ends meet. They are just not 
thinking about the fate of their great grandchildren, nor anyone’s, or if it does 
cross their mind, like the vast majority, they don’t have clue a about human 
ecology, nor dysgenics, and can’t see the inexorable path to collapse. Insofar 
as they do, they will not risk personal discomforts by saying or doing 
anything about it (selfishness and cowardice). 
 
A reader suggested I was talking about ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Diverse by Euros, 
but what’s happening worldwide is exactly the reverse. I had not actually 
thought of the destruction of America and industrial civilization by Diverse 
as genocide, but since the number of Euros of all types (and many groups of 
Diverse such as Japanese and Koreans) will steadily decline, and their 
countries be taken over by Diverse, it does have that aspect, though it’s the 
Euros failure to produce enough children that is responsible for their 
declining numbers. A few zealots (but not so few in the future as Muslims 
will increase from about 1/5 of the world to about 1/3 by 2100, stimulating the 
conditions which breed fanaticism) like Al Queda and ISIS want to eliminate 
all Euro's (and Jews and Sunni’s and Feminists and Christians etc., etc.)  and 
the Arabs will certainly demolish Israel by and by, but otherwise there is little 
motivation to get rid of those who are giving you a free lunch (though of 
course few Diverse will grasp how big the lunch really is until it stops and 
civilization collapses). However, as time passes and the competition for space 
and resources gets ever more desperate, genocide of all Euro groups may 
become an explicit goal, though mostly it will be far overshadowed by attacks 
of various Diverse groups on others, which has always been the case and 
always will. In any event, all Euro and many Diverse groups are certainly 
doomed--we are talking roughly 2100 and beyond, when the USA (then a part 
of Mexico) and Europe will no longer have the money or the will to suppress 
anarchy everywhere, as they will be unable to control it at home. 
 
Shocking as it is for me to come to these realizations (I never really thought 
about these issues in a serious way until recently), I don’t see any hope for 
America or the other ‘democracies’ (America has one foot in Fascism and the 
other in Communism already) without a drastic change in the way 
“democracy” works, or in its complete abandonment. Of course, it’s going to 
be pretty much the same elsewhere and both Euros and Diverse ought to pray 
the Chinese adopt democracy soon (so they collapse too) or they are doomed 
from outside and inside. That democracy is a fatally flawed system is not 
news to anyone with a grasp of history or human nature. Our second 
president John Adams had this to say in 1814: 
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“I do not say that democracy has been more pernicious on the whole, and in 
the long run, than monarchy or aristocracy. Democracy has never been and 
never can be so durable as aristocracy or monarchy; but while it lasts, it is 
more bloody than either. … Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon 
wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that 
did not commit suicide. It is in vain to say that democracy is less vain, less 
proud, less selfish, less ambitious, or less avaricious than aristocracy or 
monarchy. It is not true, in fact, and nowhere appears in history. Those 
passions are the same in all men, under all forms of simple government, and 
when unchecked, produce the same effects of fraud, violence, and cruelty. 
When clear prospects are opened before vanity, pride, avarice, or ambition, 
for their easy gratification, it is hard for the most considerate philosophers 
and the most conscientious moralists to resist the temptation. Individuals 
have conquered themselves. Nations and large bodies of men, never.”  John 
Adams, The Letters of John and Abigail Adams 
 
The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough 
resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor 
out of poverty and keep them there.  The attempt to do this is bankrupting 
America and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food 
decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the 
greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich. Without dramatic 
and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of 
America, or any country that follows a democratic system.  
 
So, it is clear that Ann Coulter is right and unless some truly miraculous 
changes happen very soon, it’s goodbye America and hello Third World 
Hellhole. The only consolations are that we older folk can take comfort in 
knowing it will not be finalized during our lifetime, that those like myself 
who are childless will have no descendants to suffer the consequences, and, 
since the descendants of those who let this happen (i.e., nearly everyone) will 
be as loathsome as their ancestors, they will richly deserve hell on earth. 
 
 
 
 
  The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we 
behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three 
groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a 
sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative 
groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide 
some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via 
short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers.  
 
America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive 
population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 
3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion 
more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about 
starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will 
die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America this is being hugely 
accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, 
combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human 
nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a 
nightmare of crime and poverty. The root cause of collapse is the inability 
of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads 
people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. 
This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social 
engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic 
societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone 
else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes 
destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently social policies 
everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without 
stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. 
Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing 
the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. 
Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”.  
 
